     Deeq | Friday, January 26, 2001 - 03:51 pm
Jalliyadaha Soomaaliyeed,gaar ahaan kuwa ku nool America,Canada iyo Ingiriiska waxey isku diyaarinayaan in ay qabtaan bananbaxyo lagu canbareneyo faragashigga Itoobiya ey ku heyso dalka soomaaliyeed tasoo ah arrin qof walba uu ka gilgisho.
Runtise bananbaxyadaas waxaay tageero weyen u yihiin dowladda H/Gidir ee C/Qaasin iyo Galaal oo ujeedadooddu tahay, sida aan wadda ognahay,in mooriiyanta loo xalaaleyo xaqdaradii iyo dulmigii ay dadka iyo dalka gaarsiiyeen.
Itoobiya waa cadowgga kowaad ee Soomaaliya iyadaana ka danbeysay burburki naggu dhacay iyo silica manta na heysta. Yaan la iloobinse in Caydiid iyo H/Gadir oo aan kala harin ay marki ugu danbeysay soo adeegstay.
Kuwa berito ama 29 ka ka qeybqadanaya bananbaxadaas xususta Xamar wixi idku garay Janaayo 1991. Cidi idin garsiisay ma aheyen askar xabashi ah ee waxey ahayeen MOORIYANTA hadda aad tageereysaan. Xabaddu waa kala xuntahay tan xabashigga yaa laguu qataa oo waad ka digtoontahay waxaa kagag daran tan uu kugu dhufto walalkaa nimaad u heysatay ee midi kuu afeysanayay.
Away maydkii Xamar lagaga soo cararay iyagoon la aasin,ma xusuusataan la heystayashii la gowgowrici jiray, ma moogtihiin in guryihiini abaal gud looga dhigay kuwa intaas idin garsiiyay.
SOOMAALIYEY IDINKOO SIDAAS WAX U OG GO'AN GARA:DIIDDA AMA KA QEYEBGALA BANAAN BAYADAAS |
| WARFAA | Tuesday, January 30, 2001 - 05:47 am
WAXAAN KASOO KOOBIGAREEYEY WEB YUHUUDU LEEDAHAY, XITAA IYAGU WAALASOCDAAN UJEEDADA ITOOBIYA
Somalia's continuing troubles
Somalia's new interim authorities, the first semblance of a national government since the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1992, not only face the immense challenge of taming the country's armed factions but will also have to cope with Ethiopian meddling.
Somalia's new authorities, who work from hotels and hire gunmen for protection, are now facing armed resistance to their reconciliation programme. In December fighting broke out in Balad, 40km from Mogadishu, when government forces unsuccessfully attempted to intercept an arms shipment on its way to Muse Sudi Yalahow, a powerful Mogadishu warlord who is aggressively opposed to the new authorities. Then in early January the speaker of the interim parliament, Abdallah Derow Issaq, was ambushed whilst touring in the southwest of the country. Several of the speaker's armed escorts were killed when the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), led by Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur 'Shargudud', opened fire on the convoy with anti-aircraft guns. The speaker managed to escape on foot with the remnants of his force and was rescued later by a relief column hastily dispatched from Mogadishu.
These clashes are a worrying precedent, especially as the United Nations Security Council has given its backing for a new mission to Somalia. The 1992-95 intervention proved disastrous with hundreds of peacekeepers killed in clashes with Mogadishu gunmen. Whilst the proposed mission would be far more modest than its predecessor, involving administrative assistance rather than military intervention, there will still be serious security concerns over the safety of UN personnel.
Whilst the interim authorities should be able to provide UN personnel with enough protection to secure them from economically motivated attacks (such as kidnaps and robberies) the recent violence represents a different kind of threat. Both Muse Sudi Yalahow's militia and the RRA are armed by Ethiopia, indeed, the shipment of arms that the government failed to intercept were of Ethiopian origin.
This relationship between Addis Ababa and various Somalia factions developed during the Ethiopian-Eritrea conflict when both sides used the anarchic country as the scene for a proxy war. Hussein Aideed's Eritrean and Libyan backed faction, however, has been notably quiet of late. This may have something to do with Aideed's meeting with Ghadaffi in September 2000. The Libyan leader now appears to be backing Somalia's new government and met President Abdulkassim Salat Hassan in November.
Ethiopia now seems to be the principle external player in Somalia and despite President Abdulkassim Salat's visit to Addis Ababa in November 2000, bilateral relations have deteriorated alarmingly. After the recent violence the interim authorities accused Ethiopia of meddling in Somali affairs by supplying weapons to opposition factions. Addis Ababa denied the charges and accused the Somali authorities of attempting to substitute their lack of domestic support with international backing.
Given that Ethiopian troops are deployed in the Gedo region of Somalia, Addis Ababa's denials ring false. These troops entered Somalia in order to neutralise anti-Ethiopian insurgency by rebel Oromos (who are an ethnic group, closely linked to the Somalis, from Ethiopia's Ogaden region). There have even been reports that these forces have been consolidating their positions and moving further into the Bay and Bakool regions, which are controlled by the RRA.
It is very possible that Ethiopia is manoeuvring in Somalia specifically to ensure that the new authorities fail to unite the country. The 1977 Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia was triggered by the strong sense of Somali nationalism encouraged under Siad Barre's nation building initiatives. If the centralising force of Somali nationalism was to be used to reunite the country then the Oromo issue could again provide a suitable rallying point and groups like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) would be guaranteed a secure base.
The rising influence of Islamic forces in Somalia may also contribute to the concerns of Christian-dominated Ethiopia. The Islamic Oromo rebel group Al-Ittihad Al-Islam has operated out of Somalia for many years and the interim government has connections with the powerful Islamic courts, which provide the only functioning judiciary in parts of the country. Ethiopia already supports the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in its fight against Sudan's hardline Islamic government.
If Ethiopia is determined to keep Somalia fractured and weak then arming and supporting opposition groups would provide a practical expedient. The hardest task for the new authorities was always going to be persuading the warlords to surrender their personal power in the name of Somali unity and influxes of weapons have always fuelled clan rivalries in the past. Ethiopia's policy, however, could conceivably backfire by providing the Somali people with a central issue around which to unite. The new authorities are very popular amongst ordinary Somalis and Shargudud has already had to suppress popular demonstrations against his policy towards the new government. Either way, the violence in Somalia is far from over. |
