from the same link as brother salahudin has provided may Allah reward him.
now people will say we attacking the salaf al saleh..
Combatting Terrorism Center
http://ctc.usma.edu/publications/publications.asp
From Stealing Al-Qaida's playbook
One could be forgiven for failing to understand why Abu Qatada was so
angry: Madkhali is not well‐known in the West and he is no longer a
person of much influence in Saudi Arabia. But in the 90s, he was incredibly
influential in Saudi Arabia (and he still has a large following among
Muslims in Europe).* Much of this influence derived from the support he
received from the Saudi government. During and after the first Gulf War,
the Saudi government faced intense criticism from the leaders of the Sahwa
movement (a politically active strain of Wahhabism) for allowing U.S.
troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia.
These leaders had a large following,
particularly among the youth. To blunt their appeal, the Saudi government
arrested the movement’s leaders and strongly backed Madkhali, who
supported the regime, was politically quietist, and, most importantly, was
effective at siphoning off potential Sahwa recruits, particularly among the
youth.
Aside from Saudi support, two things account for much of Madkhali’s
popularity among the youth: he used cassette tapes to spread his message41
and he was quite skillful at discrediting his opponents. As an example of
the latter, one of his favorite tactics was to call jihadis “Qutbis” rather than
Salafis, since they agreed with the political doctrines of Sayyid Qutb, a
leading jihadi thinker who was executed by the Egyptian government in the
60s. Doing this denied them the legitimacy of being known as Salafis,
followers of the pious forefathers, and suggested that they were members of
a deviant sect. To this end, another of Madkhali’s effective tactics was to
force an opponent to acknowledge that Sayyid Qutb, whose teachings he
followed, had made a number of theological statements that were at
variance with orthodoxy; thus, his followers were heretics too.
* For example, in 2002, four hundred followers gathered in a French mosque to hear a
badly‐relayed phone call from Madkhali to the congregation
(
http://www.fsa.ulaval.ca/personnel/vern ... fistes.htm). See
also Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, 251‐3.