ThE BIRTH OF Somaliland..

[GENERAL_SNM]

Somaliland: Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions

In the early part of the twentieth century, all efforts of the British administration of the Protectorate aimed the defeat of the Sayid and his Dervishes. It was a period of limited administration and no social development in the protectorate. Following the defeat of the Sayid, peace returned to the protectorate, and with it the British policy of benign neglect: there was little or no development to speak of in the inter-war years. In 1939, when the Second World War broke, Italy briefly occupied the protectorate in an attempt to incorporate it within the Italian East African Empire, but British forces expelled the Italians in 1941 and restored the Protectorate to British military rule. In order to strengthen its claim to the territory, the British began to provide various public services such as law enforcement, education, health, water and roads. However, a Somali nationalist political awakening accompanied these developments.

In the 1940s new nationalist political movements began. Political associations and religious based social clubs were organized, which later developed into political parties that led the struggle for independence. In Somaliland the most notable parties were the Somali National League (SNL) formed in 1957, the National United Front (NUF) established in 1958 and the United Somali People (USP) formed in the last year preceding independence. The Somali Youth League (SYL) also had some influence but was more prominent in the south.

Given the general lack of political education under the British, the new political parties were typically initiated by Somalilanders living abroad5 and they depended for their support base upon local merchants, traders, civil servants and religious leaders. They faced formi dable obstacles in reaching the rural populace and their appeal remained chiefly confined to the Protectorate’s major towns. Their political platforms were remarkably similar, sharing a commitment to nationalism, pan-Somalism and the rejection of clanism.

In 1948 political activism gathered momentum when the British signed an agreement to cede the Hawd reserve area, the main grazing area for trans-border clans, to Ethiopia. The agreement, which was implemented in 1954, intensified the anti-colonial and pan-Somali sentiments, and ultimately contributed to the unification of the British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian Trust territory in 1960.

Although the political parties were, theoretically, driven by a nationalist cause, the clan system remained the overriding principle of social organization and the main support base of each party. Nevertheless, some parliamentary candidates in the 1960 pre-independence polls were elected in areas of the Protectorate where they had no clan support base, suggesting that nationalism did have a role to play. For example, the politicians Mohamed Bihi “Shuuriye” from the Gabooye clan and Cumar Maxamad Cabdiraxmaan (“Cumar Dheere”) from an Ethiopian branch of the Ogaden clan, were elected respectively in 1960 and 1964 from Hargeysa, an Isaaq-dominated city.

The clan base of the political parties became more apparent as the euphoria of the independence faded. However, the formation of political alliances like the Somali Youth League (SYL)6 made it impossible for narrowly based clan parties to achieve any effective position in national politics. There were no political parties representing the interests of a single clan, but at the same time the transfer of clan loyalties to political parties had become pervasive.

The thirty-three-member legislature of the Somaliland protectorate was elected in February 1960. The Isaaq-dominated Somali National League (SNL) won 21 seats; the United Somali Party (USP), composed mainly of members of non-Isaaq clans, won 12 seats and the National United Front (NUF) 1 seat. This short-lived assembly debated many issues, but its main focus was the unification of the Somali territories in the Horn. Immediate union with the south without pre-conditions was agreed by consensus, and on 1 July 1960 the State of Somaliland united with the Italian Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic Independence and Union, 1960-1969.

After official unification of the two Somali regions a new provisional constitution was adopted with a parliamentary system of government. This government was comprised of a non-executive President elected by the 123 members of parliament and an executive Prime Minister nominated by the President. The Prime Minister appointed his cabinet from the leading parliamentary party, subject to approval by the President and the Parliament. A third organ of the government was the judiciary, with five Supreme Court judges appointed by the President. The Ministry of Interior appointed Regional Governors and District Commissioners in the eight administrative regions and thirty districts of the country. District Councils, however, were democratically elected along party lines. Each council then elected a Chairman who functioned as the mayor of the district capital.

The major challenges confronting the new government were to consolidate unification, through administrative integration and the harmonization of the socio-economic development of the two different regions with their “dual colonial heritage” (Lewis, 1980). This included different British and the Italian systems of education, administration, security services, pay rates and legal systems.

In many respects the south was more advanced in government politics, having exercised self-rule under the Italian Trusteeship for ten years prior to unification. However, there was no agreed power sharing arrangement or pre-planned methodology to facilitate the amalgamation of the two territories. Ahmed Samater (1988) noted that matters were complicated “by the dominance of the politicians from the south in the new government.” This was apparent in the imbalance in the distribution of cabinet and other government posts, including in the security forces. The South had gained the top political offices of the President and the Prime Minister. British Somaliland received just 33 seats in the legislative council, while 90 were awarded to the former Italian Somalia. This meant that when the territories and legislatures were joined in 1960, less than one third of parliamentary seats were held by northern politicians.

Northern disenchantment with the union began shortly after independence, when the people of the northwest saw their former capital Hargeysa reduced to a minor regional headquarters while the new capital, Mogadishu, became the seat of the government and center of national affairs. Northerners, who had perceived Somaliland and Somalia as two equal states before independence, became a minority in the new Somali state. The former Protectorate’s secondary influence in national affairs damaged northern pride and began to breed feelings of resentment. Commenting on the difficulty that the northern parliamentarians faced, one contemporary observer noted: They were aggrieved that they could not influence any decision making process because of unbalanced minority representation in the national assembly. (Qalib, 1995)

The latent political discontent in the north found expression in June 20 1961, when the majority of the people of the north voted against a new unitary constitution. This was soon followed by a failed coup attempt led by group of disgruntled northern British-trained officers in December the same year.

After the first euphoric years of independence, the multi-party political system began to falter and lost momentum. Political parties ceased to be based on an ideology of nation building and there was a mushrooming of clan-based political parties. People were generally inexperienced in the modern system of governance and the society’s deeply rooted nomad way of life, poverty and high illiteracy were, and still are, limiting factors in the emergence of a political consciousness. The clan remained the overriding principle of social organization, hindering the formation of a civil society and broad-based political parties. Only a handful of political parties contested the first elections after independence. By the 1964 election the number had risen to over twenty, and in 1969 over sixty political parties contested the elections. One workshop participant described the situation as one where, “political parties had no political mandate and roughly every clan or large sub-clan had formed its own political party.” Local councils and mayors were elected by the same system and so also reflected the clan-based divisions.

Throughout the 1960s, government became increasingly centralized. The administration and policy decisions were concentrated in the capital city, leading northerners to label the government ‘Cawaro’ (‘one eyed’) and to remark that: ‘Nalka Xamar baa la nooga soo daara’ (“[In the rest of the country] even the electric light has to be switched on from Mogadishu”). Citizens requiring trade licenses, legal services, passports, higher education and civil service recruitment were obliged to travel to Muqdisho – a trip of considerable expense and inconvenience for those who did not live in the south. Northerners whose political connections in Mogadishu were weak had problems getting access to government services – a situation described by one bitter political commentator in the following terms: Ninkaan daba gaabi daadihinayn amase dibitaati daaya lahayn dameerka abgaalba wuu dilli. (‘He who is neither led by a mini-skirted lass, nor protected by a parliamentary boss, will eventually be killed by the donkey of the Abgaal’ [a clan from the Mogadishu area]).

Northern resentment was sharpened by the well-founded belief that felt that only a small proportion of the millions of dollars of international aid that poured into Somalia, was invested in the north. The construction of Berbera port, Tog-wajaale wheat farm, Laasqoray fish factory and the extension of Hargeysa airport, were among the few development projects executed in the north, in contrast to the south where many projects were implemented. Total development expenditure in the north was less that ten percent of that in the south.

Political dissatisfaction was not confined to the north, however. Disillusionment at the misappropriation of state powers, rampant corruption, favouritism and nepotism by the civilian administrations was felt throughout the Republic. In 1969, chaotic elections that resulted in several deaths were followed by the assassination of president, Dr. Cabdirashid Cali Sharmaarke in the remote town of Laascaanood, paving the way for a coup d’etat on 21st October 1969.

The Military Regime

In October 1969 democratic civilian rule was replaced by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), comprising twenty-four officers from the uniformed forces led by General Maxamad Siyaad Barre. Under military rule, power became further concentrated in the office of the President, favouring Mogadishu and its environs. National development planning and political opportunities were concentrated in the capital and certain aras of the south, while the rest of the country was marginalized politically and economically.

Following the military coup, the SRC suspended the constitution, dissolved the elected parliament, disbanded the independent judiciary and banned all political parties. The SRC assumed sole authority for formulating policy objectives for the country, assisted by a handpicked council of 14 civilian Secretaries, who executed the routine affairs of the administration in the different ministries. In terms of clan representation the SRC was unbalanced. Only eight out of 25 members were from the northern clans and the Digle and Mirifle, who inhabit the large agro-pastoral regions of Bay and Bakool, were not represented.

Military officers directly accountable to the SRC replaced the regional and district administrations, followed by the formation of local revolutionary councils selected and chaired by governors and the district commissioners, appointed from the circles of the revolutionary party. The Charter of the revolution proclaimed equality, justice and the universal right to work. After a year in power, the SRC adopted Scientific Socialism as the country’s ideological orientation. This reflected the SRC’s heavy ideological and financial dependence on the Soviet Union.

The Somali people, disillusioned with the corrupt parliamentary rule of the previous nine years, welcomed the ‘bloodless revolution’ and placed their hopes in the change of government. In the initial years, therefore, the military leaders of the revolution had little difficulty eliciting community participation in their development programs. Revolutionary programs and slogans, disseminated through the ‘Hanuuninta’ (political orientation centres) or by radio sought to engineer a new socialist nation free from the bondage of ‘clanism’.

Intensive public campaigns were conducted against corruption, nepotism and clanism. An effigy of the clan was buried and burnt and the collective practice of diya-paying was abolished and replaced by death sentences and life imprisonment. A Public Relations Office was established to prepare the youth and intellectuals to become cadre of the revolution. In the early 1970s several ambitious development programmes were launched: state farms were formed in agricultural areas, a new Somali script was introduced in 1972, followed by a successful national literacy campaign, and a major resettlement operation was launched to assist nomads affected by the 1974/5 Daba-dheer (‘long tailed’) drought. Social services and basic infrastructure were expanded, a national university was established, family law was amended giving women more inheritance rights, and an embryonic industrial sector was started.

Despite these accomplishments, the grandiose socialist policies of the regime in the end only served to impoverish rural producers, who formed the majority of the population and the backbone of country’s economy, and intensify economic and social misery. The government Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) controlled grain market prices and distribution, allowing the farmer to retain only a portion for domestic consumption. The purchase of grain at prices controlled by the government discouraged food production and the country moved from a situation of food surplus to one of food deficit.

Government agencies also had a monopoly on other sectors such as the marketing and export of skins and the importation and distribution of food items. Over time, nationalized enterprises such as SNAI (Societa’ Nazionale Agricola Industriale - The Italian Jawhar Sugar Factory), SEIS (Societa Eletrica Italo-Somaalo - The Italo-Somali Electric Society) , tobacco importers, fuel-oil distributing companies, banks and insurance companies, began to work far below capacity. Nationalization and other economic policies left the country with large deficits and dependent on foreign borrowing and aid. By the 1980s, exports were in serious decline and the economy was characterized by massive corruption and raging hyperinflation. Faced with such troubles, the regime became more repressive. Rather than relying on orientation centres, greater powers were given to internal security forces to pursue its policies. These included the National Security Service (NSS) formed in 1970 from the former intelligence services, the Guulwadayaal (‘Victory Pioneers’) formed in 1973, which provided a community-level system of surveillance. Following Somalia’s defeat in the Somali-Ethiopian Ogaden war in 1978 and in response to internal strife within the army, the state terror agencies increased in number. The Haangash (military intelligence), Koofiyaad Cas (‘Red Berets’ – Presidential Guard), and the investigative organ of the government party (Baadhista xisbiga) were formed to further strengthen the regime’s power base. Repression and the violation of human rights and became the order of the day. A former Police Commander explained the powers of these security organizations: “With the exception of the social organizations, they all had powers of arrest, search and seizure of property, torture and detention with out trial. The social organizations fulfilled the role of intelligence”. (Qalib, 1995)

In a thinly veiled attempt to disguise the dictatorial nature of the military regime, and ostensibly to implement his own brand of socialism, Maxamaad Siyaad Barre founded the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in 1976. This involved forming a rubber stamp “Peoples’ Assembly” to legitimise his increasingly dictatorial regime. The purpose was not in fact to enlarge popular participation in public affairs, but strengthen the apparatus of control. Ensuring loyalty to the regime took precedence over development or good governance.

Party and administrative structures were established that linked the grassroots to the office of the President. Every 50 houses in the cities, towns and villages were linked together as a political unit (Tabeela). The next higher level was the Xaafada (‘Quarter’) with an orientation centre for mobilizing the community and spreading propaganda on the successes of the revolution. The regional and district administrations represented the party and were assisted by nominal local councils whose members were also well connected to the SRSP.

Opportunities for corruption proliferated at all levels within both the party and the administration. Despite the government’s declared intent to free the country from ‘clanism’, patronage, favoritism and nepotism were revived and became common practice in government circles. Certain clans were favored and rewarded for backing the regime. Key positions in the administration and the security forces were given to individuals related to the President, many of whom had little or no qualifications for their posts.

Under Barre, the Somali state’s combination of centralization and authoritarianism steadily undermined social and economic development, and incrementally disenfranchised a growing proportion of the population. As one report described, “Somalia’s government under the authoritarian rule of Siyaad Barre systematically shut out community input into the development agenda” (HDR, 1998).

Insurgency and civil war

Somalia’s defeat in the 1977/78 war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden is considered by many analysts as a watershed in Somali history, signalling the end of pan-Somali nationalism and the beginning of the disintegration of the Somali Democratic Republic. From 1978 onwards, the proliferation of clan-based rebel groups kept Somalia in a constant state of political and military turmoil.
* One major consequence of the Ogaden war was a mass influx of mainly ethnic Somali refugees from Ethiopia. The country hosted roughly 1.5 million refugees, representing some 40% of the population of Somalia (Bradbury, 1997). Of the 41 refugee camps throughout Somalia, 12 were located in the Hargeysa-Boraame region (Said S Samatar, 1991). Fear that Isaaq land and rights would be usurped by Ogadeen and the Oromo refugees was one of the causes of the SNM’s challenge to the regime. The refugees caused widespread land degradation, while food aid for the refugees discouraged local farm production. In return for hosting the refugees the regime received a great deal of foreign aid. Much of this was later used to wage war against the armed insurgents and many refugees were recruited by the military to fight, particularly against the SNM in the north.

In April 1978, one month after the ceasefire with Ethiopia, a group of Majeerteen military officers launched an abortive coup, triggering brutal government reprisals in their home regions. These disaffected military officers went on to establish the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1979, which launched attacks against the regime from bases in Ethiopia. The SSDF was followed in 1981 by the formation of the mainly Isaaq Somali National Movement (SNM) in the northwest, and in 1989 by the United Somali Congress (USC, Hawiye) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM, Ogadeen).

In response to the SNM uprising, the regime launched both a military and economic war against the Isaaq. The system of Franco valuta, introduced in the 1970s in the north to facilitate trade and commerce, was terminated. In 1983 local qaad farms were burned out and uprooted and northern merchants were refused import-export licenses. As the military situation deteriorated, martial rule and a night-time curfew were imposed in Hargeysa. Civilians suspected of being SNM supporters were subject to arbitrary arrest and detention; torture and summary execution became commonplace. In 1984 the government army massacred civilians in Burco and Hargeysa. In 1988, when the SNM attacked and captured Hargeysa and Burco, the Somali military responded with aerial bombardments of Hargeysa, virtually destroying the towns. People fled to neighbouring countries for refuge. In Ethiopia alone, approximately 360,000 refugees resided in the camps of Awaare, Kaamabokor, Rabbasso, Daroor, Aishaca and Hartasheekha (Said S Samatar, 1991)7.

A gradual intensification of conflict between the disparate rebel forces and the government eventually forced the Barre regime from power on 26th January 1991. As the USC took control of Mogadishu, the SNM took control in the north-west. The SNM The Somali National Movement (SNM), based in Ethiopia, was founded in London in 1981 by a group of former politicians and civil servants. The movement aimed primarily to topple the Siyaad Barre regime and aimed to replace him and his government with a more democratic and decentralized system.

The SNM lacked unifying ideology and was organized essentially as a coalition of sub-clans, each supporting its fighting militia with supplies of food and other resources. This was coupled by contradictions between urban elite from urban centres and the bulk of the fighting forces from nomadic communities whose support the movement desperately needed.

Despite the difficulties and controversy that attended that SNM’s war effort, its decentralised leadership, its democratic transfers of power and its institutionalisation of traditional leadership8 are counted among the SNM’s more valued legacies to post war Somaliland. The SNM’s essentially democratic nature also contributed to the succeed of the Burco peace conference of 1991 and the relatively smooth hand-over of the SNM leadership to a civil administration in May 1993.

The SNM Interim Government

[GENERAL_SNM]

How peace was achieved...

The SNM Interim Government

Following their defeat of the Barre forces in January 1991, the first task of the SNM leadership was to seek peace and reconciliation between the northern clans. Between 15 and 27 February 1991, the SNM convened the first of several peace conferences, the ‘Shirka Walaalaynta Beelaha Waqooyi’ (meaning ‘The Brotherhood Conference of the Northern Clans’), which sought to restore trust and confidence between the Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans who had fought on opposing sides during the war. The conference achieved what one observer has described as the SNM’s conciliatory policy of peaceful coexistence between all the clans (Drysdale, 1993).

The Berbera meeting prepared the ground for a larger conference of prominent clan elders and leaders from the north, convened in the city of Burco between 27 April and 18 May 1991. The conference, known as the ‘Grand Conference of Northern Clans’ (Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyi), took place in parallel with the meeting of the SNM Central Committee. The purpose of this conference was to continue the process of confidence building among the northern clans and to discuss the destiny of the region. After extensive consultations lasting nearly two months, the clan elders and SNM leaders approved the following resolutions:
* The withdrawal of the former British Somaliland Protectorate from the 1960 union with former Italian Somaliland, and restoration of its sovereignty
* The declaration of the Republic of Somaliland
* The continuation of peace-building in Somaliland.

On May 18, 1991, the SNM Central Committee formally announced the independence of the Republic of Somaliland and the formation of a transitional SNM administration to govern the territory for a two-year period.9 The incumbent SNM chairman, Cabdiraxmaan Axmad Cali ‘Tuur’, an experienced civil servant and diplomat, became President. The decision to withdraw from the union was taken with some reluctance by the SNM leadership (Drysdale 1993) – a reluctance due to their concerns about the state of the devastated country, a fear that international recognition would be difficult to achieve, and the preference of many of the SNM’s senior figures for a federal system of government for Somalia. However, particularly within the Issaq community, the call for independence was deeply popular, and was given urgency by the USC’s unilateral announcement of an interim government for Somalia on 27th January 1991 in Mogadishu.

Cabdiraxmaan Tuur formed his first cabinet at the end of May 1991. This consisted of eighteen Ministers, six of whom were non-Isaaq.10 The new administration faced the daunting task of rebuilding a war-torn country from scratch, with no financial and material resource base to draw on and limited international assistance.

The demobilization and reintegration of militia proved to be a particularly complex and problematic issue. After the defeat of Barre’s forces in 1991, many members of the SNM and clan militias voluntarily demobilized and returned to civilian life. But this spontaneous demobilization was offset by the mushrooming of irregular militias whose members included both war veterans and new recruits seeking to earn a living from banditry and extortion. Many of them occupied checkpoints along the main trade routes between towns, disrupting the flow of people and commercial goods. Some units controlled public facilities, such as ports and airports within their clan territories, collecting revenues and perpetuating insecurity. In 1993 the government of Somaliland estimated the armed clan militiamen to be demobilized and reintegrated at 50,000 (Niyathi, 1995).

Within a year the new administration faced a serious security problem. Unable to control the clan-based militias, the Tuur administration failed to restore law and order or to extend the administration’s authority beyond Hargeysa. The crisis was compounded by a power struggle with the political elite, who manipulated clan loyalties. In the absence of a common foe, cohesion between the Isaaq clans broke down, and competition over public resources became a new source of contention (Farah, 1997).

Wartime rivalries between the civilian and military wings of the SNM resurfaced. One group of SNM military commanders in particular, popularly known as the Calan Cas (Red Flag) faction, felt underrepresented in Tuur’s administration and began to coalesce as an opposition force. The collapse of SNM solidarity in the aftermath of the movement’s victory made it impossible to convene a meeting of the SNM Central Committee during the two-year tenure of the interim administration”.

The central committee was legally bound to meet every six months, though after the take over in 1991 the SNM found difficult to achieve this. In 1992, for example it failed to get a quorum at the May meeting because of difficulties of logistics and partly because of the problems connected with some SNM supporting clans at war in Berbera and reluctance of many members (Gilkes, 1993).

In January 1992 fighting broke out in Burco between two Isaaq clan militias, controlling the east and west halves of the town respectively. The fighting was triggered by the administration’s attempt to organize a national military force and to disarm clan militias. Since Tuur’s administration was locally perceived to be partisan, one part of the Burco community welcomed the force while the other 11 opposed it. The fighting, which lasted one week, displaced virtually the entire population of the town and resulted in hundreds of casualties from both sides. Elders from different regions, including prominent Isaaq elders cooperating with the government, mediated between the parties to restore peace and stability. Women in Hargeysa and Burco made public demonstrations for peace.

The government’s campaign to disarm militias and constitute a national force, however, continued. In March 1992, shortly after the battle in Burco, a government-supported militia force moved to Berbera, triggering a new standoff between pro-government and opposition forces. As in Burco, the population of Berbera was divided in its reaction to the government initiative. Efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to t he crisis failed, and fighting broke out in March, causing a mass exodus from the town. The fighting continued sporadically for over six months, until opposition forces managed to expel the pro-government militia from Berbera in October 1992. A special peace committee, known as the Kulanka (‘meeting’) comprising of thirty individuals equally selected from members of the cabinet and the opposition was organized to mediate the conflict. The Kulanka concluded that Berbera port should be placed under government control, but local leaders argued in response that all public facilities in the country should therefore be similarly treated.

The Gadabuursi clan elders, concerned about the potential spread of the war throughout Somaliland and utilizing their neutral status as non-Isaaqs, offered to mediate. Their Guurti 12 brokered an agreement by proposing a formula agreeable to all the parties. This stipulated that all public facilities in Somaliland, including airports, seaports, roads and fuel storage depots should be managed as state property.

The initial Gadabuursi initiative formed the basis for the constitution of a broader Somaliland Guurti. Having resolved the Berbera conflict, they proposed a further conference in the town of Sheekh to complete the peace process. That conference, which took place in October 1992, was attended by the Guurti from all the clans of Somaliland, who jointly brokered an agreement between Berbera’s warring clans. Although, the Kulanka had declared an immediate cease-fire, the Sheekh conference consolidated peace, underpinned by the following resolutions:
* Fixed assets taken during the war must be returned to owners on both sides.
* Militias should be withdrawn from the battlefield.
* All roads must be cleared from armed militias and be opened for traffic, especially the road between Burco and Berbera.
* Prisoners of war must be exchanged.

In addition, a further peace and reconciliation conference was proposed to consolidate the peace and discuss the future of the nation. Boorame was chosen as the location for the conference, because of its enduring stability and because the Gadabuursi clan had played a neutral and central role in reconciling the conflict over Berbera.

The Boorame Peace and Reconciliation Conference, January-May 1993

The 1993 Boorame conference has been described as the watershed of peace making and political development in Somaliland (Farah 1993). The Conference successfully concluded the inter-clan fighting and oversaw the transfer of power from the SNM to a new civilian administration. It also set the direction for governance in Somaliland and established a model for future peace processes in the Somali territories. After five months of serious deliberations the main outcomes of the conference were the following:
* A National Charter for Somaliland was adopted, which served as a working constitution for Somaliland from 1993-1997.
* A Peace Charter for the Somaliland clans was adopted, which laid down provisions for peace agreements to be mediated by the Guurti and set out methods and procedures for conflict resolution.
* A president and a vice president were elected.
* A parliament was formed comprising the 150 voting delegates of the conference.

The success of the Boorame conference can be attributed to a number of elements: the meticulous preparations of the organizing committee (see table 5), the fact that it was largely between them and the SNM’s military and political wings. In the 1990s in Somaliland, the Guurti represents clans in regional and national inter-clan peace conferences.

financed by Somaliland communities,13 and it operated according to a flexible time -frame.

The conference included 150 voting delegates of elders from almost all the clans of Somaliland,14 although an estimated 2,000 people actually attended and were hosted by the Boorame community. The conference lasted for five months, allowing for interventions by religious leaders and other facilitators to break any deadlocks, and for separate clan and subclan meetings to take place as needed.

Table 1. Major Reconciliation Conferences in Somaliland, 1991-97

Clans Meeting place... Duration Name of Meeting

1 National Berbera 15-27 Feb 1991
The Brotherhood Conference of Northern Clans
2 National Burco 27 April - 18 May 1991

The Grand Conference of Northern clans

3 Dhulbahante & habarjeclo Yagoori Feb 1991
4 Warsangali &habar-yoonis Yube 18 June Yube I
5 Habar-yoonis & Warsangali Yube 6-9 October 1991 Yube II
6 Habar-yoonis, Habar-jeclo & Dhulbahante

Oog 30 October 1991

7 Warsangali & Habar-jeclo Ceel-Qoxle 10 May 1991
8 Gadabuursi & Isaaq Boorame 17-19 Feb 1991 Guul Alla
9 Baha Samaroon & Jibriil Abokar

Boorame 17-19 Oct 1992

10 Reer Nur & Jibriil Abokor Boorame
11 Habar-Awal & Gadabuursi Haargeysa
10 Dhulbahante & Habarjeclo Kulal/Awrboo

gays 1-22 June 1992

11 Habar-jeclo, Warsangali &Gahayle Shinbiraale 16-22 Aug 1992
12 Dhulbahante & Habar-jeclo Xudun 1 Sept 1992
13 Habar-yoonis & Warsangali Jiidali 5-9 Nov 1993
14 Habar-jeclo, Dhulbahante, Warsangali

& Gahayle Garadag 23 Nov - 1 Dec 1993

15 Warsangali & Gahayle Dararweyne 2 Jan - 5 Feb 1993
16 Sanaag region Ceerigaabo 1993
17 Gadabuursi eastern clans &
Sacadmuuse
18 Gadabuursi & Issa Geerisa
19 Gadabuursi & Issa Agabar
20 Habar Yoonis/Ciisa Musa Sheikh 28 Oct – 8 Nov 1992 Tawfiiq
21 Dhulbahante/ Habar Yoonis Dararweyne 2 Jan - 5 Feb 1993 Khaatumo
22 Warsangali/ Habar

Yoonis Jiideli 6-9 Oct 1992

23 Habar Yoonis/Ciisa Musa Hargeysa 4 Oct 1992
24 Warsangali/Habar-jalo 11-18 Aug 1992
25 National Boorame 24 Jan - May 1993 Allaa Mahadleh
26 National Ceerigaabo
27 Ciidagale Xarshin 1995
28 Ciidagale Kaam-Abokor 1995
29 Habar-yoonis & Habarjeclo Gaashaamo 1996
30 Habar-yoonis & Habar-jeclo Baaldhaye 1996
31 Habar-yoonis & Habar-jeclo Duruqsi 1996
32 Habar-yoonis & Habarjeclo Beer 1996
33 Reer-nuur & Jibriil Abokor Gabilay 1996
The Cigaal Administration, May 1993 to February 1997

On the basis of the interim Charter agreed to at Boorame, a two-year transitional government was formed. On May 5 1993, Maxamad Xaaji Ibraahim Cigaal, a prominent Isaaq politician, and Prime Minister of the last civilian Somali government in 1969, was elected as the President. Cabdiraxmaan Aw Cali Faarax, an SNM colonel from the Gadabuursi clan, was elected as his Vice President.

Importantly, the National Charter defined a hybrid system of government. This comprised a bicameral legislature including an elected House of Representatives and a Council of Elders, or Guurti, a Presidential Executive, and an independent judiciary. 15 The new government differed from the previous SNM administration in two main ways:
* It possessed a broader base in terms of political participation and representation. Although the smaller and minority clans were not represented in the conference, non-Isaaq clans were given better representation compared the previous administration.
* The role of traditional clan leaders was institutionalised in one of the central political institutions of the state, as a check on the executive and the elected representatives. The newly formed government took immediate steps to implement the mandate of the National Charter. The government began by forming a “national army” and disarming clan militias in the western regions (Hargeysa and Awdal). Much progress was achieved, and by by 1995 the national army numbered 5,000 (NDC, 1994). The nucleus of an administration was formed and public sector institutions were revived. An environment favourable for repatriation was created and, with the help of UNHCR, a process of voluntary repatriation from Ethiopia commenced in 1994.

Also in 1994 the government introduced a new Somaliland currency with the assistance of some of the country’s big businessmen. The new currency generated mixed reactions. The government asserted that the issue of new currency was consistent with their mandate to enhance Somaliland’s status as an independent state, while the opposition feared that it would empower the President and his clan. Many Somalilanders consider the new currency as one of the principal causes of the war that erupted in Somaliland in November 1994.

Many others, however, argue that the new Somaliland currency was a turning point for the creation of the Somaliland State, uplifted the rebuilding government institutions, and protected the Somaliland economy from the rampant inflation that subsequently affected the Somali shilling.

The administration of President Cigaal was more inclusive than that of his predecessor in terms of clan participation, both in the Executive and in the Parliament. However, not all grievances had been settled at Boorame and some groups were not yet satisfied by the formula for political representation. Politicians of the Habar Yoonis, the clan of the former President Tuur, almost immediately expressed their dissatisfaction with the election of Cigaal as well as the number of seats accorded the clan in the parliament and the allocation of only one ministry in the cabinet to the clan. Furthermore, the inclusion in Cigaal’s cabinet of members of the Calan Cas, who had opposed Tuur, was seen by some Habar Yoonis political leaders as a provocation. Although, the proportional representation of Isaaq clans in the administration was based on a formula agreed at the 1990 SNM congress in Balligubadle, the Habar Yoonis, having lost the Presidency, now contested their allocation. A Somali proverb described their mood: ‘Libaax laba raqood lagama wada kiciyo’ (‘Do not attempt to make a lion surrender two carcasses.’)

In July 1993, the Habar Yoonis held a conference in Burco, known as ‘Libaan I’, to discuss their political position. The conference concluded by declaring the withdrawal of Habar Yoonis cooperation from the government. The following year, members of the Habar Yoonis opposition organized ‘Libaan II’ – at conference at which it was agreed that the Cigaal government was illegitimate. A group of Garxajis political leaders led by Cabdiraxmaan Tuur subsequently declared themselves in favour of a federation between Somaliland and Somalia, and joined the Muqdisho-based “government” of General Maxamed Faarax Caydiid. Not all Garxajis agreed with the decisions of Liibaan II, which many described as being a political gathering rather than a clan conference, and rejected the alliance with Caydiid. These developments set the stage for a serious military confrontation between the government and an increasingly entrenched opposition.

The peace accords reached at Boorame in 1993 and the new National Charter had given the government control of major public infrastructure. This included Hargeysa airport, which fell within territory controlled by Ciidagale militia associated with the opposition leadership. Extensive talks and consultations between the government and the airport militia failed to persuade the militia to peacefully hand over the airport to government control. Although Ciidagale senior elders worked closely with the government to defuse the crisis, they were unable to persuade either the militia or their political backers to desist from a confrontation.

In November 1994, government forces moved to wrest control of Hargeysa airport from the militia, and fighting erupted. The clashes displaced many people from Hargeysa and divided the city into two halves. The conflict rapidly escalated into a war between the government and its associated clan militias on one side, commonly known as Marya-alool,16 and the opposition militia on the other. In 1995 the fighting spread to Burco: again thousands of people were displaced and the city was extensively mined and destroyed. Despite subsequent characterization of the conflict as a war between the government clan coalition and a Garxajis opposition, it essentially involved only the political leadership and military forces on both sides, and failed to engage their clan “constituencies.”

The government’s term ended in the middle of the conflict. In order to avoid a political vacuum, it was extended by the Parliament for another one and half years, from September 1995. Neither the government nor the opposition was able to win a decisive victory and in the end this induced the government to seek a peaceful solution. Without a formal ceasefire agreement between the warring parties, Somaliland’s second civil war was brought to an end by a series of inter-clan conferences,17 which culminated in the second national Shirbeeleed held in Hargeysa between December 1996 and February 1997.18

The Hargeysa Peace and Reconciliation Conference, October 1996-February 1997

The Hargeysa Shir-beeleed signalled the formal conclusion of the 1994-6 war. Like Boorame the conference employed the Beel system of representation to work out a new power-sharing formula – one that addressed the grievances of the opposition, particularly the Habar Yoonis among the Garxajis19. This conference also benefited the minorities. The Habar Yoonis clan gained five more seats in Parliament. Cigaal also gave them four cabinet posts and several assistant ministerial posts. The Madigaan, Akisho, Abba-yoonis, Gurggure, Jibraa’iil, Gahayle, Gabooye and the Carab minority clans who were not represented at Boorame, were given representation in the parliament through the addition of nine new seats.

The differences between the 1993 Boorame conference and the 1997 Hargeysa conference are noteworthy. Unlike Boorame, the Hargeysa meeting was organized and funded by the government. Whereas 150 delegates took part in the Boorame conference, Hargeysa was attended by a total of three hundred and fifteen delegates. These comprised the one hundred fifty parliamentary members who had been named at Boorame, plus one hundred and sixty five new delegates representing all the clans of the Somaliland20.

Instead of bringing about a change of leadership, the Hargeysa conference reinstated the incumbent President and Parliament. In February 1997, the conference re-elected Cigaal as President and named Daahir Rayaale Kaahin as the new Vice President21 for a term of five years. It also appointed the 164 members of House of Representatives and House of Guurti for a further five years and six years respectively.

Finally, the conference replaced the National Charter with a provisional constitution, which had been a bone of contention between the Executive and the House of Representatives during the previous term (see the section on the Constitution below). This provisional document stipulated the validation of the constitution by referendum, the introduction of a multiparty political system, and the holding of elections within the term of office of the new administration. Critics of the Hargeysa conference have described it as an undemocratic exercise dominated by one circle within the political elite. Allegations that the process was heavily manipulated by the incumbent government and its supporters damaged perceptions of the viability of the shir beeleed as a vehicle for democratic political change and highlighted the necessity of exploring alternatives.

Despite these shortcomings, the successful completion of the Hargeysa conference enabled Somaliland’s political, economic and social reconstruction to continue. In the years following the conference, significant progress was made in a number of important ways. Peace and stability were consolidated and government administration was extended to much of Togdheer and Sanaag regions in eastern Somaliland, areas that previous administrations had failed to reach. The prevalence of peace and stability attracted both international assistance and private investment to Somaliland and cooperation between the government and foreign aid agencies improved, albeit modestly. More than 60 or so international agencies operate in Somaliland. Generally in Somalia, Donors adopted ‘peace dividend’ approach, conditioning aid on security and good governance, a policy aimed to invest in the more politically stable areas of the former Somalia. “The restoration of security in Somaliland is reflected in the larger proportions of international aid channeled to the region since 1997 and the reorientation of aid programs from rehabilitation to development” (HDR, 2001). A more efficient administration oversaw an increase in annual revenues from $20 million to $37 million over the period in 1999 to 2001. The government managed to pay off its internal debts and balance its budget, even as it strengthened government ministries and para-statal agencies.

The re-imposition of a ban on Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia slashed Somaliland’s export earnings and government revenues. Household incomes also suffered, particularly in pastoral areas. The lion’s share of government revenue continued to be absorbed by security needs. According to government figures, in 1999 almost 83% of the national budget was dedicated to the security forces and general administration. Only 10% remained for social spending, while 7% was allocated for ‘economic’ purposes (WSP/SCPD, 2000). The proportion of security spending increased again in 2001, against a significantly smaller absolute budget.

Somaliland continued to face political challenges to its authority from the Puntland administration, which laid claim to parts of eastern Sanaag and Sool regions, and the newly established administration in Muqdisho, which enjoyed a limited degree of international recognition as a Transitional National Government claiming jurisdiction over both Somalia and Somaliland. Against this backdrop, Somaliland entered the most difficult and delicate stage of its political transition.

The Constitution and the Legalization of Political Parties

On May 31st 2001, Somaliland’s provisional constitution was approved through a general referendum, superseding the National Charter agreed to at Boorame in 1993, and signaling the transition from the beel system to a multiparty system of government. The preparation of the constitution had been long delayed by a disagreement over the respective responsibilities of the legislature and the executive. The 1993 National Charter had given legislature the responsibility for formulating the new constitution, while the executive was given powers of execution. In January 1994, the House of Representatives nominated 10 members from the House and appointed a secretary to draft the Somaliland Constitution. A consultative body of 25 members representing all regions of the country and various groups of society advised this committee. This body consisted of five categories: traditional elders, politicians, judges/lawyers, cultural experts and religious leaders. However, later that year the President also contracted a Sudanese lawyer to draft a new constitution, triggering a direct confrontation with the legislature. Predictably, the main difference between the drafts lay in the balance of powers between the legislature and the executive: the parliament’s draft gave more powers to the former, and the president’s draft favoured the latter.

By 1996, the dispute had created such a serious split within the House of Representatives that the legislature almost collapsed. According to one analyst: “Government loyalists unconstitutionally chose a new speaker of the House of Representatives; the opposition lost the game and the house speaker associated with the opposition lost his post”. The constitutional process became deadlocked.

In 1997 the Hargeysa conference briefly overcame the stalemate by combining the two drafts and producing a new provisional constitution. However, Cigaal was not satisfied with the hybrid draft, complaining that “the constitution has been skewed”(‘Distoorkii laaxin baa galay’) according to one workshop participant. The process remained at an impasse until the year 2000 when a 45-person joint committee from the executive and the legislature together reviewed amendments of the provisional constitution proposed by the executive. The Parliament approved the final version after it received additional powers over finance and approval of public appointments.

A national referendum on the constitution was initially scheduled to take place in March 2001, when provisional constitution was due to expire. Anticipating delays in the preparation of the referendum, however, led the legislature extended the viability of the provisional constitution for a further six months, beginning 17th March 2001. The referendum took place two months later on 31st May 2001. Official figures indicated that 1.18 million people voted and that the constitution was approved by 96.65% of the vote. Approval of the constitution paved the way for local government elections, leading to general parliamentary and presidential elections. Initially, these were scheduled to take place before the expiry of the government’s term on 23 February 2002. However, by August 2001, several important pieces of legislation necessary for the establishment of a multiparty system and for the conduct of fair elections had still not been prepared. These included laws pertaining to the formation of an Electoral Commission, confirmation of regional and district administrative units, demarcation of electoral constituencies, voter registration and citizenship laws.

[Jamac_Yare]

iga daa inadeer shubaan ba iga qabtaay