SNM the heroes

[Steeler [Crawler2]]

OK, I have to wade in here.

The SNM, as militias go, had a remarkable record of restraint. There were certainly atrocities committed by its members, but overall it was a well disciplined force with a decent human rights record which maintained it's integrity when Siad Barre was defeated. This can NOT be said for the USC, which has a remarkably poor human rights record, which had far less discipline, and inferior military leadership.

I am not a fan of insurgent movements, because I believe they have a strong tendency to operate completely outside the rule of law, but the SNM has a relatively good military and human rights record and compares favorably with any other insurgent movement in the world in this regard. On a side note, the decision by the SNM to seize and attempt to hold Hargeisa was incredibly foolish - they never had a chance - and caused the destruction of that city. However, this was a military miscalculation, not an act of deliberately destruction.

[gurey25]

Thats becuase the SNM was answerable to the people.
It was a democratic movement and had at least 4 chairmen in 10 years.
All major decisions were agreed on by concsesus.
most of the weapons were either captured or payed for from contributions.

compare that to the SSDF that were given weapons and funding and were unanswerable to nobody but ethiopia.

[Sadaam_Mariixmaan]

SSDF were Lapdogs of Ethiopia

[Steeler [Crawler2]]

But Abdullahi Yusuf did do a good job of consolidating our their gains north of Galcaio and estblishing some sort of stability. Not as good a record as that of the SNM, but clearly a superior one to the SPM or USC.

[Sadaam_Mariixmaan]

[quote="MAD MAC"]But Abdullahi Yusuf did do a good job of consolidating our their gains north of Galcaio and estblishing some sort of stability. Not as good a record as that of the SNM, but clearly a superior one to the SPM or USC.[/quote]


what do u think of the SNF?


and For that matter the JVA??

[COSTA]

These dead soldiers got nothing to do with the Somalian civil war

its the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csFC932fl78

Cadaadleey media are worse than Shabeele + Idimaale

[Steeler [Crawler2]]

JVA fell apart. Too many players in the Juba Valley to placate.

SNF is a non-factor.

[Mooge_88]

Muj.Mohamed Mooge was right about it when he sang this song

''Kii halgamii lahaayow''
'' kii ka seexaan lahaaba''
''Taariikhi way kala hadhi''
''Weyna kala hufmaysaa''
Xisbigan(SNM) heegan ka ahay''.
Kuusha waa u Hadhaayaa.''

God bless their souls,the fallen SNM heroes.

[DR-YALAXOOW]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csFC932fl78&NR

waryaaa brother isaaq this video is war between ethiopia and ereteria 1998 meeydka tirada baddan ee dhulka jiifa waa ethiopians loool codka ayaad badasheen ku kor duubteen bbc somali ka hadleyso.'
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csFC932fl78&NR

this video waa ethiopiand ereteria war nothing to do 1988 isaaq vz siyaad bare goverment


wax yar aan ku xasuusiyo so called snm xitaa tuuulo isaaqland ah ma qabsan ilaa USC ay siyaad bare ka eryadeen somalia even after 3 days SNM burco berbera hargeysa waa imaan waayeen inaa amar la siiyey cidankii dawladii dhacdey ee siyad bare inay isaaqa dhulkooda uga baxaan after that SNM come burco hargeysa berbera waa after siyaad bare ay rideen USC.


DAWLADII SIYAAD BARE WAXAA RIDEY ONLY USC HAWIYE.

SO CALLED SSDF AND SNM WAA FASHILMEEN WAA LA JABIYEY LABADOODA

[XidigtaJSL]

SNM Executive Committee Memorandum

Somaliland: On The Restoration of Its Sovereignty And Independence

INTRODUCTION

In the checkered history of the old Somali Republic (July 1960-June 1991), two facts need not be forgotten: Somaliland created that Republic and Somaliland brought it to an end. The former occasion was indeed euphoric, the latter remains written in indelible blood. On both occasions, Somaliland was well within its rights. Somaliland's ill-started dream of a greater Somalia dates back to the close of the Second World War. As that famous and fateful wind of change began to sweep across Africa, the people of Somaliland found themselves consumed by a vision of a Greater Somalia, i.e. the unity of the five Somali's comprising the British protectorate of Somaliland, ex-Italian trusteeship territory of Somalia, Eastern Ethiopia, Djibouti and North-East Kenya.

As the first Somalia territory to win outright independence in June 1960, Somaliland could hardly wait for the independence of the other Somali territories. The second to gain independence was ex-Italian Somalia on 1st July1960. Somaliland offered them immediate and unconditional unity. When Somalia appeared hesitant, Somaliland allowed them to take the Presidency, Premiership, the majority of seats in the cabinet and the new Assembly as well as the command of both the army and police. Such profligacy was to prove portentous.

The third Somali territory to gain independence was North-East Kenya in 1961. In a plebiscite held by the British colonial authority, they voted overwhelmingly to join the Somali Republic. It took two international telephone calls between an Emperor, a President and a Premier to put paid to the wishes of these Somalis as well as the career of one British Colonial Secretary. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia phoned President Kennedy in Washington who in turn dialed his friend, Prime minister Harold Macmillan in London and Ian Macleod, the then British Colonial Secretary who countermanded, and resigned. Somaliland's dream of a Greater Somalia suffered its first external blast.

The fourth Somali territory to achieve statehood was Djibouti in 1977. Djibouti had a good look at the by now dysfunctional unity of the Somali Republic and declined to join it. The fifth attempt towards a greater Somalia came in 1977-78 when the Somali dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, decided to take Eastern Ethiopia by force and invaded that country. That, too, proved to be a failure. With Somaliland's original vision of a Greater Somalia, geopolitically in tatters, the inner workings of the merger of the ex-Italian Somalia was itself to prove another misadventure. The naivety of the political leaders of Somaliland in allowing the Southerners to occupy almost all the high offices of state inevitably resulted in a political takeover rather than a merger of equals. Soon, Somaliland was treated as an administered province and later as an occupied territory. Thus, Somaliland's grand dream of Somali unity was sunk by the twin currents of external geopolitical offensive re-enforced by the cold war and an internal breakdown of political equity.

THE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF SOMALILAND

The refusal thus far by the international community to recognize the newly reborn Republic of Somaliland is based on a) disreputable politics, and b) a false representation of international law.

THE CASE AGAINST RECOGNITION

Firstly, the disreputable politics is no secret that many countries in Africa and the Arab World have an inordinate fear of themselves breaking up into separate states. Anyone and anything redolent of secession drives them berserk; they automatically blackball any state remotely resembling a secessionist in case it sets up a precedent. This deep fear is now being played upon by a number of countries with various axes to grind in the Somali affair. Some African and Arab countries do not see a strong Ethiopia as being in their interest. They are beholden to the 19th century theory of the balance of the power of states and are obsessed with a united, powerful Somalia providing a deterrent to unbridled Ethiopian options. Even little Djibouti is frantic in its anti-Somaliland campaign under the smoke screen of its so-called Somalia reconciliation conference. Djibouti cannot put up with the prospect of a recognized prosperous Somaliland. They are desperately trying to prevent this from happening by asking the international community to push Somaliland back into the quagmire that is in Mogadishu.

Secondly, false application of international law is evident. Countries with such suspect political motives advance two arguments against Somaliland in terms of international law - unacceptable secession and the inviolability of the borders inherited from colonial rule i.e. inherited territorial integrity. Blinded by unprincipled political motives, these countries forget that neither the concept of secession nor the notion of the inviolability of the colonial boundaries applies in the case of Somaliland.

THE CASE FOR RECOGNITION

The concepts of territorial integrity and secession are two sides of a cumbersome legal-cum-political coin. First, you have to be integral to a thing before you can be accused of seceding from it. Somaliland, simply, has never been an integral province of ex-Italian Somalia. Somaliland has been a separate state within its own internationally recognized boundaries before, during and after the colonial period. Prior to the European colonial stage, Somaliland was aligned with the Ottoman Empire regime. During the European colonial era, the country was known as the British Protectorate of Somaliland.

Upon independence, on 26th June 1960, the country was recognized as the sovereign state of Somaliland. Hence, the current use of the name Somaliland intended to allude to its earlier separate identity. The reason why Somaliland could not be accused of being a secessionist state is because Somaliland had never been part and parcel of ex-Italian Somalia. For example, Katanga was part and parcel of the Congo during and after the colonial age. Biafra was part and parcel of Nigeria during and after the colonial period. Somaliland on the contrary, was a separate state before, during or immediately after colonial rule. How could they be dragged together into a binding common territorial integrity? The notion is absurd. Without territorial integrity in place, the question of secession does not arise. You have to have something that is wholly integrated first, before you can complain of a part of it breaking away at a later stage. The present boundaries of Somaliland are the same as on Independence Day, 26th June 1960, therefore, the restoration of the sovereign and statehood of Somaliland is neither in contravention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) policy of adherence to colonial boundaries, nor is it contrary to any territorial integrity of any relevance.

The relevant precedent for the restoration of the sovereignty and independence of Somaliland is the temporary merger of Syria and Egypt in the sixties. Here, as in the case of Somaliland and Somalia, two sovereign and independent countries decided voluntarily to merge and form a united state with a new name. However, their unity proved unworkable and the two original states re-emerged. Exactly the same thing happened in the case of Somaliland and Somalia. Only in this case, it took a bloody civil war to revert to the status ante.

The unity of Somaliland and Somalia had other major faults. The act of union was never ratified by a joint session of the two legislative assemblies. With the folly of unconditional unity soon apparent to the people of Somaliland, young military officers in the North attempted a coup d'etat the following year. In their subsequent trial, the court acquitted all the officers precisely because of the lack of an act of union joining the two Somali states and because of an oath of allegiance to the new united Republic of Somalia. The same year, a draft constitution of the new Somali Republic was put to a referendum in both states. The people of Somaliland rejected the draft constitution by a No vote of the large majority. But the constitution was adopted and implemented apparently legitimized solely by southern approval.

The concept of the self-determination of nations, put to such powerful effect in the ex-Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia, is indirectly relevant. Self-determination is normally directly applicable in a colonial setting or in a situation where there is valid territorial integrity but a province still wants to secede. The Somaliland case is neither. Nevertheless, the express wishes of the people of Somaliland would have to command respect. Once they decided to restore their sovereignty and independence, that decision precludes anybody else's say in their destiny. The people of Somaliland exercised their right under international law to rebel against a government guilty of exceptionally hideous violations of human rights. The United Nations office on genocide and ethnic cleansing expressed its recognition of the massacre of the population of Somaliland by the old Somalia regime. Therefore, the people of Somaliland are entitled under international law to exercise, inter-alia, their right to determine their destiny. The political reality of the current separation of Somaliland and Somalia and the bitter experience of the decade long national liberation struggle by the population of Somaliland against the totalitarian regime of Somalia clearly rule out any immediate resumption of the unity just demolished. The intensity of the war of liberation was such that it left no single family in Somaliland unscathed at the height of the cold war.

The Somali National Movement (SNM) set out to challenge the strongest military force in black Africa and won this decade long national liberation struggle. It has had two major abiding effects on the population of Somaliland: bitterness against the brutality of Somalia's oppression and overwhelming national confidence engendered by the people's victory over such incredible odds. The masses in Somaliland are not in the mood to allow anyone else to stand in their way, let alone little Djibouti.

WAY OUT OF THE PREDICAMENT

According to the 1933 Montevideo convention's classic definition of a state with regard to recognition, a state should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and capacity to enter into relations with other states. Somaliland obviously possesses these qualifications. Once a state satisfies such criteria of statehood, as Somaliland clearly does, there is no question in law that it becomes a subject of international law. Therefore, it is incumbent on the international community to proceed with the full diplomatic recognition of Somaliland without further delay. Somaliland, on its part, should prepare to hold a plebiscite on the question of the restoration of national sovereignty and independence. The international community would be invited to witness that the referendum is held in a free and fair manner. The result of this plebiscite should be recognized as settling the matter. SNM believes this will result in a resounding national vote in favor of the restoration of sovereignty and independence, Insha Allah. Once Somaliland attains the full diplomatic recognition it deserves, SNM proposes a further step. We recommend to the countries of the Horn of Africa to set up a regional economic cooperation leading to ever-closer political cooperation, along the lines of the European common market and European Union. We believe this will lead to regional economic development and to political harmony not just amongst the Somalis but also for the people of the region as a whole.

Hassan Essa Jama

SNM Acting Chairman

[XidigtaJSL]

Somali National Movement.

In April 1981, a group of Isaaq emigres living in London formed the Somali National Movement (SNM), which subsequently became the strongest of Somalia's various insurgent movements. According to its spokesmen, the rebels wanted to overthrow Siad Barre's dictatorship.

Additionally, the SNM advocated a mixed economy and a neutral foreign policy, rejecting alignment with the Soviet Union or the United States and calling for the dismantling of all foreign military bases in the region. In the late 1980s, the SNM adopted a pro-Western foreign policy and favored United States involvement in a post-Siad Barre Somalia. Other SNM objectives included establishment of a representative democracy that would guarantee human rights and freedom of speech.

Eventually, the SNM moved its headquarters from London to Addis Ababa to obtain Ethiopian military assistance, which initially was limited to old Soviet small arms.

In October 1981, the SNM rebels elected Ahmad Mahammad Culaid and Ahmad Ismaaiil Abdi as chairman and secretary general, respectively, of the movement. Culaid had participated in northern Somali politics until 1975, when he went into exile in Djibouti and then in Saudi Arabia. Abdi had been politically ctive in the city of Burao in the 1950s, and, from 1965 to 1967, had served as the Somali government's minister of planning. After the authorities jailed him in 1971 for antigovernment activities, Abdi left Somalia and lived in East Africa and Saudi Arabia.

The rebels also elected an eight-man executive committee to oversee the SNM's military and political activities.


On January 2, 1982, the SNM launched its first military operation against the Somali government. Operating from Ethiopian bases, commando units attacked Mandera Prison near Berbera and freed a group of northern dissidents.

According to the SNM, the assault liberated more than 700 political prisoners; subsequent independent estimates indicated that only about a dozen government opponents escaped. At the same time, other commando units raided the Cadaadle armory near Berbera and escaped with an undetermined amount of arms and ammunition. Mogadishu responded to the SNM attacks by declaring a state of emergency, imposing a curfew, closing gasoline stations to civilian vehicles, banning movement in or out of northern Somalia, and launching a search for the Mandera prisoners (most of whom were never found).

On January 8, 1982, the Somali government also closed its border with Djibouti to prevent the rebels from fleeing Somalia. These actions failed to stop SNM military activities. In October 1982, the SNM tried to increase pressure against the Siad Barre regime by forming a jointmilitary committee with the SSDF. Apart from issuing antigovernment statements, the two insurgent groups started broadcasting from the former Radio Kulmis station, now known as Radio Halgan (struggle).

Despite this political cooperation, the SNM and SSDF failed to agree on a common strategy against Mogadishu. As a result, the alliance languished. In February 1983, Siad Barre visited northern Somalia in a campaign to discredit the SNM. Among other things, he ordered the release of numerous civil servants and businessmen who had been arrested for antigovernment activities, lifted the state of emergency, and announced an amnesty for Somali exiles who wanted to return home.

These tactics put the rebels on the political defensive for several months. In November 1983, the SNM Central Committee sought to regain the initiative by holding an emergency meeting to formulate a more aggressive strategy. One outcome was that the military wing--headed by Abdulqaadir Kosar Abdi, formerly of the SNA--assumed control of the Central Committee by ousting the civilian membership from all positions of power.

However, in July 1984, at the Fourth SNM Congress, held in Ethiopia, the civilians regained control of the leadership. The delegates also elected Ahmad Mahammad Mahamuud "Silanyo" SNM chairman and reasserted their intention to revive the alliance with the SSDF.After the Fourth SNM Congress adjourned, military activity in northern Somalia increased. SNM commandos attacked about a dozen government military posts in the vicinity of Hargeysa, Burao, and Berbera. According to the SNM, the SNA responded by shooting 300 people at a demonstration in Burao, sentencing seven youths to death for sedition, and arresting an unknown number of rebel sympathizers. In January 1985, the government executed twenty-eight people in retaliation for antigovernment activity.


Between June 1985 and February 1986, the SNM claimed to have carried out thirty operations against government forces in northern Somalia. In addition, the SNM reported that it had killed 476 government soldiers and wounded 263, and had captured eleven vehicles and had destroyed another twenty-two, while losing only 38 men and two vehicles. Although many independent observers said these figures were exaggerated, SNM operations during the 1985-86 campaign forced Siad Barre to mount an international effort to cut off foreign aid to the rebels.

This initiative included reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Libya in exchange for Tripoli's promise to stop supporting the SNM.Despite efforts to isolate the rebels, the SNM continued military operations in northern Somalia. Between July and September 1987, the SNM initiated approximately thirty attacks, including one on the northern capital, Hargeysa; none of these, however, weakened the government's control of northern Somalia. A more dramatic event occurred when a SNM unit kidnapped a Medecins Sans Frontieres medical aid team of ten Frenchmen and one Djiboutian to draw the world's attention to Mogadishu's policy of impressing men from refugee camps into the SNA. After ten days,

the SNM released the hostages unconditionally. Siad Barre responded to these activities by instituting harsh security measures throughout northern Somalia. The government also evicted suspected pro-SNM nomad communities from the Somali-thiopian border region. These measures failed to contain the SNM. By February 1988, the rebels had captured three villages around Togochale, a refugee camp near the northwestern Somali- Ethiopian border. Following the rebel successes of 1987-88, Somali-Ethiopian relations began to improve. On March 19, 1988, Siad Barre and Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam met in Djibouti to discuss ways of reducing tension between the two countries. Although little was accomplished, the two agreed to hold further talks. At the end of March 1988, the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs, Berhanu Bayih, arrived in Mogadishu for discussions with a group of Somali officials, headed by General Ahmad Mahamuud Faarah.

On April 4, 1988, the two presidents signed a joint communique in which they agreed to restore diplomatic relations, exchange prisoners of war, start a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border area, and end subversive activities and hostile propaganda against each other. Faced with a cutoff of Ethiopian military assistance, the SNM had to prove its ability to operate as an independent organization.

Therefore, in late May 1988 SNM units moved out of their Ethiopian base camps and launched a major offensive in northern Somalia. The rebels temporarily occupied the provincial capitals of Burao and Hargeysa. These early successes bolstered the SNM's popular support, as thousands of disaffected Isaaq clan members and SNA deserters joined the rebel ranks. Over the next few years, the SNM took control of almost all of northwestern Somalia and extended its area of operations about fifty kilometers east of Erigavo. However, the SNM did not gain control of the region's major cities (i.e., Berbera, Hargeysa, Burao, and Boorama), but succeeded only in laying siege to them. With Ethiopian military assistance no longer a factor, the SNM's success depended on its ability to capture weapons from the SNA. The rebels seized numerous vehicles such as Toyota Land Cruisers from government forces and subsequently equipped them with light and medium weapons such as 12.7mm and 14.5mm machine guns, 106mm recoilless rifles, and BM-21 rocket launchers.

The SNM possessed antitank weapons such as Soviet B-10 tubes and RPG-7s. For air defense the rebels operated Soviet 30mm and 23mm guns, several dozen Soviet ZU23 2s, and Czech-made twin-mounted 30mm ZU30 2s. The SNM also maintained a small fleet of armed speed boats that operated from Maydh, fifty kilometers northwest of Erigavo, and Xiis, a little west of Maydh. Small arms included 120mm mortars and various assault rifles, such as AK-47s, M-16s, and G-3s. Despite these armaments, rebel operations, especially against the region's major cities, suffered because of an inadequate logistics system and a lack of artillery, mine-clearing equipment, ammunition, and communications gear. To weaken Siad Barre's regime further, the SNM encouraged the formation of other clan-based insurgent movements and provided them with political and military support. In particular, the SNM maintained close relations with the United Somali Congress (USC), which was active in central Somalia, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which operated in southern Somalia. Both these groups sought to overthrow Siad Barre's regime and establish a democratic form of government.

The USC, a Hawiye organization founded in 1989, had suffered from factionalism based on subclan rivalries since its creation. General Mahammad Faarah Aidid commanded the Habar Gidir clan, and Ali Mahdi Mahammad headed the Abgaal clan. The SPM emerged in March 1989, after a group of Ogaden officers, led by Umar Jess, deserted the SNA and took up arms against Siad Barre. Like theUSC, the SPM experienced a division among its ranks. The moderates, under Jess, favored an alliance with the SNM and USC and believed that Somalia should abandon its claims to the Ogaden. SPM hardliners wanted to recapture the Ogaden and favored a stronger military presence along the Somali-Ethiopian border.

On November 19, 1989, the SNM and SPM issued a joint communique announcing the adoption of a "unified stance on internal and external political policy." On September 12, 1990, the SNM concluded a similar agreement with the USC. Then, on November 24, 1990, the SNM announced that it had united with the SPM and the USC to pursue a common military strategy against the SNA. Actually, the SNM had concluded the unification agreement with Aidid, which widened the rift between the two USC factions. By the beginning of 1991, all three of the major rebel organizations had made significant military progress. The SNM had all but taken control of northern Somalia by capturing the towns of Hargeysa, Berbera, Burao, and Erigavo. On January 26, 1991, the USC stormed the presidential palace in Mogadishu, thereby establishing its control over the capital.

The SPM succeeded in overrunning several government outposts in southern Somalia. The SNM-USC-SPM unification agreement failed to last after Siad Barre fled Mogadishu. On January 26, 1991, the USC formed an interim government, which the SNM refused to recognize. On May 18, 1991, the SNM declared the independence of the Republic of Somaliland. The USC interim government opposed this declaration, arguing instead for a unified Somalia. Apart from these political disagreements, fighting broke out between and within the USC and SPM.

The SNM also sought to establish its control over northern Somalia by pacifying clans such as the Gadabursi and the Dulbahante. To make matters worse, guerrilla groups proliferated; by late 1991, numerous movements vied for political power, including the United Somali Front (Iise), Somali Democratic Alliance (Gadabursi), United Somali Party (Dulbahante), Somali Democratic Movement (Rahanwayn), and Somali National Front (Mareehaan). The collapse of the nation state system and the emergence of clan-based guerrilla movements and militias that became governing authorities persuaded most Western observers that national reconciliation would be a long and difficult process.

[DawladSade]

[quote="Enemy_Of_Mad_Mullah"]WALLAHI FAQASH GOT FUKED FAKIN PU55YS

ALL THEY COULD DO IS BOMB THE INNOCENT CIVILIANS..

MY AYEEYOS MOM DIED IN THE BOMBING, WAT A DISGRACE..


MAY ALLAH DESTROY MAREXAAR![/quote]


walle kan wuu isku xaaray.

if you will blame ppl, blame ppl that should be blamed. siad barre was in a coma in jidda when the bombings happened you idiot. that is after the big car accident.

blame the people who signed and collobrated to finish off the snm, gen morgan who was the commander there and made a deal with the rhodesians, cabdiqasim who was interior minister and signed the deal, and cali samantar who as acting president ok'ed it, maxaad kaloo ka hadlaysiin?? afar iyo labaatan saac mareexaan baad dhaqan ka dhigataan inaad dabo haysatiin

btw that video is from the ethiopian/eritrean war you isaaq are taking victimization to a whole new level, intaad oran lahaydeen al xamdulilaah much more suffering hadnt occured yaadba alle u baryaysaan more of you could have been killed

pitiful wallahi, dadku waabay raganimo lahaayeen xitaa hadii la dilay oran jireen walle inaan nala dilin ee yaa nagu dhaco, idinkuna dhanka jereerta american waa inala gumayste caado ka dhigtay yaad u ekaateenba

[XidigtaJSL]

SNM was a very sophisticated organization, extremely democratic, unlike SSDF. Four democratically elected chairmen, radio Halgan and a newspaper

[DawladSade]

[quote="XidigtaJSL"]SNM was a very sophisticated organization, extremely democratic, unlike SSDF. Four democratically elected chairmen, radio Halgan and a newspaper[/quote]


No offense Xiddig but the whole reason majeerteen crawled back to Siyaad was to make sure to turn you and the kacaan against each other.

when the majeerteen committed treason against the somalis by trying to take advantage at a time of national confusion and low morale after our defeat by the communist world, it is why they tried to enroll you and the hawiye but everyone knows how you isaaq responded in honor and dignity by being above the gun, then of course it was when their poets started employging stuff like "what is it to you, me and siyaad are both daarood" waan iskaga kaa xignaa and then they joined the government with the explicit purpose to use the government's name to raise you up against attrocities the government was committin against you even though it was majeerteen hitting two birds with one stone, one hand making more opposition to siyaad by using his name to subjuguate you and another as revenge for embarassing them infront of somalis by reminding them of their treason. even cilmiile does not hid this.

then of course you isaaqs bought it...

that is why recently i have been fully understanding why you rose, you aren't really bad its just you were just used by the majeerteen

[abucubeed]

dont make sing ninkii jabaaya ha jabo jaala siyaad aan lajirna