     MO-man | Friday, January 19, 2001 - 11:03 am
OK, imagine that in a house down the block someone is behaving in a way that you do not approve of. Surely it would not normally be right for you to break down the door, storm in, and try to set things straight. On the other hand, suppose the behavior in question were truly horrendous: for example, a child has been tied up in the basement and deprived of food. Suppose further that you had called the Division of Youth Services and the police, and for some reason they were unwilling or unable to act. In this case, it would certainly be proper for you to put aside any concern for principles like "the sanctity of the home" and to intervene, forcibly if necessary.
Many Americans saw the situation in Somalia in late 1992 as analogous to this hypothetical example.Generally, a country's sovereignty should be respected and one should not intervene in its internal affairs; on rare occasions, however, the situation will be so monstrous that basic humanitarianism will require that the principle of non-intervention be set aside. According to many, the massive starvation going on in Somalia was
one of those horrific occasions where intervention was justified, and the dispatch of the U.S. Marines was a welcome and necessary means for saving large numbers of lives.
But consider another hypothetical case. Imagine that there's a house in which a parent regularly abuses a child. Mr. Moneybags, the richest man in town, has often stopped by the house, had a drink or two with the parent, and even provided a pair of brass knuckles. Some neighbors try to get a Youth Services worker or the police to visit
the house, but the town's upper class, led by Mr. Moneybags, has made sure that taxes are so low that these agencies are understaffed and unable to act. In the meantime, Mr. Moneybags has a retinue of bodyguards who have been routinely harassing the town's citizens. A few brave voices begin to question whether armed thugs ought to be allowed to roam the streets. At this point, Mr. Moneybags volunteers to send some of his "boys" to the house to prevent child abuse.
In this situation, we might reluctantly indicate our support for Mr. Moneybags's thugs going to the house, believing that it's the only way the battered child is going to survive. But our praise for Mr. Moneybags would surely be muted. He helped create the terrible situation and he blocked all alternative ways of dealing with the situation that didn't at the same time serve his interest by enhancing the reputation of his thugs.
It is this second hypothetical example that is the real analogy to what has gone on in Somalia. In making this argument, I will replace the simple question, "Should U.S. Marines have been sent to Somalia?" with two separate questions: One, "why did the United States send troops to Somalia?" And, two -- logically distinct from the first -- "Did the Marines help or hurt the Somali people?"
The United States has now, and since the war followed one of its two basic policies toward Africans: either dominate them or let them starve. Somalia was not an exception. Polls at the time showed that half the American public favored this sentiment, even if another famine were to result. "It's really very simple," said one citizen. "If I have to choose between pictures of starving Somalian babies or dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, well, I don't want to see any more dead Americans. Sorry."
**There are currently talks going on about further UN involvement in Somalia in which the US may or may not be involved. |
| MAD MAC | Sunday, January 21, 2001 - 01:22 am
MO-Man
There are talk, but not of military presence. That's not going to happen again in Somalia, not in my life time.
It is unfair to blame the US for the Somali civil war, just as it's unfair to blame the Ethiopians, Kenyans, etc. To be sure, you cans tart attaching blame to anyone who had anything to do with Somalia as it decended toward anarchy. But let's put the real blame for what happened where it truly belongs: On the Somalis themselves. They did the fighting, they did the killing, etc.
As one of the soldiers who spent over a year in Somalia I am ambivalent about it. On the one hand, I am proud of what we did there in terms of stopping the mass suffering which I was unfortunate enough to witness (of course, I appreciate the little things in life A WHOLE LOT MORE NOW). On the other, I was deeply disappointed in my own government and how it quite when the going got a little tough. I am not of the apologist camp that says the US mishandled the situation by taking sides. The fact is we did not take sides until the SNA attacked us. We were an impediment to Aideeds claims to the presidency and he wanted us out of the way - that's the bottom line.
As for whether we should have intervened at all - this is a tough one. There are tragendies all over the world. Are we to intervene in them all? Invariably when we do intervene there are going to be some hard feelings. If you have to use military force, that means you have to start dictating terms. At the end of the day I am willing to do it again so long as my government is willing to see it through to the end. Nothing I hate more than a quitter. In spite of everything I still love Somalia and Somalis and would go back tommorrow if my government asked me to. |
| MO-man | Sunday, January 21, 2001 - 03:53 am
I am not stating that the US should be blamed for all our problems, but really did they help. Were the U.S. troops, then, finally needed?
President Bill Clinton claimed that Operation Restore Hope saved close to one million lives (though in the same speech he asserted that only two thirds of a million had been at risk of dying). In fact, however, death rates had been falling dramatically before the U.S. troops arrived, and the most likely excess death estimates for December -- according to the well- informed Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar of Africa Rights -- were in the range of 10-15,000.
In a variety of ways, Operation Restore Hope actually cost lives in the short run. First, it disrupted carefully negotiated agreements that provided local stability. For example, in the two months before the U.S. intervention, Baidoa had been relatively peaceful as a result of understandings worked out between rival clans. But, as noted above, on the eve of the Marine landing these agreements collapsed and gave way to rampaging militias, causing thousands to flee, including relief agencies.There was eleventh-hour violence elsewhere as well. In the port city of Kismayu, more than a hundred prominent members of the Harti sub-clan were assassinated as U.S forces arrived in Mogadishu. And hundreds more died in clan battles and looting raids. In general, U.S. officials reported that violence increased in regions where there was no foreign military presence. And in many areas where food was delivered, as soon as the troops left rioting or looting took place.
Second, Restore Hope drew people to refugee camps where food was distributed but where disease was readily contracted. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that in Bardera, for example, the mortality rate doubled in the first month of Restore Hope and quadrupled for children under five. Many of those who died were people who came to the camp already weak and near death, but the crowded conditions helped spread disease.
The main argument on behalf of the U.S. intervention was that conditions were too dangerous for the agencies providing food. But in fact, in the first three months of Operation Restore Hope three foreign relief workers were killed compared to two in the previous two years. The Red Cross, which had been skeptical of the troop deployment, announced on December 19 that it did not plan to use U.S. armed escorts for any of its food distribution. Its operation was so huge, an official said, that military protection was not feasible; instead, it was necessary to deal with the clan-based factions.In July 1993, the UN refused to provide military escorts into areas where its peacekeepers had been killed, so CARE worked with Somali elders to assure that unescorted deliveries could be made.
Before the arrival of the troops, relief agencies hired gunmen to protect their shipments; now the gunmen were disarmed, leaving the agencies more vulnerable than before. Both the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders reported more cars looted or shot up than before foreign forces landed. Where before relief workers were valued by gunmen as a source of protection money, they were now prime targets for armed robbery.
As U.S. troops arrived in the famine zone, they found that the worst of the starvation was over. According to the _New York Times_, "it has become clear that because so many of the hungry died before the foreign forces arrived, emergency food is perhaps a less critical issue than was originally outlined. Just as important now, say Western diplomats, aid workers and Somalis, is the need for political reconciliation, to allow Somalia some semblance of normality." The crucial question, then, is whether political reconciliation has been facilitated or hindered by the massive U.S. military presence.
In Somaliland, in the north, civil society was reconstructed by Somalis. Perhaps the violence in the south is so deeply- rooted, that Somalis alone can't restore order. But there are great pitfalls in outsiders getting involved in Somalia's clan politics. Even the incident that was said to have convinced George Bush that U.S. troops were necessary -- the firing on a food ship chartered by the UN off Mogadishu, forcing it to return to sea -- revealed some of the dangers of foreign intervention. A representative of Ali Mahdi acknowledged to the BBC that his forces had fired on the vessel in order to put pressure on the UN to deploy troops (recall that Aidid opposed an increased UN presence, while Ali Mahdi favored it).
U.S. troops brought with them much ignorance of Somali society (despite the fact that some of them had served as advisers to Barre's military in 1988). Some blunders have been amusing, such as the U.S. leaflets that rendered the Somali words for United Nations as "Slave Nation." But much more serious has been the attitude toward the warlords. On the one hand, the United States and the United Nations have lavished too much attention on them, as when U.S. envoy Robert Oakley arranged a high profile meeting with the two Mogadishu warlords in December 1992, giving them a legitimacy they do not deserve. On the other hand, Washington has demonized Aidid, placing a reward on his head, and killing hundreds of civilians in its fruitless effort to capture him. Before the U.S. intervention there were signs that Aidid was waning in power within his sub-clan. Now, however, in the words of a _New York Times_ report, "by painting himself as the aggrieved party in a war with UN colonialists, Aidid has increased his stature in his own clan." Among his supporters, "Aidid has taken on almost mythical proportions."
The tragedy of this, of course, is that Aidid is responsible for tens of thousands of deaths by famine and civil war and now he is a hero. Not that the other warlords whom the United States and UN favored while going after Aidid were any better: Ali Mahdi and other warlords share with Aidid responsibility for the famine deaths, and Ali Mahdi is now being backed by the particularly brutal Gen. Said Hersi Morgan (Barre's son-in-law, guilty of major war crimes in 1988 against the Isaak).In late October, 1993, Ali Mahdi organized a demonstration in Aidid- controlled territory in southern Mogadishu which UN officials speculated was intended to provoke conflict in hopes that the UN would again intervene against Aidid. The resulting clash broke the 19-month old truce between the two Mogadishu warlords.
The Clinton administration later tried to blame the UN for being obsessed with capturing the warlord. In fact, however, the UN resolution authorizing the anti-Aidid campaign was drafted and promoted by Washington, and many of the raids were carried out by U.S. forces operating outside the UN chain-of-command, which, in any case, was U.S. dominated.
The costs of trying to get Aidid have been enormous. Despite UN cover-ups, hundreds of Somali civilians have been killed. Among the other victims of U.S. and UN attacks were a French relief agency (one Somali worker killed and seven others wounded), and the UN Development Program (4 foreign aid workers and 4 Somalis roughed up, arrested, and released), and the pro-UN former police chief of Mogadishu (wounded, arrested, and released). Another impact of the hunt for Aidid, was that "there's an anger directed against all foreigners now," in the words of Michael McDonaugh, director of Irish Concern, a relief agency. "More than ever before, we're all targets. How can we work?"
Twenty-six relief organizations in Somalia sent a letter to Boutros-Ghali, charging that the UN offensives left a moral and legal cloud over the peacekeeping operation. The UN, they said, "must be held scrupulously to higher standards of conduct," singling out for special criticism the U.S. air-strikes in June and July against Aidid. The official newspaper of Italy's Catholic bishops called the July attack "a vile American raid," the Vatican charged that the operation's humanitarian mission had been "abandoned or momentarily forgotten," and both Italy's defense minister and the president of Eritrea condemned the "Rambo" behavior of the United States/UN forces.
In Washington, T. Frank Crigler, the former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, told a House Subcommittee that "we are turning triumph into tragedy, applying brute military force to a situation that calls for quiet diplomacy, patient mediation, steadiness and understanding." But these traits -- quiet diplomacy, patient mediation, steadiness and understanding -- are precisely what the United States has in short supply. As soon as the brute force approach ran into substantial American casualties, Clinton announced that U.S. troops would be out in six months. In the meantime, the United States and the UN would not interfere with clan fighting. The obvious strategy for Aidid, a U.S. official noted and Clinton acknowledged, would be to lie low until March 31 and then bring out the guns and declare war. In March 1993, Robert Oakley had boasted that the problem of clan warfare, which had taken so many lives, was "virtually gone." But, in fact, the dangers of renewed civil war -- after the pull-out date, if not before -- have become worse than ever.
U.S. casualties quickly revealed how superficial the humanitarian concern for Somalis was.
Even in December 1992 it would have made sense to bring back UN special representative Mohammed Sahnoun or someone using his approach. He painstakingly built up the trust of all parties in Somalia, not just warlords but clan elders and other more peaceable elements, and was laying the basis for the political process that is a prerequisite for the survival of Somalia. A Sahnoun would have understood how to deal with Aidid, neither boosting him nor trying to humiliate him. The negotiator should also have been given more clout. He or she needed not just backing from the UN bureaucracy, but economic incentives to help encourage political reconciliation, a counter-weight to the existing incentives that encouraged looting and warfare. It also would have made sense to press for the deployment of the 3,500 UN troops, as Sahnoun had urged. The Rahanwayn clan in particular had been unable to protect itself from the depredations of the other, well-armed clans and some international protection was necessary. But this was a far cry from the massive U.S. troop presence. Where patient negotiation with Somalis was called for, Washington sent in the Marines.
As things developed, the Pentagon did not get the boost it wanted from the Somalia operation. If anything, the experience has made future interventions more difficult rather than less so. (Indeed, some Republicans who opposed Restore Hope back in December 1992 worried that it might drain the Pentagon's resources and erode its willingness to intervene in more important places. On the other hand, it has made the penchant for U.S. unilateralism greater than ever. Secretary of State Warren Christopher concluded that multilateralism "is warranted only when it serves the central purpose of American foreign policy, to protect American interests," while columnist William Safire wrote that the lesson of Somalia was: "Do not put U.S. troops under UN control anytime, anyplace."
But the real lesson of Operation Restore Hope was provided by Kevin M. Cahill, an American doctor with thirty years' experience in Somalia. Writing in early 1993, Cahill warned that he had a physician's profound mistrust of 'quick fix' therapy, of the dangers in deceiving ourselves that dramatic displays can ever substitute for the tedious tasks required to truly rehabilitate a gravely wounded nation. Changing a humanitarian effort into a security action may offer a temporary respite from the pain of frustration, but it reflects an approach that, while gratifying the short-term needs of the healer, fails to resolve the problems of the patient. In fact, the vast scope of military action adversely alters the critical relationship between donor and recipient, drains the finite resources available, and imposes a transient mirage of well-being that simply cannot be sustained. |
| MAD MAC | Sunday, January 21, 2001 - 08:21 am
First on the numbers of people at risk. The number was about 300,000. When we arrived in Baidoa death rates were certainly in excess of 100 persons a day. I personally only got as far as Burhakaba. And there were plenty of photogenically starving kids between Afgooye and Bur Hakaba and there was also an abundance of fresh graves in Mogadischu. I believe that we probably saved somewhere between 100,000 and 300,000 people, although admitedly none of this is provable.
Were the US troops needed? Yes. Not only did we bring the level of violence way down, but we destroyed a great many heavy weapons which had done so much killing in 91 and 92. Also, the SNA (the strongest of the military fórmations) expended so many resources fighting us that they had little left to resume serious conflict after our departure. Note that when there is fighting now it is sporadic and the casualties are light. I do not attribute this to the fact that the SNA has become more humanitarian.
You are correct in that we lavished too much attention on the warlords. We should have worked directly with local commnities on rebuilding projects, marginalized the warlords, and simply killed them when they tried to kill peacekeepers. Anyone caught with a weapon should have been shot on site. This would have brought the level of violence way down because when we showed up we had FAR, FAR more resources than any of the factions.
I know McDonaugh, he's a self-serving jerk. Most of the NGOs are hopelessly corrupt anyway. I recommend Miachael MArins "The Road to Hell" for more on this subject.
As for the hunt for Aideed, our response was fully justified. In fact Crigler (who doesn't know half of what I do about Somalia, and probably less than 10% of what you do) was completely wrong. There was no way to seek a diplomatic solution. The Haber Gedir closed ranks. And he had just enough fanatics (like Abdi Hasan Awale) to keep him going. What we should have done was start targetting with helicopter strikes all of the known weapons caches, and everytime the SNA met we should have targetted the location and killed everyone there. This would have forced one of two endstates:
a. The SNA woudl have realized that Aideed was more risk than he was worth and turned him in.
or
b. They would all have ended up dead.
Once we reached the point where the SNA broke (and we held all the cards, they had to break even if we had to kill 50,000 people to do it) then the other people who might be inclined to make trouble would have gotten the message and we could have started serious negotiating. This might sound brutal, but it was an extroidinary situation. There was no other way to win than to apply force. The humanitarian dorks who love putting us in places like that don't understand that some folks have to be killed if you want to reach a peaceful end-state. There are plenty of bad people in the world, like Mohammed Farah Aideed.
From a US military perspective, these are now the rules for employment. You want us to go somewhere, give us the mission and the end-state you want and get out of the way. You wouldn't be sending us if it wasn't a violent place. And since it's our lives at risk and not the peaceniks, they don't get a vote. That's why no one wants to send us anywhere now, because they no it's our way or the highway and if someone causes trouble (like if the Kosovo Albanians get out of line) we're gonna start dropping folks.
On the last point, from Cahil, I agree. Although we could have probably forced a solution in Somalia, it might well have been a short term fix (this is my view). There are limits to what can be achieved with force. However, once you commit to such a venture, you should see it through.
The Italians were selling weapons and munitions to the SNA - they aren't in a position to criticize squat. |
| Sirrus | Sunday, January 21, 2001 - 08:41 am
"Don't blame anybody who had to do with somalia, blame the somalis"
I find that argument the most naive ever expressed. Somalia is part of a global politics, economy, imperialism, arms market and regional feud. How can you blame the somalis, people who were swept from their pastoral and agricultural lifestly, fighting with the harsh climate of their country to centralized goverment, and Roman style republic. Not to mention the technological jump and political games of the cold war. The only somalis who might deserve a blame are those self styled elite. Even they can not be blamed as much, for they responded to the predominant African politics of exploiting your brother. Somalia went down, because of external influence, and is still falling do to that influence. So in conclusion don't blame thy innocent people, fit the blame where it rightly belongs, the world. |
| MAD MAC | Sunday, January 21, 2001 - 11:58 pm
Sirrus
Be serious. If I shoot someone I'm responsible. If I rape some poor girl I'm responsible. Civil wars are the fault of the peoples fighting in them. If they did not fight, there would be no war. No one made, or with rare exception even encouraged, the Somalis to start killing each other.
I once read a quote I thought was very interesting. It went like this. When the Clinton adminstration first took power they thought that bad countries weren't bad because of the people in them, it was because of evil leaders. The "people" were the victims. You stop an old woman on the street in Hamer and ask her if she wants peace. "Yes, I pray for it daily." Then you ask her if she would be willing for her clan to share power with another to have that peace. "With those murderers and thieves, I'd die first." People in these countries (Bosnia is another example) don't want peace, they want victory, they want power. The fighting and killing continues because they want it to, or because they don't want peace enough to stop it.
Now, let's take another example. Ahhh, recent. The Phillipines. This is a poverty stricken country. This is a country which didn't gain its independence until 1946. This is a country that had a mercurial relationship with the US. This is a country with a string of pathetic leaders. This is a country that had a great leader assasinated on the tarmac of its international airport. Yet in the Phillipines there's no civil war (OK, there's a chump, insiginificant Islamic movement with a handful of followers that manage to get attention of the news media), there's no man made famine, there,s no mass rapes and killings, there's no huge refugee flow. When their president did something untoward what happened? The people turned out in protest, the government arms associated with force (police, Army) did not rally around an obviously corrupt president, and he was peacefully ousted. In Somalia, the Army supported the president, the police supported the president, there was a civil uprising, and then, lo and behold, they turned on each other. The members of the USC could have said - hey the Barre regime is gone, it's time to put away the guns, but noooooo. They had to loot and rape and kill and act like a bunch of animals. This is their own fault. Phillipinos aren't esspecially well educated. Phillipinos aren't rich (not most of them), yet the Phillipinos didn't starting ravging their country leaving a smoking ruin in their wake.
I am hardly naive. I've studied this problem in historical context til I'm blue in the face. It's been my experience that people pretty much get the government they deserve. The Somalis are no exception. They destroyed and looted their own country. No one did it for them. Blaming others for your own actions (like the shithead who blames his parents because he raped and murdered the neighbors 10 year old girl) is a cop-out. And in the case of the Somalis it is also very counter-productive. They need to face what they've done to their country and acknowledge they are the only ones who can undo it. |
| Dare-Devil | Monday, January 22, 2001 - 08:16 pm
Mad Man well said!
Once again thanx a million for educating
The monkey ass* brother & the sh*t head sista |
| Anonymous | Thursday, January 25, 2001 - 02:59 am
xoxuxix |
| Trying to explain | Thursday, January 25, 2001 - 11:00 am
I do not think that the Us had anything in mind when they went there. At least at the biggining and I do not know what went wrong after that, though, from what I heard it is understandable that they were influenced by the Somalis and got not imperrisive informations.
Anyway, my aim here is to differ Mad Mac that if the USC had said that they got rid off the Barre's Regime, everything else would be okey. First of all, this is very baised info you had. USC were not based on political oppossation. They were only Hawiye clan. There aim was not to over throw only Siyad Barre but to finish all Daroods. And this was seen the way they carried on their masacries of all daroods regardless women, men, old, children. And the fact that they started from their neighbours. It is very true that they did not attack the millitary bases or where the government was based. they made sure that every Darood either was killed or driven from Mogadisho then they went to attack the place the government was at the time. At this time already, the poeple were divided into darood and hawiye. when Siyad Barre left, any darrod that left behind were either a hostage or living with relatives that were hawiye.
The poeple who carried on this massacre were those mostly those benefited from Barre's regime. Because , almost all the Daroods were in war themselves. And even marehan, the same clan of Siyad barre were the least benefited from it. they were in war. Except not many that hold power in the militarry but the marehan as a whole who live a different part of Somalia was victimised by the other somalis by being scapegoated and some of them even hate Barre's regime. Majerten, well, they did mistake as well when they set up their parties based on only their clan. I think, when all the Somalis were supporting Siyad barre anyone who opposed the government had been a victim of it. but I think, at least their politics were bad or may be they were used by some eliets who were hungry for power as all the Somali leaders did.( I think, they were victims) Isaqs were also the same when they follow the same system that majerten did. and they faced a government that had a power, though, they may legitematly claim they needed the government to listen their rights and needs, then tehy were victims of it.
I think all the somalis have something to blame for not letting that regime to have the power for the first 15 years without oppositions. simply, somalis were atleast 85% nomadis that do not understand how government works.they should have taken the chances for education and then start their ways to overthrow the system when it got corrupted.
And now we are repeating the samething when we do not except the new government that was needed for the last 10 years.
NB i am trying not to take sides but this is my true undrstanding of the situation of somalia now and past.do not try to find anywhere that I coypied from. see the language. you can argue againest but no swearing. And before you cursed me I think Hawiye, darood and Isaq are victims of their leaders. Insha Allah, when we go back to our diin everthing will be okey. I do n ot hate any clan as I am a mixed of two and the third one is my grandmother's one. |
| GhettoGirl | Friday, January 26, 2001 - 02:59 pm
MO man that was very interesting and might I add insightful. However, your views on the whole situation are a bit vague for example:
"OK, imagine that in a house down the block someone is behaving in a way that you do not approve of. Surely, it would not normally be right for
You to break down the door, storm in, and try to set things straight. On the other hand, suppose the behavior in question were truly
Horrendous: for example, a child has been tied up in the basement and deprived of food. Suppose further that you had called the Division of
Youth Services and the police, and for some reason they were unwilling or unable to act. In this case, it would certainly be proper for you to put
Aside any concern for principles like "the sanctity of the home" and to intervene, forcibly if necessary "
Personally, I think that if you were to act in such a manner it would be totally unapporpriate and uncalled for...reason being I believe that invading someone's privacy is irrational no matter the dilemma. Thank God for democracy! Otherwise, if we had a communist system our society would have been corrupt and insignificant. Though something as serious as child abuse or in other words "Corporal Punishment"should be dealt in a judicial matter I still feel that it's wrong to intervene in the personal affairs of others.
"Many Americans saw the situation in Somalia in late 1992 as analogous to this hypothetical example. Generally, a country's sovereignty should be respected and one should not intervene in its internal affairs; on rare occasions, however, the situation will be so monstrous that basic humanitarianism will require that the principle of non-intervention be set aside. According to many, the massive starvation going on in Somalia was
One of those horrific occasions where intervention was justified, and the dispatch of the U.S. Marines was a welcome and necessary means for saving large numbers of lives".
Yet another conversational statement. Honestly I along with many other's believe that the American's went to Somalia for their own purpose's one of them being oil expeditioning. What I’m trying to say is that the American's could care less whether or not Somalia was going through a crisis!"It seems a significant motive behind the decision of US President George Bush, a former Texas oil magnate, to send troops to Somalia may have been protecting the oil industry's multimillion-dollar investments there" quote by Norm Dixon. Somalia was a country that was going through hard and dyer times while still trying to recuperate from the UN rivaled famines, droughts, political, and economic problems it was facing at the time and here came along the UN screwing everything up! Americans think their so unstoppable their naive enough as to think that they could just conquer any land they step foot on.
"The United States has now, and since the war followed one of its two basic policies toward Africans: either dominate them or let them starve. Somalia was not an exception. Polls at the time showed that half the American public favored this sentiment, even if another famine were to result. "It's really very simple," said one citizen. "If I have to choose between pictures of starving Somalian babies or dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, well, I don't want to see any more dead Americans. Sorry."
It is very important for me to stress that Somalia is not a nation of beggars and victims. The international community often thinks that the U.S. military and foreign relief organizations are the only people who helped Somalia this is completely untrue...The American's were no help at all infact. Many of the most active workers belonged to the Somali Red Crescent, which, like American Red Cross, is composed of nurses, doctors and volunteer workers. Many of them could have left the country, but they offered to stay because of their faith in the country's future.
To be frank I think American's are lowlife scums and should be ridden of this earth. They are too fixed on the needs of their people that they completely forget that other life forms exist! To some extent their hypocrite's they claim to be pro-life but yet their for the death penalty! Innocent lives were taken at the hands of UN forces. The name of the mission was "RESTORE HOPE"when really it should have been called "DESTRUCTION OF HOPE". Somali’s parade over a victory that wasn't won...If you ask most Somali's today they will bluntly tell you that they won the war when really their loss was much greater then any other nation in history!
Thank you and Good night This is GhettoGirl Signing off at ABC headquarters this was 20/20 news...Now back to you Barbara |
| MO-man | Friday, January 26, 2001 - 07:28 pm
This is MO-man reporting live from Barbara, Ghettogirl, I thank you for your frank and rather insightful reporting. Now to me. I shall make this rather short since I have not much time. To Ghettogirl, I do believe you have misunderstood me and quite missed my point. The hypothetical situation that I had begun with "is the real analogy to what has gone on in Somalia" as I had indicated earlier. Who is Mr.Moneybags? None-other than the USofA. What is the name of this hypthetical house-Somalia. Who is the parent-Siad Barre. And who is this unfortunate child that is being abused-the people of Somalia.
Many people, many Somalis, don't realize that the US has had a much longer history with Somalia than most may think. For example, where do you think much of the military training for the Somali army came from? Where do you think the majority of fire arms were obtained? USofA. I'll leave it at that for the moment,as I have got places to go, people to see lol, but seriously, this is a topic I've done some research on and will post a follow-up detailing my reasons for saying this along with some facts-cold hard facts that is. Until then, peace |
| MAD MAC | Saturday, January 27, 2001 - 02:04 pm
Ghetto Girl
Were you in Southern Somalia in December of 1992?? Because I was, and I can tell you that clearly without US intervention tens of thousands of people would have died. Anyone who says this isn't true is simply subscribing to revisionist history for politcal reasons and prefer to disregard facts that conflict with their prefered view of the world.
Maybe you wish the US was gone, but you can forget it. Remember the golden rule, he who has the gold, makes the rules. |
| anon | Sunday, January 28, 2001 - 04:01 am
Mad-Mac, you seem to know a lot about Somalia and its people. I'm curious, what were the circumstances in you going to Somalia, how was your experience, & how is it you became so dedicated to going back to Somalia. Detail, details, detail...cuz I'd luv to know. |
| Arawello | Sunday, January 28, 2001 - 05:57 am
I think this idea of anti-americanism are going too far and I think it is unnesaserry. ( I know the response I will get but will face it for the sake of thruth)
I am starting to avoid the use of word ''frankly'' because it seems a lot of poeple are nowadays using it inapproproatly.
Okey, my opinion on this. I beleaive the Americans went there for humanatrism, at least to beggin with. It was the Somali worlods who are tpo blame what happened before that and after that, though, I personally think, Iided's clash with the Army and the help of the other somalis may came out as advantage for many poeple who were not happy the preence of the Americans for longer period. which seemed to be the case after a while of their arrivel.
of course other somalis were there but could not have an acces to the victims. because Iedid and the others were lucking the basic human understanding.
Ghetgirl.
Whether you liked or not Somalis are victims and to some extend beggars( though I dislike to use your termonology).
Your thoughless statement that americans are lowlife and scums represent your senseless abuse of the same poeple that hosted you whethere they are to be Canadians, or other westrens.
But I agree the Somalis were effected that war hugegly but who are too blame???? |
| MAD MAC | Sunday, January 28, 2001 - 11:31 pm
Asad
You want details, I'll give you details.
I went to Norwish University. Small military college in central Vermont. Graduated in 1984 and was commissioned a second Lieutenant in intelligence.
September 1984 through April 1985 I attended the Intelligence Officers basic course. Graduated as a Tactical All-source Intelligence Officer.
April-May 1985 attended airborne school.
June 1985 Assigned to a Field Station in Germany. Stayed there until 1991. In 1990 deployed to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield. Stayed and participated in Operation Desert Storm as an intel Officer with 3rd Army. This was my first experience with Islam - I hated it. Lived for four months like an animal in the Desert. Loved the experience but wouldn't want to go back.
1992 got assigned to 10th Mountain Division as the Cavalry (Air Cav) Squadron S2 and in July of that year got married. December 19 1992 deployed to Mogadischu Somalia. December 20th went to Baledogle and set up a Brigade Tactical Operations Center. Spent Christmas and new Years there. New Wife not happy. From there worked the Shabelli River region and Bay region providing security to relief convoys and medical organizations providing medical support to the local population. Saw more misery in one month there than I had ever seen in my life. March 1993 redeployed back to Forst Drum.
July 1993 redeployed to Somalia to take over as the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) S2. Wife pissed. Participated in numerous small engagements culminating with the battle on 3 October. Then our leadership decided to quit. Spent Christmas and New Years in Mogadischu. Wife pissed.
Redeployed to Fort Drum January 26 1994. Spent one month at home and went to CAS3. Was there 9 weeks. In September 1994 deployed to Haiti as part of Operation Restore Democracy (what a joke). Spent Christmas and New Years there. Wife splits.
Three more deployments follow but you've got the idea.
While in Somalia one of my men was killed by the SNA. Additionally, I spent a great deal of personal capital trying to make that mission work. I left Somalia weighing 112 pounds and nearly got my brains blown out. Still I loved the place. And I made some great friends there. Lifelong friends. Last year when I went on vacation to Kenya I stayed with the parents of one of my translators. They were lovely people. Anyway, I habe spent some 8 years now studying Somalia and Somalis. And putting together a plan that I hope will help Somalia regain some unity. I have developed a small following and I think I can do it. Anyway it's worth the risk. Hope that answers your questions. Wish me luck because I'm going to need it. |
| Anonymous | Tuesday, January 30, 2001 - 03:18 am
why did you call me Asad? Quite a story though. You said you're working on putting together a plan that will help Somalia gain some unity. How do you mean? Anyways, I'd luv to collaborate and maybe help out. |
| Trying to explan | Wednesday, January 31, 2001 - 10:02 am
Madmac
Did you read my massege abv? what do you think about that. |
