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     | Monday, January 22, 2001 - 09:38 am Dear Sirs, I want to educate you all. Please let me do so. Todays Lecture is about the brain, and I should title it FUnctionalism: Functionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind which, most simply, holds that mental states are functional states. Specifically, mental states are understood by their relations to (a) their sensory stimulation or input, (b) other inner states, and (c) their behavior effects. Suppose, for example, I experience pain by placing my hand too close to a hot stove. My pain is understood in reference to (a) the physical stimulation I receive from the hot stove, (b) its causal impact on other mental states I have, such as worry, and (c) behavioral effects I exhibit, such as saying "ouch". The most distinctive feature of functionalism is that it implies that human mental states are not restricted to human biological systems, such as brains. Non-biological systems which exhibit the same functional relationships as humans do, such as systems of computer chips, can be said to have the same mental state. As such, mental states are not based on the intrinsic properties of the mental state in question, such as the stuff it is made of. The same state may be shared by things with different physical makeups, thereby distinguishing between the role which a mental state plays, and the occupant in which the state exists. The hardware/software distinction, borrowed from computer science, is a useful metaphor to explain the difference between the bodily occupant and mental event experienced. Although functionalists associate themselves with materialistic monism (that is, the view that only material things exist), there is a dualism lurking beneath the surface. For, since any given mental state cannot be reduced to the physical mechanism which produces it (whether neurological or silicon-based), then mental states must be something more than the merely physical. Functionalism may be contrasted both to behaviorism and identity theory in its account of mental events. Behaviorism defines mental events solely in relation to sensory input and behavioral output. Unfortunately, this includes any input/output device, such as a mousetrap, to which we would not want to attribute mental states. However, in addition to input and output relations, functionalism also acknowledges causal relations with other internal mental states, which mousetraps do not exhibit (such as the mental state of worry). Identity theory restricts mental events to brain activity. Functionalism, by contrast, acknowledges that mental events may be instantiated in systems or machines other than brains. There are several different types of functionalism, each based on different models; these include Turing machine functionalism, causal theory of mind, and teleological (homuncular) functionalism. Turing machine functionalism, proposed by Hilary Putnam, uses as its model a special theoretical mechanical device (the Turing machine). Most succinctly, the machine (a) receives input, (b) carries out the instructions of the input program, (c) changes its internal state, and (d) produces an appropriate output based on the input and instructions. A pop machine, for example, shows these features insofar as it has instructions on various acceptable inputs with various associated behavioral outputs. Based on this model, Putnam argues that humans are probablistic automatons. A second type of functionalism, defended by David Armstrong and David Lewis, involves a causal theory of mind. Mental states are defined by a common sense understanding of the situations in which they appear and the behavior that is elicited. In his essay "Mad Pain and Martian Pain", Lewis hypothesizes about two kinds of beings which experience pain differently than normal humans. In the case of mad pain, the subject experiences pain when doing moderate exercise on an empty stomach; further it improves his concentration for mathematical reasoning. Martian pain, by contrast, takes place in a Martain organism constructed of hydrolic hardware rather than neurons. Lewis'’s point is that pain is associated only contingently with either its causes (as in mad pain) or its physical realization (as in Martian pain). We cannot specify a priori its causal role or physical realization. A third type of functionalism, associated with William G. Lycan and Daniel Dennett, breaks mental states down into a hierarchy resembling that of a large corporation. This includes cooperating units, sub-units, sub-sub-units, and so on, until a neurological level is reached which simply reduces to a series of on-off switches. On this view, the pattern of on-off switches can be instantiated in a variety of non-biological mechanisms, such as computers. The main problem with all types of functionalism is that they approach mental states in a purely relational way. One criticism focuses on a hypothetical situation in which someone perceives an inverted light spectrum. For example, person A perceives red when person B perceives green. Although they both function precisely the same with regard to input, related internal states, and behavior, they clearly have different qualitative mental states (qualia). However, a functionalist might reply to this charge maintaining that what is central to functionalism is how people discriminate between colors, not their qualia. A second criticism of functionalism hypothesizes that if we could create an android which is functionally the same as a human, but lacks qualia, then functionalism would be incomplete or false. To this the functionalist might respond that we should be able to make an android out of some physical stuff which has qualia (since its type of constituent physical stuff should not make a difference). A third criticism is that functionalism is too narrow (or chauvinistic) in the kinds of things that are capable of having mental states. Specifically, functionalism seems to be dependent on physicalism, insofar as only physical things (biological, silicon, etc.) can house functional mental states. This leaves out non-physical mental beings, such as disembodied spirits.
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| | Monday, January 22, 2001 - 09:48 am Good. Do we have a new Philosopher in the house, are you trying to exercise your brain functions? Dick
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| | Monday, January 22, 2001 - 09:51 am And which school of thought is that Mr Sophist? Please do elaborate??? YOurs truly Plato
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| | Monday, January 22, 2001 - 06:56 pm Sophist. Please! You are reproducing a research done by University of Tennessee at Martin. In addition, it is part of the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. And you aught to pointed out this link: http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/function.htm You see, we hate plagiarism. Indeed it is a most shameful thing to do!
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 02:42 am there isnt anything wrong with the reproduction of an outhors work...you guys ,, where is your senses.? Historically speaking, everyone in the academics is entitled to borrow in part or reproduce in full the other works of other authors,,,That is why your silly idiotic mind is here unable to grasp...What u guys are doing is just another somali mentality that is sick and old like your motherfucking grandfathers who are in their graves for sin,,,••••,,,ugly people Evryone is entitled to reproduce the context of other academicians,,damn u fools...Yo think you all seem to be intelligentss,,,bastards that is why the italians fucked your grandmothers in colonization,,,wake up somalis,,the bro is rite,,and i am fucking lucky not to be somali ass like you people,,,,
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 03:49 am To qoute from someone's work is OK, as long as you give credit. But it is downright stupid to plagiarise and present as your own someone else's effort. We are against this and we will point it out as and when it is necessary to do so. And if one wishes to call that "wrong criticism without an objective" so be it. To Itallian (the spelling of your name says alot). May you fall under the weight of the massive chip on your shoulder.
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