WHY SOMALIS FLEE A SYNTHESIS OF CONFLICT EXPERIENCE IN NORTH

[RIIGHAYE]

WHY SOMALIS FLEE A SYNTHESIS OF CONFLICT EXPERIENCE IN NORTHERN SOMALIA BY SOMALI REFUGEES, DISPLA CED PERSONS AND OTHERS
ROBERT GERSONY, Consultant*

*Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State Washington DC, USA

ABSTRACT

This report was compiled on behalf of the US Department ofState Bureau for Refugee Programs, and looks at the root causes of refugee flows between Ethiopia and Somalia, at the problems of internal displacement, disruption of UNHCR refugee camps, protection issues, and the prospects for repatriation. It is based on a three month field visit, during which the author visited thirty-one different locations and spoke, individually and at length, with over three hundred randomly selected refugees and displaced persons. Following a description of his methodology, the author provides a synthesis of reports from Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya, Somalis in northern Somalia, and Ethiopians in northern Somalia. Full details of the background of those interviewed are given, as is an account of their personal experiences, particularly their reports of incidents of violence, summary execution, death and ill-treatment in prison, looting and rape. The author found that both sides, in an increasingly violent, and essentially clan-oriented, conflict between the government Somali Armed Forces and the Somali National Movement (SNM), were responsible for attacks on civilians, including refugees; in most cases, ethnic identity appears to have been a relevant factor. Both parties to the conflict also engaged in systematic violations of the internationally.


By International Journal of Refugee Law 1990 2(1):4-55; doi:10.1093/ijrl/2.1.4-a


FULL REPORT made in 1990.

[RIIGHAYE]

I WILL COPY AND PASTE FULL REPORT since the source will not be accessible for you poor fellas.



1. Introduction
In February 1989, the author was engaged by the United States
Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs to undertake an
assessment of designated Somali and Ethiopian refugee issues. The
Bureau's Director decided to have the assessment conducted as a result
of the Bureau's perception of a mounting refugee crisis in this area of the
Horn of Africa. A longstanding civil conflict between the insurgent
Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Government of Somalia
had suddenly intensified in May 1988 and was thought to be the
principal cause of this crisis.
In the eight months between May 1988 and January 1989, an
estimated 300,000-500,000 Somali refugees had arrived in eastern
Ethiopia from northern Somalia, sometimes at the rate of 4,000 a day.
Mobilized through the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, the international community provided food and cash
contributions approaching an annual level of US$50 million to assure
the survival of these refugees. Somali refugees were said to be arriving
in Djibouti and Kenya as well. Hundreds of thousands of other Somalis
were thought to be internally displaced inside Somalia.
Another population of concern to the Refugee Bureau were hundreds
of thousands of refugees who had Red from Ethiopia to sanctuary in Somalia
as many as ten years earlier, who were still residing in refugee camps in
northern Somalia and who were also severely affected by the intense
fighting which broke out there in May 1988. These refugee camps had
been established under the auspices of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
In August 1988 the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Refugee Assistance in the Bureau for Refugee Programs visited the
affected region. His reports suggested that detailed study of numerous
aspects of the northern Somalia situation was required. Among the
concerns was how scarce assistance resources for the Somali refugees in
the inhospitable environment of eastern Ethiopia should be allocated,
based in part on an assessment of how long they were likely to stay there
and the possibilities for their voluntary repatriation. An additional
concern was whether it would be possible to return to a normal
internationally monitored programme of refugee assistance for the
Ethiopian refugees in northern Somalia. The answer to both concerns
hinged in large measure on the experiences, motivations and intentions
of the refugees themselves.
The author was engaged by the Bureau for Refugee Programs to
examine such issues as the root causes of refugee flows, internal
displacement, and disruption of the UN refugee camps in northern
Somalia; refugee protection issues; and prospects for repatriation and
return strategies which could offer durable solutions for the affected
populations.
To do this, the author conducted a field visit of nearly three months
to thirty-one different locations in three countries—Ethiopia, Somalia
and Kenya. In these places, which were separated by as many as 1,000
miles, he spoke at length and individually with more than three
hundred randomly selected individuals who fell into two broad
categories:
—He interviewed over two hundred and fifty refugees and displaced
persons who had fled from or who continued to reside in conflictaffected
locations in northern Somalia. The bulk of the information
included in this report is derived from these interviews. Their reports
focused on violence against unarmed civilian non-combatants.
—For comparative purposes, he spoke with twenty Ethiopian refugees
residing in UNHCR refugee camps in southern Somalia and with thirty
Ethiopian refugees who had until recently resided in those camps and
who had just repatriated to their homes in southern Ethiopia. None of
these fifty refugees/returnees was directly affected by the intensified
civil conflict in northern Somalia.
Throughout the eleven week field trip, the author spoke with many
national and international personnel who provided valuable complementary
information, and with Government officials.
The map which follows describes some key reference points for
northern Somalia and the areas of eastern Ethiopia where refugee
camps are located. The two hundred and fifty-two interviews which are
the primary basis of this report's conclusions were conducted in some of
these locations.
2. Assessment Procedures
2.1 Source of Findings
The field research for this assessment was conducted during a period of
eleven weeks, between March and May 1989, in Ethiopia, Somalia and
Kenya. The principal source of the assessment's findings were three
hundred and two individual interviews with refugees, displaced
persons and others who provided eyewitness accounts of incidents and
NORTHERN SOMALIA / EASTERN ETHIOPIA
ILLUSTRATIVE MAP
INDIAN
OCEAN
DagehBur
ETHIOPIA
8 Robert Gersony
patterns of conduct related to the subject of this study. In the national
capitals, regional administrative centres and in some field sites, the
author met with about forty national and international personnel with
first-hand experience in the field. They provided background information
and an opportunity to better understand and sometimes corroborate
aspects of the information provided in the three hundred
interviews with local eyewitnesses. The author also met with host
Government, United States Embassy and United States Agency for
International Development officials.
2.2 Geographical Scope
The assessment was conducted in thirty-one locations in Ethiopia,
Somalia and Kenya which included:
—Sixteen sanctuary sites for Somali refugees and displaced persons
directly affected by conflict violence in northern Somalia. Among these
were:
— Five refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia
— Ten sites in northern Somalia
— One location in Kenya.
Almost all of the two hundred and fifty-two interviews with families
directly affected by the war in northern Somalia were conducted in
these locations. The bulk of the data in this report is based on these two
hundred and fifty-two interviews.
—Two longstanding UNHCR camps in northern Somalia for Ethiopian
refugees which had not been directly affected by the conflict.
—Three national capitals (Addis Ababa, Mogadishu and Nairobi) and
five regional administrative centres where relief operations are based.
—Two refugee camps in southern Somalia which were not directly
affected by the conflict in the north; and four 'returnee' re-integration
settlements in southern Ethiopia for families who had recently returned
from refugee camps in southern Somalia. None of these had been
directly affected by the fighting in northern Somalia, and it was in these
camps that, for comparative purposes, fifty of the interviews were
conducted.
2.3 Host Government Cooperation
Both the Government of Ethiopia and the Government of Somalia, in
whose countries ninety-seven per cent of the interviews were conducted,
provided full cooperation to the author. This cooperation in
both.countries included:
—Prompt approval of the author's requests for lengthy travel
programmes with loose advance itineraries, to which neither government
was accustomed in these border and conflict areas.
Why Somalis Flee 9
—Freedom to use his time and to alter the travel plan without prior
notice within the regions visited as he felt necessary.
—Unimpeded access to the refugee, displaced persons and other sites
during daylight hours. For security reasons which in both countries
appeared reasonable and warranted by local circumstances, the author
was in some cases required to return to nearby administrative towns at
sunset. In northern Somalia, the duration of access to some sites was
curtailed because of security concerns.
—Almost all travel in both countries was conducted without government
accompaniment. However, in northern Somalia, security accompaniment
on the road was deemed necessary during some daytime
travel. In southern Ethiopia, accompaniment during travel by local
government relief workers was deemed necessary by government
officials. In both instances, such accompaniment did not include
participation in the substantive work of the trip such as decisions about
random selection or conduct of interviews.
—Freedom to randomly select subjects for interviews and to organize
the interview process in accordance with his own procedures.
—Freedom to engage the translators of his choice.
—No government presence in the interviews. However, in one refugee
camp in eastern Ethiopia, a local employee of the Ethiopian
Government's relief unit insisted upon being present during parts of
four interviews conducted in that particular camp. This presence was
discontinued after consultation with the government's senior camp
coordinator.
—Assistance with logistics when local weather (in Ethiopia) or conflict
conditions (in Somalia) generated unanticipated requirements.
Given the security and logistics constraints present in northern
Somalia, the freedom of movement and activity and the logistical and
security assistance extended to the author by Government of Somalia
officials are particularly noteworthy.
2.4 Selection of Interviewees
The three hundred interviews described earlier were conducted in
twenty-four locations in three countries. The author personally selected
or directed the selection for interviews of refugees, displaced persons
and others as randomly as possible. They were selected without
reference to the type of problems they might have experienced (except
at the author's request in five cases in northern Somalia, which are
described later in this report). In Ethiopia, the author also placed
particular emphasis on selection of those who came from as wide a
geographical distribution as possible.
The author attempted to select refugees, displaced persons and
others who became displaced throughout the eight-month period when

the refugee flows and displacement had occurred. In the case of Somali
refugees in Ethiopia, the majority of the refugees had arrived in the
June-September 1988 period. The author selected refugees who had
arrived in the thirty days preceding the interviews in somewhat higher
numbers than the proportion of all refugees which they represented.
2.5 Categories of Interviewees
Interviewees in this study fell into the following categories:
—One hundred and twenty individuals in refugee camps in eastern
Ethiopia and ten individuals interviewed in Kenya all described
themselves as Somali citizens of the Issak clan family, which is based
predominantly in northern Somalia. Most had fled their home region as
a result of the intense violence which broke out in May 1988.
—One hundred and twenty-two individuals interviewed in northern
Somalia fell into three sub-categories:
Thirty-three were Somalis who had been displaced by the intense
violence and who continued to live as displaced persons in sanctuary
areas in northern Somalia far from their home towns. Most of these
were non-Issaks.
Twenty-four were Somalis who had remained in their hometowns in
northern Somalia despite intense violence, or who had temporarily fled
to a nearby location for sanctuary and returned to their homes shortly
thereafter when the violence abated. Most of these were also
non-Issaks.
Sixty-five were Ethiopian refugees who had fled their own country
because of a war there some ten years ago and had been living in
UNHCR refugee camps in northern Somalia since then. When these
camps had been directly affected by the violence in northern Somalia,
these refugees had either fled to different sanctuary locations or, despite
the violence, had remained in their refugee camps.
Thus, about half of the interviews conducted in northern Somalia
involved Ethiopian refugees affected by the conflict. The emphasis
which the author placed on visits to these refugee camps and interviews
with the affected refugees was the result, in part, of the access they
provided to concentrated populations and of the Refugee Bureau's
special concern for them. It was also a function of the relatively greater
difficulty of locating and identifying the displaced Somali population,
which tended to reside in very dispersed patterns.
—Fifty of the interviewees, described earlier in the report, were
interviewed for comparative purposes in southern Somalia and
southern Ethiopia, and had not been directly affected by the conflict in
northern Somalia.
Chart A illustrates the categories of interviewees described above.
Why Somalis Flee 11
CHART A CATEGORIES OF INTERVIEWEES
NORTHERN SOMALIA RELATED (252 interviewees)
Issak Refugees Northern Somalis Ethiopian Refugees
Ethiopia Kenya DPs Non-DPs in Northern Somalia
120 10 33 24 65
SOUTHERN SOMALIA RELATED (50 interviewees)
Southern Somalia Southern Ethiopia
Ethiopian Refugees Returnees
20 30
2.6 Interview Accounts
Interviewees provided eyewitness and other detailed, credible accounts
of their experiences; spontaneous responses to many follow-up
questions; and, in some cases, diagrams which illustrated the manner in
which the incidents they described had occurred. The majority of the
respondents had no formal education or literacy skills. But they
described effectively what they had seen and what had happened to them, and
these observations are the principal basis for the data and findings of
this report. A small number appeared reluctant to provide any
information. But the great majority appeared to speak forthrightly and
with confidence about their experiences.
Except where otherwise indicated, the violent incidents described in
this report refer only to those committed by armed combatants against
unarmed civilians in the absence of combatants of the other side. Thus,
except as otherwise specified, the stated presence of SNM soldiers at
the scene of violence attributed to the Somali Armed Forces automatically
excluded the incident from this report. This applied equally to
reports concerning negative actions by the SNM. Crossfire deaths were
attributed to neither party to the conflict.
This report included statistical compilations of deaths and other
casualties eyewitnessed or described in credible detail by interviewees.
Where possible and in contexts in which it was reasonable to expect
that the interviewee would be able to provide them, the author
collected the names of as many as possible of the victims of each
incident as the interviewee could provide. Criteria for accepting reports
were relatively stringent and, in the author's view, have had the effect of
underestimating the statistics for the numbers of deaths and other
casualties witnessed by all interviewees.
The reports from the refugees who had fled Somalia, regardless of
which of the five refugee camps in Ethiopia they resided in, and for the
small number interviewed in Kenya, tended to be consistent, even
though the interview sites were separated by hundreds—and in some
12 Robert Gtrsony
cases nearly 1,000—miles. In addition, some of the reports of the same
incidents, received from randomly selected refugees in different
interview locations, corroborated each other.
The sanctuary sites in northern Somalia were quite dispersed—with
some up to hundreds of miles apart. The number of sanctuary locations
in which interviews were conducted in northern Somalia was about
twice the number of interview sites in eastern Ethiopia. The reports
received from individuals within the group of one hundred and twentytwo
interviews conducted in northern Somalia also tended to be
consistent and mutually corroborative.
The interviewees provided sufficient detail so that accounts by
several of them—sometimes received in different countries—could be
readily identified and thus not 'double-counted' in the quantitative
tabulations. All of the interviewees appeared to be able to readily
identify and distinguish between the two parties to the conflict. Where
differences in perceptions or reports emerged between the Somali Issak
refugees outside Somalia and the principally non-Issak Somalis and
Ethiopian refugees interviewed within Somalia, these are described in
the report. The same consistency and mutual corroboration which
characterized the two hundred and fifty-two northern Somalia-related
cases applied within the groups of fifty refugees and returnees interviewed,
respectively, in southern Somalia and in southern Ethiopia.
To describe the refugee accounts of why they had fled from their
homes and from other sanctuary sites as clearly and accurately as
possible, the author analysed their reports and divided their accounts
of conflict violence into nominal categories of conflict conduct by both
parties, recognizing that some categories overlap in some respects.
2.7 Limitations of Interviews
Serious negative reports concerning the conduct of both parties to the
civil conflict in northern Somalia were described in the interviews.
Negative reports about each side tended to contain the same level of
detail and authority, to be conveyed with the same level of conviction,
and to permit the same level of mutual corroboration.
The Issak clan members who had fled their homes in northern
Somalia had overwhelmingly chosen Ethiopia as their destination.
They provided a few negative reports concerning SNM actions. But
almost all of their negative reports concerned actions by the Somali
Government's Armed Forces which had compelled them to flee from
their homes. It is said that Ethiopia has in the past provided sanctuary
and assistance to the predominantly Issak SNM forces, and most Issak
clan members who fled when the violence intensified went to Ethiopia.
Those displaced persons and others who when forced to flee had
chosen sanctuary within Somalia or who had remained in conflicted
Why Somalis Flee 13
areas under government protection, identified themselves mostly as
Darod, Dir and other non-Issak clans. The Government of Somalia is
dominated politically by Marehan and other Darod clans. The
interviewees provided some negative reports concerning Government
forces. But the overwhelming majority of their negative reports
concerned specific actions by SNM forces which had forced them to flee
their homes or exposed them to danger.
In the political and geographical context of this particular conflict,
these destination choices appear consistent, even predictable. The
forces in this conflict are rather clear cut. Those affected by the war
tended to seek sanctuary with the side which they did not fear, which
did not take the action which generated their flight, or which they
believed would extend protection to them, generally consistent with the
clan divisions which appear to be at the heart of the conflict. The
accounts provided by those who had fled in both directions usually
seemed equally credible and consistent.
A small number of affected individuals interviewed on both sides
may have had a natural hesitation to provide negative reports of
incidents carried out by the side under whose flag they have sought
protection. It is believed that this factor is unlikely to have significantly
affected the findings of this assessment.
Interviews with about forty national and international personnel
sources contributed to the findings and conclusions of this report. Some
of these sources were eyewitnesses to the events in northern Somalia
reported by the interviewees, or were present in the immediate areas
from which these reports emerged.
2.8 Limitations of Precision of Data
The great majority of the reports provided by the two hundred and
fifty-two interviewees described incidents which occurred within the
nine-month period (June 1988-February 1989) during which they had
been forced, in most cases, to flee their homes or to endure intense levels
of violence around them. Some of their reports can be pinpointed in
time in relation to an event whose date is widely known. For example,
many respondents could estimate the number of days between the
SNM attacks on Burao and Hargeisa (27 and 31 May 1988,
respectively) and the incidents which they described in the interviews.
But as the incidents they described occurred more distantly from the
period immediately before or after these important events, or from
commonly-known religious days, it became increasingly difficult to pinpoint
with precision the date of the incident they reported. However,
many of the incidents described by the interviewees can be assigned to
relatively specific time periods before and after the conflict intensified.
These periods are described in more detail in the body of the report.

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2.5 Categories of Interviewees
Interviewees in this study fell into the following categories:
—One hundred and twenty individuals in refugee camps in eastern
Ethiopia and ten individuals interviewed in Kenya all described
themselves as Somali citizens of the Issak clan family, which is based
predominantly in northern Somalia. Most had fled their home region as
a result of the intense violence which broke out in May 1988.
—One hundred and twenty-two individuals interviewed in northern
Somalia fell into three sub-categories:
Thirty-three were Somalis who had been displaced by the intense
violence and who continued to live as displaced persons in sanctuary
areas in northern Somalia far from their home towns. Most of these
were non-Issaks.
Twenty-four were Somalis who had remained in their hometowns in
northern Somalia despite intense violence, or who had temporarily fled
to a nearby location for sanctuary and returned to their homes shortly
thereafter when the violence abated. Most of these were also
non-Issaks.
Sixty-five were Ethiopian refugees who had fled their own country
because of a war there some ten years ago and had been living in
UNHCR refugee camps in northern Somalia since then. When these
camps had been directly affected by the violence in northern Somalia,
these refugees had either fled to different sanctuary locations or, despite
the violence, had remained in their refugee camps.
Thus, about half of the interviews conducted in northern Somalia
involved Ethiopian refugees affected by the conflict. The emphasis
which the author placed on visits to these refugee camps and interviews
with the affected refugees was the result, in part, of the access they
provided to concentrated populations and of the Refugee Bureau's
special concern for them. It was also a function of the relatively greater
difficulty of locating and identifying the displaced Somali population,
which tended to reside in very dispersed patterns.
—Fifty of the interviewees, described earlier in the report, were
interviewed for comparative purposes in southern Somalia and
southern Ethiopia, and had not been directly affected by the conflict in
northern Somalia.
Chart A illustrates the categories of interviewees described above.
Why Somalis Flee 11
CHART A CATEGORIES OF INTERVIEWEES
NORTHERN SOMALIA RELATED (252 interviewees)
Issak Refugees Northern Somalis Ethiopian Refugees
Ethiopia Kenya DPs Non-DPs in Northern Somalia
120 10 33 24 65
SOUTHERN SOMALIA RELATED (50 interviewees)
Southern Somalia Southern Ethiopia
Ethiopian Refugees Returnees
20 30
2.6 Interview Accounts
Interviewees provided eyewitness and other detailed, credible accounts
of their experiences; spontaneous responses to many follow-up
questions; and, in some cases, diagrams which illustrated the manner in
which the incidents they described had occurred. The majority of the
respondents had no formal education or literacy skills. But they
described effectively what they had seen and what had happened to them, and
these observations are the principal basis for the data and findings of
this report. A small number appeared reluctant to provide any
information. But the great majority appeared to speak forthrightly and
with confidence about their experiences.
Except where otherwise indicated, the violent incidents described in
this report refer only to those committed by armed combatants against
unarmed civilians in the absence of combatants of the other side. Thus,
except as otherwise specified, the stated presence of SNM soldiers at
the scene of violence attributed to the Somali Armed Forces automatically
excluded the incident from this report. This applied equally to
reports concerning negative actions by the SNM. Crossfire deaths were
attributed to neither party to the conflict.
This report included statistical compilations of deaths and other
casualties eyewitnessed or described in credible detail by interviewees.
Where possible and in contexts in which it was reasonable to expect
that the interviewee would be able to provide them, the author
collected the names of as many as possible of the victims of each
incident as the interviewee could provide. Criteria for accepting reports
were relatively stringent and, in the author's view, have had the effect of
underestimating the statistics for the numbers of deaths and other
casualties witnessed by all interviewees.
The reports from the refugees who had fled Somalia, regardless of
which of the five refugee camps in Ethiopia they resided in, and for the
small number interviewed in Kenya, tended to be consistent, even
though the interview sites were separated by hundreds—and in some

cases nearly 1,000—miles. In addition, some of the reports of the same
incidents, received from randomly selected refugees in different
interview locations, corroborated each other.
The sanctuary sites in northern Somalia were quite dispersed—with
some up to hundreds of miles apart. The number of sanctuary locations
in which interviews were conducted in northern Somalia was about
twice the number of interview sites in eastern Ethiopia. The reports
received from individuals within the group of one hundred and twentytwo
interviews conducted in northern Somalia also tended to be
consistent and mutually corroborative.
The interviewees provided sufficient detail so that accounts by
several of them—sometimes received in different countries—could be
readily identified and thus not 'double-counted' in the quantitative
tabulations. All of the interviewees appeared to be able to readily
identify and distinguish between the two parties to the conflict. Where
differences in perceptions or reports emerged between the Somali Issak
refugees outside Somalia and the principally non-Issak Somalis and
Ethiopian refugees interviewed within Somalia, these are described in
the report. The same consistency and mutual corroboration which
characterized the two hundred and fifty-two northern Somalia-related
cases applied within the groups of fifty refugees and returnees interviewed,
respectively, in southern Somalia and in southern Ethiopia.
To describe the refugee accounts of why they had fled from their
homes and from other sanctuary sites as clearly and accurately as
possible, the author analysed their reports and divided their accounts
of conflict violence into nominal categories of conflict conduct by both
parties, recognizing that some categories overlap in some respects.
2.7 Limitations of Interviews
Serious negative reports concerning the conduct of both parties to the
civil conflict in northern Somalia were described in the interviews.
Negative reports about each side tended to contain the same level of
detail and authority, to be conveyed with the same level of conviction,
and to permit the same level of mutual corroboration.
The Issak clan members who had fled their homes in northern
Somalia had overwhelmingly chosen Ethiopia as their destination.
They provided a few negative reports concerning SNM actions. But
almost all of their negative reports concerned actions by the Somali
Government's Armed Forces which had compelled them to flee from
their homes. It is said that Ethiopia has in the past provided sanctuary
and assistance to the predominantly Issak SNM forces, and most Issak
clan members who fled when the violence intensified went to Ethiopia.
Those displaced persons and others who when forced to flee had
chosen sanctuary within Somalia or who had remained in conflicted
Why Somalis Flee 13
areas under government protection, identified themselves mostly as
Darod, Dir and other non-Issak clans. The Government of Somalia is
dominated politically by Marehan and other Darod clans. The
interviewees provided some negative reports concerning Government
forces. But the overwhelming majority of their negative reports
concerned specific actions by SNM forces which had forced them to flee
their homes or exposed them to danger.
In the political and geographical context of this particular conflict,
these destination choices appear consistent, even predictable. The
forces in this conflict are rather clear cut. Those affected by the war
tended to seek sanctuary with the side which they did not fear, which
did not take the action which generated their flight, or which they
believed would extend protection to them, generally consistent with the
clan divisions which appear to be at the heart of the conflict. The
accounts provided by those who had fled in both directions usually
seemed equally credible and consistent.
A small number of affected individuals interviewed on both sides
may have had a natural hesitation to provide negative reports of
incidents carried out by the side under whose flag they have sought
protection. It is believed that this factor is unlikely to have significantly
affected the findings of this assessment.
Interviews with about forty national and international personnel
sources contributed to the findings and conclusions of this report. Some
of these sources were eyewitnesses to the events in northern Somalia
reported by the interviewees, or were present in the immediate areas
from which these reports emerged.
2.8 Limitations of Precision of Data
The great majority of the reports provided by the two hundred and
fifty-two interviewees described incidents which occurred within the
nine-month period (June 1988-February 1989) during which they had
been forced, in most cases, to flee their homes or to endure intense levels
of violence around them. Some of their reports can be pinpointed in
time in relation to an event whose date is widely known. For example,
many respondents could estimate the number of days between the
SNM attacks on Burao and Hargeisa (27 and 31 May 1988,
respectively) and the incidents which they described in the interviews.
But as the incidents they described occurred more distantly from the
period immediately before or after these important events, or from
commonly-known religious days, it became increasingly difficult to pinpoint
with precision the date of the incident they reported. However,
many of the incidents described by the interviewees can be assigned to
relatively specific time periods before and after the conflict intensified.
These periods are described in more detail in the body of the report.
14 Robert Gersony
The knowledge of numbers among these interviewees was imperfect
but more developed than similar skills in interviewees in other
countries in which the author has conducted similar assessments. The
author believes that the stringent criteria applied to the statistical
compilation of these accounts, as described in an earlier section of this
report, has had the effect of under-counting the deaths and other
human rights abuses witnessed by the interviewees.
The author believes that these two limitations—pinpointing of dates
and numbers—would affect all of the reports collected—inside and
outside Somalia—in equal proportion and do not materially affect the
conclusions of the assessment.
The foregoing limitations notwithstanding, the ability of the
interviewees to effectively describe what they had seen and what happened to
them in credible detail; the relatively stringent criteria governing
acceptance of their reports; and the reinforcement by instances of
mutual corroboration of the same accounts from refugees in places
separated by hundreds of miles, established a high level of credibility
for the two hundred and fifty-two accounts of events in northern
Somalia and to the fifty accounts from southern Somalia and southern
Ethiopia which are synthesized in this report.
3. Reports from Somali Refugees in Ethiopia and
Kenya
The first part of this section of the report describes the locations in
which the one hundred and thirty Somali refugees in Ethiopia and
Kenya were interviewed and some characteristics of this group. The
second part of this section describes the reports which these refugees
provided.
3.1 Location and Characteristics
Interview Locations
Interviews were conducted in the following locations:
Ethiopia Refugee Camps 120 interviews (92%)
Hartesheikh/Harshin 50 interviews (39%)
Rabasso 20 interviews (15%)
Daror 16 interviews (12%)
Cam Aboker 34 interviews (26%)
120 interviews (92%)
Kenya 10 interviews (8%)
Total 130 interviews (100%)
Why Somalis Flee 15
Sex of Interviewees
Of the Somali refugees interviewed in Ethiopia and Kenya, eighty
(61%) were men, fifty (39%) were women.
Age
18 and under 3%
19-29 years 32%
30-39 years 20%
40-49 years 22%
50 and over 23%
Total 100%
The ten Kenya interviewees fell into the 19-30 year age range; seven of
the ten were men.
Marital Status
Eighty per cent of interviewees described themselves as currently
married. Of the married men, sixty-five per cent reported being
married to one woman, thirty-five per cent to two women.
Home of Origin
In order to gather information concerning the causes of refugee
migrations from the widest number and types of origins, the author
placed emphasis on selection of individuals who came from as many
different locations in northern Somalia as possible. Thus, the following
statistical breakdown should not be construed as a proportionate
sample of the towns and villages of origin of all of the Somali refugees in
Ethiopia and Kenya. Had the author not sought the widest geographical
dispersion in the sample, a far greater proportion than listed in
Chart B would have been former residents of Hargeisa and Burao
towns in northern Somalia. The breakdown which follows reflects only
the composition of the interview sample.
The refugees identified their hometowns (or home areas) in Somalia
as the forty-three which appear on Chart B. Many of these locations
appear on the map on page 7.
Place of Birth
Forty-seven per cent of the refugees reported that they had been born in
the same town or village where they had been living when they were
forced to flee by the war. Some fifty-three per cent of the sample
indicated that they had moved to the area from which they had fled
many years before the war intensified.

Robert Gersony
CHART B VILLAGES OF ORIGIN
130 Somali Refugees interviewed in Ethiopia and Kenya
Town/Village
Hargeisa
Berbera
Burao
Percentage
25%
12%
13%
Subtotal
Dobolok*
Erigavo*
Odwiena
Mogadishu
Adadle
Ainabo
El Afwein
Gebile
Maigaga
50%
5%
5%
4%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
27%
Town/Village Percentage
Daraweina
Darburuk
Deaad Budo
Deregod
Dcrewoyne
Dokoshe
Dulmadoba
Ged Balaad
Gelole
Habale
Hahe area
Kismayo
Laso Dahwo
Lcfcruk
Libo
Lugh
Mait
Ogh
Qaradag
Ramalc
Sheikh
Wadamago
Dabogoryale Subtotal 23%
Daragodleh Total 100%
* Reported particularly among relatively recent arrivals.
Previous Travel Outside Somalia
About seventy per cent of the refugees reported that they had never
travelled outside Somalia before circumstances related to the civil
conflict obliged them to flee to Ethiopia or Kenya. Of those interviewed
in Ethiopia, ninety-four per cent reported that they had never visited
Ethiopia before; twenty-five per cent said that they had made previous
visits to Djibouti. Three times as many men as women had visited
Djibouti. Of the ten interviewees in Kenya, one reported having visited
Kenya before.
Mode of Travel from Somalia to Ethiopia/Kenya
Nearly eighty per cent of the interviewees reported that they had made
the entire journey from their homes to the sanctuary site in which they
Subtotal
Arapsio
Bali Matan
Bederwanak
Ber
Beye Gure
Bihendulah
Why Somalis Flee 17
were interviewed by foot. About twenty per cent indicated that apart of
their journey had been made by vehicle.
Clan Identification
One individual interviewed outside Somalia declined to identify his
clan. All of the other respondents identified themselves as members of
the Issak clan family, and described their individual clans as follows:
Clan Percentage
Habr Awal
Habr Joelo
Habr Yunis
Edegelle
Arab
Other
Unnoted
26%
25%
21%
18%
3%
4%
3%
Total 100%
Formal Education
Those interviewed in Ethiopia and Somalia reported that they had
received formal education or schooling for the following numbers of
years:
No. Years Education Percentage
None 78%
1-2 years 3%
3-6 years 6%
7-9 years 6%
10 years and over 7%
Total 100%
Approximately ninety per cent of the women reported having no years
of formal education, as compared with seventy per cent of the men. The
Kenya interviewees had higher levels of formal education than those
interviewed in Ethiopia; three of the ten Kenya interviewees had more
than ten years of education.
Occupation
The individuals interviewed in Ethiopia and Kenya identified their
principal occupations as described in Chart C.
Refugee Family Participation in SNM
Forty (33%) of the one hundred and twenty Issak refugees interviewed
in refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia reported that members of their
immediate families (defined as parents, spouse, children and siblings)
18 Robert Gersony
CHART C OCCUPATIONS OF ISSAK REFUGEES
Small business
Shopowners, traders,
merchants
Housewife
Family duties
Nomad/Herder
Transportation Owner/
Driver
Tradesperson
Plumber/Mechanic/
Carpenter
Farmer
Worker/Labourer
33%
19%
8%
8%
6%
5%
5%
Government Employee
Policeman/Port official/
News Agency
Soldier
Religious Man
Livestock Export
Professional
Engineer/Accountant
Student
Teacher
Charcoal producer
Cook
Other
Total
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
3%
100%
were SNM combatants in northern Somalia. They were said to have
joined the SNM before the intensification of the conflict in May 1988 or
in Somalia imediately thereafter. They reported an aggregate number
of 85 such relatives in the SNM, of whom seventy-two (85%) remained
active and thirteen (15%) had been killed inaction. The Issak refugees
in Kenya reported no family members in the SNM.
3.2 Conflict Experience: Reports of Violence Against Civilians
In explaining why they had fled Somalia, most of the refugee reports in
Ethiopia and Kenya focused on incidents of violence against unarmed,
civilian non-combatants which had driven them to leave their homes
or, having left their homes, forced them to abandon another place to
which they had gone to escape the violence. Ninety (nearly 70%) of the
one hundred and thirty interviewees had witnessed the killing of
unarmed civilian non-combatants, and almost all of these were
attributed to the Somali Armed Forces. (Two incidents, which
involved eleven killings attributed to the SNM, are described at the
conclusion of this section of the report.) Some of the reports concerned
events said to have occurred before the conflict intensified in May 1988;
but the overwhelming majority were said to have occurred thereafter.
The refugee reports of violence against non-combatants tended to
fall into a number of distinct categories of incidents which reflected
similar patterns. The author has divided the reports into these nominal
categories, which are presented in the following order:
Why Somalis Flee 19
—Civilians killed near battle areas
—Attacks on unarmed civilian villages and watering points
—Attacks on unarmed asylum seekers
—Summary executions and other killings
—Systematic elimination outside conflict zone
—Deaths and ill-treatment in prison
—Deaths during looting and rape
Each of these patterns of conduct and statistical analysis for them are
described below.
Civilians Killed Near Battle Areas
The one hundred and thirty refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya, like their
one hundred and twenty-two counterparts in northern Somalia,
witnessed crossfire deaths too numerous to record during the interviews
and, both groups said, too numerous to count. Their accounts
suggest that crossfire deaths ascended into the thousands, particularly
in the battles for Hargeisa and Burao.
A separate, non-crossfire category of deaths which was recorded,
however, were those said to have taken place near a battle, but not at its
immediate scene, where soldiers of only one side to the conflict killed
unarmed civilians who offered no resistance. Seven Issak refugees in
Ethiopia reported twelve such incidents involving twenty-six deaths of
Issak civilians which were attributed to Somali Armed Forces soldiers.
Nineteen (73%) of the victims were identified by name. According to
these reports, nearly seventy-five per cent of the victims of these actions
were women, children and elderly persons. They included a very
elderly man who had left his house to search for water and who was
stabbed to death with a bayonet; two boys (ages one and seven) who
were beheaded; a religious man reading the Koran in front of a mosque;
a father and three young children shot when Somali Armed Forces
soldiers entered their home; and two women and a man, all unarmed,
who were standing still at the order of Somali army soldiers. The
remainder of the cases describe civilians, including several unaccompanied
women and children, shot while fleeing from their houses in areas
which were not the scene of immediate conflict.
These deaths were ascribed to the following time periods:
Timing
27 May-31 August 1988
September-December 1988
January-March 1989
Total 26 100%
No. Deaths
24
0
2
Percentage
92%
0%
8%
20 Robert Gersony
Attacks on Villages and Watering Points
Thirty (23%) of the Issak refugees reported eyewitness and/or credible
detailed accounts of twenty-six separate surprise armed attacks on
unarmed, undefended civilian villages in the reported absence of
resistance, conflict or SNM forces. These attacks were targeted at
civilians in and immediately around Issak villages, and at Issak
civilians and their livestock at watering points and grazing areas near
the villages. All of these attacks were attributed to the Somali Armed
Forces.
A total of two hundred and fifty-four civilians were reported to have
been killed in these attacks, of whom sixty-four per cent were identified
by name. Of the victims, fifty-eight per cent were reported to be men,
twenty-five per cent women, sixteen per cent children. The gender and
age of two (1%) of the victims were not noted.
These deaths were ascribed to the following time periods:
Timing No. Deaths Percentage
January-26 May 1988 2 1%
27 May-31 August 1988 188 74%
September-December 1988 16 6%
January-March 1989 44 18%
Undetermined 4 1%
Total 254 100%
Of the twenty-six reports of these types of incidents, twenty-three
were said to have been conducted by ground forces; three were air
attacks.
Ground Attacks
Twenty of the ground attacks were reported to have been directed
against villages, three against watering points. Fifteen were separate
instances in which the pattern of attack was the same. In these cases, a
column of uniformed Somali Armed Forces soldiers surrounded a small
village or watering point. These troops were sometimes said to have
originated from the Somali Armed Forces camps on the outskirts of the
villages, and sometimes from military camps in nearby towns. The
residents of these villages were said to have been almost exclusively
Issaks. Without warning, the soldiers were said to have opened fire on
the villages/watering points and at the fleeing occupants. Some
refugees reported that while shooting appeared indiscriminate, the
attacks seemed to give higher priority as targets to Issak men.
Air Attacks
The three air attacks, which accounted for eleven of die two hundred
and fifty-four deaths, were said to take place during the 27 May-31
Why Somalis Flee 21
August 1988 period. Seven of the reported deaths were attributed to
strafing, i.e., machine-gunning from the aircraft; four were attributed
to bombing. Two of the attacks were directed at villages, one at a
grazing area.
Attacks on Asylum Seekers
Nine (7%) of the one hundred and thirty Issak refugees reported
witnessing ground or air attacks on unarmed civilians as they were
fleeing by foot from conflict areas in search of sanctuary and asylum in
Ethiopia. These attacks tended to take place as the refugees were
walking along a road or track, or as they were resting or preparing a
meal along the journey.
The nine refugees observed a combined total of fifty-four deaths of
Issak asylum seekers in these incidents. Eight of the nine refugees
ascribed their reports to the 27 May-31 August 1988 period; the timing
of the ninth report could not be determined. Of the nine reports, four
were made by refugees from Hartesheikh/Harshin; three from Daror
and two from Cam Aboker.
—Four of the nine cases, accounting for thirty-three per cent of the
deaths, were observed to have been committed by Somali Armed
Forces ground soldiers. Sixteen (89%) of the victims were killed by
gunshots; two (11%) were knifed to death. About fifty per cent of the
victims were identified by name.
—Five of the nine cases, accounting for sixty-seven per cent of the
deaths, were caused by air attacks against the asylum seekers. Of these,
twelve (33%) were said to be caused by strafing; twenty-four (67%)
were caused by aerial bombing. About forty per cent of the victims of
the air attacks were identified by name by the witnesses.
Of the fifty-four victims of the nine attacks on asylum seekers, fifteen
per cent were said to be men, sixty-seven per cent women and children.
The sex and ages often of the victims were inadvertently not noted.
Summary Executions and Other Killings
Twenty-eight of the Issak refugees, about twenty-two per cent of those
interviewed in Ethiopia and Kenya, reported eyewitness or credible
detailed accounts of thirty-two incidents of executions conducted in a
summary manner, in the absence of judicial process, by the Somali
Armed Forces. Twenty-nine of the incidents were reported by refugees
in Ethiopia, three by refugees in Kenya. Because some refugees
reported both single and multiple instances of these types of incidents,
including some duplicate reports of the same incident, there is a
difference between the number of refugees whose reports fall into this
category and the number of reported incidents of these types of deaths.
A total of two hundred and thirty-three civilians were reported to

have been killed in these executions, of whom about forty-three per cent
were identified by name. About seventy-seven per cent of the victims of
these executions were said to have been men. These deaths were
ascribed to the following time periods:
Timing No. Deaths Percentage
1982-1986
1987
January-26 May 1988
27 May-31 August 1988
September-December 1988
January-March 1989
Undetermined
10
1
33
156
1
27
5
4%
1%
14%
67%
1%
11%
2%
Total 233 100%
The two hundred and thirty-three reported deaths fell into diree
general categories: executions conducted in reprisal for actions known
or suspected by the Somali Armed Forces to have been conducted by
the SNM; execution of Issaks immediately upon their apprehension
where the motive is uncertain and the conduct of a judicial process can
be ruled out; and other killings.
Reprisal Deaths
Some one hundred and eleven deaths—about forty-eight per cent of
those reported in the category of'executions and other killings'—were
described as reprisals exacted against the local civilian population by
the Somali Armed Forces. About ninety-one per cent of the victims
were said to have been killed by shooting; six per cent by knifing; and
three per cent by other methods.
These deaths were placed in the 'reprisal' category because the
refugees reporting them made a link between them and a related
security incident. Such reprisals were reported to have been conducted
after landmine explosions believed to be the work of the SNM killed
Somali Armed Forces soldiers; after the hijacking of a truck; in reprisal
for suspected harbouring of SNM forces in a village; in reprisal for
SNM attacks on nearby Somali military camps; and in reprisal for an
SNM execution of an alleged Somali military agent. (The SNM
execution is described later in this section.)
The reports characterized these incidents as a random roundup of
local citizens followed immediately by their executions.
Summary Executions Without Process—Motive Unknown
This category of executions took much the same form as the 'reprisal'
executions, except that the witnesses to them said that they were not
aware of the Somali Armed Forces' motive for the actions or were
Why Somalis Flee 23
unable to make a link between these executions and security incidents
in the area.
A total of one hundred and three individuals were said to have been
killed in this manner, equal to about forty-four per cent of those two
hundred and thirty-three said to have been killed in the 'executions and
other killings' category. These incidents included the indiscriminate
massacre on one occasion of seventeen civilians (16 named individuals,
15 of them men) who had just been summoned to a location by the
military authorities, and numerous cases in which army soldiers
collected small groups of people (about eighty per cent men) and
almost immediately executed them nearby. About seventy-five per cent
of these cases took place during the period 27 May-31 August, and after
abating for several months, appeared to surface again in reports for
January-March 1989, the last period covered by this assessment.
Other Killings
The smallest number of deaths in this category—some nineteen deaths
accounting for eight per cent of the 'executions and other killings'—are
comprised of numerous small incidents. For example, five incidents,
involving five deaths, were said to have occurred when the individuals
attempted to flee from an involuntary unpaid labour system in Berbera.
Two incidents, which resulted in thirteen deaths, took place when
individuals attempted to flee from Somali Armed Forces roundups of
Issaks which were sometimes preludes to the types of executions
described above.
Systematic Elimination Outside Conflict Zone
Fifteen of the refugees interviewed identified the port town of Berbera
as their home (no Berbera residents were interviewed in Kenya).
Berbera has not been the object of an SNM attack or the scene of violent
conflict to date. It would thus not normally be expected to generate
many refugees and displaced persons, although it apparently has. A
sizeable proportion of Berbera's population before May 1988 was
Issak.
Fourteen of the fifteen Issak refugees who described conditions in
Berbera stated that they fled Berbera in order to avoid violence and
persecution. All fourteen made reference to the killings of Issak civilian
men. Five made direct reference to substantial numbers of systematic
deaths of Issak men which they had witnessed, or of which they had
credible, detailed information. Four others provided anecdotal information
which, while failing the test as 'eyewitness or credible, detailed
accounts,' was nonetheless consistent with and corroborative of the
first five accounts. Other refugees reported witnessing in Berbera the
deaths or the corpses of Issak men killed in other ways, including
24 Robert Gersony
several executions in town and two murders in the course of an army
looting incident.
According to many of these refugee accounts, shortly after the
SNM's 27 May 1988 attack on Burao, and continuing at least until
September 1988, Somali Armed Forces soldiers systematically collected
large numbers of Issak males on the sole basis of their clan
association. Some of these men were placed in prison in the town of
Berbera; other victims were said to be held in two or three different
locations outside the town near the Berbera airport. According to the
accounts, prisoners and detainees, after remaining in these locations for
varying lengths of time, were routinely taken out at night in groups of
five to fifty persons, and believed to have been killed. The individuals so
removed were not seen or heard of again by the refugees who provided
these accounts. None of the witnesses or others knew of a judicial
process of any type which had been applied to the victim population.
Other victims were said to have been taken directly from the location
where they were collected to an execution area, where they were
immediately killed.
Those held in prison in Berbera reported that they saw or heard of no
deaths in the prisons themselves. Two of the refugees (each in a
different refugee camp in Ethiopia) reported that their own freedom
from a prison in Berbera town had been obtained through payment of
50,000 and 200,000 Somali shillings, respectively, to a Somali Armed
Forces official. They stated that this practice had been used by Somali
officials to obtain funds from other Issak men who had the means to
raise such amounts. (One other refugee from northern Somalia and one
from southern Somalia also reported this practice.)
Two eyewitness accounts were provided by refugees who had been
kept in prison for varying lengths of time and had then themselves been
taken out with a larger group for the purpose of being killed. They
stated that they had witnessed the deaths on those occasions of all those
who had been taken from prison with them. They said that they had
survived because the Somali Armed Forces soldiers either thought they
were dead or decided to question them further. A third account was
provided by a man who witnessed such killings because of the location
of his detention facility but who was never himself taken out of the
building to be killed. These three, and the two other credible, detailed
accounts, report that the killings took place in several Berbera locations
always with large knives chopped into the necks of the victims. The
bodies were then said to be buried close to the place where they were
killed. Several refugees identified one burial location about one
kilometre from the end of the Berbera airport runway.
These accounts describe a pattern of activity which appears
systematic, organized and sustained over a period of at least several
Why Somalis Flee 25
months. The author believes that at least five hundred and perhaps
many more Issak men weresystematically eliminated in Berbera in this
manner solely because they were Issaks.
Deaths and Ill-Treatment in Prison
Twenty-eight interviewees reported cases of ill-treatment, sometimes
resulting in deaths and/or cases of executions of prisoners who had
been held in Somali Government prisons. Eight of these refugees
described ill-treatment of prisoners and the death of some who had
been subject to this treatment. Twenty-two of these refugees reported
cases of execution of prisoners by Government forces.
Ill-Treatment and Resulting Deaths
Eight refugees—about six per cent of the one hundred and thirty
persons interviewed in Ethiopia and Kenya—reported eyewitness
accounts of ill-treatment in Somali Government prisons. They stated
that virtually all of the prisoners whose ill-treatment they reported were
accused of supporting the SNM. Four said they had personally
experienced this ill-treatment (three of them had prominent scars
which were consistent with their accounts); two had themselves been
prisoners and reported witnessing the ill-treatment of other prisoners;
one routinely visited the prison in connection with his occupation and
had frequent opportunity to observe such practices; and one, who lived
opposite a prison, witnessed one incident of ill-treatment which
occurred in front of the prison building. Six of these cases were reported
by refugees interviewed in Ethiopia; two were reported by refugees in
Kenya.
The accounts of three refugees who observed prison conditions for
weeks or months either as prisoners or, in one case, as an individual
who had reason to routinely observe conditions there, suggest that illtreatment
of prisoners as described below was a routine practice during
the periods of their observation. The interviewees state that they
personally witnessed the deaths of five prisoners as the result of this illtreatment.
Their accounts included reference to the practices listed on
Chart D.
Execution of Prisoners
Twenty-two interviewees described ten cases of execution by government
authorities of a total of one hundred and one persons (all men,
sixty-one per cent of whom were named) who had been held in
Government prisons. Several of the cases were reported by more than
one interviewee. Six of the eight cases were said to have taken place
prior to the May 1988 SNM attack on Burao, including two particular
cases which between them comprised eighty-one (80%) of the victims.

[RIIGHAYE]

This will be helpful to you guys. More will be coming in the future.

[RIIGHAYE]

SNM Executions of Prisoners of War
Two of the one hundred and thirty Issak interviewees provided
eyewitness accounts of SNM executions of eleven prisoners of war. One
of these prisoners was said to have been executed in the 27 May—31
August 1988 period; ten during the January-March 1989 period. The
ten prisoners executed in the more recent case were described as
Ethiopian refugees who had received weapons from the Somali Armed
Forces in order to combat the SNM. According to this account, six told
the interviewee before they were killed that they had resided at the
United Nations refugee camp at Sabaad. This interviewee also claimed
to have routinely eyewitnessed execution of prisoners by the SNM.
4. Reports from Somalis in Northern Somalia
The first part of this section of the report describes the locations in
which fifty-seven Somalis were interviewed in northern Somalia and
some characteristics of this group. The second part of this section
describes and quantifies the reports which they provided.
30 Robert Gersony
4.1 Locations and characteristics
Categories of Interviewees
The interviewees whose reports are included in this section fell into the
following categories:
—Thirty-three were Somalis who had been displaced by the intense
violence and who continued to live as displaced persons in sanctuary
areas in northern Somalia far from their home towns.
—Twenty-four were Somalis who had remained in their hometowns in
northern Somalia despite intense violence, or who had temporarily fled
to a nearby location for sanctuary and returned to their homes shortly
thereafter when the violence abated.
Interview Locations
Interviews were conducted in
Location
Boroma
Burao
Hargeisa
Las Anod
Other
the following locations:
No J'Percentage
14 interviews
15 interviews
10 interviews
16 interviews
2 interviews
(25%)
(26%)
(18%)
(28%)
(3%)
Total 57 interviews (100%)
Sex of Interviewees
Of those interviewed in northern Somalia, thirty (53%) were men,
twenty-seven (47%) were women.
Age
Marital Status
18 and under
19-29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50 and over
Total
3%
28%
23%
25%
21%
100%
Eighty-five per cent of interviewees described themselves as currently
married. Of the married men, eighty-three reported being married to
one woman, seventeen per cent to two women.
Home of Origin
In the selection of the thirty-three displaced interviewees, the author
placed emphasis on selection of individuals who came from as many
different locations in northern Somalia as possible. This emphasis was
Why Somalis Flee 31
not possible in the selection of (previously-displaced) returnees
because the number of persons who could be located for interviews was
very small. The fifty-seven Somali interviewees identified their home or
area of origin as shown below. Many of these locations appear on the
map on page 7.
Town/Village Percentage
Hargeisa 40%
Burao 33%
Calabeir 9%
Erigavo 4%
Subtotal
Agabar village
Alebedc
Ber
Bohotleh
Gcbilc
Mogadishu
Nasiya
Nomadic area
Subtotal
86%
14%
Total 100%
Clan Identification
The interviewees identified themselves as members of the following
clans:
Clan Percentage
Uolbahantc
Mitgang
Issak
Gadabursi
Subtotal
Dir
Hawiya
Marehan
Warscnghelli
Subtotal
Bartire
Gueri
Issa
Ogadeni
Subtotal
23%
23%
18%
16%
80%
3%
3%
3%
3%
12%
8%
Total 100%
32 Robert Gersony
Formal Education
Those interviewed in northern Somalia reported that they had
participated in formal education or schooling for the following number
of years:
No. Years Education Ptrcenlage
None -86%
1-2 years 2%
3-6 years 4%
7-9 years 5%
10 years and over 3%
Total 100%
Approximately ninety-three per cent of the women reported having no
years of formal education, as compared with eighty per cent of the men.
their
Occupation
The individuals interviewed in northern Somalia
principal occupations as follows:
Occupation
Small business
Shopowners, traders, merchants, video
rentals, coffee shop
Housewife
Family duties
Trades person
Blacksmith/Butcher/Potter
Shoemaker/Wireman
Farmer
Soldier
Current or pensioner
Transportation/Driver
Government Employee
Tourism department
Cook
Worker/labourer
Relief worker
Student
identified
Percentage
39%
23%
14%
7%
5%
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
Total 100%
4.2 Conflict Experience: Reports of Violence Against Civilians
In explaining why they had fled their homes or how they had been
affected by the conflict, seven (about 14%) of the fifty-two randomly
Why Somalis Flee 33
selected northern Somalia interviewees and five non-randomly selected
interviewees reported witnessing killings of unarmed civilian Somali
non-combatants which they attributed to the SNM. All of the reports
concerned incidents said to have occurred after May 1988, when the
war intensified. (Two interviewees reported the deaths of Ethiopian
refugees in UN refugee camps—these are described in a later section.)
The refugee reports concerning SNM human rights abuses fell into
distinct categories, which are presented in the following order:
—Attacks on sanctuary/asylum seekers
—Civilians killed near battle areas
—Burao executions
—Attacks on UNHCR refugee camps
In the following pages, each of these patterns of conduct and
statistical analysis for them are described.
In addition, three (6%) of the randomly selected interviewees in
northern Somali reported incidents of deaths of civilians attributed to
the Somali Armed Forces or to the (non-governmental) Gadabursi
Front clan militia. A synthesis of these reports appears at the
conclusion of this section.
Attacks on Sanctuary/Asylum Seekers
Two (4%) of the fifty-two randomly-selected northern Somali interviewees
reported witnessing two incidents which resulted in the killing
of five unarmed civilians as they were fleeing on foot from conflict areas
in search of sanctuary in northern Somalia. Four of the victims were
men; one was a woman. Two of the victims were identified by name. All
five were non-Issaks and were killed by gunshots. Both incidents took
place between 27 May and 31 August 1988.
Both incidents reportedly took place at SNM checkpoints along the
road. In the first case, a woman was shot by SNM combatants when she
resisted the looting of the belongings she was carrying. Two men who
protested her killing were themselves killed in the same manner. In a
second incident, two men were stopped at a checkpoint, asked to
identify their clan (they were non-Issaks), taken away and later killed.
Civilians Killed Near Battle Areas
Five (10%) of the randomly selected fifty-two Somali interviewees
reported eyewitness or credible, detailed accounts of five incidents of
killings of noncombatants by the SNM involving the deaths of twentyone
non-Issaks, of whom half were identified by name, and eighty per
cent were men, twenty per cent women. Three of the reported incidents
happened in Hargeisa and Burao, two in rural areas. The motives for
these killings were not known, although two of the interviewee reports.

[muslim-man]

Interesting material, I don't know if many people have the patience to skim through it all though, you know Somalis & ADD go hand in hand...

[RIIGHAYE]

34 Robert Gersony
indicate that SNM combatants were seeking out non-Issak males
randomly for execution.
Burao Executions
At the outset of the assessment, the author received reports through
independent human rights sources concerning alleged systematic
execution of prisoners by the SNM in Burao during the period when the
battle for that city was being waged. Some of these reports suggested
that Somali Armed Forces and Government officials of Burao had been
the victims of these incidents. Upon arrival in Burao, the author visited
the buildings and sites allegedly used for the detentions and executions.
At the author's request, Government authorities in Burao identified
eyewitnesses to the alleged detentions and/or executions, each of whom
the author interviewed individually and privately. Four of these
individuals were interviewed in Burao; a fifth eyewitness was interviewed
in Mogadishu.
The accounts reported by these five men in Burao and Mogadishu
were detailed, credible and consistent, as well as mutually corroborative
in many respects. All five reported that they had been detained by
the SNM in Burao. The specific characteristics of these five men were:
Interviewee
Number 1
Number 2
Number 3
Number 4
Number 5
Age
20
22
42
42
35
Occupation
Taxid river
Small trader
Businessman
Businessman
Government
Tourist Office
Employee
Clan
Hawiya
Ogadeni
Born in Burao
Dolbahante
Dolbahantc
Warsanghelli
Substance of Reports
The five interviewee accounts appeared highly credible and are
synthesized as follows:
Within days of the arrival of the SNM in Burao on 27 May 1988,
these men and several hundred others were rounded up by SNM
combatants. Some of those detained were Issaks who then eitherjoined
forces with the SNM or were released. But in these five and probably in
the vast majority of cases, the men appeared to have been arrested
principally because they were non-Issaks. In some cases they were
identified or denounced to SNM combatants by local Issak civilians.
The five interviewees reported that many of the detainees remained
in custody until a short time after the SNM withdrew from its attack on
Burao. During that period the deuinees apparently received food once
Why Somalis Flee 35
daily and were permitted out of their detention rooms at routine times
twice daily. The five interviewees did not report witnessing incidents of
ill-treatment of detainees.
In some cases, it appears that a type of peremptory court martial was
conducted. One of the interviewees received such a judicial process,
which he described as lasting ten minutes. According to his account, he
was accused of being an officer in the Somali Armed Forces but was
given no opportunity to respond. A sentence of death was pronounced
immediately and he was removed from the proceedings. (This
interviewee was apparently a civilian who had never served in the
Somali Armed Forces or held a government or political party position.)
Of the several hundred men who were detained, it appears that
about fifty were executed, three of whom were identified by name by the
five interviewees. A few individuals who complained about the
detention or the theft of their money were killed individually on the
spot. But most were executed more systematically: they were shot in a
pit dug in the earth under a tree near the buildings in which many of the
detainees were kept. One reported that he had escaped from the pit just
as he was about to be killed. These reports suggest that at least some of
the detainees were civilian businessmen and others who had played no
role whatsoever in government or politics. When the SNM position in
Burao collapsed, a significant proportion of the detainees were
apparently taken to Ethiopia and released unharmed.
SNM Tactics in Hargeisa Attack
Some Issak and non-Issak interviewees in northern Somalia—as well
as Issak refugees in Ethiopia—reported that as it began its attack on
Hargeisa and increasingly as the battle evolved, the SNM dispersed its
combatants throughout the densely populated, principally Issak
residential areas of Hargeisa. This placed civilian residents in the
immediate line of fire between the two sides. Some SNM combatants
were said to be wearing distinct uniforms; some wore civilian clothes
with a distinctive sash to identify themselves as SNM combatants. But
others wore only civilian clothes or were not readily distinguishable
from ordinary civilians. Some SNM combatants also were said to
occupy empty houses in civilian neighbourhoods which were still
densely populated by non-combatants.
Civilian crossfire deaths in Hargeisa may have ascended into the
thousands. Both the Somali Armed Forces and the SNM were reported
to have used artillery in the Hargeisa battle, although the more
powerful artillery was used by the Somali Armed Forces. The Somali
Armed Forces also used military aircraft to strafe and bomb the
residential areas in which SNM forces were dispersed.

[Ashlee]

"Interesting material, I don't know if many people have the patience to skim through it all though, you know Somalis & ADD go hand in hand..."

genius!

[RIIGHAYE]

SNM Attacks on UNHCR Refugee Camps
Of the fifty-seven Somalis interviewees, fourteen (25%) fled to
UNHCR refugee camps near their towns and villages when the conflict
erupted. They did so because they believed that refugee camps
established under international auspices would be immune to the
hostilities. The next section of this report will address the issue of SNM
violence against such camps. The data of two of the fifty-seven Somali
interviewees who provided reports of deaths in UNHCR refugee camps
in which they had sought sanctuary are taken into account in the
findings and conclusions.
Deaths Attributed to Somali Armed Forces
Two northern Somalia interviewees reported two incidents in which
fifteen individuals had been killed by the Somali Armed Forces. The
victims, none of whom was identified by name, were said to include five
men, three women and seven children.
In one incident, Somali Armed Forces reportedly returned to a small
town which earlier had been the scene of a battle and fired on five
unarmed men who fled when they saw the soldiers coming. Four of the
victims were non-Issaks, one was an Issak. In a second incident,
soldiers were said to have fired on a group of Issak women and children
who were apparently sanctuary seekers.
Deaths Attributed to the Gadabursi Front
One Issak refugee reported that her brother, who suffered from mental
retardation, was apprehended by members of the Badabursi Front clan
militia and executed, in an apparent anti-SNM reprisal killing. The
Gadabursi Front is a loose amalgam of Gadabursi men who are armed
and whose objective is to protect Gadabursi clan interests. Although it
has at times received arms from the Somali Armed Forces, it operates
under its own direction.
4.3 Recapitulation: Conflict Violence Attributed To The SNM
Seven interviewees (about 14%) of the fifty-two randomly selected
northern Somalia interviewees and all of the five non-randomly
selected interviewees reported witnessing killings of unarmed civilian
non-combatants which they attributed to the SNM. All of the incidents
were said to have occurred during the 27 May-31 August 1988 period.
The fifty-two randomly selected interviewees in northern Somalia
provided eyewitness and/or credible detailed accounts of the killings of
twenty-six unarmed, non-combatant Somali civilians by SNM combatants.
Of the twenty-six who were killed, half were identified by
name, and eighty per cent were men. Twenty-one (81%) of the deaths
No. Deaths
5
21
50
Percentage
6%
28%
66%
Why Somalis Flee 37
were described as killings near battle areas; five (19%) had civilians
seeking sanctuary as their victims.
The five non-randomly selected interviewees provided credible
eyewitness accounts of the detention in Burao of several hundred men
and the summary execution of approximately fifty of them, including
civilians with no links to government, politics or the conflict.
Killings attributed to the SNM are recapitulated in the following
chart:
Context
Attacks on Sanctuary/Asylum Seekers
Civilians killed near battle areas
Burao Executions
Total 76 100%
Two (4%) of the interviewees reported two incidents of the killing of
civilians attributed to the Somali Armed Forces; one (2%) of the
interviewees reported a death attributed to the Gadabursi Front clan
militia.
5. Reports From Ethiopian Refugees in Northern
Somalia
For up to ten years, as many as several hundred thousand Ethiopian
refugees who fled a war beteen Somalia and Ethiopia have resided in
twelve refugee camps established in northern Somalia (of a total of
forty-one such camps established throughout Somalia) under the
auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The first part of this section of the report describes the
locations in which sixty-five Ethiopian refugees were interviewed in
northern Somalia and some characteristics of this group. The second
part of this section describes and quantifies the reports which these
refugees provided.
5.1 Location and characteristics
Categories of Interviewees
The sixty-five refugee interviewees whose reports are included in this
section fell into the following categories:
—Ten of the interviewees were residents of two UNHCR refugee
camps, Dawaale and Darimaan, which had not been the objects of
attack or the scene of conflict-related violence.
—Twenty-five of the interviewees had resided in four UNHCR refugee
camps which were said to have been attacked once, after which they
had fled to other sites.

[muslim-man]

[quote="Ashlee"]

genius![/quote]

[RIIGHAYE]

42 Robert Gersony

From the camps together with the refugees themselves at the onset of the
SNM attacks.

In a small fraction of the attacks it was reported that detachments of
twelve to thirty Somali Armed Forces soldiers or civilian militia were
present, usually also around the food warehouses; however, they
reportedly offered no more than token response to the attacks. After
many of the attacks on the camps had been underway for some
time, interviewees said that the Somali Armed Forces arrived to
defend them, usually after many refugees were reported to have been
killed.
According to the refugee accounts, although the tactics for each
attack varied a bit, they invariably began with indiscriminate artillery
and/or ground fire by heavily armed SNM combatants against the
residential sections of the camps where not even the token guard forces
were present.
It appears from the refugee accounts that four of the camps were
abandoned by their residents after the first SNM attack. These four
camps were located fairly close to Government controlled towns such
as Dila and Boroma, which were not attacked by the SNM and to which
many of the refugees fled for sanctuary.
In the cases of five of the nine camps, after repeated attacks, the
refugees asserted that they had demanded that the Government of
Somalia deploy sufficient military forces in the camps to deter and
defend against such attacks. The United Nations, under whose
auspices the camps are established, is not mandated to provide
physical protection for them, which is the responsibility of the
Government of Somalia. Government authorities assert that because
its armed forces at that time were fully engaged combating the SNM
offensive, Somali Armed Forces units could not be assigned to the
defence of the refugee camps.
Consequently, the refugees insisted that the Government provide
them directly with weapons for their own defence. The refugee
interviewees explained that although ultimately the Government
complied with their demand, the weapons had come too late to prevent
the worst attacks, and that too few weapons—and weapons of poor
quality in comparison with those of their attackers—had been
delivered. The refugees said that both before and after they received
these weapons, they had been actively searching for and collecting
weapons from dead combatants of both the Somali Armed Forces and
the SNM.
Of the two hundred and forty-one refugee deaths witnessed by the
refugee interviewees, ninety per cent were said to have taken place
before the camps received arms with which to defend themselves; ten
per cent were said to have taken place thereafter. The refugees asserted
Why Somalis Flee 43
that their self-defence efforts had deterred SNM attacks or limited the
number of refugee deaths arising out of them.
5.2.2 Agabar and Las Dhure—The First Attacks
Two United Nations refugee camps, Agabar and Las Dhure, were the
first of the refugee camps to be attacked by the SNM. The camps are
located within miles of each other, northwest of Hargeisa. According to
refugee reports and corroborating information, it appears that the
SNM attacked these camps on 30 or 31 May, a few days after the SNM
attack on Burao and within about one day of its attack on Hargeisa.
The timing and manner of this attack suggested that it had been an
integral part of the SNM plan of attack in that region.
Both Agabar and Las Dhure were described as having their
respective complements of twelve warehouse guards. The reports
suggest that, in addition, after the attacks began, a detachment of thirty
Somali Armed Forces soldiers were dispatched to defend the two
camps. The unit was said to be present first in one, then in the other
camp. But it was withdrawn from the entire area soon thereafter. All of
the deaths reported by the Agabar and Las Dhure refugees were said to
have taken place when this detachment was far from the camps or after
it had been fully withdrawn from the area.
Refugee and other reports indicate that the refugees in Agabar and
Las Dhure camps had neither been armed for self-defence at any time
before these attacks, nor played active roles in opposing the SNM
offensive in the area which had only begun within hours of these
actions. The method and objective of the SNM attacks appeared to be
to employ violence to force the refugees out of the area. The SNM
prohibited the refugees from taking any personal belongings as they
left. It appears that at least in some cases the SNM stopped them along
the road and took the few belongings they attempted to carry away.
According to the refugee accounts of these attacks in Agabar and Las
Dhure, fourteen refugees were killed through indiscriminate shooting
inside the camps; thirteen were rounded up and summarily executed;
and sixteen were killed on the road outside the camps as they were
complying with the order to evacuate. Of these, eleven of those forced
out of the camp were witnessed to have been massacred on the road
after they complied with an SNM checkpoint order to stop.
Of the forty-three unarmed refugee deaths reported for Agabar and
Las Dhure, forty per cent were identified by name; sixty-three per cent
were men, thirty-seven per cent women and children. Over ninety per
cent were killed by shooting. Three refugee children died of dehydration
on the forced march which took place after the SNM forced the
Agabar/Las Dhure refugees out of their camps.

[RIIGHAYE]

Learn from it and discuss on it.

Muslim , they will read all of it.