Real Talk: Somalia-Two Periods

[Somaliweyn]

Sadeboi

Somaliweyn, you have drove this thread into the wrong place, on purpose maybe.

SB (and all those others who missed the purpose of this topic) read below the first post of this topic:

Voltage,

Coming from an objective analysis, whether it is because he ruled for 21 years or not, clearly Siad Barre's legacy and his achievements, even just looking at the "good", outweigh the combined achievements of the others multiplied by infinity.

With respect to objectivity my list goes:

1. Mohammed Siad Barre
2. Abdirashiid Ali shermake
3. Aden Cadde

Aden Cadde in his tenure accomplished naught, and I mean naught. But he was a fair and decent man who was also the first modern African ruler to step down democratically.

Abdirashiid Ali Shermake tried to reform the country in order to make it an effective post-colonial African state but under is tenure, not necessarily because it his fault, Somalia became the most corrupt country in the world, over a hundred tribal parties came into existence, he failed to write the Somali script despite the determination by the academics, failed to lobby on behalf of the NFD, and failed to tackle Ethiopia's cross border raids into Somalia. Yet he tried and was also a fair and decent man.

Siad Barre is synonymous with modern Somalia, the good as well as the bad. That really says it all.

Done?

Now whats the purpose of this topic?


Voltage makes clearly claims based on what he calls ''objective analysis'' and then ranks the three presidents according to what he calls ''objective analysis''. He makes astounishing claims, WITHOUT any sources, and then ranks the three presidents.

The purpose of this topic is to SHOW how a genuine OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS is conducted complete with the relevant SOURCES to back every claim.

Only after presenting this genuine OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS complete with SOURCES of the two different periods, can we resort to the act of ranking them based on the OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. In this way, people can see how the three leaders performed, and how they had impact on Somalia and thus why they are ranked on this way or that way.

I hope everything is clear now, so we can continue to the presenting of the military era and its impact on Somalia. After that we will compare the two different era's in terms of their impact on Somalia's society, economy, politics, military etc etc, so we can rank the different leaders.

Without futher delay (caused by attempted distortions of the topic by some), I will continue to adress your question firstly and present the picture of Somalia during the 21 years rule of Siad Barre.

[Somaliweyn]

A short recap of the performance of the civilian government of 1960-1969:

Political field:

-A working democratic system in which party's could contest for political power, and in which political power was passed on fairly and peacefully. (1961 (referendum), 1963, 1964, 1967 & 1969 elections).
-Free press
-Freedom of speech, movement, political association etc.
-The nation-state's institutions were built and the nation-state impressed both the world and Africa as it showed how united its elite were and how determined and sophisticated they were compared to other African heads.


Economic field:
-Economic plans were drawn up that were implemented, albeit not fully.
-Roads were built and infrastructure was improved as the ports of Mogadishu, Kismanyo, Berbera were modernized to accomodate the increasing exports of the nation.
-Large model farms in Baidoa in the Bay Region, Afgooye near Mogadishu, and Tog Wajaale, west of Hargeysa, were established during this period. See here an example of the creation of these farms:

To summarize by a quotation of the country study of Somalia:

There were therefore some notable successes among Somalia's early development projects. The nation became nearly selfsufficient in sugar, and banana exports grew, albeit haltingly. Livestock exports increased, and investments in roads and irrigation facilities resulted in some genuine improvements.

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?f ... ID+so0070)

On the military field:

-The SNA was created, equiped, expanded, and trained.
-The young nation performed well against the Ethiopian imperial state that existed much longer.

----

Now, at the end of 1969: the country's government was deteriorated by the infilitration of clannism, which led to excessive corruption and nepotism.

After the assasination of President Sharmarke, a coup was staged in which a military junta assumed power.

The legitimacy for this coup is known as earlier illustrated by the quotation of Siad Barre's words.

Here is it again:

Intervention by the Armed Forces was inevitable. It was no longer possible
to ignore the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft of public
funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country.
The laws were thrust aside and people did whatever they wanted. There was no longer a sense of confidence in the national will, not even a minimum basis for national cooperation was established, and there was a high degree of moral decay.

As written in David D Laitin (1976)

Now lets explore in the next sections how this military junta will combat the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft of public funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country. Also let us see whether the military regime succeeds in creating a sense of confidence in the national will, and a sustained basis for national cooperation. Ofcourse we already know the answer

[sadeboi]

Cawar, now is my case made bro? No need to waste my time, and the statements can be debated, but it is still not part of this debate (which is done).

[King-of-Awdal]

May i just say that you people need to forget and forgive. It is time to move on.

[Shilling]

I for one disagree with Voltage, Afweyn 21 year of dictatorship can put into three categories: The first period was between 10/21/1969 - 7/1/1976 (although he suspended the constitution I admit these were good years for Somalia, as David Lamb puts it in his book "The Africans" Somalia was better then most African countries in term of security). The second period was between July 1976 - May 1986 (this was when Somalis realized Afweyn wasn't going to transfer power and when he realized this was obvious he turn to qabiil: hence M.O.D). The finel face of his dictatorship was between May 1986 - Dec. 1990 (this was when he had that car crash, the man was mentally handicapped and the country was basically being run by his close kins; rebels started popping up everywhere and the regime was nearing its end).

So to sum it up, other then the first 6 years his regime did nil for the country.

My rank of the best presidents in Somalia:

1) Adan Cade
2) Abdiraashid Sharmarke

*I don't consider Afweyn a president so other then his first 6 years the guy was the worst dictator that ever walked the face of Africa.

[luis1]

I have been talking to Somaliyen,he told me that Somalia defeated Cuba and URSS in 1978.

I think that is very funny.

But let me show you somali sources about Ogaden War:

http://www.sirclund.se/conference%20report%202004.pdf

Please read pag 226,the author is Abdi Samantar a somali writer.

Somali successes
were momentary once the Soviets, Cubans, and Yemani contingents intervened and helped
Ethiopian troops beat the Somali army.


Another somali source:

http://wardheernews.com/Articles_06/may ... bdoon.html

[luis1]

Said Samantar who wrote a book with David Laitin says something very interesting:

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?f ... ID+so0038)

Domestically, the lost war produced a national mood of depression.


http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/sotoc.html

Another source:

http://marehansade.blogspot.com/2007/08 ... barre.html

Somali National Army back to the Somali borders. Even though this was a staggering defeat, the spirit of the Somali people remained roused.

http://dare.uva.nl/document/65588

[Somaliweyn]

The Military Rule: 1969-1991

Political aspect: achievements

- Winning over early popular support by PR-stunts like: transparency policy (xisab xil maalle). burning of clanism, combating nepotism (at least rhetorically)
- Siad Barre declares ' scientific Socialism' ala Soviet style.
- Nationalizes various economic sectors
- Creates a seemingly strong government which rises above clan-structure in the early years of its rule.
- Pursues a policy of self-reliance
- Builds National unity and confidence in the future by organising collective projects (sand dunes, literacy campaigns etc)


---------

Political aspect: failures

- Military regime looses support and resorts to brutal oppressive measures.
- The burned clannism resurfaces, even at the top layers of society: The famous MOD is created.

Faced with shrinking popularity and an armed and organized domestic resistance, Siad Barre unleashed a reign of terror against the Majeerteen, the Hawiye, and the Isaaq, carried out by the Red Berets (Duub Cas), a dreaded elite unit recruited from among the president's Mareehaan clansmen. Thus, by the beginning of 1986 Siad Barre's grip on power seemed secure, despite the host of problems facing the regime.

(Library of Congress, country study: Somalia)

No clear evidence exists, of course, that clan politics are being played
by Siyad, but arrests and executions have had a carefully managed
clan balance, and in the lower-paid jobs in the administrative structure
the Marayxan and the Dulbahante are doing comparatively well.

David D. Laitin

- pseudo Scientific socialism is abandoned for IMF-ism.
- The nationalized economic sectors are mismanaged and used for personal gain
- National unity is destroyed as the military dictatorship becomes more brutal
- Corruption and nepotism are back in town with a vengeance.

Abdi Samatar says in Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? Bananas, Boom, and Poverty in Somalia:

Members of the regime, who controlled and used the national coffers as their personal accounts, paid little attention to the details of the new contract and related questions of fairness and the national interest.

He continues:

Moreover, senior members of the regime and their families had a stake in this distribution because they owned plantations. For example, two large estates were owned by one of the president' s wives and one of his daughters

Nepotism is not eradicated but became one of the main employment criteria

State is turned into a clan/family enterprise, worse than the 1960-1969 period.

As Steve Askin explains in the article: Food Aid Diversion (1987)

For at least six years, top officials of the Somali government
diverted US food aid from the most needy to
enrich their friends and to feed the army fighting a
long-running border war with Ethiopia.

Siad Barre thus not only abandoned self-reliance but even became dependent on US Food Aid to feed what's left of the SNA to combat poor Somali civlians which were tired of oppressive military dictatorship and rose up against it. A classic turn of events!

The article continues:

Some of the worst abuses occurred during Africa's most tragic
famine year, 1984. Only 12 percent of the 16,000 tons of emergency
food the US provided Somalia reached the hungry people it
was intended for, reported the GAO.

Instead, 9 percent went to
the Somali armed forces, 21 percent to other government bodies
for their use, and 58 percent was not even distributed.

Basically this would be the same tactic used by faction leaders in post-1991.

More quotations from the article!

Somalia also misused $96 million worth of wheat, rice, vegetable
oil and other food items bought from the US between 1978
and 1984 under an economic aid program (PL 480) which gives
Third World countries low-interest loans to buy surplus commodities.

At one point, AID pressed Somalia to sell the food at public
auction. Somali officials obligingly staged auctions, but rejected
high bids and sold grain to their friends at low cost.

By allowing food aid to enrich this small
elite of politically-connected merchants, the US further impoverished
the Somali people and undercut local farmers, charged the
GAO.

[Somaliweyn]

Now lets look back at the speeches of Siad Barre to legitimize the coup

Intervention by the Armed Forces was inevitable. It was no longer possible
to ignore the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft of public
funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country.
The laws were thrust aside and people did whatever they wanted.

He continues:

There was no longer a sense of confidence in the national will, not even a minimum basis for national cooperation
was established, and there was a high degree of moral decay. (David D. Laitin, 1976)

At the end of Siad Barre's rule

-corruption was at its height,
-bribery the norm of the day,
-nepotism official employment criteria,
-theft of public funds was normal as public coffers and personal accounts was the same,
-injustice and disrespect to our religion very normal as every wadaad which had different interpretation of the religion then Siad Barre was executed,
-and the laws of the country was a joke,the ruling people did whatever they wanted. Exemplified by the brutal measures taken against any dissident, the famous land cruiser-symbol etc.

What the coup set in motion, in the words of Richard H. Shultz, Jr. in State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis

The coup set in motion 21 years of
military rule in Somalia, prevented
the development of civil institutions
and a sense of nationhood, and culminated
in clan warfare and state disintegration.

The resurrection of the burned clannism by Siad Barre: Again in the words of Richard H. Shcultz, Jr

Thus, Siad Barre actually pursued a policy of
undermining the power of certain
clans while promoting that ofhis own
Marehan group and subclans allied
with it (mainly the Ogadeni and, to a
lesser extent, the Dolbuhanta)

)

Barre's insatiable hunger for power:

To maintain control, Siad
Barre established an extremely repressive
internal security apparatus,
the National Security Service,
headed by his son-in-law

The seeds of clan-based hatred and violence:

To destroy the role and power of
the clan system, while promoting his
own Marehan subclan and its allies,
Siad Barre relied on violence and repression.
These policies had the opposite
effect. Instead of shattering
the clan structure, they facilitated
the creation of clan-based politicallparamilitary
organizations committed
to the overthrow of the government
through the use of force.

Conclusion:

Siad Barre stole the ruling seat by proclaiming that he would eradicate evil things like clannism, nepotism, corruption and would restore a sense of confidence in national will and a minimum basis for national cooperation. In the first years of his rule he came with PR-stunts which secured him popular support. But as soon as the economic windfalls generated by the previous civilian government ended after 1974, Siad Barre had to secure his wide support and launched a premature invasion of Ethiopia to gain the Ogaden region, this turned disastrous despite the courageous effort of Somali soldiers. After the 77 war things went really bad, economy was bankrubt, self-reliance policy abandoned in favour of IMF-ism, clannism, nepotism and corruption surfaced back. Instead of restoring confidence in national will and a minimum basis for national cooperation, and fighting the evils of the previous civilian government Siad Barre's oppressive military dictatorship further underminned any credibility the Somali state had, and ultimately destroyed any confidence and hope Somalis had in a neutral Somali state which rises above clan structured society and is free from nepotism, corruption and clannism. The dead of the First Republic of Somalia was a fact when Siad Barre was forcefully removed from the capital of Somalia. His brutal repressive measures undermined any future national unity and the required minimum of trust between the different Somali groups which is the basis for national cooperation. This was only further exacerbated by the civil war and enduring anarchy in many parts of Somalia.

Next part is the economic aspect of the 21 years rule of Siad Barre.

[RebelLion]

I don't always agree with somaliweyn, but your on the money in this topic. Anyone who looks at both the civilians regime and the dictatorship of barre(aun) rationally will come to the conclusion that barre's regime although accomplished a few things was a disaster for somalia and it's the main reason the civil war started. While the civilian government although made mistakes was the best period for somalia so far in our history.

I also would suggest reading " The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History by DAVID d laitin " in which the author talks about the bumbling leadership, nepotism, lack of diplomacy of siyaad during the ogaden war. The main reason the war was lost was Barre lack of leadership.

[luis1]

I agree with you, Barre made several mistakes in 1978,for example he trusted in EE.UU,that was a big mistake.

[luis1]

Look at this video,Carter betrayed Somalia.

[Somaliweyn]

To continue with the economic aspect of the military rule:

Economic aspect: achievements


- Nationalization of key economic sectors
- Announcement of the first Three Year Plan

The plan emphasized a higher standard of living for every Somali, jobs for all who sought work, and the eradication of capitalist exploitation. Agricultural ''crash programs'' and creation of new manufacturing plants were the immediate results.
Siad Barre quickly brought a substantial proportion of the modern economy under state control. The government nationalized banks, insurance companies, petroleum distribution firms, and the sugar-refining plant and created national agencies for construction materials and foodstuffs. (Library of Congress, country study: Somalia)

In 1973 the government decreed the Law on Cooperative Development, with most funds going into the agricultural sector. In the pre coup years, agricultural programs had received less than 10 percent of total spending. By 1974 the figure was 29.1 percent. (Library of Congress)


- Barre's regime pursued a self-reliance policy, economic as well as political.

As he put it in his speech on 23 February 1971:

We filled our lives with degradation, thievery, backbiting, envying and plotting. That was our harvest in the past. He also distinguished between the recurrent and capital budget, and
argued that a 'fully-independent country never ...seek(s) money for
the actual running of its machinery from a foreign country.

And so, independence in food and in ability to pay for the regular budget would
enable Somalia, according to Siyad, to restore its lost national dignity (David D Laitin, 1976)

Lets see whether this was the case.


As shows David D. Laitin in Political economy of Military Rule in Somalia (1976):

1. The Revolutionary Goal of Making Somalia Self-Sufficient in Food Has Not Been Achieved

- Import of rice, cereals, fruit & vegetables, and other foodstuff increases after 1969.

2. The Revolution Has Not Succeeded in Reducing Foreign Dependence in Trade

- Imports increase from a level of 286.4 million Sh in 1967 to 646.2 million Sh in 1973.

- Exports also increase but relatively slow.
- Trade deficit increases from a level of 87.9 million Sh. In 1967 to 342.2 million Sh. In 1973

David concludes:

The general point which emerges from these figures and from Tables
2-4 is that Siyad, despite his rhetoric, has not been able to give Somalia
a new economic independence from the colonialists and the neocolonialists.

This is also supported by Ahmed I. Samatar in Self-Reliance Betrayed: Somali Foreign Policy, 1969-1980 (1987)

He says:

The evidence presented in this analysis points to serious failures with regard
to the Somali regime's declared objective -a self-reliant political economy.
By 1980 Somalia's acute degree of external economic dependency was highlighted
by heavy reliance on export-receipts (their dwindling contribution
notwithstanding), high concentration of import / export markets, chronic
balance of payment deficits, and a hobbling debt burden.

[Somaliweyn]

Now lets further scrutinize the economy by looking at the two pillars of the Somali economy and main sources of state revenues: The Rural Sector

*Agriculture and Pastoralist economy.

In the beginning till the drought of 1974, the agricultural and pastoral sector showed somehow good figures (when not compared to population increase). Siad Barre as usual claimed it as the result of his socialist experiment, but a closer look at it will reveal that it was the harvest of the investments the previous governments made in its Development Plans.

Like for example the expansion in area under cultivation and banana export till 1974.

Abdi Samatar says in Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? Bananas, Boom, and Poverty in Somalia (1993)

The National Banana Board was organized to 'manage' the industry. Whatever its supposed function was, this board had little positive impact on the plantation economy. While banana output increased from 145.500 tons in 1970 to 168.300 tons in 1973, with the area under cultivation growing from 6.500 cultivated hectares to 9.500 hectares, such growth was the result of investments and improvements made before the regime came to power (Gaas 1990)

So what happened after 1973, which is solely the harvest of what the military government did

Abdi Samatar sheds some light on this issue:

Banana production began a downward spiral in 1973. The area under cultivation fell by more than 50 percent from its peak in 1973 to 3.600 hectares in 1981, while production hit rock bottom in 1981 at 59.000 tons, less than a third of the 1973 output. Yields per hectare declined from 29.7 tons in 1973 to 20.3 tons in 1981 (World Bank 1987,17).

So it was a mess after the windfall of 1973 as consequence of the Development Plans of the previous civilian government ended.

What about the economy in general ?

Again Abdi Samatar in his own words:

The Somali agrarian economy, guided by 'scientific socialist' policies, failed to keep pace with population growth (over 3 percent annually) in the 1970s. Even lifestock, the most vibrantly growing sector, fell behind population in rate of increase (Table 1). The crop sector, including bananas, declined in absolute terms during most of the 1970s. The banana economy of the Shabelle and Juba valleys of southern Somalia was one of the sectors that suffered the most during that decade.

Abdi Samatar is not alone in this pessimist view of the Somali economy at the end of the decade:

It was also diagnosed by World Bank and IMF as suffering from all problems which other African countries also faced: declining productivity, excessive expansion of the public sector (every illiterate cousin gets a public office), overvalued exchange rate, a restrictive investment code, poor incentives for farmers etc. In short the usual bambo jambo of IMF and World Bank.

[Somaliweyn]

So to make a long sad story short: In what shape was the economy at the end of the military dictatorship

As Jamil A. Mubarak explains in his 1997 paper titled The 'Hidden Hand' Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia:

The official economy was close to a total collapse in the years preceding the fall of Siad Barre from power. The magnitude of the macro-economic imbalances were astounding. During 1989-90, the non-financial public sector deficit exceeded 30% of GDP, and the current account deficit of the balance of payments (excluding official grants) averaged 45% of GDP. Government policies were repressive and had little credibility and influence. The alienated urban private sector was forced to join the informal market. Activities, such as trade smuggling, black marketeering of foreign exchange and other goods and services became entrenched. By the mid-1980s, the crisis intensified to the extent that the government lost control over managing or solving the economic crises. Hence the collapse of economic institutions and the private sector's efforts to cope with harsh environment and to fend for itself was a process that started long before the Somali state's ultimate collapse in 1991.

Conclusion:

So basically the formal national economic system was down to the ground at the end of the 21 year rule of Barre' s regime. In 1969, when the regime took over the ruling seat of Somalia the economy was doing well thanks to the development plans the civilian government had implemented. These good figures continued the first half of the first decade (till 1974). After that year, the economy was trapped in a downward spiral which mainly influenced the regime to start an invasion of Ethiopia (1977) since the best time to start a war is when one needs diversion from domestic problems. After this war, which Somalia lost due to diplomatic failures of the Mogadishu regime, the Somali economy was nearly close to collapsing wasn't it for the IMF and World Bank' s Structural Adjustment Plan. Since this year the control of the Somali economy was handed over to foreign forces (IMF, World Bank, USAID etc), which completely destroyed the policy of self-reliance which the regime used to win over popular support. Much money was poured into revitalizing the Somali economy, but most of this money ended into private pockets of senior members of the military regime. This shameless corruption and nepotism was the last straw for the economy of Somalia, which collapsed around 1988-89, much earlier then the collapse of the regime. The formal economy of Somalia was nonexistant at the end of the regime, since most business groups went underground and created the informal economy which would launch Mogadishu and Somalia into 21st century.