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     | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 08:42 am The euphoric hopes that accompanied Africa’s independence in the early 1960s have, so far, proved to be largely a cruel mirage for many Africans. Independent Africa’s story of the past three decades reads like the litany of the apocalypse as the region continues to be devastated by conflicts and the widespread destruction of life, limb and property. Indeed, the names of many African countries continue to evoke images of horror, elemental suffering, destruction and death: Congo (Zaire), Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone ... As one locus of horror begins to recede in memory, another locus, even more horrifying, thrusts itself onto our consciousness. Almost four decades of post-independence Africa have, indeed, been frittered away in conflicts. At this historic moment, conflicts and their consequences constitute the fundamental challenge to Africa. To neglect to seek new, effective answers to the pervasive problem of conflict is to condemn the peoples of Africa to live under conditions where war becomes a curse to be endured and not a problem to be solved.
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 11:06 am please ppl, this is a corruption , a new trend of mental degeneration. What happened to your senses. No wonder Sagattarius was right when he got tired of the likes of these people who steal other authors work. This guy simply copied a page from the web and pasted it here. Use your own mind please and dont steal other ppl's work. The web page he copied from is :: http://www.undp.org/erd/archives/cnflict.htm read for yourselves,,,damn,,,,get the hell out of here african,,,,you are a fool and a damn fool,,,,,
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 12:09 pm To manaxe. What is your point? hater the man simply posted an article regardless where he got it from....
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 12:38 pm ma naxe for posting the link. to african guy thanx for copying it. i am doing more here i will past the whole thing.. it's nice that we somalis have this on the net so we can all read it and it will help us definitely. thanx african thanx ma naxe political crisis, albeit with devastating economic consequences." Conflict as a result of elite manipulation In recent years, one increasingly hears an instrumentalist view of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. This view essentially holds that "ethnicity is not a natural cultural residue but a consciously crafted ideological creation"; ethnic conflicts result from the manipulations of the (radical) elite who incite and distort ethnic/nationalist consciousness into an instrument to pursue their personal ambitions. The press, government functionaries, foreign "experts" and "progressive" leaders from the areas in conflict who strive to attract to support from foreign experts and patrons, often resort to the instrumentalist model to explain the sources and dynamics of ethnic and nationalist conflicts from Bosnia to Burundi. This contention is actually not new. In 1967, Richard Sklar submitted that "... tribal movements may be created and instigated to action by the new men of power in furtherance of their own special interest which are, time and again, the constitutive interest of emerging social classes. Tribalism then becomes a mask for class privilege." The thesis that ethnicity is "imposed" by the elite whose manipulations precipitate conflicts assumes too much at best to be valid; at worst it is prejudicial and condescending. It assumes that ethnicity is plastic and malleable - just an instrument for other ends, usually those of the elite with incidental benefits for the group. It fails to give sufficient attention to the conflict motives of the nonelite, whose stake in the benefits being distributed is often tenuous at best. It fails to give appropriate weight to the significance of the emotional intensity that undergirds ethnicity and accompanies ethnic conflicts. It does not adequately account for the individual’s willingness to sacrifice the ultimate on behalf of the group; nor does it even begin to explain the emotional intensity that accompanies the inhuman atrocities committed during ethnic conflicts. Further, the rather patronising perspective that elite machinations and deceptions herd the masses along the path of conflict suggests that nonelites are suffering from a case of Marxist "false consciousness," since they are pursuing interests other than their own. This position presumes that enormous masses of people in country after country - in Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Spain, Sudan, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, the former Soviet Union - do not have a sound conception of their own interests. This presumption does not square with mounting evidence, at least in Africa, that nonelites are far from ignorant about their politics.
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 12:40 pm Deep-rooted conflicts Human needs perspective may provide the most inclusive explanation of conflicts in Africa; but first it is necessary to define the level of conflict under discussion. In a regional system of Africa’s size, diversity, and political complexity of new and developing states, at any particular time there is bound to be an almost infinite number of disputes, some of which may even be functionally necessary and useful for the establishment of norms and conventions in relations. The focus of this paper is on deep-rooted conflicts with potential for violence, whose solutions may only lie in considerations of altered institutions and structures. Deep-rooted conflicts involve not merely interests of groups that can be negotiated, but deep value-laden motivations and needs which cannot be compromised. They are not disputes that can be settled by deriving solutions from commonly accepted legal, political or cultural norms; we are here dealing with conflicts between parties that do not participate in or have access to a legitimised system of norms and institutions. These are conflicts which can be resolved only through the identification and elimination of systemic causes. The events in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Zaire are current examples of such conflicts in Africa; others may be latent. The human needs paradigm as an inclusive framework for analysis of African conflicts It is an objective reality that ethnicity has invariably been the critical dimension in African politics; and ethnic heterogeneity furnishes the primary ingredients for conflicts in Africa. Ethnic heterogeneity per se, however, is not the determinative source of conflicts in Africa. A more inclusive paradigm of the sources of African conflicts, in the context of governance, would posit that: Sources of conflicts in Africa are located in basic human needs for group (ethnic) identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy, as well as in the circumstances, policies and institutions of political and economic systems that attempt to deny or suppress such basic needs. In other parts of the world, the satisfaction of such needs forms the core of the democratic process. As a framework of analysis of African conflicts, this paradigm has certain orientations and possibilities. First, the proposition that these needs are universal, and that their frustration everywhere constitutes a threat to social peace and order, is a most welcome departure from jingoistic propositions exemplified by Bozeman’s controversial argument that Western concepts of conflict do not apply in Africa because peace is not a preferred fundamental value among Africans; rather, Bozeman asserts, conflict "carries particular significance in present-day Africa as a constitutive force in political organisation, a structuring element of unity, and as the main mode of communication between states and their political elites. . ." Second, by rejecting orientations that blame societal pathologies in Africa on some atavistic ethnic and religious sentiments, and rather focusing on structural and institutional deformities as the primary sources of conflicts, the paradigm attempts to account for the causes of violence and disorder in a manner that is consistent with the ultimate construction of an orderly but non-coercive society. Thirdly, the proposal of human needs theory as an explanatory devise for conflicts in Africa implies a specific political orientation in African politics. It is an orientation which holds that the satisfaction of the basic needs of identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy is central to the functioning of political frameworks and institutions. Normatively, it submits that the fulfilment of these needs is the ultimate criterion by which the quality of governance, institutions and policies must be evaluated. Empirically, it contends that the degree to which political frameworks or governments satisfy these basic needs is the most significant determinant of their perceived legitimacy, effectiveness and stability. Thus, the paradigm not only explains the causes of conflicts in Africa, it also delineates the core fundamentals of responsive governance, offers an insight into policy possibilities in Africa which place human values above institutional values and responds to the reality of the structure and history of the African state. The contention here is that the critical salience of ethnicity in African conflicts is not a pathological societal condition but a challenge of governance.
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 12:41 pm IV. THE SALIENCE OF ETHNICITY ... ... In Politics There are objective factors in the structural makeup of the African state that have continued to underscore the salience of ethnicity and constitute inherent conditions which influence the outbreak and process of conflicts in the continent. The widely acknowledged notion of the artificiality of the African state has ramifications which extend beyond the simple historic fact that African states are alien creations with geometrical boundaries that were determined by imperial ambitions and might rather than ethnic, linguistic or local political considerations. For within the colonial administrative nets which later metamorphosed into independent "nations," there were, only a few decades before independent sovereignty, a varying number of more or less disparate societies, each with a distinct political system, and with different intersocietal relationships. Hence, at independence, the African state lacked a coherent and functional unity; it was consequently fragile. A corollary of the absence of coherent and functional unity, and further undermining the viability of the African state is the problem of the absence of historical continuity of the political area that constitutes the state. With the possible exception of Morocco, all the new states of Africa did not exist as national entities prior to their colonisation by European powers. Rather, many colonial possessions which later became independent states comprised ethnic groups, nations and, indeed, kingdoms and empires with diverse political cultures. Some of these had been bitter antagonists for centuries and had only been compelled to tolerate each other in peaceful coexistence under the umbrella of a European power. The imposition of colonial overrule had no perceptible impact in terms of coalescing such diverse political cultures into a common, acceptable political system for the colony and, later, the state. Nor was much effort expended to transform the population of the colonial territories into subjects, let alone citizens. Hence, barely thirteen years (in 1947) before his country’s independence as a sovereign state, Chief Obafemi Awolowo could say that "Nigeria is not a nation ... It is a mere geographical expression... There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘Englishmen’ or ‘Welsh’ or ‘French.’ The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within Nigeria from those who do not." Further, colonial interregnum in Africa did not constitute an appreciable historical continuity for the geographical areas which evolved into states. Colonial administration in most of Africa was relatively brief (50 to 75 years), impoverished and superficial, with its presence and impact felt mostly in the immediate environs of administrative headquarters. The impoverished and superficial conditions were rationalised under the notion of indirect rule, a policy of keeping various groups apart, distinct and "self-governing." The African state that emerged from this historical process was inherently unstable with grave potential for conflict. There was barely any development of historical identity, national consciousness or loyalty. Such affective ties still reposed in, and were nurtured by, the ethnic group. The symbols and myths of nationalism, and the euphoria of independence proved too superficial to develop and sustain alternative modes of allegiance and a community of purpose at the state level. In many African states, this condition, indeed, worsened due to poor advice, misguided policy prescriptions and vindictive governance which afflicted more than enabled. The "artificiality" of the African state; the absence of historical continuity of the political area that constitutes the modern state; the relative brevity and the superficialness of the colonial interregnum and the precipitate process of decolonization; the misgovernment and abuse inflicted upon the citizenry of many states; and the predatory nature of some of these states, have all combined to continue to give ethnicity critical salience in the African polity. For, in contrast to other institutional processes and historical experiences in many an African state, the ethnic group has remained "natural", constant, protective and positively meaningful to the African. Although ethnicity may appear instrumental, it is structurally primordial, possessing an intrinsic absolute value, involving and demanding a level of loyalty which transcends that given to any other group or the state. "  O)ne is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributable to the very tie itself." In contrast to such primordial ties, civil ties are characterised by amorphous, routine allegiance to the civil state, gingerly sustained to a greater extent by governmental use of brutal, suffocating force and hollow ideological rhetoric. Civil ties and primordial ties are not labels that characterise social relationships in different societies at different times or levels of development. Rather, they are centrifugal forces pulling persons in different directions at the same time. Increasing homogenisation through modernisation and education has not undermined the salience of the ethnic group to provide a tangible source of self-identification and a basis for political action. Values and norms of the incipient national character have not grown at the expense of the values and norms of the ethnic group, as if it were a zero-sum option in which the more a country becomes "modern" the less it remains "traditional". The citizen of the contemporary African state exhibits a type of survival instinct which enables him to combine values and norms from both civil and primordial centres, with his perceived interest and loyalty still weighted on the latter. Ethnic ties can override loyalty to the state because while at the local level in most African states there is still a deep sense of belonging to a community based on and nurtured by kinship, there is no parallel to such modes at the state level. The delicate balance between consent and authority within a fine spun web of kinship in the traditional African society has not been usurped, or even duplicated, within the modern state, the latter often demanding and coercing consent without the balance of perceived legitimate authority which it has failed to earn. Nor has many an African regime proffered security for loyalty. Thus, groups find themselves trapped in an oppressive, predatory condition in a colonial inheritance of a polity they did not bargain for or underwrite, without the traditional option of voting with their feet. Yes, they can flee the dangerous environment of their polity; but in modern times they become refugees in a demeaning limbo, sustained and dependent upon the generosity of the international community. Events in Africa since independence would appear to indicate that in times of personal and political crises, ethnic ties are by far more meaningful to most citizens than civil ties. The sense of security most Africans derive from the ethnic group is vital. According to one Nigerian observer, the Nigerian’s ethnic loyalty is based on "the feeling of security that it gives him especially as many ordinary Nigerians believe that in the event of their getting into trouble, whether at home or abroad, ... only members of their families and their ethnic group will rally round to their rescue, and not the theoretical nation. ... In the light of the experience of many Nigerians ... their view is perhaps understandable." Since the ethnic group is seen as the guarantor of personal security, when the ethnic group is threatened, the members are threatened in a personal sense. "Threat toward the fundamental need for identity (and security) is thus seen to be operative at both individual and group levels, thereby increasing the power of this dynamic in situations of intergroup conflict." As the primary source of satisfaction of fundamental need of identity and security, ethnicity defines the individual’s perception of, and relationship to, political issues. So crucial are ethnic identifications that they often override loyalty to the state, "dedication to the parliamentary process, respect for law and order and even for the security of human life" (emphasis added). The phenomenon of ethnicity in African politics is not a throwback to some atavistic affective ties. Ethnic conflicts are often functions of the creation of new political and economic systems. In situations where ethnic relations are tense and volatile, the introduction of competitive politics, especially the majoritarian electoral systems where the winner takes all, can provide the stimulus for explosion along ethnic lines. Modern political processes, without any innovative formula to respond to African realities, tend to exacerbate the conflict potential in the ethnic heterogeneity of the African state. The logic of electoral representation of universal adult suffrage means that the expectations of power of an ethnic group become a function of voting total. Thus, the introduction of electoral processes leads to the power defining phenomenon of ethnicity that further embitters the relations among various ethnic groups. The two social forces that operate at the core of politics in Africa are ethnic groups and political parties. In the absence of widely-held and strongly-felt ideologies, however, ethnicity provides the focus for "party" loyalty. Indeed, on the basis of the social patterns of voting behaviour in Africa, we may submit that invariably parties and ethnic groups overlap. In Burundi, for example, the two main political parties, UPRONA and FRODEBU, are officially non-ethnic and include individuals from both groups; their programmes, however, differ largely on what are directly or indirectly the grievances of Tutsis and Hutus, respectively. Both originated in political movements to assert their groups’ power. Furthermore, since ethnicity is close to the core of individual identity, perceived slights or threats from "outsiders" tend to generate powerful collective reactions. Such reactions are easily mobilised and politicised by the group’s elite, motivated partly by genuine concern for their people and partly to nurture their political ambitions by exploiting the natural resource of collective identity. This use of ethnicity as a political resource has led many observers of the African political landscape to subscribe to the instrumentalist view and contend that ethnicity is invented for political ends. An ethnic group, of course, could have political interests, but it is arguably invalid to define the ethnic group in terms of its political interests; it confuses an aspect of the phenomenon with the phenomenon itself. Rather, the ethnic group, lacking confidence in the new political dispensation, naturally reposes its faith in primordial relations to protect the basic needs of identity and security in the new and suspect game of majoritarian electoral processes. The salience of ethnicity in competitive politics creates an ascriptive majority-minority problem where elections more or less become a census of the adult population. Ethnic parties develop and contest extremely divisive elections; the ethnic group with the largest population takes power in the majoritarian electoral system; and a feeling of permanent exclusion is produced on the part of those (the minority) who are locked out of office by the accident of birth. The sense of permanent exclusion generates a predisposition to violent opposition and conflicts, be it in South Africa or Burundi. Hence, for democratic elections to be sustainable and helpful in ethnically divided societies, prudent and responsive electoral, administrative and/or territorial arrangements will have to be crafted to build the confidence of each group in the political system. On the other hand, to dispense with democratic elections in the interest of harmony often ends up sacrificing both harmony and democracy. ... In conflicts The most significant structural factor in the sources and the dynamics of conflicts in Africa may be summed up in this question: how do diverse peoples with distinct political cultures, and often with negative, bitter memories and images, live amicably in a polity of an alien political system, now without the alien Leviathan which had coerced them together and imposed the system in the first place? The one vital issue which confronted Africa at independence, and persists as the principal source of conflicts, is the absence of a viable social compact to govern the relations among the diverse units within the state, while recognising and ensuring each unit’s need for identity, security, participation and, at least, some form of autonomy. In the absence of a social compact or a formula of power relations, there is no basic national consensus about the means and ends of government; and this raises doubts as to the legitimacy of the formal government in power. The consequence is an explosive situation where authority is exercised without the sanction or approval of those over whom it is exercised. Without a social compact acceptable to all groups, there is no basis for agreement among competing groups on legitimate and authoritative methods of resolving disputes and conflicts. Indeed, the potential for conflict is intensified because the basis and the processes for resolving disputes are themselves stakes in disputes. A corollary to the absence of social compact is the lack of institutionalisation of political processes to mediate and moderate group action. Without the moderating influence of negotiated, accepted and subsequently institutionalised political processes, competing groups confront each other nakedly, and the search for a formula of governance soon turns into a zero-sum struggle for dominance and/or survival. Ultimately, what is at stake is the ownership of the state which is perceived as the only guarantor of a group’s identity and security; and what ensues, as Claude Ake observes, is "a desperate struggle to win control of state power ... since this control means for all practical purposes being all powerful and owning everything. Politics becomes warfare, a matter of life and death." Hence, even despotism assumes an unmistakably ethnic form. The reigns of terror and the accompanying violence perpetrated by Marcias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Idi Amin of Uganda and Bokassa of the Central African Republic, were directed by militias drawn from their respective ethnic groups, and the victims were ethnically defined. In Africa, therefore, it is less power per se which corrupts, it is more the fear of the loss of power which corrupts and corrupts inhumanely. Thus Rwanda. Dysfunctional prescriptions The path the African state has generally taken in the search for a viable social compact has certainly not helped matters. Total, coerced integration has often been acclaimed as the only progressive approach to ethnic problems; integration becomes an end in itself; it is an absolute good; it conjures up a moral notion: the oneness of the Black race, Pan Africanism. Not too long ago integration became a progressive alibi for authoritarianism. The African must be convinced, cajoled or coerced to integrate; anything short of the unitary, centralised structure will encourage the centrifugal tendencies in the ethnic psyche. Humane, participatory governance has often been sacrificed on the altar of integration, political consolidation and nation-building. No innovative formulae, beyond hollow exhortations to "transcend tribalism", have been attempted to craft a system of governance that responds to the reality of the critical salience of ethnicity in African politics. The problem for Africa has been that political consolidation without a consensus on what politics (or formula of power relations) was to be consolidated has meant that the primary instrument of this consolidation has been naked force and the strategic use of violence. There is now a new concept of "governance" in Africa which contains as much hope as confusion. The term "governance" runs the frightening risk of encompassing a potpourri of jargons in season. As in the early 1960s, the potpourri in the governance basket looks like a collection of prefabricated political structures imported for assembly in Africa. While most of the principles of democratic governance may be universal, these principles should be adapted to accommodate the local realities of the societies in which they are to be applied, lest we continue to build castles in the sand. It is dangerous to persist in sweeping the structural sources of conflicts under the carpet of modernisation platitudes. V. THE HOPE: STRUCTURAL RESPONSE TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS The fundamental challenge Africa faces as it strives to eliminate destructive ethnic conflicts is to change the popular mindset which views ethnicity as some pathological societal condition with backward atavistic roots, to be cured with an enlightened dosage from the medicine cabinet of modernisation. The salience of ethnicity in African politics should be considered an African reality imposed by history. An understanding is needed of the fact that the conflicts resulting from this overwhelming salience are primarily attributable to two factors: universal, basic human needs for group identity, security, recognition, participation and a sense of an empowering level of autonomy; and the absence of appropriate policies and institutions of political and economic systems that would enable the attainment of these needs. This challenge should be confronted through the consideration of appropriate structural measures that will not only prevent and mitigate ethnic conflicts but also create conditions conducive to sustainable political and socio-economic development from within. These structural measures may include political compacts and processes; institutional arrangements that promote accommodation, territorial and power devolution; and electoral innovations that build confidence in the political system. Such structural measures and institutional arrangements may include, but should not be limited to, the following: - decentralisation and devolution of governmental authority and responsibilities; - benign processes of integration, guided through conducive policies and facilitating conditions with less emphasis on coercion; and - innovative electoral arrangements that avoid tyranny of the majority.
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| | Tuesday, January 23, 2001 - 12:42 pm Decentralisation Tocqueville, in his condemnation of the regime of Louis XVI, deplored the fact that "for long the government ... had undertaken to command all, to foresee all, and do all. It had become responsible for all". This, in a nutshell, is the description of many an African government. The assumption of all authority by the central government and its consequent responsibility for everything lead to excessive demands being made on it. The central government thus becomes the target of varied complaints, pleas and conflicting expectations, and, eventually, the source of civic disappointment and the focus of common hatred. In essence, the African government promises all, satisfies few and antagonises most. This in itself is a recipe for conflict; for without the means to satisfy exaggerated demands, the government resorts to coercion to suppress demands. The devolution of administrative responsibilities and authority can reduce this source of tension and conflict. This view, particularly its linkage to the generation of conflict, is succinctly advocated by Mahbub ul Haq: Most developing countries are overcentralised. On average, less than 10% of their budgetary spending is delegated to local levels, compared with more than 25% in industrial nations.. Even foreign aid has a centralising influence. Most decision-making is kept in the hands of a small, central elite. These patterns of governance are inappropriate in societies that have considerable ethnic and cultural diversity and where people increasingly resist dictates from above. What may save these societies from internal explosion is a sweeping decentralisation of decision-making powers and faster movement toward economic and political democracy. Unless this is done before people begin to agitate for their rights, the change may come too late and prove too disruptive. A political system based on genuine decentralisation (and not some lip service to the notion) would involve a constitutional distribution of authority and responsibilities among central, regional, district and local institutions, and a generous devolution of power to these institutions within the state. Decentralisation as conceived here, however, goes beyond the juristic constitutional structure; it is indeed more concerned with the development of a total environment conducive to the social learning and practice of self-government. For it is not love for some abstract concept of democracy, but interest in the solution of tangible problems that can motivate citizens to responsible action; and the practice of responsible action in the local area enhances the development of responsible civic culture in the wider sphere of the state. Thus, decentralisation would not only satisfy fundamental needs for group identity, security, autonomy and participation, but lay the foundation for the evolution of a democratic culture in the state through self education for a new system of pluralistic political society to replace the homogeneous traditional/ethnic political system. Furthermore, decentralisation can introduce less destabilising and relatively accommodating intragroup competition at the regional and local levels. Many issues could be contested within ethnic groups rather than between them, simply because many contested issues would become regional or district issues; politics would indeed be local. Multilevel competition over wider issues and stakes can reduce the tension and the stakes at the centre or the state level where issues and competition tend to be too narrowly defined with zero-sum propositions. The degree of devolution of power and the level of decentralisation would be determined by the configuration of political and economic circumstances of the particular state; but consensus among the component units of the pluralistic state on the vital issues in the governance system must be a guiding principle. This would lay the foundation for openness and accountability in the system. Further, to the extent possible without jeopardising sovereign and territorial integrity, political arrangements and dispensation should allow a functional level of local self-determination to include the group’s control of its own destiny and participation in public affairs. It is not solely the lack of resources that generates conflicts. The resilience and stoicism of groups in the deprived areas of the world must never be underestimated; peoples of these areas have more appreciation of their circumstances than the patronising perception of many analysts gives them credit for. Rather, what generates bitterness, tension and conflicts is the brazen denial of distributive justice, equity and, even more importantly, the process which allows this denial. This condition is particularly volatile when it is accompanied, as is often the case, by a blatant display of conspicuous consumption by a privileged elite - from an identifiable group with overwhelming control over the reigns of power. Hence, decentralisation must not only be sustained by a fair and equitable economic basis, but the whole political-economy must be characterised by transparency, accountability and distributive justice. The costs of decentralisation and devolution of power For almost four decades, development experts harped on the so called costs of decentrlisation and devolution of power, and their perceived wisdom was embraced by governmental propaganda. This has engendered a paralysis in research into the modalities, and resourceful application of governance systems informed by the principles of decentralisation and devolution of power in the region. It is often alleged that more local autonomy would result in duplication of functions, expenses of building additional administrative infrastructure, various diseconomies of scale and even total disintegration. What price can we really put on decentralisation vis a vis life and livelihoods in a region with the contemporary history of Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Liberia, Burundi, Rwanda ... ! Indeed, governance systems that are more responsive to the socio-political structures of the societies in the region would constitute a most efficient preventive development process, and would save lives, limbs and property. In any case, administrative decentralisation with a full complement of officials supposedly exists in almost every state in the region; but such officials are no more than Roman envoys, the extractive tentacles and controlling machinery of the imperial capital (and the dominant group); they are invariably not accountable to the local population and have no independent or constitutionally mandated economic base. Hence, the costs of decentralisation are already being incurred without any benefits. Genuine devolution of power and even functional self-determination are treated with more alarm by those who would discredit these principles: they would lead to independent statehood for every single "tribe". This alarmist view is not necessarily valid. Power devolution and self-determination can lead to various outcomes, including minority-rights protections, cultural, political and administrative autonomy and, of course, independent statehood. The principles of power devolution and self-determination may best be viewed as entitling people to negotiate the terms of political allegiance, to influence the political order under which it lives, to preserve its identity and to safeguard its security. With the goodwill of the parties concerned and the encouragement and assistance of the international community, these objectives are obtainable without resorting to agitation for secession. Paradoxically, the forceful denial of these principles with a view to promoting integration tends to be counterproductive. The birth of Eritrea is a case in point. The scuttling of the federal arrangement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the forced Eritrean integration into the Empire resulted in wastage of life, destruction of livelihoods and untold suffering on all sides and led to the total secession of Eritrea. The results of President Numeiry’s unilateral abrogation in 1981 of the ten-year old agreement on autonomy for the groups of southern Sudan continue to unfold with horror. Ethiopia appears to have absorbed some far-reaching lessons on decentralisation and devolution of power from its harrowing experience. Since 1992, the country’s leadership has continued to declare its commitment to pursue an administrative strategy that would transform the country from a highly centralised state into one with a federal government based on what is generally referred to as "ethnic federalism"; this is a strategy of devolving public sector powers and tasks to regions dominated by the country’s major ethnic/national groups. Among the objectives of the decentralisation initiative, the leadership proclaims, are "reducing the interethnic conflict that has divided Ethiopian society for centuries" and "building a polity based on democratic principles". Benign integration Short of wishing away essential differences among the component ethnic groups to achieve an instant "post-ethnic" state, integration would be the most progressive and ideal approach to mitigate ethnic tensions and conflicts. Enforced integration, however, has proven to be counterproductive and costly in Africa and elsewhere. It has tended to lead to the imposition of authoritarian regimes, and resistance by groups which felt, often justifiably, that the manner of integration jeopardised their security or lacked any perceptible benefits. In spite of widespread tension in many states, however, an appreciable level of integration has already taken place in almost all African countries. Still, we cannot assume that the critical mass of integration that has been achieved is sufficient to neutralise the potential for explosion along ethnic fault lines. The process of integration must be guided by benign but consciously crafted means. Benign integration is achieved through policies, processes and measures - and within structures - that do not threaten or restrict the values and needs of the members or groups of the society that is being integrated. This means that integration would emerge as a result of co-operation in whatever form deemed appropriate by the groups involved. This process need not drift; nor should the authorities be passive. Authorities can consciously create an environment that would promote communication, understanding, acceptance, and even enthusiasm for the process of functional co-operation, leading to enhanced intergroup relations and integration. The central government may intervene to ensure unrestricted mobility in work and living conditions to encourage the development of interethnic relations and a sense of nationhood. The educational process may be designed to facilitate understanding and acceptance of the process of integration. Perhaps even more importantly, a broad range of preferential (affirmative) policies and programmes may have to be adopted, explicitly or implicitly, to help along and encourage groups or areas which are shackled by obvious comparative disadvantage due to some accident of history and/or other factors; and consequently, consider integration a threat due to their perceived inability to compete. Nor do those groups with overwhelming advantage always invite or attract integration and unity of purpose, due to arrogance and prejudice in demeanour and language (as perceived by the less "advanced"  . There are still countries in Africa (more so at the time of independence in the early 1960s) where ethnic group identities also correspond to wide differences in economic circumstance and social and political position. The scope and specificity of a state’s preferential initiative may be influenced by several factors, including history, ethnic composition and relations, social structure, equity and even geography. Areas commonly targeted by preferential policies are educational and public sector opportunities, and the security services (army and police). Some countries have even gone further to include opportunities in the private sector as well. Horowitz and others have observed that the Malaysian constitution "recognises the special position of the Malays and authorises reserved shares of public service positions, scholarships and educational benefits, certain lands and certain business permits ... all with the aim of restructuring the society to reduce or actually eliminate the identification of race with economic function." India and Sri Lanka are among the many countries in Asia with group-targeted preferential policies. In an effort to reduce ethnic disparities in opportunities and rewards, and thereby improve ethnic relations and enhance integration, some African states have also attempted preferential programmes. The constitution of Nigeria’s Second Republic contained clauses providing that public sector appointments should "reflect the federal character of the country", and insure that "there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups" in central government agencies. Kenya’s Parliament was reported in November 1996 to have passed a motion introducing preferential admission requirements "in favour of students from marginalised regions." Ghana’s first President, Kwame Nkrumah, explicitly used the educational process to address regional disparities and enhance inter-group relations and integration. He expanded educational opportunities (including free and compulsory primary schooling in 1952) to an extent at the time criticised in the foreign press as overly ambitious; he instituted a special scholarship programme to enable qualified children from cocoa farming (hence rural) areas to have secondary school education; and offered generous financial aid packages to qualified candidates from the most marginalised regions to attend universities, which were free in any case. In retrospect, the more important legacy of Nkrumah’s foresight in this area is not the dividends resulting from investment in human capital. Rather, it is the conditions created for educational institutions, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels, to constitute ethnic melting pots for the critical first generation of post-independence elite (not least, through inter-marriages). The policies and programmes of benign integration may have a long time frame from adoption to impact; but what is achieved, when it is achieved, would be more meaningful and enduring, built essentially on free choice and through processes that are humane and sustainable. The sceptre of the tyranny of the majority. Elections constitute an essential component of democratic governance in that they fulfil two legitimising functions: popular participation and a means to change those to whom the vital task of running the affairs of state is entrusted. The expectation of the possibility of change must be reasonable for popular participation to be meaningful and enhance stability. In situations where the majority "party" invariably coincides with or is dominated by the largest communal group, it is too easy for the latter to monopolise power to the permanent exclusion of minority groups in winner-take-all majoritarian electoral systems. Given ancient animosities and mistrust among communal groups, often resurrected and intensified by present societal inequities, majority rule in Africa can, and has been known to, degenerate into the tyranny of the majority. The conflict potential in winner-take-all electoral systems becomes more intensified when there is a post-independence status reversal among ethnic groups. This was the case in independent Chad where the majority Sara ethnic group in the south of the country, recalling the injuries and humiliations their ancestors had suffered at the hands of the Arabized northern groups, who had raided and sold them into slavery, savoured their new power as the majority ethnic group at independence and ruled their former slave masters with brutal vengeance. Hence, the adoption of the universal principles of democratic governance, like the popular selection of leaders through an electoral system, must be made responsive to distinct local conditions. Decentralisation of administrative authority and devolution of power may blunt some of the destabilising consequences of competitive politics. The political elite, especially those from the majority ethnic groups, may craft a consensual formula of governance to promote equitable power-sharing at the centre and to ensure that none is condemned to live with the prospect of being permanently excluded from power through an essentially ascriptve process. In states where group tension has already erupted into conflict, conflict resolution through the electoral mechanism has been found to be not only problematic, but, sadly, has created conditions for self-perpetuating bloodshed and the progressive ruin of societies. When electoral competition becomes part of the legitimisation of the envisaged outcome of a peace process, an optimum level of viability of the civil society is required. There also needs to be time to begin to heal open sores and restore popular confidence in the political process, and to establish a minimum level of trust among key actors. It is often more conducive to conflict resolution for elections to be preceded by the negotiation (facilitated by a mediator) of a peace package with implementable details that would ensure that all actors and groups involved win at some level. Elections cannot be the sole arbiter of the disposition of vital stakes in a deep-seated conflict. Further, elections in a conflict environment should be to decide the proportions of a national unity government, not to declare a winner-take all outcome. National unity governments and powersharing arrangements impose on all factions the responsibility to let peace work, and foster "the notion that electoral losers still have a stake in the government." VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS The initiatives suggested in this paper to address the systemic or structural sources of conflicts in Africa - comprehensive decentralisation, benign integration and electoral arrangements compatible with local circumstances - should ideally be taken as preventive actions to forestall the outbreak of violence. Interventions to avoid conflicts and sustain peace should be based on long-term strategies, and initiated in times of peace whenever possible, or when group relations are not overly strained. In crisis situations or when tensions are on the verge of erupting into violence, the fields of co-operation narrow and become more sensitive and politically volatile. Parties become more distrustful of each other’s motives and outside interventions, always suspect. It is, however, never too late to mend; the pursuit of an enduring peace is a long term and, indeed, constant endeavour. In the violent environment of deep-rooted conflicts, strategies targeted to address factors in socio-political structures that generate conflicts could constitute elements in the peace process and form part of the negotiated package for settlement. It should be noted that programmes like education for peace and dramas on reconciliation, while helpful, do not address the crux of the issues at stake, of which the cause, dynamic and remedy relate to socio-political structures and dysfunctional governance arrangements. The strategies discussed in this paper within the framework of structural response to ethnic conflicts do not presume to constitute a blueprint or a "how to manual" on the resolution of ethnic conflicts in Africa. The terrain and circumstances are too different in each case for a single road map to make life easier for peacemakers. The significance of the paper’s strategies lies in the fact that they highlight the crucial elements that can lay the foundation for the construction of stable socio-political edifices in the beleaguered societies of the region. Additional interventions are always needed to complete the structure of peace. Foremost among these additional interventions is the restoration of basic security, normally through a negotiated and monitored cease-fire. A process of national reconciliation must begin immediately, facilitated by third parties, and through formal and informal negotiations. The international community, including bilateral donors and development co-operation agencies, must mobilise resources to launch peacebuilding programmes. Development, which supposedly continues wherever possible even at the peak of the crisis when relief becomes the principal source of sustenance for the society, should be intensified, with the assistance of the international community to resuscitate economic activity and begin the restoration of livelihoods. Institutions and state machinery must be rebuilt, strengthened and made functional. "All this", as Zartman points out, "must be done at once and at the same time, and steps kept apace of each other as the process moves along ... rather than a series of discrete steps taken one step at a time." All this must be underpinned by a thorough and realistic analysis of the sources of the conflict, which relate directly to the socio-political structures of the society. Misdiagnosis of the nature of a conflict often leads to the mismatch of response and, sadly, the perpetuation of conflict and suffering. Such a situation, as the Akans of Ghana would say, is akin to picking ants from one’s body while standing on an anthill. About the author Sam G. Amoo is a Senior Adviser with the Emergency Response Division of the United Nations Development Programme. His career spans over three decades in varied aspects of the field which constitutes the subject of this paper, beginning in 1966 as an Infantry Officer of the Ghana Army, and including his service in the Ghana Foreign Service as a diplomat. From October 1994 to April 1996, he was a Senior Political Affairs Officer at the Headquarters of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, following his service at the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat as a Senior Political Affairs Officer with the Research and Analysis Unit and the Africa Division. Dr. Amoo was educated at the Universioty of Ghana, Legon, and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University where he obtained his Masters and Doctorate degrees. From 1991 to 1992, he was United States Institute of Peace Fellow at the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution of the George Mason University, Virginia. For additional information or comments please contact UNDP-ERD
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| | Monday, January 29, 2001 - 08:28 am Mohamed, Why don't you simply point us to go to that link and print this interesting article for ourselves instead of copying it here, and if you did copy it please indicate and credit the hard work of that author. Let's not confuse between finding information and conveying it, no question the Article is very interesting but to discuss it in these forumss, we need to know your point of view, does it differ from the one of the author, or it just agrees with him on the basis that you fully coppied it here. I believe that it's imposible that you agreed with everything that Sam G. Amoo wrote. I would find more interesting if you could just summarize the main points of that article instead of coppying every word of it. Please try, it will be easier for us to read and understand better certain lengthy articles. Manaxe, thanks
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