The true history of Somalia from the Ogaden War

[James Dahl]

Somalis have been fed the Western viewpoint on what exactly happened after the Ogaden War, and I am amazed that the truth of what occurred is not generally known.

The truth is that the Ogaden war never ended. Ethiopia and Somalia have been at war since 1977, save for a brief period between 1993 and 2000. The war was put on hold but it was not ended.

The WSLF was created, armed and financed by the Somali Democratic Republic. In no way, shape or form was it an independent rebel movement, it was Siad Barre's "popular uprising" against Ethiopia. This is not to say that many people in Somali Galbeed would rather be part of Somalia, but it was not grass-roots. The failure of the Ogaden War was not a failure of military power but of geopolitics. Siad Barre was not a "proper Communist", and when the Soviets had to side between him and Mengistu, who was a proper Marxist butcher, partisan, and soviet proxy, the whole communist bloc sided with Ethiopia.

Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev decided that this was no place to start WW3, and Ethiopia and Somalia were both essentially forced to end their conflict and go back to status quo ante (the way things were before the war). The war continued however between the proxy armies. The WSLF continued to fight but lost to Mengistu's armies by 1984.

Mengistu could not invade Somalia, so he took a page out of Siad Barre's book and created numerous "Eastern Ethiopia Liberation Fronts" in 1981, the SNM and the SSDF. Mengistu knew he could count on the rebels to attract clan-based support the same way the WSLF gained the support of Somalis in the Ogaden. Both were founded and based in Addis Ababa, and both took part in Mengistu's border offensive in 1982. By 1984 they were operating inside Somalia.

Both of these groups were essentially Ethiopian proxies, who continued to fight the Ogaden War in Somalia. Siad Barre reacted with his characteristic brutality and essentially granted the SNM and SSDF the support of the local people that they did not deserve. His paranoia about Majerteen dating back to the counter-coup attempt in 1978 and his history of brutality from that period forced ordinary Majerteen into the arms of the SSDF, and his bombing campaign in Waqooyi Galbeed did the same with the Isaaq and the SNM.

Siad Barre also made things worse by drumming up support for and arming clan-based and religious paramilitary forces amongst the Gadabursi, Dulbahante, Warsangeli, Hawiye and Ogaden, and depending on largely clan-based special forces (the majority-Marehan Red Berets). Each of these paramilitary forces would become a civil war faction after he fell from power, and would dissolve into a feuding mass of warlords after the civil war ended in 1995, with the sole exception of religious paramilitaries, who would become al-Ittihad al-Islamiya.

In the early 1980s, Siad Barre threw Mohammed Farah Aidiid in prison and began to mistrust everyone. He started preferentially arming Darood paramilitaries and disarming Hawiye paramilitaries. He essentially created the Hawiye-Darood issue that persists to this day. This eventually disintegrated into the Somali Army being a euphemism for the Marehan clan militia.

In 1989 things had reached the point that virtually everyone agreed that Siad Barre had to go. His ham-fisted, arbitrary and clannish approach to counterinsurgency was just making things worse. Various anti-Barre paramilitary forces banded together into the United Somali Congress, the Somali Democratic Movement and the Somali Patriotic Movement, united under the Manifesto Group to topple Siad Barre's dictatorship. By 1991 they had forced Siad Barre from power.

In 1991 something else happened however, the Derg collapsed, and the SNM and SSDF both simultaneously lost the stated goal of their movements and their backers. They did not disband however as they were not Somalian movements, and moved to establish their own administrations. The SNM declared that all of what used to be British Somaliland was now independent, under their leadership, despite the pro-government paramilitaries that continued to resist the advances of the former Ethiopian proxy.

Without a government to finance, arm and support them, the northern paramilitaries took it upon themselves to form their own pro-government fronts.

The Gadabursi and Issa pro-government paramilitary forces formed the United Somali Front to continue resistance against the ex-Ethiopian proxy SNM, while the pro-government Dulbahante and Warsangeli paramilitary forces in turn formed the United Somali Party to continue resistance against both the SNM and SSDF.

Having driven Siad Barre from Mogadishu, the Manifesto Group attacked the SSDF and the remnants of the mostly-Marehan Somali Army north of Mogadishu who had been opposed to one another, culminating in the Battle of Galkacyo. The Somali National Army became the Somali National Front.

The SNM, USP and USF continued to fight until 1993, when the civil war ended in Waqooyi Galbeed. All three factions signed a peace treaty, which in reality was victory for the SNM and defeat for the USF and USP, as the treaty stipulated that Somaliland would be independent from Somalia. The Sultan of the Warsangeli intervened however and issued the Hadaftimo Declaration against seccession.

Al-Ittihad began their resistance to Ethiopia after Siad Barre's fall from power, establishing themselves in all regions of Somalia.

The civil war in Konfur was much shorter than in the north, lasting only 5 years from 1989 to 1993, but far more bloody and vicious. Massacres occurred everywhere as clans turned on one another for being pro-Barre or for being part of the Manifesto group.

Things went from bad to worse when the leadership dispute within the Manifesto Group then dissolved into an all-out clan war, finally ending in 1993 with a peace treaty.

Ethiopia also recovered from the post-Derg collapse and Meles Zenawi renewed the temporarily-severed relationship with the SNM and SSDF. The USP influenced the SSDF not to establish an independent state and to remain part of Somalia, and not an Ethiopian protectorate like Somaliland, though the best they could do was get the USP+SSDF state Puntland to only declare autonomy in 1998. The SSDF old guard continued to oppose all national union efforts.

By 2000, the paramilitaries in the south had become feudal warlords, who ruled their patches of land and neighborhoods, and Meles Zenawi began to make many of them Ethiopian clients, while the remaining nationalists banded together to form the Transitional National Government. Ethiopia's client states of Puntland and Somaliland, as well as his client warlords successfully opposed the TNG and prevented it from establishing itself. Ethiopia attacked nationalist islamists in Gedo and drove out Hussein Aidiid, the most prominent nationalist warlord, from Bay and Bakool, while nationalist islamists in Bari were attacked and defeated by Puntland.

In 2004, in the ultimate victory of Ethiopia over Somalia, Ethiopia managed to get international recognition of their conference in Nairobi, where they elected a government made up entirely of Ethiopian clients, and managed to establish that government in Baidoa. This was the TFG.

The nationalists and islamists tried to prevent Somalia's complete takeover in 2005 and 2006 and succeeded for a time, in fact they managed to defeat all the Ethiopian proxies and were on track to driving Ethiopia out of Somalia entirely for the first time since 1982. Ethiopia intervened to defend their dominion over Somalia in 2007 and conquered all of Somalia.

[luis1]

James Dahl,it is a very interesting article:

You wrote this: [b]The truth is that the Ogaden war never ended.[/b]

The Ogaden War ended in 1988,When Siad Barre and Mengistu signed a peace agreement.After that there were not fightings between Barre and Mengistu,because Barre knows that he could not take Ogaden back again.

And after 1991 until 2006,Somalia was not a threat to Ethiopia.The somalis were fighting each other,they were not a threat to ethiopia,even many of them were allies of Meles.

The problem began in 2006 when Sheik Aweys defeated the warlords,but before that Somalia was not a threat.

You wrote this:
"save for a brief period between 1993 and 2000"

But they were not at war from 1988 to 1991,too when Barre and Mengistu fell.

The war ended in 1988,after that Somalia was not reay to take Ogaden,Barre had domestic problem and he didnt have time for Ogaden.

Dont forget you told me:Greater Somalia dream was weak after 1991.

[luis1]

Dahl says:I don't believe it was pan-Somalism that declined, but rather it became clear that due to cold war politics the nationalist reasons for invading Western Somalia were being overshadowed by the proxy battle between the USA and Soviet Union. Neither superpower cared enough to support Somalia or Ethiopia sufficiently to win, but DID care about preventing the other superpower's proxy from winning, so Somalia and Ethiopia were ignored when winning and supplied only when losing.

When this cold war dynamic finally collapsed in 1991, [u]Somalia was in no position to pursue Greater Somalia, which is unfortunate as the fall of the Derg was a golden opportunity that was missed[/u]

[luis1]

The american ambassador in Ethiopia,David Shinn told me this:

Briefly, the Ogaden War was a defeat for Somalia although Ethiopia had a lot of help from Cubans and advisers from the Soviet Union. Somali irredentism became dormant after 1991 because of the failure of the Somali state and numerous internal divisions inside Somalia. Somalis became too concerned about their internal problems. They did not have the time or energy to worry about Somali-inhabited territory in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Some day, Somali irredentism will return.

Check out this web,it belongs to Abdi Samantar a somali profesor of University of Minessota,he is an expert about Somalia.

http://www.sirclund.se/conference%20report%202004.pdf

Read pag 226


Nonetheless, the
Somali-Ethiopian population supported the war despite this stranglehold. Somali successes
were momentary once the Soviets, Cubans, and Yemani contingents intervened and helped
Ethiopian troops beat the Somali army.

This defeat has been catastrophic for Somalia and the
liberation movement. In Somalia an armed political power struggle among the elite ensued,
culminating in the state's collapse and in the country's disintegration in 1991.
During the interim period, 1978-1991, the liberation movement lost its autonomy. Because the
Somali military regime used the liberation movement for its own purposes many movement
leaders became the regime's henchmen.
Those who disagreed with the regime's tactics were
forced to flee the country; the unlucky individuals rotted in jail. This treatment caused the
movement to lose its identity and become a sycophant of the military regime.
The state's
collapse and subsequent fragmentation of the Somali society into warlord territories and the
rise of sectarian politics had dire effects on Somali-Ethiopian politics. Although Somalis have
contributed significantly to the Mengistu regime's weakening, the liberation movement was
politically and militarily a spent force in 1991.

This article says Somali army and WSLF were defeated and this defeat was a huge disaster for Somalia and after that WSLF or liberation movements were not a threat to Mengistu, "a spent force".

[luis1]

There have been times of peace between Somalia and Ethiopia. In 1988 for example.

http://homepages.wmich.edu/~asefa/Confe ... fflict.pdf

Please read pag 23

[Ilax]

Yes, I agree with you. but,the war started a new face, althought the major reason why Ethiopia is highly involved in Somalia's politics is its concern about the revival of 'Greater Somalia' despite, the assertation of Meles that Somali Wsyn reached unreturnable stage, this is what he believes, but still they are working not to happen that. In any case, Somalis in Ogaden/Somali Galbed started to stand on their own feet, and the strugle is associated with the inhabitant not an imposed strugel, hence there is hope of that this may lead the long waitng dream of liberating Somali galbeed/Ogaden.Then, the next will be the revival of GS.

[luis1]

But dont forget that Mengistu and Barre signed peace in 1988 and after that the somalis were busy figting each other,they didnt have time for Greater Somalia dream.

[Ilax]

right, but that does not mean the thinking of GS has disapeared, it does not have the significance it used to have in the hay day of Somalia.But, as Somalis realise and get the opportunity no reasonable factor that can stop them to do so.Laakin hada waaba timirtii horaba dab loo layahay.

[luis1]

I agree with you.Greater Somalia dream didnt disapeared but after 1991,this dream was very weak because the somalis were fighting each other.

[luis1]

A web about Ogaden War.

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_188.shtml

[Ilax]

Interesting to read, thanks alot.

[luis1]

If someone has somali webs about Ogaden War,he may share the information with us,the importan here is to know what really happened in 1978.

Check out this web:

http://dehai.org/archives/dehai_archive ... /0275.html

[luis1]

A web:

http://74.125.95.104/search?q=cache:0IP ... d=17&gl=pe

[luis1]

Another web about Ogaden War:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD ... tTRDoc.pdf

The WSLF
is believed now to number no more than a few hundred adherents.