Moderator: Moderators
new-york24 wrote:hanqadh,New York in other words has said he's a shepard and he has to take care of his flock....He owns the house, he takes care of its occupants.
whats wrong with that...ONLF is the guradian of the people, it never said it fights for Ogaden.
ind am tired of dragging that boy through the mud every time we ENGAGE,from here on out waa iga garanuug.
agah NY ninkan Waa General Duufle...Ilaa aa sanka Duufka dhiig oogu dartid ma joogsanayo, markaa ha iska camirto.
Xamud. wrote:*yawn* I stopped reading at
Sure thing dude, fight the powerCoolPoisons wrote:Xamud, we like all the major qabiils are fighting against an international qabiil laakin sheekada ha badalinjust don`t bother mentioning the noble name of Leelkase, next time we disagree on something let`s keep it between coolcaaq and Xamud. I don`t give a flying f about who your fighting or not, but I have to say from my point of view it looks like your loosing the battle
losing the battle. maxaad u inkira suaalaha ku weydiyey
Doqonimadi ogadeen wa taa. Bal I have yet to get personal with neither of you, but you resort to childish insult when you start to lose the argument..hanqadh wrote:new-york24 wrote:hanqadh,New York in other words has said he's a shepard and he has to take care of his flock....He owns the house, he takes care of its occupants.
whats wrong with that...ONLF is the guradian of the people, it never said it fights for Ogaden.
ind am tired of dragging that boy through the mud every time we ENGAGE,from here on out waa iga garanuug.
this topic waa xidhan 
To begin with the ONLF does not make it a secret, at least when addressing its supporters, that this conflict is nothing but the continuation of Ahmed Guray and Sayid Mohammed’s wars against highland Ethiopia. The following lyrics are drawn from one of the most famous songs ONLF cadres recite to instigate supporters during public gatherings.
Axmed guray ma uu dhiman Ma gablamin darwiishkii Geenyaduu ma daalanaa.
It can be roughly translated as follows:
Ahmed Guray has never died, The Dervish has never lost, and The horse is not retired.
Accordingly, if one recognizes that religion had a big influence in Ahmed Guray’s and Sayid Mohammed’s struggles against Abyssinia, there is no reason to deny that in the current conflict between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government religion has a place as well.
Despite portraying itself as secular when communicating with the international community, buzzwords such as jihad and fighting for the Muslim nation against invader ‘infidels’ characterise ONLF’s strategies for mobilising supporters.1 The majority of ONLF’s top officers live abroad where they are allowed to campaign relatively freely. In order to present ONLF’s struggle as legitimate, its leaders deliberately appeal to Somalis’ Muslim identity to garner Diaspora support. ONLF cadres in the rural areas of Somali Regional State use a very similar rhetoric to justify their cause and rally support. Other proof of ONLF’s reliance on religious propaganda is a recent fatwa by Sheikh Sharif Abdi Nur, a most respected and knowledgeable Somali cleric based in Saudi Arabia, who describes the Ogadeni rebels as Mujahideen and their war with Ethiopia as a legitimate jihad against Christian aggressors.2
Whether political Islam is genuinely pursued by ONLF while it uses a secular rhetoric to mislead the Western countries in which a majority of its leaders reside, or vice versa—whether ONLF is genuinely secular and has used religion for tactical reasons only—their religious undertones influence the conflict lastingly. Whatever leaders’ true intention may be, the combatants are mobilised under the banner of jihad against Christian aggressors. Consequently, combatants will remain loyal to ONLF as long as they see it through the lens of jihad. Any other organization with more dedication to a radical Islamic ideology might be able to attract ONLF combatants in the future in case the latter fails to uphold its religious principles. In the case of Afghanistan during the Soviet-Mujahideen war, religion was an important factor in mobilizing the insurgents. To generate the support of a Muslim people invaded by a non-Muslim power, leaders have not spared any chance to manipulate religion to win the war. This has been the case despite a majority of leaders’ tendencies towards nationalism rather than religion. The jihad rhetoric and idea has attracted many Muslims around the world, which are part of a transnational network of Islamic militants that goes far beyond the Afghan context in which they originally emerged. (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2005:15).
Fourthly, ONLF’s dependence on the stronger Islamist groups in Somalia such as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) also contributes to the religious colouring of the conflict. ONLF relies both directly and indirectly on the Islamists. In some cases ONLF has cooperated with Islamists to weaken or defeat Ethiopian troops according to the maxim ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. Even though credible reports have shown that relations between ONLF and al-shabaab have reached the worst stage since they first got into conflict in Degahbur Zone in December 2007, the same reports also indicate generally good relations between ONLF and other Islamists in Somalia (Abdullahi, 2007). Furthermore, the second deputy chairman of ONLF, Abdulkadir Hassan Hirmoge has confirmed that good ties exist between ONLF and Islamist fighters in Somalia. In an interview with Al-Jazeera’s Arabic channel he claimed in mid-March 2008 that ONLF entertained all kinds of cooperation with neighbouring Somalia’s Islamists.3 The Islamists’ popularity in many parts of Somalia forces ONLF to keep good ties with the former since they rely on Somalia as their main supply route. In addition to that, Eritrea, which provides material and moral support to both ONLF and Somali Islamists (HRW, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007) has an interest in bringing the two into alliance. ONLF’s partial dependence on the Islamists and the need to recur to religious discourse to mobilize supporters comfort Islamic sympathizers within ONLF and may attract jihadi support from outside the region. This keep Islamic sympathizers within ONLF’s camp, but also provides them the opportunity of pursuing their jihadist ideologies within the organization.
So my consulsion is correct then. The ONLF struggle is one of a qabil, and nothing more?new-york24 wrote:gen,
every quetion you asked me you answered it within that same quetion,i got to a point where i had to "waa iga garanuug"
Source, doqon.hanqadh wrote:This is a good Article.
To begin with the ONLF does not make it a secret, at least when addressing its supporters, that this conflict is nothing but the continuation of Ahmed Guray and Sayid Mohammed’s wars against highland Ethiopia. The following lyrics are drawn from one of the most famous songs ONLF cadres recite to instigate supporters during public gatherings.
Axmed guray ma uu dhiman Ma gablamin darwiishkii Geenyaduu ma daalanaa.
It can be roughly translated as follows:
Ahmed Guray has never died, The Dervish has never lost, and The horse is not retired.
Accordingly, if one recognizes that religion had a big influence in Ahmed Guray’s and Sayid Mohammed’s struggles against Abyssinia, there is no reason to deny that in the current conflict between the ONLF and the Ethiopian government religion has a place as well.
Despite portraying itself as secular when communicating with the international community, buzzwords such as jihad and fighting for the Muslim nation against invader ‘infidels’ characterise ONLF’s strategies for mobilising supporters.1 The majority of ONLF’s top officers live abroad where they are allowed to campaign relatively freely. In order to present ONLF’s struggle as legitimate, its leaders deliberately appeal to Somalis’ Muslim identity to garner Diaspora support. ONLF cadres in the rural areas of Somali Regional State use a very similar rhetoric to justify their cause and rally support. Other proof of ONLF’s reliance on religious propaganda is a recent fatwa by Sheikh Sharif Abdi Nur, a most respected and knowledgeable Somali cleric based in Saudi Arabia, who describes the Ogadeni rebels as Mujahideen and their war with Ethiopia as a legitimate jihad against Christian aggressors.2
Whether political Islam is genuinely pursued by ONLF while it uses a secular rhetoric to mislead the Western countries in which a majority of its leaders reside, or vice versa—whether ONLF is genuinely secular and has used religion for tactical reasons only—their religious undertones influence the conflict lastingly. Whatever leaders’ true intention may be, the combatants are mobilised under the banner of jihad against Christian aggressors. Consequently, combatants will remain loyal to ONLF as long as they see it through the lens of jihad. Any other organization with more dedication to a radical Islamic ideology might be able to attract ONLF combatants in the future in case the latter fails to uphold its religious principles. In the case of Afghanistan during the Soviet-Mujahideen war, religion was an important factor in mobilizing the insurgents. To generate the support of a Muslim people invaded by a non-Muslim power, leaders have not spared any chance to manipulate religion to win the war. This has been the case despite a majority of leaders’ tendencies towards nationalism rather than religion. The jihad rhetoric and idea has attracted many Muslims around the world, which are part of a transnational network of Islamic militants that goes far beyond the Afghan context in which they originally emerged. (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2005:15).
Fourthly, ONLF’s dependence on the stronger Islamist groups in Somalia such as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) also contributes to the religious colouring of the conflict. ONLF relies both directly and indirectly on the Islamists. In some cases ONLF has cooperated with Islamists to weaken or defeat Ethiopian troops according to the maxim ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. Even though credible reports have shown that relations between ONLF and al-shabaab have reached the worst stage since they first got into conflict in Degahbur Zone in December 2007, the same reports also indicate generally good relations between ONLF and other Islamists in Somalia (Abdullahi, 2007). Furthermore, the second deputy chairman of ONLF, Abdulkadir Hassan Hirmoge has confirmed that good ties exist between ONLF and Islamist fighters in Somalia. In an interview with Al-Jazeera’s Arabic channel he claimed in mid-March 2008 that ONLF entertained all kinds of cooperation with neighbouring Somalia’s Islamists.3 The Islamists’ popularity in many parts of Somalia forces ONLF to keep good ties with the former since they rely on Somalia as their main supply route. In addition to that, Eritrea, which provides material and moral support to both ONLF and Somali Islamists (HRW, 2008; Menkhaus, 2007) has an interest in bringing the two into alliance. ONLF’s partial dependence on the Islamists and the need to recur to religious discourse to mobilize supporters comfort Islamic sympathizers within ONLF and may attract jihadi support from outside the region. This keep Islamic sympathizers within ONLF’s camp, but also provides them the opportunity of pursuing their jihadist ideologies within the organization.
hanqadh wrote:CLosed
What do you think about the issue? you never stated your opinion you just asked us what we thought?Queen_Arawello wrote:I was going to add my 2 cents but i see some of you are getting too emotional
