The Prophetic Words of Marxum Gaddafi

[Arabman]

But what I have read that Egyptians lost 67 war because half of the army was in Yemen

Interesting. This is new info or one that slipped my memory.

[AbdiWahab252]

Do u remember da 1st female PM of israel ? I wanna read her book ? Wats da title maybe I will get from da public library

Golda Meir.

The American Jewish Committee were supportive of the Italian Somaliland independence bid and provided financial/moral support while the Arab states were not. The Israelis offered very lucrative deals if the new state was supportive of the Israeli state.

[Insomniac]

Why didn't the Arab states support Somalia's independence bid?

[sahal80]

First egyptian president mohamud najib was nubian too but at that time it was had for a mixed person to become a president so the army removed him and replaced him with jamal abdi nasir.

it was a coup masterminded by Nasir.

That is what they thought you in their nasiri schools!

The ikhwan were the grand mastermind of the coup who made the conditions that allowed the revolution 52 to take place like assasinating the prime minister, making strikes and massive demonstrations againist the king and that why the regime has too assassinated al bana!

Nasir himself was a member of al ikhwan, exactly a member of their al nizam al khas(secret apparatus) wich was established to influence on the army and give them an islamic direction! Nasir had been working with them for 10 years, between 1944-54, he even use to visit al banas grave after he clashed with them! but they don't tell you this! They would go as far as saying he only had contacts with them but had never joined them! al ikhwan was first silent about this bc they didn't like to cause shock for their kids just like the jewish knew that hitler was a jew but they kept silent about it bc it will be a jewish problem!!

Nowadays, both ikhwan and jewish admit the truth!

As for najib, bc he was more sudanese than egyptian the egyptian media distorts his basic role in the coup, this man was a general and a commander in the first arab-jewish war in 1948 so he was considered a hero in the army and had a wide respect while nasir was a young officer in his early 30s! this is the reason why the army let the coup to take place, without him it wasn't going to happen! The real reason behind the coup was not the free officers naïve agenda, two realistic factors were behind the coup; the ikhwan demonstrations and the army being defeated in that war! hence it was the armys initiative and the ikhwanic plan!

Many were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, including Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. all political parties including the DMNL, the Communist and Socialist parties and the Wafd, jailing the Stalinist leaders and severely circumscribing the trade unions.
Only the Muslim Brotherhood escaped the political ban. The B

hieldin , Monday 23 Jul 2012
Views:2605
Khaled Moheidin (Top row - Right) in a photo with other Free Officers

As we neared the end of 1944, we were anxiously groping for a way for Egypt and for ourselves. One day, Abd El-Munim  Abd El-Rauf came to me saying that we should meet with another officer who shared our anxieties and who was seeking answers to the same questions. So he took me to see Gamal Abd El-Nasser. This was the first time I met him.
A little later, Rauf proposed that he introduce me to another officer. He took me to the Tea Island at the Zoological Gardens, where I met Major Mahmud Labib. Later I found out that he was in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood's military wing.

At this meeting I was accompanied by Usman Fawzi. Mahmud Labib began to talk cautiously, addressing the issue of religion in an unhurried manner. He was aware that our prime motivation was the nation and so he spoke about nationalism but with Islamic overtones.

I was persistent in trying to extract from him specific answers to the questions that had preoccupied me for so long: How we could liberate the nation and what was the position regarding the negotiations?

He was very shrewd and cautious in his replies as he did not want to lose me by answering in the controversial manner of the Muslim Brotherhood. He said, "Egypt will be liberated by its men; the young men in the armed forces are its striking force," and similar phrases.

Usman Fawzi immediately sensed the Muslim Brotherhood overtones in the conversation and on the way back he said, "This is a very dangerous and harmful organisation." However, I was happy with the meeting and said that the nation needed sacrifice and that the Islamic trend could imbue youth with the spirit of sacrifice.

Usman Fawzi was adamant and never attended any other meetings I had with Mahmud Labib. However, on another occasion he attended a meeting I had with Gamal Abd El-Nasser. It was Abd El-Munim Abd El-Rauf who introduced me to Gamal Abd El-Nasser and then we (Gamal and I) each met separately with Mahmud Labib.

There developed an odd relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and a military group that was formed that comprised a large number of officers. We no longer met in public. We held organised meetings in private homes. We usually met in the home of Magdi Hasanayn and sometimes in that of Officer Ahmed Mazhar (now a well-known film star).

These meetings were often attended by Gamal Abd El-Nasser, Kamal El-Din Husayn, Husayn Hammuda, Husayn El-Shafi, Salah Khalif, Abd El-Latif Bughdadi and Hasan Ibrahim. Relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and this group of officers were highly sensitive: the Brotherhood had unexpectedly discovered a treasure trove of officers who were ready to do anything for the nation.

Those officers, however, did not all maintain the same level of loyalty to the Brotherhood. Salah Khalif and Husyn Hammuda, for example, were committed body and soul to the Muslim Brotherhood. The others, however, were just seeking a direction.

We were not against the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, we supported them – but without total commitment. Nasser, for example, believed that the Muslim Brotherhood only wished to exploit officers as tools to achieve political status and influence within the army and that they would never offer anything to the national cause.

At the meetings, Gamal was persistent in his question: if you have half a million members and four thousand cells, why should we not be calling strikes against occupation, and mass movements and demonstrations?

I was always a point of controversy at those meetings. Meanwhile, Usman Fawzi kept supplying me with books, asking me to turn my attention to social issues. It seems that he had then become actively involved with the communist movement, for he brought me a green book printed in Arabic, by Roger Garaudy, entitled 'Economy: Motivator of History.'

I read the book voraciously to discover that many answers were beginning to fall in place, and I began to associate Egypt with Egyptians, the nation's freedom with that of the citizen, and the nation's social issues began to take up a major part of my thinking.

At our meetings, I continuously asked Mahmud Labib: What is the programme of the Brotherhood? He would answer: Sharia (Islamic law). Then I would say: We are all Muslims and we all believe in Sharia, but exactly what shall we do to liberate the nation – will we wage armed struggle or shall we accept negotiations?

What shall we offer the people in the areas of education, housing, and agriculture, as well as the various other social issues? Mahmud Labib was very elusive in his answers, but I persisted in my questions. Finally, he brought to us Mr. Hasan El-Banna, grandmaster of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Truthfully, Hasan El-Banna had an exceptional ability to convince his listeners and infiltrate their hearts. His arguments were solid and he was widely read. At our first meeting, Abd El-Nasser and I expressed our views. When we spoke, he shrewdly and calmly made us understand that the Brotherhood had granted preferential treatment and did not require of us the complete loyalty it demanded of ordinary members.

He said, "We, the Brotherhood, are like an immense hall that can be entered by any Muslim from any door to partake of whatsoever he wishes. Should he seek Sufism, he shall find us ready. Should he seek sports and scouting, it is there. Should he seek battle and armed struggle, he shall find us. You have come to us with the issue of 'the nation'. So, I welcome you."

We debated matters with him and he was very patient. I emphasised the necessity of announcing a programme, saying, "We cannot win the people without having a clear programme that offers practical solutions to their problems." He said, "If I were to draw up a programme, I would please some and anger others. I would win some people and lose others, and I do not want that to happen."

We had several other meetings with Hasan El-Banna. Though he had numerous strong arguments, they remained neither sufficient nor convincing to most of us. Nasser was firm in his suspicions that the Brotherhood only wanted to exploit the officers for its own interests.

I continued to read the books brought to me by Usman Fawzi and I constantly demanded that there be a clear programme for the Brotherhood, defining its national objectives and its position and demands of the various social categories. In my arguments, I began to lean to the left and I became the odd man out in a group supposedly affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood.

In a final effort, Hasan El-Banna sought to link us with the Brotherhood via a strong bond. He decided that Nasser and I should join the Brotherhood's Secret Division. Perhaps it was because we were the most active and effective in our group and, consequently, winning us over completely would mean ultimately winning over the whole group.

Or perhaps it was because we talked much about the nation and nationalism and therefore he believed that by having us join the Secret Division, which was concerned with weaponry and armed action, he would be satisfying our patriotic enthusiasm and ensuring closer ties with the Brotherhood.

Anyway, we were contacted by Salah Khalifa, who took the two of us to a house in Darb Al-Ahmar toward Sayyida Zaynab. There we met Abd El-Rahman El-Sanadi, head of the Brotherhood's Secret Division at the time.

We were taken into a totally darkened room where we heard a voice (I think it was that of Saleh Ashmawi) and, placing our hands on the Quran and a gun and repeating after the voice, we took an oath of obedience and total allegiance, for better or worse, to the Grandmaster, swearing by the Book of God and the Sunna (traditions) of the Prophet. Although these rites were meant to stir the emotions, they had very little impact on Nasser and myself.

In any case, we began to work in the Secret Division and we were taken for training at a place near Helwan. Since we were officers, it was only natural that we were more knowledgeable about weapons than our training instructors. Nasser was not too happy with the situation and we felt alienated from the Brotherhood.

A strong tide of patriotism swept Egypt in 1946. There were huge popular movements under the slogans of the National Students and Workers Committee. As rowdy demonstrations took place, martyrs fell and clashes with the regime intensified, the government decided to bring in the army to confront the demonstrations.

As a member of the cavalry, I was ordered to Masura to confront the demonstrations there. Sarwat Ukasha was with us on this mission. Our force was garrisoned in the house of Nur family, on Al-Bahr Street near the Cinema Royale, where we stayed for about a month and a half.

There, Sarwat Ukasha and I had many long discussions: How could we shoot citizens demonstrating to demand independence? How could we consider ourselves nationalists if we allowed the government to exploit us into crushing this national movement against occupation? We promised ourselves never to allow the army to be used against the people.

But the demonstrations in Mansura quickly intensified and became widespread. When a student was shot dead by police, the whole town rose as one and the police were unable to control or break up the demonstrations. Mansura's police chief called on the army to disperse the demonstrators.

The commander of our force was Lieutenant Colonel Abd El-Khaleq Kamel. Sarwat Ukasha and I went to see him and said, "We cannot deploy our troops without a written request by the chief of police clearly stating his inability to maintain law and order in the town. He should withdraw his men and leave matters in our hands."

Of course, the police chief refused to submit this written request since it would have been an admission of his incompetence and failure. We said to Lieutenant Colonel Abd El-Khaleq Kamel, "If you want us to deploy our troops in the town, then the police must withdraw completely."

Again, the police chief refused. Thus we were able to extricate ourselves from a very awkward situation in which our military duties as officers were in direct confrontation with our national obligations. Our troops played no role in suppressing the demonstrations. We remained there for a month and a half without work and then we returned to Cairo.

Once more I resume the story of our relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. Political events were developing rapidly. The Muslim Brotherhood had unmasked its political features. It now acted as a political group, abandoning all purely religious claims.

Since it was in need of a daily journal, and given the severe shortage of printing paper, the Muslim Brotherhood sought rapprochement with Ismail Sidqi, and having done so, it was able to secure the support it needed.

The Muslim Brotherhood had also opposed the National Students and Workers Committee, and attempted, in collaboration with Ismail Sidqi, to set up a counter group. We began to feel that the Muslim Brothers were like all other politicians. They pursued their own individual and collective interests at the expense of the principles they propagated, and the interests of the country.

I had long discussions with Gamal Abd El-Nasser about our relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. He voiced his fears that the Brotherhood was exploiting us, as officers, to serve their own interests and not those of the nation. We acknowledged that we had involved ourselves with the Brotherhood more than was necessary and we should withdraw.

However, I cannot say that, on such-and-such a day, we withdrew from the Muslim Brotherhood. I can only say that we were filled with suspicions and became disdainful and less enthusiastic. Nasser and I began to distance ourselves from the Brotherhood and, perhaps feeling that we did not have sufficient loyalty and allegiance, it also began to distance itself from us.

By 1947, my and Nasser's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood had faded altogether, although I still maintain close ties with Usman Fawzi, who, from time to time, continued to supply me with books. By then, Usman Fawzi had definitely become a member of the communist organisation Iskra (Russian for "spark").

It was in January, or perhaps February, 1947, that I met a friend, Ahmed Fuad, who was a district attorney. We ran into each other at the Cairo Boat Club, where I enjoyed rowing, whereupon Ahmad Fuad said, "Let's sit down. I want to talk with you for a while."

We chatted for some time, but from the very first moment I felt that Usman Fawzi had something to do with this meeting.

From: Memories of a Revolution: Egypt 1952, Khaled Mohieldin, member of the Revolution Command Council, Cairo: AUC Press, 1995. 259pp

[ quote][/quote]

[Jaidi]

SA,

I don't know. But what I have read that Egyptians lost 67 war because half of the army was in Yemen and I have seen Nasser making fun of the Saudi royal family and in one of his speeches Nasser said that he can conquer Saudia Arabia by just sending 12 planes. The guy had good sense of humor.

Yup intervening in Yemen was a huge disaster for Egypt and one of Nasser's biggest mistakes. Over 30k Egyptians were killed there,even their side eventually won the war.

[Jaidi]

My favorite clip, Sadat making fun of Gaddafi. Sadat jokes about Gaddafi's and the Soviet's bilateral relations.

This guy's charisma was something else.

[gurey25]

First egyptian president mohamud najib was nubian too but at that time it was had for a mixed person to become a president so the army removed him and replaced him with jamal abdi nasir.

it was a coup masterminded by Nasir.

That is what they thought you in their nasiri schools!

The ikhwan were the grand mastermind of the coup who made the conditions that allowed the revolution 52 to take place like assasinating the prime minister, making strikes and massive demonstrations againist the king and that why the regime has too assassinated al bana!

Nasir himself was a member of al ikhwan, exactly a member of their al nizam al khas(secret apparatus) wich was established to influence on the army and give them an islamic direction! Nasir had been working with them for 10 years, between 1944-54, he even use to visit al banas grave after he clashed with them! but they don't tell you this! They would go as far as saying he only had contacts with them but never joined them! al ikhwan was first silent about this bc they didn't like to cause shock for their kids just like the jewish knew that hitler was a jew but kept silent about it bc it will be a jewish problem!!

Nowadays, both ikhwan and jewish admit the truth!

As for najib, bc he was more sudanese than egyptian the egyptian media distorts his basic role in the coup, this man was a general and a commander in the first arab-jewish war in 1948 so he was considered a hero in the army and was well respected while nasir was young officer in his early 30s! this is the reason the army let the coup to take place, without him it wasn't going to happen! The real reasons behind the coup was not the free officers agenda, two factors were behind the coup; the ikhwan demonstrations and the army being defeated in that war! hence it was the armys initiative and the ikhwanic plan!

This is khalid muhyadin a member of the free officers

hieldin , Monday 23 Jul 2012
Views:2605
Khaled Moheidin (Top row - Right) in a photo with other Free Officers

As we neared the end of 1944, we were anxiously groping for a way for Egypt and for ourselves. One day, Abd El-Munim  Abd El-Rauf came to me saying that we should meet with another officer who shared our anxieties and who was seeking answers to the same questions. So he took me to see Gamal Abd El-Nasser. This was the first time I met him.
A little later, Rauf proposed that he introduce me to another officer. He took me to the Tea Island at the Zoological Gardens, where I met Major Mahmud Labib. Later I found out that he was in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood's military wing.

At this meeting I was accompanied by Usman Fawzi. Mahmud Labib began to talk cautiously, addressing the issue of religion in an unhurried manner. He was aware that our prime motivation was the nation and so he spoke about nationalism but with Islamic overtones.

I was persistent in trying to extract from him specific answers to the questions that had preoccupied me for so long: How we could liberate the nation and what was the position regarding the negotiations?

He was very shrewd and cautious in his replies as he did not want to lose me by answering in the controversial manner of the Muslim Brotherhood. He said, "Egypt will be liberated by its men; the young men in the armed forces are its striking force," and similar phrases.

Usman Fawzi immediately sensed the Muslim Brotherhood overtones in the conversation and on the way back he said, "This is a very dangerous and harmful organisation." However, I was happy with the meeting and said that the nation needed sacrifice and that the Islamic trend could imbue youth with the spirit of sacrifice.

Usman Fawzi was adamant and never attended any other meetings I had with Mahmud Labib. However, on another occasion he attended a meeting I had with Gamal Abd El-Nasser. It was Abd El-Munim Abd El-Rauf who introduced me to Gamal Abd El-Nasser and then we (Gamal and I) each met separately with Mahmud Labib.

There developed an odd relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and a military group that was formed that comprised a large number of officers. We no longer met in public. We held organised meetings in private homes. We usually met in the home of Magdi Hasanayn and sometimes in that of Officer Ahmed Mazhar (now a well-known film star).

These meetings were often attended by Gamal Abd El-Nasser, Kamal El-Din Husayn, Husayn Hammuda, Husayn El-Shafi, Salah Khalif, Abd El-Latif Bughdadi and Hasan Ibrahim. Relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and this group of officers were highly sensitive: the Brotherhood had unexpectedly discovered a treasure trove of officers who were ready to do anything for the nation.

Those officers, however, did not all maintain the same level of loyalty to the Brotherhood. Salah Khalif and Husyn Hammuda, for example, were committed body and soul to the Muslim Brotherhood. The others, however, were just seeking a direction.

We were not against the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, we supported them – but without total commitment. Nasser, for example, believed that the Muslim Brotherhood only wished to exploit officers as tools to achieve political status and influence within the army and that they would never offer anything to the national cause.

At the meetings, Gamal was persistent in his question: if you have half a million members and four thousand cells, why should we not be calling strikes against occupation, and mass movements and demonstrations?

I was always a point of controversy at those meetings. Meanwhile, Usman Fawzi kept supplying me with books, asking me to turn my attention to social issues. It seems that he had then become actively involved with the communist movement, for he brought me a green book printed in Arabic, by Roger Garaudy, entitled 'Economy: Motivator of History.'

I read the book voraciously to discover that many answers were beginning to fall in place, and I began to associate Egypt with Egyptians, the nation's freedom with that of the citizen, and the nation's social issues began to take up a major part of my thinking.

At our meetings, I continuously asked Mahmud Labib: What is the programme of the Brotherhood? He would answer: Sharia (Islamic law). Then I would say: We are all Muslims and we all believe in Sharia, but exactly what shall we do to liberate the nation – will we wage armed struggle or shall we accept negotiations?

What shall we offer the people in the areas of education, housing, and agriculture, as well as the various other social issues? Mahmud Labib was very elusive in his answers, but I persisted in my questions. Finally, he brought to us Mr. Hasan El-Banna, grandmaster of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Truthfully, Hasan El-Banna had an exceptional ability to convince his listeners and infiltrate their hearts. His arguments were solid and he was widely read. At our first meeting, Abd El-Nasser and I expressed our views. When we spoke, he shrewdly and calmly made us understand that the Brotherhood had granted preferential treatment and did not require of us the complete loyalty it demanded of ordinary members.

He said, "We, the Brotherhood, are like an immense hall that can be entered by any Muslim from any door to partake of whatsoever he wishes. Should he seek Sufism, he shall find us ready. Should he seek sports and scouting, it is there. Should he seek battle and armed struggle, he shall find us. You have come to us with the issue of 'the nation'. So, I welcome you."

We debated matters with him and he was very patient. I emphasised the necessity of announcing a programme, saying, "We cannot win the people without having a clear programme that offers practical solutions to their problems." He said, "If I were to draw up a programme, I would please some and anger others. I would win some people and lose others, and I do not want that to happen."

We had several other meetings with Hasan El-Banna. Though he had numerous strong arguments, they remained neither sufficient nor convincing to most of us. Nasser was firm in his suspicions that the Brotherhood only wanted to exploit the officers for its own interests.

I continued to read the books brought to me by Usman Fawzi and I constantly demanded that there be a clear programme for the Brotherhood, defining its national objectives and its position and demands of the various social categories. In my arguments, I began to lean to the left and I became the odd man out in a group supposedly affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood.

In a final effort, Hasan El-Banna sought to link us with the Brotherhood via a strong bond. He decided that Nasser and I should join the Brotherhood's Secret Division. Perhaps it was because we were the most active and effective in our group and, consequently, winning us over completely would mean ultimately winning over the whole group.

Or perhaps it was because we talked much about the nation and nationalism and therefore he believed that by having us join the Secret Division, which was concerned with weaponry and armed action, he would be satisfying our patriotic enthusiasm and ensuring closer ties with the Brotherhood.

Anyway, we were contacted by Salah Khalifa, who took the two of us to a house in Darb Al-Ahmar toward Sayyida Zaynab. There we met Abd El-Rahman El-Sanadi, head of the Brotherhood's Secret Division at the time.

We were taken into a totally darkened room where we heard a voice (I think it was that of Saleh Ashmawi) and, placing our hands on the Quran and a gun and repeating after the voice, we took an oath of obedience and total allegiance, for better or worse, to the Grandmaster, swearing by the Book of God and the Sunna (traditions) of the Prophet. Although these rites were meant to stir the emotions, they had very little impact on Nasser and myself.

In any case, we began to work in the Secret Division and we were taken for training at a place near Helwan. Since we were officers, it was only natural that we were more knowledgeable about weapons than our training instructors. Nasser was not too happy with the situation and we felt alienated from the Brotherhood.

A strong tide of patriotism swept Egypt in 1946. There were huge popular movements under the slogans of the National Students and Workers Committee. As rowdy demonstrations took place, martyrs fell and clashes with the regime intensified, the government decided to bring in the army to confront the demonstrations.

As a member of the cavalry, I was ordered to Masura to confront the demonstrations there. Sarwat Ukasha was with us on this mission. Our force was garrisoned in the house of Nur family, on Al-Bahr Street near the Cinema Royale, where we stayed for about a month and a half.

There, Sarwat Ukasha and I had many long discussions: How could we shoot citizens demonstrating to demand independence? How could we consider ourselves nationalists if we allowed the government to exploit us into crushing this national movement against occupation? We promised ourselves never to allow the army to be used against the people.

But the demonstrations in Mansura quickly intensified and became widespread. When a student was shot dead by police, the whole town rose as one and the police were unable to control or break up the demonstrations. Mansura's police chief called on the army to disperse the demonstrators.

The commander of our force was Lieutenant Colonel Abd El-Khaleq Kamel. Sarwat Ukasha and I went to see him and said, "We cannot deploy our troops without a written request by the chief of police clearly stating his inability to maintain law and order in the town. He should withdraw his men and leave matters in our hands."

Of course, the police chief refused to submit this written request since it would have been an admission of his incompetence and failure. We said to Lieutenant Colonel Abd El-Khaleq Kamel, "If you want us to deploy our troops in the town, then the police must withdraw completely."

Again, the police chief refused. Thus we were able to extricate ourselves from a very awkward situation in which our military duties as officers were in direct confrontation with our national obligations. Our troops played no role in suppressing the demonstrations. We remained there for a month and a half without work and then we returned to Cairo.

Once more I resume the story of our relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. Political events were developing rapidly. The Muslim Brotherhood had unmasked its political features. It now acted as a political group, abandoning all purely religious claims.

Since it was in need of a daily journal, and given the severe shortage of printing paper, the Muslim Brotherhood sought rapprochement with Ismail Sidqi, and having done so, it was able to secure the support it needed.

The Muslim Brotherhood had also opposed the National Students and Workers Committee, and attempted, in collaboration with Ismail Sidqi, to set up a counter group. We began to feel that the Muslim Brothers were like all other politicians. They pursued their own individual and collective interests at the expense of the principles they propagated, and the interests of the country.

I had long discussions with Gamal Abd El-Nasser about our relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. He voiced his fears that the Brotherhood was exploiting us, as officers, to serve their own interests and not those of the nation. We acknowledged that we had involved ourselves with the Brotherhood more than was necessary and we should withdraw.

However, I cannot say that, on such-and-such a day, we withdrew from the Muslim Brotherhood. I can only say that we were filled with suspicions and became disdainful and less enthusiastic. Nasser and I began to distance ourselves from the Brotherhood and, perhaps feeling that we did not have sufficient loyalty and allegiance, it also began to distance itself from us.

By 1947, my and Nasser's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood had faded altogether, although I still maintain close ties with Usman Fawzi, who, from time to time, continued to supply me with books. By then, Usman Fawzi had definitely become a member of the communist organisation Iskra (Russian for "spark").

It was in January, or perhaps February, 1947, that I met a friend, Ahmed Fuad, who was a district attorney. We ran into each other at the Cairo Boat Club, where I enjoyed rowing, whereupon Ahmad Fuad said, "Let's sit down. I want to talk with you for a while."

We chatted for some time, but from the very first moment I felt that Usman Fawzi had something to do with this meeting.

From: Memories of a Revolution: Egypt 1952, Khaled Mohieldin, member of the Revolution Command Council, Cairo: AUC Press, 1995. 259pp

[ quote]

[/quote]


sounds the ikhwan are bad at history,
the Russian revolution was the work of many different groups with the menshiviks the main players,
the bolsheviks under lenin that had a minority following ended up in charge.
The methods they used are famous, shouldnt they have though of this?
Ikhwan stumbled in an even more embarasing way in 1990 when they messed up the coup against assad senior.

[Navy9]

Lol I wanna read it cus I heard she said wen all muslims pray fajir prayer its over for us thy will get majid al aqas

you don't say...

[Navy9]

Sahal,

I read what you quoted when I get back from work. But I am not talking about the coup that kicked the King out. I am talking about the coup that kicked Naguib out of the presidency and into a house arrest for 29 years. The coup that made sure not only to get rid of him but also his two elders sons.

[sahal80]

Sahal,

I read what you quoted when I get back from work. But I am not talking about the coup that kicked the King out. I am talking about the coup that kicked Naguib out of the presidency and into a house arrest for 29 years. The coup that made sure not only to get rid of him but also his two elders sons.

Ok. He took advantage of some local problem. he had also another conflict with camir so he made him the ruler of syria in order to keep the local power for himself.

Nasir conspiracy againist adden adde

cosmopolitan mogadisho

Many don't understand why the westren countries are very intersting in mogadisho, its because mogadisho is a cosmopolotan city.... the ambassadors would share their memories about it

The westren interests are based in the cosmopolitan mogadosho and al shabaab threatens their interests.

Mogadisho was a cosmopolitan city even back in the 40s because we have been fighting againist nazism...oops, I mean againist fascism their puppets.

The jewish had to support the somali independence with israel becoming the first nation to recognize somalia soon as the fascists get defeated....that was perior to our 10 years trusteeship.

the somalias first president adan adde had survived from an egyptian assassination around the year 65-66, back then we didn't yet had our somali airlines so the somali officials would use smaller planes that hardly reaches cairo to change planes in there and continue their journy.
as his plane was landing at the cairo airport, suddenly, the electricity has gone off but thanks god there were no crash, he survived from the nasiri plot.

I believe it has to do with the nasiris thinking somalia being adopted by mossad even it was just one side relationship

The predident adan adde believes another story, he said it was the biggest diplomatic lesson he ever had, he and king faisal of arabia have been discussing some topics and as somalis are straight talkers, adde added that nasir is trying to rule the arab world... apparently, the egyptians heard about it!

Today dozens of embassies have returned to our cosmopolitan capital.

sahal80

[Navy9]

But what I have read that Egyptians lost 67 war because half of the army was in Yemen

Interesting. This is new info or one that slipped my memory.

It is not a new information and it has not slipped your memory.

[Arabman]

It is not a new information and it has not slipped your memory.

OK.

[Navy9]

Sahal,

Nice read, thanks for it. Naguib's father was an Egyptian from al-Qarbiya governorate and his mother, Zahra, was a Sudanese and her mother was an Egyptian. Naguib's father and Zahra's brother went to the same school and became friends. Naguib was a well known figure before the revolution of 1952. He was a highly educated military man with great charisma and well loved and respected by everyone. It was Nasir and his dogs who worked hard to erase this man from the memory of the Egyptian history. I remember in my school years, the text books didn't mention anything about him.

Of the many reasons, why Nasir and co turned against him was he wanted the army to go back to its original mission and that a civil government to rule the country, but already conspiracies to silence this old man was in motion. They got rid of him and then turned on each other.

[Navy9]

It is not a new information and it has not slipped your memory.

OK.

[Navy9]

سري للغاية موت الرجل الثاني by Yosri Fouda, a cool character. Him and Faisal al-Qassim, my favorite Arab journalists.

Documentary on the death of Abdihakim Amer...