Consequences-of-Somalilands-International-Recognition
Posted: Mon Aug 15, 2011 9:24 pm
http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/ ... nition.pdf
Executive Summary
This Discussion Paper considers the case for Somaliland’s formal recognition following
the recent 20th anniversary of its declaration of independence (18 May 1991) and in light
of the secession of Southern Sudan. Based on a series of field studies in the region over
several years, most recently in Somaliland in June 2011, this Paper focuses not only on
the options for Somalia and others in this regard, but considers the vital question: How
will recognition – or continued non-recognition – affect Somaliland’s prospects for peace
and stability as well as the interests of the international community? It also asks whether
there is an alternative to full recognition, and what a strategy to achieve recognition
might look like.
The Paper argues that recognition of Somaliland would be a most cost-effective
means to ensure security in an otherwise troubled and problematic region. Moreover,
at a time when ‘ungoverned spaces’ have emerged as a major source of global concern,
it is deeply ironic that the international community should deny itself the opportunity to
extend the reach of global governance in a way that would be beneficial both to itself,
and to the people of Somaliland. For Africa, Somaliland’s recognition should not threaten
a ‘Pandora’s box’ of secessionist claims in other states. Instead it offers a means to
positively change the incentives for better governance, not only for Somaliland, but also
in south-central Somalia.
The Paper’s authors acknowledge, however, that recognition would not resolve all
of Somaliland’s problems, or the region’s. Indeed, the Paper explains that recognition
may, for example, exacerbate tensions with both Al-Shabaab, committed as the Islamist
organisation is to the notion of a united Somalia, and with neighbouring Puntland.
Recognition might also diminish the link of accountability between Somaliland’s
democratic government and its people, as the government may be tempted to be more
responsive to international partners, with their potentially significant aid packages, than
to the people. And nor should the recognition question obscure the deep-rooted social
and economic problems in Somaliland that will need constant and continued attention.
But whatever the benefits and costs to Somaliland, regional states and the international
community, recognition would illustrate that African borders, far from being sources of
insecurity, can be a source of stability and enhanced state capacity. In that respect, the
recognition of Somaliland would certainly be an African game changer.
Executive Summary
This Discussion Paper considers the case for Somaliland’s formal recognition following
the recent 20th anniversary of its declaration of independence (18 May 1991) and in light
of the secession of Southern Sudan. Based on a series of field studies in the region over
several years, most recently in Somaliland in June 2011, this Paper focuses not only on
the options for Somalia and others in this regard, but considers the vital question: How
will recognition – or continued non-recognition – affect Somaliland’s prospects for peace
and stability as well as the interests of the international community? It also asks whether
there is an alternative to full recognition, and what a strategy to achieve recognition
might look like.
The Paper argues that recognition of Somaliland would be a most cost-effective
means to ensure security in an otherwise troubled and problematic region. Moreover,
at a time when ‘ungoverned spaces’ have emerged as a major source of global concern,
it is deeply ironic that the international community should deny itself the opportunity to
extend the reach of global governance in a way that would be beneficial both to itself,
and to the people of Somaliland. For Africa, Somaliland’s recognition should not threaten
a ‘Pandora’s box’ of secessionist claims in other states. Instead it offers a means to
positively change the incentives for better governance, not only for Somaliland, but also
in south-central Somalia.
The Paper’s authors acknowledge, however, that recognition would not resolve all
of Somaliland’s problems, or the region’s. Indeed, the Paper explains that recognition
may, for example, exacerbate tensions with both Al-Shabaab, committed as the Islamist
organisation is to the notion of a united Somalia, and with neighbouring Puntland.
Recognition might also diminish the link of accountability between Somaliland’s
democratic government and its people, as the government may be tempted to be more
responsive to international partners, with their potentially significant aid packages, than
to the people. And nor should the recognition question obscure the deep-rooted social
and economic problems in Somaliland that will need constant and continued attention.
But whatever the benefits and costs to Somaliland, regional states and the international
community, recognition would illustrate that African borders, far from being sources of
insecurity, can be a source of stability and enhanced state capacity. In that respect, the
recognition of Somaliland would certainly be an African game changer.