

Moderator: Moderators
In early August 1989, the SNM initiated operations around Borama, a key market town used by the pro- Government ... In late November 1989, the rebels captured Erigavo, capital of the northeastern region; and on 5 December 1989, overran
They were in ruins but both cities had garrisons, these garrisons were surrounded by SNM.Hargeysa and burco was ruins by 1988 what main cities are you talking about?
SNM’s comparative advantage and the role of the elders building on a cohesive clan base, combined with an essentially pan-Somali democratic ethos,
the SNM strategy, according to Davies, was to assist other clan and regional groups to embark on their own resistance against the Barre dictatorship. He went on to say that “it assisted the Hawiyes in forming their USC and the Ogadenis in forming their SPM as sister
liberation movements in the fight to oust the socialist dictatorship of General Barre in the war-
of-liberation”.(17) Nevertheless, the SNM succeeded in attracting non-Isaaqs, though Siad Barre
also did well in trying to undermine this attraction. “General Barre was extremely irritated by
the growing number of Hawiyes joining the SNM and the fact that the Vice Chairman was a
Hawiye. He succeeded in creating a conflict between the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the
SNM, which led to the resignation of Vice Chairman, Ali Mohamed Ossoble ('Wardhigley').
Other foreign countries appear to have co-operated with General Barre in developing the
theory that since the SSDF had stopped its armed resistance to General Barre, only the SNM
was left. If the SNM could be induced to give up its armed struggle, there would be no further
conflict and opposition to General Barre.”
Despite the various bribes offered, the SNM refused to end its war of liberation. Many
other leading Hawiye members of the SNM also left the SNM in 1987 as a result of this
episode. This no doubt accentuated the regionalisation of the SNM as a sectional movement
with harbingers of things to come in terms of a repeat of regional tensions in post-Barre
Somalia. In any case, the rest is history in the escalation of Somalia’s civil war, to the point of
the Barre regime’s eventual collapse in 1991. Here, in terms of post-Barre political dynamics
leading to a politics of reconciliation and power sharing in Somaliland, it is important to
examine the role of the clan elders. From the late 1980s until the Barre regime’s collapse, the
SNM apparently did most of the fighting in the resistance war. It seems that only towards the
end, in the last one to one and a half years, did it receive substantial assistance from the USC
and the SPM. Once this armed struggle phase ended, the initiative within Somaliland shifted
to the clan elders as the SNM handed over to them to navigate what would become a
complicated and delicate process of post-conflict reconciliation and political consolidation of a
brutalised society that had been under prolonged siege. The backdrop to the unfolding of this
clan-elders-led national reconciliation phase in the north-west is the state collapse in
Mogadishu, which followed on the heels of the collapse of general Barre’s government. It was
the USC, a powerful force in Mogadishu that seized control of the capital only to have the
situation deteriorate into a round of factional fragmentation and infighting, which ushered in
what became an era of stateless warlordism in former Italian Somalia.
The shift of the initiative from the SNM, as the politico-military vanguard, to the more
popularly based leadership of the clan elders was underlined by the manner in which
Somaliland moved from insurgency towards the outright declaration of independence.
Immediately after general Barre’s defeat in January 1991, followed by a February peace
conference in Berbera that proclaimed a formal cease-fire, the SNM called a March meeting
of the elders of all non-Isaaq clans “to reconcile any potential differences between them and
the Isaq clans — as agreed upon by all liberation movements before the end of the war-of-
liberation”.(18) What is important here is the implicit power sharing strategy of the SNM as a
‘modernist’ nationalist movement in its consultative outreach to the region’s clan leadership as
a basis for building the fledgling foundations of what has evolved in terms of democratic
governance. In effect, the seeds of indigenous democracy were evident in the culture of SNM-
clan elder consultation.
The Berbera peace conference had established the SNM’s policy of peaceful
coexistence among the clans of Somaliland. The post-Berbera non-Isaaq meeting was
followed by an April meeting with the Isaaq clan elders in Hargeisa, setting the stage for an
end of April SNM congress, together with representatives of all clans, Isaaq and non-Isaaq
alike. This became the Guurti Congress of the Elders. The elders and other democratically
selected representatives forced the SNM, against its will, to announce the creation of the
independent Republic of Somaliland on 18 May 1991.
Geeljire252 wrote:I'm not going to insult Siad barre (AUN) he was Muslim and died a long time ago (21 years ago) but we all know what his MOD government did to Somalis. He was bound to get overthrown. Plus it wasn't USC only who was fighting. I proved USC killed no innocents, even the Kacaan soldiers we captured we treated them nicely as human beings.NubianQueen97 wrote:They overthrow the government, but what was the outcome?![]()
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USC destroyed not 1 building in any city.
USC didn't set any village on fire nor poison wells unlike the Kacaan Government.
USC wasn't a qabiil based organisation there were multiple Qabiils in their ranks.
USC didn't steal no land.
USC made a temporary government.
USC met with other rebel leaders (SNM,SSDF, RRA and SPM to form a permanent Government.
But you are a qabiilist only supporting Siad Barre and Morgan because of Qabiil. We know in ey guusha ciida Xaq u dirirka ee USC, SNM, SSDF, SPM and all the other groups who fought the Kacaan Government.
Take your Kacaan filth somewhere else