Forum rules
This General Forum is for general discussions from daily chitchat to more serious discussions among Somalinet Forums members. Please do not use it as your Personal Message center (PM). If you want to contact a particular person or a group of people, please use the PM feature. If you want to contact the moderators, pls PM them. If you insist leaving a public message for the mods or other members, it will be deleted.
Aiman We already established they are employing or testing the BM 21. They are not going to try and use copies of the FROG 7, those are crude missile systems which require weather data and advanced maintainence that ain't happening in Somalia.
Do you know anything about warfare or do you just like to pretend you know something?
aiman forget about the Frog missle, or any ballistic missles. They are of no use in the somali battlefield.
what the UIC needs badly is Anti-tank missles, and good accurate artillary. if they use thier mobility and technicals properly they can inflict damage on the ethiopians.
I dont believe the Ethiopian airforce is quite capable in the ground attack role. niether side in the Eritrean/Ethiopian war managed to use ground attack properly.
and i do not believe a MIG fighter is good at atacking ground targets, especially scattered ground troops, unless they use cluster bombs.
The ethiopians do however have some hinds, attack mi-28a attack helicopters. These alone should give the Ethiopians respect.
I believe Gurey is largely correct. Supporting ground operations with aircraft is trickier buisiness than one might suppose. It requires good communications between the attack platform and the ground troops. Fratricide is a constant risk and can only be overcome with good coordination. I think the Ethioians would be hard pressed to employ their fast attack aircraft effectively in this role.
HOWEVER, the Ethiopians also have MI 24s. This is a robust and capable, if somewhat underpowered, attack helicopter. It can carry a variety of armament and is tough and well armored. If used at a flying profile above the range of RPGs, this platform could create serious problems for ANY Somali force trying to deal with it.
Frankly, Ethiopia has far too many resources right now for any Somali faction to consider seriously tangling with it. The 12 Division alone could make life miserable for any force a Somali faction could field, and it would doubtless get force multipliers from Army level headquarters, such as mutliple rocket launchers, specialized infantry and attack helicopters. If the conflict remains restricted to the internal borders of Somalia, it is likely the Ethiopians will not put much on the ground, and the level of committment will remain low. But if Aweys and Indhacade get delusions of grandeur, and start trying to attack targets within Ethiopia, they are going to get an a$$ whoopin'.
Here are details on the BM 21 for those who are interested. By far and away, the challenge for any Somali group employing this weapon would be good fire control coordination between the supported unit and the BM 21 itself. This weapon is most effective when able to mass fires, so we can assume that ammunition supply would be an issue as well. Getting sufficient practice to actually put the rockets where you intend, with ammunition supplies being limited, might also propose a challenge for Somali militias seeking to employ this weapon.
The 122mm 40-tube multiple launch rocket system Grad (Hail), with a firing range of up to 20 km, was introduced into operational service with the Russian Army in 1963 [and initially designated in the West as the M1964]. The BM-21 is unquestionably the worldÂ’s most widely used MRL. The successful use of the Grad system in local conflicts of various intensity for three decades led many countries to develop similar systems. The launcher with supporting equipment is referred to as the complex 9K51. This 40-round launcher has four tiers of ten tubes mounted on the chassis of a truck. The BM-21 can be distinguished from other multiple rocket launchers by the square-cornered, 40-tube launching apparatus (4 banks of 10 tubes), which is often covered by a protective canvas. It is mounted on the Ural-375D 6х6 truck chassis, which has a distinctive fender design and a spare tire on the rear side of the cab. The BM-21 also is the only known Soviet rocket launcher without blast shields on the driver's cab. However, the material used in the cab windows and windscreen is strong enough to withstand the overpressures and other effects associated with the firing of 122-mm rockets.
The BM-21 can be operated and fired from the cab, or it can be fired remotely at a distance of up to 60 meters, using a cable set. The launcher is traversed forward towards the cab for traveling and for firing uses two stabilizing jacks at the rear of the vehicle. A special electric generator powers the launcher. The 9V170 firing device is cab mounted, but the rockets can be fired using a remote-firing device that has a 64-meter-long cable. This MRL can fire all rockets in 6 seconds or fire each singly, and can reload in 5 minutes. It can fire the 40 rockets or any part thereof at a fixed 0.5-second interval. Single rockets can be fired manually at any desired interval. The five-man crew can reload the launcher in 8 minutes.
The BM-21 fires a "9-ft rocket" with a range of 20,380 meters. Each launch tube is grooved to impart a slow rotary motion to the rocket. However, the rocket is primarily fin-stabilized. This combination of spin- and fin-stabilization ensures closely grouped fire at ranges of up to 16 kilometers. The BM-21 and other 122mm rocket launchers can fire all 122mm rockets designed to fit in Soviet-derived 122mm launchers (including those that can achieve ranges of 30,000 to 36,000 meters). The 122-mm fin-stabilized rockets can deliver Frag-HE, chemical, or incendiary warheads to a range of over 20 kilometers, or the newer HE and cargo rockets out to 30 kilometers. On explosion, the warhead produces a great fragmentation effect and shock wave.
Because of its high volume of fire and large area coverage, the BM-21 is well suited for use against troops in the open, for use in artillery preparations, and for delivery of chemical concentrations. One volley from a BM-21 battalion is 720 rounds. Because these weapons have a large circular area probable (CEP), they are not suited for attacks against point targets.
The Ural-375D vehicle has a maximum road speed of 75 km/hr, a cruising range of 750 km, and an exceptional cross-country capability.
Rockets must always be fired with the vehicle parked obliquely to the target to avoid blast damage to the unprotected cab.
The BM-21 entered service in 1964 as a replacement for the 140-mm (16- and 17-round) BM-14 rocket launchers, and is now the most widely used truck-mounted rocket launcher in the Warsaw Pact forces. Heavier rocket launchers, including the 200-mm (4-round) BMD-20, the 240-mm (12-round) BM-24, and the 250-mm (6-round) BMD-25, are seldom seen in front-line units. Although the BM-21 rockets are smaller in caliber than previous models, the warhead is equal to that of the 140-mm rocket, and the range exceeds that of the older 140-mm and 240-mm models. Due to the smaller caliber of its rockets, the BM-21 also can fire a greater quantity of rockets than the earlier models, making it especially useful for area fire and delivering massive surprise fires. The BM-21 is found in the rocket launcher battalion organic to each motorized rifle and tank division. It also has been used at front and army level, where it was replaced by the 220-mm rocket launcher (16-round) BM-27 in some units.
or the mobile verison, would more than make up for any deficiency in Airpower.
If you have a crew that is well trained and know what they are doing, this beauty will really be like you have ordered an airraid on the other side, becuase it is accurate and at 40KM outranges everything else.
ofcourse this is all hypothetical and i hardly expect the uic to do anything of the sort
Gurey Ahhh, but there is a problem with that. That would only apply if there was simply no air power. But in this case, as we both know, there is. A BM 21 or a G-5 gun would stick out like a sore thumb in the Somali deserts. You would have to shoot and scoot and responding air power would have to be a long way away so it couldn't catch you on the run.
What normally limits airpower from being effective is when the opponent refuses to mass his forces. Then he simply fails to provide a good target. If he remains dispersed, however, he can't control any ground. This is why in Iraq, we can always control a piece of ground when we really want to. And why the insurgents no longer try to stand and fight like they did in Fallujah. Now their main goal is to launch random harrassing attacks and avoid direct gun battles, which they can't win. This would also be true in Somalia. The problem for any Somali militia is, the Ethiopians are not Americans. They would have no problem simply killing a shitload of Ayr - be they women, children or whatever, in order to make their point. The UIC would be unable to protect their families. Therefore, attacking a country like Ethiopia, which is likely to respond harshly, is risky buisiness.
In the Horn of africa you do not have much valuable realestate. When confronting a force like an ethiopian motorized/mechanized division you should not attempt to hold territory, this only works in mountainous areas like eritrea.
As for hiding your artillary, there are plenty of wadis, shrub forests. I wouldnt give too much credit to the ethiopian ariforce finding them and taking them out, although i am worried about the falling price and availabilty of infrared/nightvision technology.
A hypothetical anti-ethiopian force should be highly mobile, im thinking technicals, guntrucks, some apc's, good number of towed, artillary and mortars. Lots of ATGM's and RPG's.
and they should not stand out in the open field, but limit themselves to raiding the convoys, especially the vulnerable supply trucks, e.g Diesal/petrol carrying tankers, ammo trucks etc etc.
A good ambush once in a while should be expected with heavy casualties on the ethiopian side, as they will be expected to stick to the better roads.
ofcourse you cannot limit yourself to the millitary field, the conflict should be limited to Somalia and the border area. Conflict presented as an illegal invasion etc etc etc.
and you are right, when puch comes to shove, one should expect large urban centerd to fall to the Ethiopians, and atrocities commited.
All in all i do not think a long term campaign of several Ethiopian divisions can be maintained for long, an they will be more vulnerable than the americans are in Iraq.
The problem with these Hawiye apache and chayanne pple they think that they have surplass of pple not taking to account that Eithiopia is around 70m also have you ever thought about how long the hawiye was at war either with themselfs or with others. Sometimes I wonder if these guys realy reborn after death, i mean they only thing they know is die, die and die. Its going to be fun for them to face the Eithiopians who will sent them home peacefull (to the Grave yards).
"All in all i do not think a long term campaign of several Ethiopian divisions can be maintained for long, an they will be more vulnerable than the americans are in Iraq. "
I can not say I agree with you on this point. The Ethiopians 12th Division has been fighting in the Ogaden for a LONG time. It is a low overhead venture, and neither Al Itihad nor the ONLF have come even close to breaking the phalanx there. The Ethiopians can conduct ambushes too. And because their forces are dispersed, they are in a position to cut egress routes.
The problem with massing techincals is they make the perfect target for a flight of HINDS. Therefore, any engagement with them has to be shoot and scoot.
In short, it all comes down to resources - human and material. And the Somalis just don't have enough of either. Therefore, taking on Ethiopia is just not a smart move. The UIC needs to find some accomodation here, or the Ary in Galgudud and Hiraan will take a beating.
I think the main problem has to do with the ICU's politics and its lack of maturity.
Rather than compromise, the capture of Xamar due to the sympathetic population has caused them to harbor schemes of a nationwide takeover ,which was leaked by Turki........
They are playing a game of 'Pick 'n Chose' between the people they want to incorporate into their top-level leadership, with people like IndhaCadde overnight made the Security Chief, while some others who have been with the ICU for longer are made his subordinates..........clearly this is suspicious.
Also, the problem has to do with their backers. The Gulf, Egypt, Libya, Eritrea...........possibly Iran.
Why on Earth would they grow confident with the track record of such supporters.
Eritrea & Iran might be the only die-hard supporters..........Iran is too far away for them to 'really' care if push comes to shove. Eritrea is limited in what they can do, only being a check against Ethiopia.........if Ethiopia appears to get out of the picture, so will Eritrea.
I mean, the day the US says : "STOP IT" (with a straight face), the majority of those backers will cease to acknowledge they ever had a relationship with the ICU..............It is senseless to alienate internal support/goodwill on the confidence of such supporters.
For the most part, the ICU has so far only incorporated militias..........they have not been adequately indoctrinated/educated so the day they find a better paymaster or the going gets a little tough, how can they be considered a reliable force
