The Great Accomplishments of the Barre Regime

[AbdiWahab252]

Patronage Politics, Foreign Aid, and the Start of State Collapse

The 1960 unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia as an independent state did not result in a reduction of external financial support, nor the economic irrelevancy that IMF investigators and scholars predicted. Though no magnet for foreign investment, Somalia’s rulers discovered that they could turn prerogatives of sovereignty into tools to attract external economic assets. Somalia’s government perfected the art of playing to the diplomatic and strategic interests of former colonial rulers, superpowers and others willing to exchange aid for affirmation of a particular ideology, diplomatic alignment, or access to military bases. Rulers used these resources to attract popular legitimacy and manage domestic political rivals. The latter presented more pressing challenges and dominated the conduct of Somalia’s external relations. As southern Somali agricultural projects shows, capital-based strongmen used foreign aid to build political networks that later provided key agents of violence and armed groups of followers when central control over this network collapsed. Ironically, the preferred strategies for building a state and political community on the margins of the global economy after 1960 also lay at the heart of state collapse and violent community fragmentation after 1990.

The high water mark of this centrally managed political project began with the coup of General Mohamed Siyaad Barre on 21 October 1969. Initially it appeared to be a state-building project. Barre (a former member of the Italian Somaliland and British wartime interim administration police) announced that all speakers of the Somali language should be unified in a single state, and supported crash literacy programs to propagate a new Somali script. In 1970 he unveiled an official ‘Scientific Socialist’ ideology and invited the Soviet navy to lease the deepwater port of Berbera, in former British Somaliland. Barre took ideological cues and foreigner’s cash where he could find it, combining Islamic poetry with the centralizing vision of Lenin, the cult of personality of North Korea’s Kim Il-Sung and advice from Western creditors and donors who in fact remained his primary financial supporters even during his alignment with the Soviet Union. Barre also admitted to admiring Benito Mussolini, who he called ‘my former commander’. While Barre was insistent on ideological consistency, he did maintain a consistent pursuit of a centrally organized state-building project, whether of fascist or socialist inspiration. In this sense, Barre responded to the global incentives of his time, a political and economic world that supported state regulation of domestic economies and that provided financial support to leaders of new states who embarked on these projects.

Barre went even further, and vigorously pursued an irredentist project of consolidating all Somali speakers in a single state. This translated into official support for a Northern Frontier District Liberation Front in Kenya and a Front de Libération de la Côtes des Somalis in neighboring French Somaliland. Somali state-building continued with the infiltration of Ogadeeni clan fighters of the Somali-Abo Liberation Front (SALF) and the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) to ‘reclaim’ ethnic Somali territory in Ethiopia’s Ogaden after a coup in 1975 amidst challenges from separatist movements in Eritrea, Tigray and Oromo. SALF and WSLF ties to the Somali government were tight enough that a government office in Mogadishu distributed their propaganda in the consolidated Bulletin of Somali Liberation Fronts, denouncing ‘Abyssinian colonialism’ and calling for these regions to (re)join the Somali nation. By March 1978, however, Ethiopian counter-attacks reached Somali territory after Ethiopia’s rulers made their own bid for Soviet aid. Barre’s attack on Ethiopia had consequences decades later as Ethiopian leaders concluded that keeping Somalia very weak and disorganized after Barre’s fall in 1991 was integral to their own security. Barre’s Soviet backers abandoned him in 1978, preferring instead to align with a seemingly more genuine Marxist-Leninist ruling party in Ethiopia (which also is ten times more populous than Somalia). This came on top of the bad news for Barre in 1977 that French Somaliland voters rejected union with Somalia and opted for independence as the Republic of Djibouti in a referendum.

Despite Barre’s loss of Soviet patronage, his regime managed to find a new external source of income. The US government established its own (more modest) military presence and gave Barre’s regime more than $800 million in aid. A quarter of this was devoted to military expenditures. Italy was more generous. Conveniently for Barre, his Italian patrons were willing to include local politicians in insider deals in providing over a billion dollars in the 1980s for more than one hundred projects, which contributed to Barre’s role as a distributor of largesse to his informal political network of associates, both inside government and in ‘private’ (but politically well connected) business.

Overall, outside aid generated $2.8 billion for Somalia between 1972 and 1989, making Somali people Africa’s greatest beneficiaries of aid on a per capita basis at that time. The geographic, sectoral and political distribution of aid, however, shows that most Somalis benefited very little as aid, not just from his Italian patrons, became a major source of corruption and kickbacks to regime favourites. The extreme dependence of the country on foreign aid for 90 percent of recorded development spending underlines the centrality of Barre in all avenues of economic life-as manager of formal state allocations and as patron to political allies-at the expense of broader community or commercial efforts. Barre’s domination of these economic channels also entrenched his power in the institutional frameworks of communities targeted for development spending. He used these initiatives to overlay his own political network over old informal local networks. The consequence later would be that informal mediating institutions such as xeer and the authority of ‘traditional’ leaders would be weakest in these areas once sustained conflict broke out in the late 1980s. Thus economic globalization in this manner laid the groundwork for state collapse. When examined in its patrimonial context, it also provides a guide for predicting which communities would organize their own responses to state collapse and which ones would not, and how each category would respond to economic opportunities in the 1990s and 2000s.

Meanwhile, agricultural projects and programs absorbed 22 percent of development spending in the 1980s, with 90 percent of that allocated to large-scale commercial crop farming. Favoured groups benefited from the construction of dams, irrigation and plantation farming in the south. This southern area was the dominant beneficiary of this category of spending. Foreign experts complained that this priority excluded more numerous pastoralists, especially those in northern areas affected by conflict that continued long after the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, even though agriculture spending rose as a proportion of development spending during this period. Further accentuating the social differentiation that development spending promoted, social service expenditures fell from 6.3 percent of development spending in 1975 to less than one percent in 1989. By the 1980s, even this small amount was reserved in large part to provide housing for faculty and staff at the National University in Mogadishu.

Even though state support declined politically favoured groups continued to benefit. Industrial firms, for example, received 35 percent of development spending in 1975, dropping to 10 percent in the mid 1980s. This decline reflected the regime’s acceptance of creditor advice to privatize industrial enterprises. This was carried out on the basis of political favouritism, and was immediately followed with massive manipulation of credit markets to benefit regime cronies. Administrative regulations depressed formal market interest rates for credit to -80 percent in real terms in 1984, compared to marginal positive rates in the late 1970s. Not efficient in economists’ terms, negative rates ensured that credit would be distributed to politically powerful groups and businessmen. Lucky recipients later paid their creditors in severely depreciated local currency, which effectively meant that the state provided its favourites with a bonus for holding these loans. The fiscal demands of this policy meant that the politically marginalized had to seek credit on their own in much more expensive informal markets that did not enjoy patronage from the state. Alternatively they could leave the country in search of economic opportunities abroad. This further marginalizing politically disfavoured groups from Barre’s informal patronage networks, though it would have positive significance in later years when their community leaders would find that they had influence over these overseas sources of income independent of strongmen associated with Barre’s regime.

Likewise, policy failure coupled with a steady flow of foreign aid helped civil servants migrate into regime-sanctioned clandestine channels. By 1989, civil servants were paid only three to four percent of the real value of their 1975 salaries, and had to support themselves through corruption, bribes and kickbacks. Despite declining salaries, Barre increased civil service employment from approximately 20,000 in 1969 to over 56,000 in 1983. This made association with foreign financed development projects a vital part of the survival strategies of civil servants. Uncertainty and scarcity helped turn these projects into an even more valuable political resource for Barre. A foreign consultant observed, however, that the civil service lost a disproportionate portion of more educated employees, particularly those who came from the north who Barre regarded as less desirable as political clients. As shown below, politically marginalized communities in the north were forced to became more adept at exploiting the economic opportunities of clandestine markets and overseas employment on their own, often in defiance of the regime and in conflict with clandestine rackets that regime favourites ran.

Even when Barre’s irredentist adventure and destructive economic policies brought growing popular insecurity, foreign relief aid offered him additional political resources that he could plow back into his ‘official’ clandestine economy. UN officials, for example, complained that $100 million in relief aid to refugees of the 1977-78 war was distributed on the basis of clan leadership loyalties to Barre, and was used to reinforce the control of regime strongmen who were responsible for controlling distribution of relief aid in the camps. Aid workers testified that food was pilfered from convoys and sold in local markets with the connivance of local officials. UN officials used this same complaint over pilferage to justify intervention in the early 1990s. Nor is it coincidence that the same individuals and armed groups were responsible for this use of violence in both periods, though prior to 1990 this was an informal ‘official’ state policy, while freelance in the latter. One aid worker estimated that three quarters of all supplies were stolen, with some going directly to pro-Barre militias that attacked clans that Barre believed opposed his rule. Massive over counting of refugees, 1.5 million by Somali government estimate versus 650,000 in the view of aid agencies also were geared toward generating resources for patronage.

[DawladSade]

Abdiwahab, stop copy and pasting without bringing sources that DIRECTLY concern the points brought by Warsame.

You cannot talk about mismanage of money in Somalia without bringing into the discussion such men as Cabdullahi Cadow and Galayr who were entrusted with State treasury and usurped it.


Now again, directly talk about the topic at hand and HOW President Siad freed Habar Gidir from mental and physical bonadage.

Before 1969, the dream job of Habar Gidir was to be the chief hair cutter of Majeerteen.

Post-1969, Habar Gidir were allowed to eat near Majeerteen.

Deny it or shall we bring Cilmiile to come in and start cursing Mareexaan again for freeing the enslaved?

[AbdiWahab252]

From a former USAID Expert working in Somalia during the Barre Regime:

http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/ir/Ch30.html

Maren, who shifted from Kenyan to Somalian relief in early 1981, then gives us a good, concise history of the Somalian polity. Somalia became an independent state in 1960, as the British and the Italians pulled out of their respective Somalian colonies and the two joined into one nation. From the beginning, the Somalian government was obsessed with fulfilling the promise of the five-pointed star of the new Somali flag: to incorporate a Greater Somalia uniting all five groups of ethnic Somalis. Two of those points: Italian Somaliland in the east and British Somaliland in the north, had already been achieved, but there were (and still are) three remaining: little Djibouti in the northwest, formerly French Somaliland and still a client state of France and containing 5,000 French troops; northeastern Kenya, to the southwest of Somalia, which is 60 percent Somali; and the Ogaden desert, to the west of Somalia, which is called Western Somalia by the Somalis but happens to be groaning under Ethiopian tyranny.

Not much could be done about combating French imperialism in Djibouti, but the other two goals were considered achievable. Kenya attained independence a bit later than Somalia, in December 1963, and Somalia had hoped to lop off northeastern Kenya for its own (called in Kenya the Northern Frontier District (NFD)). When the Kenyan government insisted on keeping the NFD, the Kenyan Somalis, egged on by Somalia, began a long guerrilla war against Kenya, an as yet futile war that still continues, out of sight and out of mind of the United Nations.

More explosive was the Ogaden, where Somalia and Ogaden Somalis launched a guerrilla war against Ethiopia, but stood no chance against the superior American-trained Ethiopian army under the "freedom-loving, pro-Western" yet slave-holding Emperor, Haile Selassie, the Lion of Judah. In 1967, the Somalian government, led by Prime Minister Mohammed Egal, decided to succumb to reality, and to make peace with their more powerful neighbors. Egal's peace process had the merit of facing reality, but it angered the Somali military, who accused Egal of selling out Greater Somalia and betraying the five-pointed star; a military coup, led by Major General Mohammed Siad Barre, ousted Egal and established a dictatorship in October 1969.

Barre promptly threw in his lot with "scientific socialism," and he and his Supreme Revolutionary Council established an alliance with the Soviet Union, happy to welcome another "Marxist-Leninist" state and to ship arms to a useful enemy of the "pro-American" Haile Selassie. A massive Soviet arms buildup, and thousands of Soviet military advisers training the Somali army, led Ethiopians and Kenyans to become even more ardent in their "pro-American" passions.

Five years later, however, came the great sea-change in the Horn of Africa: a military coup of Marxist-Leninist army officers overthrew the Lion of Judah in 1974 and established a Marxist-Leninist military dictatorship under the junta, the Dergue, led by Colonel Meriam. The Soviets embraced the new military junta, and amidst the turmoil, General Barre took advantage of the Ethiopian crisis and invaded and conquered the Ogaden in 1977. Another point in that star!

The Soviets, however, poured arms and the Cubans sent troops to aid Ethiopia, at which point Barre turned to the United States, playing down his Marxism-Leninism and undoubtedly discovering a new commitment to "freedom" and "democracy." But the Carter administration was slow in delivering aid, and the Soviet-aided Ethiopian army drove the Somalian army out of Ogaden in the spring of 1978.

Barre's popularity was plummeting in Somalia; the hero of the Ogaden had become the loser. And so Barre stepped up his dictatorship in Somalia, increasingly narrowing the ruling clique to his own Marehan tribesmen and within that to his own relatives. Impervious to any of this development, the new Reagan administration sent none other than Dr. Henry Kissinger to Mogadishu in early 1982 to assure the despot Barre of our eternal support for this "scientific socialist" dictator, all of course in the name of anti-Communism and the Cold War. As Maren puts it, "From Washington, the barren wastes of Somalia suddenly looked like downtown Berlin."

Enter Michael Maren into Somalia as a food monitor for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Maren was in charge of tracking the relief food from Mogadishu to the Hiran desert district in the north, which contained nine refugee camps near the Ethiopian border. Maren quickly found that fully two-thirds of the U.S. food to the refugees was being stolen, most of the theft being conducted by the refugee camp commanders, Somali army officers who sold the food, or else it was just taken by the soldiers, or by the Somali-supported Ogaden guerrillas of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). The WSLF also systematically raided the refugee camps for able-bodied young men, whom they would conscript into their continuing guerrilla warfare against Ethiopia in the Ogaden.

What about the refugees in the nine camps? Why were they there, and were they really starving? Maren discovered the truth: in the first place, the refugees were there because they were nomads fleeing the Ogaden, where they had been caught between the Ethiopian army and WSLF. Second, the number of refugees was deliberately highly inflated by the Somali government, in order to sucker Americans into sending aid. Barre was claiming two million refugees when there were far less (he had originally claimed half a million). Thus, Maren found that one camp, Amalow, which was supposed to have 18,503 refugees, and had food allotted for that many, really had only about 3,500. As a result, far too much food was being shipped into Somalia and into the camps by the bamboozled Americans.

Not only that: just as occurred eleven years later, the American excess of food was inspired by duplicitous journalists, "who took pictures of the sick and the hungry, and the relief agencies arrived on the scene with food. And the food was being stolen."

Moreover, Maren reveals, despite the massive theft, "no one was starving to death in the refugee camps." Oh, there was plenty of death all right, but the death was caused by disease: malaria, measles, dysentery, diphtheria, pneumonia, river blindness. But food, though not the problem, kept pouring in and being stolen.

There was more method to this madness than simply providing free American food for Barre's army and for the Ogaden guerrillas. As Maren perceptively points out, the Somalian government, like the Kenyan government, hates nomads. Even though the nomadic Somali refugees weren't starving, they were attracted to settling in the refugee camps by the promise of free food. After all, it's easier to sit in a camp and receive food for free than to have to hunt and work for it. As Maren puts it:

"Somalis are nomads who spend most of their time looking for food. If you put a pile of food in the desert they will come and get it...The famine camps were set up and they came."

And so the American food unwittingly played into the hands of Barre and later Somali rulers: helping to build a modern socialist state by settling nomads. Maren puts the point trenchantly:

"African leaders like to settle nomads. Nomads make it hard to build a modern state, and even harder to build a socialist state. Nomads can't be taxed, they can't be drafted, and they can't be controlled. They also can't be used to attract foreign aid, unless you can get them to stay in one place.

"In addition, many African leaders, trying hard to be modern, view nomads as an embarrassment and a nuisance. Anything 'primitive' is an embarrassment and a nuisance. From Bamko to Nairobi I've listened to Africa's elite discuss nomads as if they were vermin."

Maren then concludes about the American relief program of the early 1980s:

"So not only was the refugee relief program feeding Barre's army, it was settling his population of nomads...And all this was happening with the assistance of energetic young foreigners who were helping to build the infrastructure of those new, refugee-populated towns, setting up clinics, drilling wells, trying to teach the former nomads how to settle down and grow food."

What had happened to the cattle of the nomad refugees? Some was lost to drought; the rest was left behind with family members. Traditionally, nomads who had lost their cattle to drought got assistance from relatives and other clan members; but now, in 1981, they had another option: free food in the refugee camps.

But, as Maren points out, the Ogaden desert is sparsely settled: one family would have eight to ten square miles of desert for grazing their camels and goats. But the refugee camps played hob with, you should excuse the expression, the nomad's eco-system. Now each family was packed into a few square yards. There is no need to learn about sanitation when you've always got ten square miles of desert to roam around in. But sanitation became a big problem in the refugee camps: hence, rampant disease and death.

After monitoring the relief situation in the Hiran district, Maren and his colleague Doug Grice, who was performing the same task in the Bardera region and near the Kenyan border, sat down and wrote reports to their bosses in the USAID program. The reports concluded that the relief program was killing at least as many people as it was saving, and that the net result was to ship food to Somali soldiers who added to their income by selling food, and to enable the WSLF to use the food as rations to conduct the guerrilla war in the Ogaden. Their boss rejected the report, saying: "You guys know you can't write this stuff. Stick to the facts," i.e., to the amount of food missing and stolen. And, too, keep the reports technical and boring, so that no critics of the program might figure out what's going on.

In his final report to his bosses before quitting the program, Michael Maren pointed out an economic absurdity created by the program: people in the towns wanted to know why they were not entitled to the food and health care handed out free to those refugees who had settled in the camps. A man in the town of Belet Huen – the headquarters town in the Hiran region – working for the very high salary of 800 shillings a month, could not supply his family with the amount of food the refugees in the camp received for free.

Maren concluded his report with a prophetic insight into the future: he noted that the American Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) were submitting hundreds of proposals to improve services to the refugees. But Maren warned:

"Expanded services to the refugees will only aggravate the problem by encouraging them to stay, and more refugees to arrive. It will spread more thinly the resource base leaving the door open for a real emergency situation in the future. The future for refugees in the camps holds only years of relief." Instead, Maren declared, the efforts of the international community should be to get the refugees out of the camps, not to attract more.

A study of the Somali economy at the time discovered that the relief industry constituted no less than two-thirds of the Somalian economy. No way that the Somali government would give that up. And now, twelve years later, the 1981 camps are still there, "the residents of those camps are still dependent on relief food and still have no way to earn a living on their own."

So the question is: how could Somalia, a land that used to be self-sufficient in food, have gotten to the point where virtually everyone seems to be dependent on U.S. and other outside relief? Michael Maren was succeeded in Somalia by one Chris Cassidy, who spent seven years there with USAID, Save the Children, and FAO. Cassidy told Maren recently:

"One of the things that got Barre and his henchmen pCCd off was when you wrote reports saying that Somalia was self-sufficient in food. That was because free food is what controls the place. The mentality is, 'Why should we let people produce their own food and control their own lives when we can keep them under our thumbs and under the gun? We claim famine, flood, and refugees and get the food shipped in here for free. Now we'll tell you when to eat and when you can't eat!'"

In short, the food "crisis" has been deliberately created by the Somalian government – by Barre and his successors – in order to exert control over the Somali population, to tell them when and who shall or shall not eat. The humanitarian, said Isabel Paterson, is only happy when a country is filled with breadlines and hospitals. The humanitarian with the guillotine!

During the Reagan and Bush administrations, and until 1988, the Barre regime received the phenomenal sum of $100 million a year in military and economic aid from the United States. Finally, in May 1988, the major opposition to Barre, the Somali National Movement of the Issaq tribe in northern Somalia, seized a few towns; the Barre regime replied hysterically, bombing, shelling, and gassing their opposition, killing at least 50,000 people. The regime proceeded to search for, and execute, unarmed Issaqs, and the result was a civil war that raged until Barre was finally toppled in the fall of 1990. By the fall of 1989, Barre's massacres could no longer be overlooked, and the U.S. cut off its aid to his regime.

Maren's analysis of the current situation is that this is simply more of the same ills that have created the problem. The U.S. marines are handing everything over to the PVOs, the relief people, who aggravate the problem still more by pouring in more free food. And what do the PVOs get out of it? Fat government contracts, as well as fat donations by deluded humanitarians who think that these reliefers are doing good and helping to solve the problem. Journalists help the PVOs by getting their information from them and featuring these heads of CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision on television. The press assumes "that these are humanitarian agencies whose only goal is to help people." In fact, warns Maren, "they are organizations that stand to reap huge benefits in the form of lucrative contracts to deliver food."

These are the do-good relief organizations that have only made all the problems worse: "These are the same organizations that have failed for the past 10 years in Somalia and all over Africa. (Hundreds of billions of dollars of aid in Africa over the last thirty years have left the continent more famine-prone and dependent on outside relief than ever.) They had thousands of refugees in camps in 1981, and they failed to get them out of the camps. They didn't get them their cattle back. They didn't teach them to grow food and to be independent. They just delivered food and collected grants for development projects." These relief agencies, Maren declares, want to fail, for "failure means a chance to try again with new grants, new film footage for fundraising campaigns, and fresh new volunteers who haven't learned yet that aid kills."

For the real objective of these agencies, Maren has concluded, is to raise money. These outfits are essentially rackets. Even though sending food hasn't really helped, what these agencies can do best is to raise money. "Aid," Maren declares, "is a business. It is a business in which people make careers, earn a good living, get to see interesting places, and have great stories to tell when they get stateside. It's a business that has to earn money to pay its executives, pay for retreats and for officials to attend conferences in Rome, buy four-wheel drive vehicles, buy advertising time on television. It's a business that makes money by attracting clients, i.e., starving, needy people."

Maren declares that he has among his friends several dozen long-time workers for these African relief agencies. All of them "thought they could do some good while enjoying the adventure." And not one of them thinks that the years of work and millions of dollars have helped, have done more good than harm. "All of them are convinced that whatever the original intentions of an aid agency, inevitably raising money becomes the primary objective." That money consists of funds raised among the American public, but primarily from U.S. government contracts. Cooking up more projects means getting more funds, which also means expanding the relief agency. Expanding the agency means more power for the top executives, and the more money it gets the more people the agency can claim to be helping.

The crucial point, Maren concludes, is that "reckless use of food aid causes famine. It depresses local market prices and provides disincentive for farmers to grow crops." All this makes the food shortage worse, and causes greater calls for food relief; and so the well-meaning foreign intervention grows and cumulates, fueled by agency venality, and causes the spiral of famine-aid-famine to get worse and worse. Until finally the marines land to try to solve the problem. The humanitarian with the guillotine.

The only way to solve the problem, Maren declares, "is a way that may seem cruel": it is to stop the food – to "wean Somalia from dependence on donated food." And then, Maren states, "all of them – the marines and the relief agencies – should get out as soon as possible." All in all, Maren concludes, "in the fragile political and environmental ecosystem of Somalia it is much easier to screw things up than it is to set them straight...the longer they (the marines), stay, the worse it will get." No paleolibertarian could have put it better.

Meanwhile, some rationality seems to have burst into the pages of the New York Times, not usually a place receptive to paleolibertarian concerns. "Does Free Food Hurt?" cries a headline (Jan. 13), and it turns out that there is a "paradox" of famine relief: food charity has just about ruined the previously prosperous farm population of Somalia. For who will buy food from local farmers when they can get food free from international suckers?

The "paradox" that so confused the Times correspondents is actually natural law – economic law – at work. It is a law that decrees: government intervention, out! In Somalia, or, for that matter, anywhere else.

[kambuli]

Waa loo darsaday Jaalle Siyad....

This was the words of Abdulwahaabis cousin....Abshir Bacadle.

Am I not right? Wallee waa loo darsaday Marxuumkaas...Ama derbiga isku qaada ama boqol page qora....

[DawladSade]

The discussion is here, stop running away -------------> viewtopic.php?f=18&t=119044



Quote of the century


----"The Caydiid-Cali Mahdi governments’ “Revolution” (deembed by AbdiWahhab):

1. Mass-rapes
2. Genocide
3. Mass-looting
4. Destruction of cities
5. No semblance of governance
6. Drug and rape-crazed future Somali child-soldiers
7. Roadblocks"--------

[DawladSade]

[quote="kambuli"]Waa loo darsaday Jaalle Siyad....

This was the words of Abdulwahaabis cousin....Abshir Bacadle.

Am I not right? Wallee waa loo darsaday Marxuumkaas...Ama derbiga isku qaada ama boqol page qora....[/quote]


Ama boqol page qora, how fitting!

[Ina Baxar]

Aniga waxay ila tahay , ninkii maanta itaal daran ama tolkii ah ayuunba u darsanaya Siyaad Barre, Allah ha u naxariisto wax dhaafsan ma hayo anigu.

[kambuli]

Ina Baxar,

Ninka hadalka yidhi oo ah "Abshir Bacadle",

Marxuum Siyaad tolkiina ma ahayn, oo waa nin Sacad Siciid ah, mana ahayn nin tabar daran ee wuxuu ahaa welina yahay a rich religious business man.

[AbdiWahab252]

kambuli,

Take your qabiilism out of here.

[DawladSade]

Kambuli, hadee in runta laysku sheego ma wax dhaamo ayaa jirto?

[Ina Baxar]

Kambuli dee waan ku gartay inaabti ee waa mid itaal daran kaasi

[kambuli]

A/W, quote "Take your qabiilism out of here."

Walaal,is this your tactic to suppress the Truth?...

If it was a Mareexaan pesron who said this famous quote 'Waa loo darsaday Siyaad" then you would have said
" He is saying this because he is Mareexaan"

What do you have to say now, walaal????

Isku xishood ninyahow...

Dawlad, Runta wax dhaama ma leh..



Ina Baxar, Abshir Bacadle iyo Itaal darro kala dheer.

Teeda labaad qofka ay u baroortaan dadka tabarta darini sow ma ogid inuu yahay ka Eebbe agtiisa sharaf ka mudan?

[Ina Baxar]

Haa waan ogahay Kambuli
<-- mindful of heeshiis -kii shalay la kala saxeexday

[Hyperactive]

[quote="Ina Baxar"]Haa waan ogahay Kambuli
<-- mindful of heeshiis -kii shalay la kala saxeexday [/quote]

hadi decument laga saheehay is illali. lol

Abdulwahab intan moaning iska deysid why don't move on. Illen tarikh osob ad hada qortan nina idink magli mahaye.

[AbdiWahab252]

kambuli,

Truth, all of the above facts speak to Barre's rule.

Let us not fool ourselves into believing the hype Barre was a wonderful leader & Somalia under his rule was heaven.

Barre hold a great responsbility for making Somalia what it now is.


So do the the men who overthrew him to including Caydiid.