Garxjis mightiest clan in Somaliland:Official UN Report 1996

[Hanad Mohamed]

Salam,

Garxajis hegemony of Somaliland: Official UN Report 1996 Part 1

This article is about Garxajis hegemony in Somaliland and how the Egal and administration tried and failed to counter this hegemony.

The Garaxjis (Idegale and Haber Younis) Militia was known as the SNM or just Militia

The Haberawal led Militia or otherwise known as 'Maadyalol',which included The Arap, Haberjealous, Ayuab, and all of Issaq besides Garaxjis.

So this how the Issaq or Maadyalol war was:

Garxajis (Idegale & Haber Younis) V.s Haberawal, Arap, Ayuab, and Haberjelous, Toljelous and rest of Issaq as well as Gadabrisi , some Warsangalli, some Dhulbahante.

Maadaylol is the clothes or junk put on top of nomad Somalia house or 'pool', and this term was a metaphor for a group that has no match. For example, Haberawal, Arap, Ayuab have the same mother as Garaxjis and are called Ba Magado, as opposed to Ba Xabashed a group of 4 Issaq sons that group in order in large themselves as they are Laangaabs.

Egal even had the Gadabrisi in his Militia, some Warsangalli, some Dhulbahante.

All these forces tried to fight the Garaxjis and failed with the Haber Younis intially having Berbera but later was expelled.

Ther Haber Younis held, Oodeweyni, Burco, and Erigavo and expelled all those clans loyal to Egal in those areas including Haberjelous, Arab, Issa Musa all expelled by the Haber Younis from Burco and Erigavo for 2 year.

Until the Duruqsi accord when the Haber Jealous surrended and was defeated.

Haberjelous were aloud to come back from Yarawe, Ballidege, and Caynaba by the Haber Younis in early 1998

A blow to Egal and his Haberawal counter to Garaxjis hegemony as he had lost 1/4 of his militia the Haberjelous, Toljelous and Ba Xabushed clans.

Egal later entered Oodweyni and seeked terms and Somaliland entred the best peace for a long time.

Rest in peace to all the SNM founders and Garaxjis kings.
Koodbuur, Koosar, Geesigii Maxamed Cali (founder of the SNM), Lixle and all the rest.

Also to the first ever President of Somaliland, Second President of the SNM and romantic Somaliweyn his HRH Abdirahman Mxamed Ali. Alla ha u naxariistee Geesigiiah

Long live Garaxjis hegemony in Somaliland. Allah iya Mahad leah

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Written by Ahmed Yusuf Farah, Consultant anthropologist, Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia, January 1996

About the Peace Mission
The peacemaking process unfolding in Somaliland under the auspices of the "Peace Committee for Somaliland" was presented in a Peace Proposal presented in Addis Ababa on November 2, 1995. Driven by a collective sense of duty and disgust with their status as passive observers of the devastating sporadic civil strife affecting their war-ravaged home since 1992, a group of "Somalilanders" agreed to work together in a search for a peaceful solution to the latest round of violence in the Northwest. Thus the active participants of the process are an independent and neutral committee of intellectuals based abroad.
The organization of an external peace mission was the outcome of a series of consultations held by the Diaspora in those countries hosting a relatively high proportion of emigrants from Somaliland. A concerned group of "Somalilanders" who are well versed with the history and the nature of the latest conflict first met in Addis Ababa in April 1995. Considering the urgent need for intervention to the difficult and complex crisis in Somaliland, the participants agreed to the following plan as presented in the Peace Proposal
• Since the traditional elders have been slow or ineffective in containing the current conflict, a new team of peacemakers should be quickly sent to the Egal Government and the forces opposed to it;
• The Team should consist of individuals widely known and highly respected in Somaliland;
• Individual members of the team should have a reputation for fairness, intimate knowledge of the problems producing the armed conflict, neutrality to the warring parties, and commitment to peace;
• The composition of the team should reflect the population of "Somaliland", although commitment to peace and fairness must supersede the criterion of clan representation;
• To keep it manageable and efficient, the team should not exceed 15 persons
The Conference of Somaliland Intellectuals Abroad, held in London at the end of April 1995, followed the Addis Ababa meeting and discussed the agreed plan. The London conference reached important agreements including the establishment of "Council for Peace and Development" in Somaliland, and decided the need for an urgent action to terminate the civil strife devastating the region. The consensus on an external peace mission for "Somaliland" was further endorsed by the National Reconciliation Committee and other groups in Scandinavian countries, the United States and Canada.

Arrival in Addis Ababa
To assemble the right size of group and the most suitable individuals in Addis Ababa was complicated by the failure to secure travel funds for particular members living abroad. Nevertheless, a functional core of peacemakers finally made themselves available to initiate peacemaking in Somaliland. During their stay in Addis Ababa, October to the end of November 1995, the peace committee devoted most of its time and effort to promoting the cause of the mission and searching for financial and material assistance for basic necessities. The Ethiopian government cordially received the mission, appreciated their effort and willingly facilitated the legal permits and visa requirements that are necessary for the presence, travel and conduct of their peace affairs in the country.
Once assembled, the members of the Peace Committee agreed to dispense their functions according to the following principles:
• They participate only as individual volunteers who represent no political organization, no clan, or no government;
• They will remain neutral to the conflict and hear all views without prejudice;
• They have no hidden agenda or political aims beyond the goal of achieving dialogue and peace;
• They will build on the history and tradition by which people of "Somaliland" had solved their conflicts: and
• They will pursue the quickest, least costly means toward durable peace with justice in Somaliland
The Peace Committee agreed to seek the following goals:
• To achieve immediate cease fire wherever armed conflict prevails;
• To prepare a framework and venue for dialogue and negotiation;
• To prepare a report on lessons learned that could be useful to prevent similar conflicts arising in the region.

To achieve agreed goals, the Committee decided to approach all parties to the conflict and:
• Hear their grievances and suggestions for achieving the above goals
• Formulate with them terms for achieving effective cease-fire, and
• Prepare mutually agreeable place, time, and participants for dialogue and reconciliation.
Since a significant number of military officials, political leaders, religious and traditional leaders, and ordinary citizens of "Somaliland" are now living in Addis Ababa, it was necessary to start the peace dialogue there. Accordingly, the Peace Committee organized a one day forum attended by "Somalilanders" in the city. This provided the first public relations opportunity to the peace committee, which conveyed the nature of their mission and the approach they intend to apply in order to deliver peace. The mission was said to have been encouraged by the desire of the Participants for peace.

The Peace Committee Launches its Mission to Somaliland and the Aware Area of Ethiopia
Despite good progress in Addis Ababa, the Committee's dwindling resources forced them to cut short their preparatory work in Addis Ababa and to depart for their destinations in "Somaliland" and the Aware area of Region 5 of Ethiopia at the end of November 1995. To facilitate the process, the Committee has been split into two sub-committees to form parallel missions, one mission to the government side and the other to the opposition.

The parallel missions took different routes to arrive at the spheres controlled by the conflicting parties. The sub-committee sent to deal with the government traveled by air through Djibouti to Hargeysa and consisted of the following:
1. Xassan Ibrahim Samatar
2. Dr. Xussein ‘Cabdillaahi Bulxan
3. Maxamed xashi "cabdi
4. Feysal ‘Cali xuseen
5. Rashiid Sheekh ‘Cabdillaahi
6. Aaden Muusa Jibriil
7. "Cali Axmed Raabi
8. Barre Xassan Warsame
The other peace group destined to deal with the opposition areas went to Jigjiga via Dire Dawa. Then they proceeded overland to Aware (Kam Abokor, Rabasso and Darror), major centers dominated by Garxajis clansmen inhabiting the Aware area. To reach the military headquarters and the strong hold of the opposition forces inside "Somaliland", the final leg of the peace trip started from Darror and across the border to Oodweyne town. This group comprised:
1. ‘Cabdi Xasan Buuni
2. ‘Cabdi Hussein ‘Ciise
3. Dr. ‘Cabddillahi Diiriye
4. "Cismaan Xaaji Jaamac

The Response of the Somaliland Government
Initial opposition to the peace mission was encountered on the government side. One can safely assume that both parties of the conflict had prior knowledge about the peace mission but, being the better organized, the government gave a pre-emptive negative response to the mission, while the Committee was still in Addis Ababa. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Planning circulated a release to the local and foreign press, stating that:
"On 2-11-1995, a peace committee of Somaliland ( a self-nominated group) in Addis Ababa published a paper which was unofficially received by the administration on 20-11-1995. This committee has not made any consultation and or discussion with the administration regarding this paper. However, among the views of the administration includes:
a) The administration is adamantly opposing the essence and basis of this document which its objective appears to mediate between the two factional groups and indicates a constant conflict which needs seize fire (sic). This document has no basic sense of truth and creates suspicion."
The statement then goes on to accuse members of the Peace Committee of being sympathetic to the opposition.
Once the mission arrived in Hargeysa, however, discussions with the government progressed in a spirit of cooperation and understanding. On 04-12-1995, President Egal inaugurated dialogue with the Peace Committee in a luncheon at the presidency. This was followed by peace forums conducted with the council of ministers and council of elders. The mediation effort in Hargeysa ultimately secured the pledge of the government to work with the mission to bring a peaceful solution to the violence.
The Response from the Opposition

The regional authority of Ethiopia's Region 5 offered to provide a vehicle to transport the mission from Jigjiga to the traditional territory of the opposition, Aware. Along the way from Jigjiga to Aware, the mission stopped at Kam Hashim, to brief Arab clansmen living adjacent to the Garxajis clans in Aware area. The mission did this quick briefing partly because of consideration of the vested interest of this clan in the affairs of "Somaliland"- the Arab are a member of coalition of clans loyal to government forces. The visit was also necessary to satisfy the honor of the Arab who may have felt affronted if the peace mission proceeded to Aware without contacting them. Satisfied with this gesture, clansmen at Kam Hashim appreciated the goal of the mission and wished them good luck.
The mission to the opposition held discussions with the residents of camp Abokor and Darror villages in the Aware area. In general, the residents of these two centers warmly welcomed the mission and generously feasted them as honorable guests. The peace dialogue the peace committee entered into with the local leaders secured the acceptance and cooperation of the clansmen in Aware area. However, it took the mission only one day to secure the acceptance and grassroots support in Kam Abokor, but 8 days in Darror.
The considerable time and effort to secure cooperation with the peacemaking endeavor from the local leaders in Darror requires some explanation. There are different reasons for this phenomenon. First, the clan composition in the Abokor and Darror is different. Abokor falls under the exclusive sphere of influence of one clan, the ‘Iidagale; while Dearer supports a mixed population made of both clans forming the Garxajis alliance, ‘Iidagale and Habar Yonis. Since the often diverse interests of two clans whose solidarity is at present based on their opposition to the government are at stake, it is naturally more difficult for the leaders of the two clans to agree on a joint response to the peace mission.
In contrast to the appreciation and support expressed by the local leaders in Abokor, the mission was at first greeted in Darror with suspicion. Also it took further time for the spokesmen of the two clans to agree on a collective response to the peace mission. Eventually the mission secured support and pledge of cooperation from the mixed clan population in Darror.
Armed with these encouraging signs of grassroots support from the Garxajis clansmen in the Aware area, the mission finally arrived at Oodweyne, the seat of the supreme war committee of the Garxajis. Its formation was made imperative by the conflict, and represents the basis of Garxajis solidarity, the war committee has ultimate authority to decide on matters of peace and war. In contrast to the rather successful contacts with the Garxajis in Ethiopia, the peace mission met its first major hurdle in the opposition camp at Oodweyne.
The traditional clan leaders of the Garxajis, the sultans of the ‘Iidagale and Habar Yonis, expressed their personal opposition to a negotiated settlement with the government. In a BBC interview, the sultan of the ‘Iidagale blamed squarely the government as the culprit and called for its resignation as a pre-condition to a national conference to deliberate the crucial issues of reconciliation and power sharing. More importantly, what deferred rather than deterred the peace mission is current changes being made to the Garxajis leadership. The reigning supreme council of the Garxajis clans has been dissolved and the formation of new council to replace them has not yet been completed. However, the Garxajis leadership agreed that the new council would meet with the Peace Committee for substantive discussions, as soon as it was formed. Thus the mission stayed only one day in Oodweyne, and then returned to Jigjiga to await the invitation of the new Garxajis council.
Problems and Prospects
The sub-committee of the Peace Committee for Somaliland returned from Garxajis area to Jigjiga on 17 December 1995 to brief the Region 5 administration regarding the developments of their mission. The parallel sub-committee sent to the government side completed a successful mission and also returned to Jigjiga as planned. Jigjiga has been chosen as a base of the Peace Committee for Somaliland, because it is suitably located at crossroads linking Region 5, Somaliland and the outside world via Dire Dawa or Addis Ababa.

The Peace Committee are now in Jigjiga planning further contacts with the opposition. They are determined to complete the delicate task of reconciling the warring parties in "Somaliland". They have already achieved partial success by securing cooperation with reconciliation process from the government side. A similar breakthrough with the opposition has been delayed, despite grassroots support for peaceful settlement of the conflict witnessed by the mission.
One positive effect of the peace mission is that it has triggered a grassroots discourse among the supporters of warring parties. This appears to have given a new impetus and drive towards a negotiated settlement that is advanced by the local peace groups on both sides of the conflict, while at the same time marginalizing the adversaries of peace.
Considering the favorable conditions existing on the ground and the good offices of the peace mission, the chance of a negotiated settlement of the protracted conflict in "Somaliland" is better than any time in the past. However, lack of resources continues to hamper the group's efforts, and may eventually curtail the process. Also since several members of the Committee cannot invest more of their own resources, the Committee is taking advantage of the delay in order to rotate some of its members and to encourage new participants to come from abroad.
"Search for Peaceful Solution to Fighting in 'Somaliland"': Comments and Analysis.

The Peace Committee has managed to put the issue of peace back on "Somaliland's" agenda. But despite this progress, obstacles to a negotiated settlement must be overcome on both sides. In the government camp, a relatively coherent, unitary administrative structure masks deep political divisions. The government's "pre-emptive" press release, suggesting some initial confusion, and the continuing opposition of some hard-line members of the administration bear witness to these stresses. Some observers interpret Egal's recent dismissal of former Interior Minister, Muse Bixii Abdi (for the second time), a member of the 'Alan 'As group, as a further indication of the rifts between hawks and moderates (if not doves) in the government camp.
On the opposition side, a monolithic leadership structure, however superficial, does not exist. The various Garxajis committees are essentially ad hoc groupings organized solely for the purpose of managing the war. It is therefore not possible to locate and engage the opposition leadership in the same way as the government. The internal leadership crisis of the Garxajis is therefore among the most difficult obstacles in the peace process. It is complicated by interacting factors relating primarily to clan politics and regional issues. In terms of traditional politics, the opposition is constituted of two traditionally rival clans with different economic interests but who have become united in their opposition to the present government as a result of mutual Garxajis grievances, e.g. distribution of power and economic resources.
The 'lidagale, the smaller of the two Garxajis clans, feel they are the actual losers of the conflict and have suffered greater economic loss than their Habar Yonis allies. Of the major Isaaq-dominated urban centers in "Somaliland", the ‘Iidagale have an interest only in the capital city of Hargeysa which is strategically located at the buffer zone of the large and rival Isaaq clans of Habar Awal and Garxajis. The war has therefore displaced "Iidagale townsmen from their major urban center. In contrast clansmen of the Habar Yonis section, Isxaaq, the most urbanized and wealthy Habar Yonis group, reconciled with the government soon after the fighting started. They therefore remain in Hargeysa although other Habar Yonis clansmen have been displaced by the conflict.
Despite the intensive fighting for the control of Bur'o, which is normally contested by the Habar Yonis and Habar Je'elo clans, Garxajis opposition forces have not been entirely dislodged from this town as happened in Hargeysa. Their foothold in this devastated city offers the Habar Yonis a sense that they have not been defeated. As part of the joint Garxajis opposition forces, sacrifices have been made by the 'Iidagale militia fighting for a town in which they have no vested interest. Fighting for the cause of a different clan (Habar Yonis) while their own city is out of the reach causes the 'lidagale further anxiety. In spite of the relatively greater proportion of economic burden inflicted on them by the fighting, the 'lidagale also feel the management of the war effort is dominated by their partners. The location of the headquarters of opposition forces at Oodweyne, which is controlled by Habar Yonis, is regarded as an evidence of this domination.
The above-mentioned grievances of the 'lidagale seem to have encouraged assertion of their independence, and demands for a more active role in the common affairs of the Garxajis. There are reports that the 'lidagale are establishing their own headquarters inside their traditional territory at Salaxley village south of Hargeysa. It also reported that they have already selected their new supreme war council and are waiting for the Habar Yonis to nominate their own council. This will be followed by the contentious election of forming a united Garxajis supreme war council.
Discord among the Garxajis over the independence of Somaliland or unification with Somalia is another critical regional issue. The difficulty here is the difference between the opinion of the majority of Garxajis clansmen and the externally based Garxajis political leaders. Garxajis kinsmen generally support the independence of Somaliland, as do the non-Garxajis clansmen loyal to Egal, while certain Garxajis politicians and military officers promote the issue of federation with Somalia. Paradoxically, the war started under dubious circumstances and appears to have been instigated without the consent of their camps by politicians belonging to both parties. The war has reached a point where politicians and military officials can no longer maintain it without clear justification, but the recent infusion of external military aid provided by opposition leaders based in Mogadishu (reportedly furnished by Libya) may give both sides the justification, and the stomach, to persist. If so, it raises the possibility that the fighting will soon be dominated by external logic, complicating both the conflict, and the prospects for a special settlement.

Relevant Literature
Farah, A. Y. (with I.M. Lewis) 1993

[Gatspy]

w/s
Sacayga cusbo ayaan siiyee, bal intuu dibirey eega.

[Dooro-Basher]

Faan kuuma meel maro haddii aan laguu furine
Faraha iyo shiishkaba rag kaa fiicanbaa jira e
Fanka geela laayaanu nahay fooska dirireede
Fadxi yeelay Aarkuba markuu foodda dhiig daro e
Ferenjaa Ilaah kuu baxshiyo faalki gaalada e
Waxaan kugu furfuray uumiyuu faallo kala daalye

Nin Itaal yar baa beri xaarweyn weyn weyn weyn toonshay. Ninkii ayaa qolo ka maskax iyo muruqba weyn u faanay oo yidhi "I am the mightest amongst you".

Nin ogaa ninka futadiisu u been sheegtay meeshuu fadhiistay (ku saxarooday) ayaa yidhi

"Adeer sida loo kala xaar weyn yahay looma kala xoogweyna ee miyirso yaanad mid kii ka weyn dhigine"

Bilaa shaqalka, booxaalliga, iyo baanisaha faanka,
Naga badi Isaaq beenta iyo boola-xooftada e,
Waxse baalku naga taagan yahay maalintii belo e,
Bulbulloow Libaax iyo dawaco power kala roone,
Haddii uu Bulxamo Aarku waa bili cuslaadaaye,
Waxan nahay rag lagu beegi jirey boqol ninkoodiiye.

[biko]

Adeer sida loo kala xaar weyn yahay looma kala xoogweyna ee miyirso yaanad mid kii ka weyn dhigine"

[Manaking]

Hanad you are ugly child .

get the fuk out off here you dont represent Garhajis
sheegato asshole.

[biko]

^^you tell him girl!

why is every xaar trying to give garxajist a bad name by claiming to be one?

[Madmadoobe]

"Nin Itaal yar baa beri xaarweyn weyn weyn weyn toonshay. Ninkii ayaa qolo ka maskax iyo muruqba weyn u faanay oo yidhi "I am the mightest amongst you".

Nin ogaa ninka futadiisu u been sheegtay meeshuu fadhiistay (ku saxarooday) ayaa yidhi

"Adeer sida loo kala xaar weyn yahay looma kala xoogweyna ee miyirso yaanad mid kii ka weyn dhigine""

[Manaking]

Hanad is a classical darood kid sheegato

in same category with
The Magnificent and &

Its seems like a strategy to provoke Isaq brotherclans against eachother.
They tried with Habar Awal in winter and argueing this clan has monopoly on trade in SL .
And earlier it was Habar Jeclo calling them " sii bakthi " esp Magnificient kiddo who needs to learn proper somali . It does not mean " dying fox " Sii Bakthi means keep dying forward . But it is not meant on the HJ , it was because of some unlucky nomads who lost everything they had and ended up in refugee camps.
Now they have learned the word Garhajis and would like to play a new game .
whos biggest and baddest
hoping some isaq kid would swallow the bate and say HIS Habar somebody clan is greater.

so fuk off sheegato kids

[dhulka-raga-hantaday]

they are at it again.very funnyy madoobow

[Madmadoobe]

Too many garxajis morons in this site, is xaar-player sheegat too. Anyway laangaab who badmouths HJ will be dealt with whether xaarxajis or not.

[dhulka-raga-hantaday]

MADOOBE ISKA DAA CIYAALKA, U SHOULD ALLWAYS BE THE BIGGER MAN,
LAAKIN MISANA HJ AYEY CAYEEN MIYAA WAR ISKA CELI,

[Madmadoobe]

"MADOOBE ISKA DAA CIYAALKA, U SHOULD ALLWAYS BE THE BIGGER MAN,
LAAKIN MISANA HJ AYEY CAYEEN MIYAA WAR ISKA CELI,"

Why, thank you mr dhulka. I AM the bigger man, naga jooji laakiin dira dirowga waryaa

[dhulka-raga-hantaday]

maya xaqiiq hadii la sheegayo hj waa dad asli ah.

[Madmadoobe]

"maya xaqiiq hadii la sheegayo hj waa dad asli ah."

, Tell that to this little xaarxejis idiot

[dhulka-raga-hantaday]

war sug mayee wuu ogyahaye isbee