     Walaalkiin | Friday, June 23, 2000 - 04:38 am
Nabad iyo Naxariis Ilaahay Korkiina Ha Ahaato
Tan iyo maalintii qaran jabku ku dhacay reer adoogay labadii meel isugu timaadda waxay ku kala boodeen saddex qodob:
1- Hubka ha la dhigo
2- Hantida ha la isu celiyo
3- Xamar cadde
Haddii 13 shir lagu guul daraystay in xal loogu helo saddexdaa qodob hadana waxaad mooddaa in ay yihiin laf dhuun gashay oo Carte looga margan doono.
Qodobka koowaad ee ah hubka ha la dhigo:
Dhaqan ahaan Soomaalidu waxay waran iyo bilaawe u sidan jireen in ay horor iyo waraabe isaga reebaan oo naftooda, xilahooda iyo xoolahooda ku badbaadiyaan. Haddii loo baahdana weerar lagu galoo geel iyo gabar lagu soo dhaco.
Xilligan maanta ahna qori dabo laab ah oo soddon ka dhacaysi baasuke waxaa loo sitaa kama duwan in nafta lagu difaaco ama dagaal iyo dulmi lagu falo.
Hadaba yaa laga dhigi hubka?
Ma kan isku difaaci mise kan dulmiga ku geli?
Yaa kala garan labadaa wiil ee isla socda kan naf ku dhawrka u sita Ak47 iyo kan bililiqo boobaha u qaatay?
Haddii reer Qansax hubka dhigaan yaa ka celin reer Labi in ay gabdhahooda kufsadaan? (Raali ha iga noqdeen Qansax iyo Labi)
Yaa hubka hor dhigi?
Yaa hubka loo dhiibi?
Yaase og hubku intuu le'eg yahay?
Waa wareegto ama meerto lugooyo mooyee aan wanaag badan lahayn wakhtiga aynu joogno.
Aad iyo aad bay u haboonaan lahayd in hubka la dhigo oo dib loogu noqdo ul iyo bakoorad lagu xaragoodo oo qofkii hadalka kaa badiya aad labo ku taagto haddii aad tahay oday sagaashan jir ah. Haddii aad tahay qof da' yarse booto iyo or aad fadhi ku dirir noqoto ama sidii faro dheerta gacmaha taagto.
Intase aynu xaligaa isaga ah ka gaarin doonno soo ma shax shax ma ahaateen haddii qodobkaa laga dhigo:
Qodobka 1aad:
a)In colaadda sokeeye la joojiyo oo khilaafaadka nabad iyo walaaltinimo lagu xaliyo.
b)Qofka Soomaaliyeed wuxuu xaq u leeyahay in uu haysto hub; waase in uusan banaanka ula soo bixin.
c)Deegaan walba wuxuu xaq u leeyahay in uu yeesho maleeshayi difaacda oo hubaysan; waase in ay ku jiraan xeryo.
Labada qodob ee kale dhawaan ayaan ka hadli doonaan haddii Ilaahay Idmo.
Haddese bal wax ku dar ama ka goo qodobka hubka.
Ilaahayow Noo Naxariiso |
| Mahmood | Friday, June 23, 2000 - 08:09 am
Title : IS THIS THE END OF THE ROAD? Part 1
(Please read objectively and comment sensibly)
Is the Djibouti conference dead? Or is the conference really going well and its demise is greatly exaggerated?
These are the two extreme positions adopted by Djibouti and its opponents. The opponents of the way the conference is being run blame the Djibouti government for ignoring the Somali people (except a minority) and forging ahead with its own agenda, which would not lead to peace and stability. The supporters of the conference are satisfied that the conference is running well and that the opponents are a mere handful of disgruntled warlords and their associates who have lost their position of influence. As always, the truth lies somewhere between these polarised positions.
Nobody would deny that the Djibouti conference has come along way and is now running into serious difficulty. This should neither alarm the organisers of the conference nor please its opponents. Peace processes are hard and tedious exercises that take a long time to see their fruits. It is bound to run into difficulties. It is the job of Djibouti to smoothen ruffled feathers and fill in the potholes along the way by dealing with the concerns of the people in a sensitive manner and alley their fears.
But why did the conference on which so much hope was placed run into a problem with relative ease? In my opinion, there are four major and inter-related sources of the problem.
(a) The Djibouti leadership and their Somali consultants convinced themselves that the warlords were the source of the problem and that if these warlords are marginalized, the peace process will run smoothly. That was a simplistic approach to a problem, which left Somalia without government for a decade. They failed to diagnose the disease properly before prescribing the medicine they and their consultants thought would cure the disease. The screaming and wailing of the patient were probably seen a proof that the medicine is working. The operation may be successful but the patient might die. The organisers should have understood that whether the medicine they prescribed would kill or cure depended on the dosage.
(b) Djibouti convinced itself that tribalism/clanism is the principle upon which the Somali nation could be rebuilt. Given the obsession of the Somali people on matter tribal, Djibouti’s medicine looks palatable, although ineffective. In the long run it could lead to more serious problems. However sugar-coated it may be presented, tribalism can not build a nation. The virtues of clanism were accentuated at a time when the majority of the Somali people realised that it is a sterile philosophy that would destroy the body as well as the soul. Therefore, one would think that the organisers of the peace process were not in tune with the mood of the nation. On the one hand, they have ignored the warlords and regional administrations which, if engaged properly, could have positively contributed to the reconciliation. On the other hand, they have opted for tribalism which, if engaged properly or improperly, would lead to serious problems in the future.
If the concept of clan state has to be implemented, it is reasonable to expect defined boundaries for each clan or group of clans. If that is followed to its logical conclusion, it becomes apparent how the seeds of future tribal conflicts will be sawn in the name of peace and reconciliation. In an interview with IRIN last May, Mr David Stephen, the representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia stated that, “we do have ongoing problems, like land taken by one clan from another.” Mr Stephens, like many Somalis, seems to accept the notion that some parts of Somalia are indeed under occupation and the owners are entitled to claim these territories. But clan sovereignty contradicts with the sovereignty of the nation.
(c) Power-sharing on clan basis is the banner under which conference was held. This concept introduces a tangible benefit for the clan. Therefore, rather than discussing and planning for the future of the nation and the responsibilities bestowed on them, the clans are engaged in a number game. How many delegates are given to clan so and so? Who will be the president? Prime Minister? Ministerial portfolio?, etc. If the sum does not add up for every clan, they will refuse to play ball. It is certain that the sums do not add up for every clan. Therefore, portraying the destiny of the nation as a mere power-sharing process in which individuals will have the right to claim government positions by virtue of their clan affiliation, is an insult to the Somali people and to the memory of those men and women who sacrificed their lives for this great nation.
(d) The warlords and regional administrations were marginalized. This was seen as the best way forward for the creation of a clan-based government. Initially Djibouti tested this dangerous water with stick and carrot, and made concessions to the warlords and regional administrators. It must have miscalculated the popularity of the warlords among the ordinary people of the clans, since the widespread turmoil that was predicted if the peace process was rejected did not materialise. Only minor disturbances were seen in some areas, particularly in Puntland. What should be worrying for the organisers is that in Puntland where serious disturbances occurred following the initial rejection of the peace process, the people came out in support of the official rejection by the Administration of the way Djibouti is running the peace process. May be the ordinary people have at last realised what the Administration saw many months ago. In my opinion, today the position of the warlords and regional administrators seems to be stronger than it was few months ago. There is a degree of disenchantment with the process, and the goodwill that the peace process lost is a net gain for the warlords and regional powers.
Djibouti could have won the day had it made the process holistic. The representations of the clans should never have been the responsibility of Djibouti. It is not possible to conduct proper meaningful reconciliation if some individuals are alienated. The so-called warlords were the backbone of the security of the clan in those ten long years of conflict. Djibouti, unwisely, tried to wipe these men with the stroke of a pen. By trying hard to unravel the power (real or imaginary) of the warlords, it risking the unravelling of the peace process. The day of reckoning may be close.
What is the way forward that will ensure a happy outcome for all the Somali people, including Djibouti? I’ll try to give my view in Part 2 in the near future, unless events overtake me. Stay tuned. |
| NeefoowKaniini | Friday, June 23, 2000 - 08:22 am
,,,,Waxa maankey gaday oo halakan Jabuuti ahi la isugu marqaanti furayaa waa midaan ila suurto galiheyn,,,,Walaalkiin wiilkayoow ma wiilka u qaatay qoriga inuu bedbaadiyo beesha ee dulankaa lagula kacahayo ka dhiidhiyay baa lagu tilmaamay jirri oo haddaanu ahayn isagu ama la'aantii beeshu u baabi'i lahayd,,,,Misna Odaygii u qalab qaatay inuu Carriga Soomaaliyeed dhammaan nageeyo se kolka u suuroobi weyday halkii uu deggaan u lahaa ka dhisay qaab dowladeed ee iskuulaadkii iyo cisbitaalada ka dhisay ee is maqalkiyo ka dambeyntii Dowladnimo soo ceshay ee aan Carri dad leeyahay ku duullin oo qabsan oo cardaadiqadaa ka yeelin baanu niraah waa Dagaal Ooge iyo Qabqable dagaal,,,,.....
,,,,,,,,Jabuutaay halkaad wax ka eegi wax kaama jiraan ee tartiibtaa tilaabso Dowlad halkaa aad ku soo aguugtayna walleynan ka islaaxin Soomaaliya waa sidaad wax ku waddaane.... |
| Mahmood | Saturday, June 24, 2000 - 04:26 am
Title : IS THIS THE END OF ROAD? Part 2
In Part 1, I have put a number of factors that might have contributed to the difficulties that the Somalia conference in Djibouti is currently facing. The organisers of the conference have committed serious errors of judgement that have undermined their efforts to be effective in their mediation and conflict resolution. These errors, although serious, can be rectified.
Here are ten positive steps that I thought could reduce, if not eliminate, the damage inflicted upon the conference. These would help in confidence-building and in making the conference an all-inclusive event. It would also help when the substantive issues of nation-building are to be discussed.
1. End the partisanship. The success or failure of any mediation depends on the neutrality and non-partisan of the mediator. The credibility and authority of Djibouti as a host emanates from its moral stature as a neutral and trusted mediator rather than its formal power. This credibility is now at low ebb due to a real or perceived bias of Djibouti against some organisations or clans.
2. Don’t rush and precipitate a settlement that does not satisfy the majority. Avoid setting artificial deadlines. It is rumoured that a government in exile will be announced on June 26 or July 1 to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the independence of Somalia. Don’t compromise long-term substantive gains for short-term headlines. Mediation is a long tedious process that often ends in failure. There is no historical precedence of quick fix for conflicts. Somalia is no exception. Persevere but focus.
3. Listen to your friends as well as foes. Listen to the negative as well as positive feedbacks from the people. Honest peace-brokers like to hear the bad as well as the good news. At the moment, the organisers of the conference are listening only to those who tell them what they want to hear. Those who like to be told only that which they like to hear are not good leaders. All the critics of the peace process are not anti-peace as they are often portrayed. They are genuine peace-lovers who just disagree with the way the organisers are manipulating the process in order to come up with certain outcome that might satisfy few people but which could have a devastating effect of Somalia in the long term. Face your critics with reason and tolerance. At the beginning of the process, Djibouti was not on trial. Today, Djibouti is on trial. It will not win unless it accommodates the different strands of the Somali political spectrum.
4. Review past achievements before going forward. The forging ahead regardless of the concerns and criticism, which characterises the Djibouti exercise, will lead to fail. Reviewing the past will show where mistakes were made and will lead to past errors being rectified and future errors being avoided. That is the sign of a health process.
5. Transparency. Keeping the Somali people in the dark of what is going on in Djibouti and feeding them empty slogans will not do the conference any good. Lack of information breeds frustration and rejection. People do not like to be manipulated. The absence of truth gives chance to the proliferation of the speculations and assumptions, sometimes with undesirable consequences.
6. Allow the people to choose their representatives, even if their choices are not to your liking. Don't favour particular persons or clans. Where there are administrations, as is the case in Somaliland and Puntland, the responsibility of the selection should be left to the authorities. The organisers should have never been allowed to have a say on who attends. Last September when he addressed the UN on Somalia, the Djibouti president was very complementary about Puntland and Somaliland and the administrations they have set up in their territories. These administrations were elected by the people of those regions and have nothing to do with Djibouti. If these administrations can be entrusted with the lives and well being of the millions of people under their jurisdiction, they can surely be trusted with the selection of handful of people to attend a meeting. Undermining these authorities can have very negative consequences, not only to their respective regions but also to the much-awaited national government. These administrations did not come into being by military coup, but by election. Djibouti should avoid promoting rival groups who at the present are amenable to it. Individuals driven by ambition and self-interest are not as reliable as the authorities in the regions.
7. Refrain from using coercion and subversion in the process of mediation. This will undermine the credibility of the mediators, generates intransigence and develops a siege mentality in those who are targeted. At the moment, this is true of Puntland where there is a general feeling that Djibouti is undermining the region by trying to remove the legitimacy of the authority through the removal of their right to select their representatives. Djibouti risks alienating the people of Puntland. The organisers of the conference should be told in no uncertain terms that the Somali people would not accept less than an all-inclusive conference to decide the future of the country. The threats of force or sanction will not do any good. Had Djibouti avoids being party to the problem, it would not feel uncomfortable to travel the extra mile.
8. Strife for accommodation not confrontation. Lean back and alley the fears of the people. Djibouti's position is as good as the trust of the Somali people. End the exclusion of some groups in favour of others. Reduce the tension. Heightening the tension by unjustified criticism, incitement by encouraging uprising against the authorities and other similar activities that were appearing lately in the conference website are counter-productive.
9. Make sure that the Somali people own any settlement reached. They are the ones who are expected to live with any settlement. There is no point in issuing declarations that cannot be enforced. The outcome of the peace conference must be acceptable to the majority of the Somali people. In the absence of the referendum or other acceptable means of balloting the people it is difficult if not impossible to claim that the majority of the people do or don’t accept the outcome. There are only three options for any settlement reached under the current condition:
a) the outcome of the conference will not be carried out and the status quo will persist. This is undesirable but possible;
b) outside forces will police any agreement reached. This is undesirable and impossible;
c) the pro- and anti-Djibouti factions will go to war in Somalia. This is undesirbale but probable.
It is easier to resolve problems by peaceful means rather than by the threat of force, especially when everyone knows that the king is naked.
10. Use the good office of third parties (individuals, organisations, governments, etc) to win over those who are at the moment rejecting the peace process. Others might succeed where Djibouti failed. Enrol third parties who could help.
It is never too late to mend. As the saying goes, if you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. This applies to both the supporters and opponents of the conference. Give yourselves a manoeuvring space in which to negotiate and, where necessary, compromise. Hopefully the lessons the organisers have learned in the past two months will prepare them for the substantive issues such as the type of government, choice of capital, choice of head of state, the constitution, elections, parliament etc, would look like. As many people have said before, these are issues of sovereignty and should be left to the Somali people.
Mahmood |
| SHANGAANI | Sunday, June 25, 2000 - 08:55 pm
TO Y'ALL
BUUG QORAYAAL WAAXID
HADII INIID BUUG QORTIIN RABTIIN MID AA LACAG KU HELEESIIN AA JIRO EE RAADSADA NOO
AW SHANGAANI INOOW NII FARIISTO 2 SAACADOOD IN UU AQRIYO WAXAAD SOO QORTEEN HA KA YAABINA MASCARBUUNSHOYAAL WAAXID! |
