A comparision of goverments (reply to X.Playa's post)

[Warsame101]

The Revolutionary Government’s Achievements:

1. Enforcing the Somali Script for the Written Language which has been regarded as the greatest achievement in Somali History.
2. Campaigns against corruption, laziness, tribalism and cleanliness
3. Self-help schemes and crash programmes, ranging from sand-dune stabilization to tree plantings. Every Somali had to contribute as much as seven hours-per-week of their spare time to construct government designed projects such as roads, hotels, office buildings, schools and housing.
4. Establishing the First Somali University
5. Educating 70% of the Somalis within five years after the commencement of the Revolution. Regarded by the United Nation as one of the most successful mass-urban literacy campaign ever recorded.
6. Nationalizing the import of cereals, fuel, medicine, films, export of bananas, hides and skins which sky rocked the poorly underdeveloped Somali economy.
7. Centralising the budget system for the first time in Somalia history which lead to a unified budget, incorporating the former central and regional budgets.
8. Taking over foreign schools and banning foreigners from employment in posts that could be filled by Somalis.
9. Freezing of prices
10. Reducing rents
11. Entering Somalia into the Arab League in 1974
12. Creating security courts to solve tribal clashes
13. Expanding the Somali Army Force from 10,000 before the Revolution to 60,000.
14. Modernizing the Somali Air force
15. Establishing the Somali Navy force
16. Created the first Somali National Bank in 1971
17. Abolishing private educations which lead to a substantial expansion of the school population at primary, secondary, and university level.
18. Phasing out all private medicine and launching a nationwide immunisation program.
19. Establishing of the first Faculty of Medicine which meant that Somali doctors could now qualify at home.
20. Extending and modernizing hospital services.
21. A concerted effort was undertaken to improve animal health care. This lead to an establishment of veterinary stations to set up and improve the condition of nomad’s livestock. Vaccinations against animal diseases were provided freely by the government and according to a Soviet observer, the inoculation of cattle increased by 100% after the Revolution.
22. Establishing training institutes for Animal Health Assistants. A step greatly admired by Julius Nyerere, an authority on African socialism, who remarked in 1974: “The Somalis are practicing what we in Tanzania preach.”
23. Somalia, for the first time, become the first governor in the African Union
24. Modernising the Kismaayo, Berbera and Muqdisho airports.
25. Leading a war for liberation of our homelands in 1977 where we defeated Ethiopia and captured the place in mere months until Russia and Cuba intervened.
26. Established the first Somali Institute of International Studies, where it provided courses about the Horn of Africa and Afro-Arab relations within the context of studies in international politics, law, and diplomacy.
27. Established the Somali National Academy of Arts, Sciences and Literature, which was the second most important institution after the Somali National University. This Academy has provided Somali language dictionaries, grammar books, Somali History, researching Somali manuscripts and culture.
28. Established the first Somali National Library.
29. Improved and expanded the Somali National Museum.
30. Provided educational scholarships to potential students
31. Provide the best education to students that wanted to enter army by sending them to the best countries known for their military education.


There are many more achievements that I could list, but it would elongate the list, thus requiring more space.



A sample comparison statistics of both governments:

1. In 1969, before the revolution, 55,021 students were enrolled in all schools located in the country. In 1975, after the revolution, the number jumped to 240,550, which is an increase of 437%!

2. In four years between pre-revolution and post-revolution, there was an increase of 128% in elementary school enrolment which is equal to an annual growth rate of 32.1%.

3. Intermediate school enrolments increased 51% (21.8% annual growth rate). Secondary education enrolments rose overall by 63.8% (16% annual growth rate).

4. Before the Revolution, there were 6,412 secondary students of which 737 were girls. Four years after the Revolution, there were 10,500 students of which 1,773 were girls, considering girls; their enrolment increased 140.6% over the four-year period.

5. Before the Revolution, there were three technical and two vocational schools in Somalia. After the Revolution (before 1978), there were sixteen: four technical schools, two polytechnics, three nursing, two clerical, and one each for maritime, agriculture, animal husbandry, range management, and telecommunication technicians.

6. Before the Revolution (in 1969), there were 1,873 Somali teachers. Three years after the Revolution ( 1972-3) the number jumped to 4,486 teachers which was a rapid increase of 440% in teacher training.

7. Before the Revolution, there was not a single university in Somalia. After the Revolution, in 1972, a Somalia National University was established with five initial faculties (gradually expanded in 1974) in education, law, economics, agriculture, and the sciences were in operation. In 1974, faculties of medicine, veterinary, sciences, natural sciences, maritime sciences, languages and literate and fine arts were established.

8. Before the Revolution, intellectuals and academics still used the English or Italian terminological terms. After the Revolution, these terms were Somalized.

9. Before the Revolution, all textbooks and school books were written by foreign authors and printed in foreign countries. After the Revolution, Somalis had their own school and textbooks, written by Somalis and printed in Somalia. Between 1973 and 1976, the Ministry of Education published over 6 million text-books in Somali.

10. In 1975 alone, 1,180 class-rooms were built for primary education.


Even the anti-Siyaad author Cabdi Sheikh Cabdi could not deny its achievements:

It can hardly be denied that Somalia under its present leadership has achieved some impressive results. This is most apparent to someone, like myself, who had been out of the country for many years. A good number of ambitious projects have been started, and in part completed, under the military Government, including the rehabilitation and resettling of nomads who had lost their flocks during the 1974-5 Deba-Dhere drought. These destitute former herdsmen have been settled in farming and fishing co-operatives between the two perennial rivers of south-western Somalia. Other projects include the north-south tarmac highway, built with Chinese technical help, which connects the two main regions of the Somali Republic and thus has both economic and political roles to play. Other projects undertaken by the Barre regime, though less successful, have instilled a co-operative spirit and a work-ethic that had been woefully lacking in the Somalia of the 1960s. The germ of this new spirit is most discernable in the numerous revolutionary youth centres that have been established in recent years. I recall having been very moved by one of the songs sun by orphan girls who had known no other home but such a centre, and no other parent but the state:


It is a time of pleasant suprises
When one journeys from a place of drought and desolation
to one of plenty and prosperity
There was a time
When I did not know my lineage
Now I have a father in [President] Siyaad.
A mother in the October Revolution
The flag is my uncle,
The land my grandfather,
The soil my grandmother

http://i166.photobucket.com/albums/u111 ... khAbdi.jpg



The 60-69 Government’s achievements:

1. Heavy corruption
2. High level of tribalism (e.g. In the 1969 elections, there were over 1000 clan-based candidates and over 70 parties for fewer than 130 seats.
3. It received the highest foreign aid per capita in comparison to other African states but there was practically little development projects to no visible improvement in the standard of living.
4. Hospitals were selling their medicines to local pharmacies
5. Government-owned cars were being used as taxis.
6. I.M. Lewis admits that in “the ten years of civilian government in Somalia, elections and competition for material resources in urban contents and in the national context greatly expanded the arenas of rivalry between clans and their segments, bringing in to sharp conflict groups which had previously never interacted, and hardly never knew of each other’s existence”

I cannot list any major developments that this government achieved for Somalia despite the fact that it had two different presidents. There was practically no unity, not to mention the great moral decay.

Prior to the Revolution, where nothing was done to develop the country, the poet Maxamed Ismaaciil responded to this situation in a way that exemplified Somali people's deepest feelings:

"Oh! My friends the Somali Language is very perplexed;
It is all anxiety in its present condition;
The values of its words and expressions are
being gagged by its own people;
Its very back and hips are broken, and
it accuses its own speakers for neglect;
It is weeping with (deep) sorrow;
It is being orphaned and its value is vanishing"

http://i166.photobucket.com/albums/u111 ... /Page2.jpg


The Caydiid-Cali Mahdi governments’ “Revolution” (deembed by AbdiWahhab):

1. Mass-rapes
2. Genocide
3. Mass-looting
4. Destruction of cities
5. No semblance of governance
6. Drug and rape-crazed future Somali child-soldiers
7. Roadblocks

[DawladSade]

You have done it again professor.


---"It is a time of pleasant suprises
When one journeys from a place of drought and desolation
to one of plenty and prosperity
There was a time
When I did not know my lineage
Now I have a father in [President] Siyaad.
A mother in the October Revolution
The flag is my uncle,
The land my grandfather,
The soil my grandmother"---

http://i166.photobucket.com/albums/u111 ... khAbdi.jpg


Where do you get all this information?

[DawladSade]

Guess we don't need any sources for this one:


----"The Caydiid-Cali Mahdi governments’ “Revolution” (deembed by AbdiWahhab):

1. Mass-rapes
2. Genocide
3. Mass-looting
4. Destruction of cities
5. No semblance of governance
6. Drug and rape-crazed future Somali child-soldiers
7. Roadblocks"-----

[cabdallah252]

the barre nigerian toilet boy government was a somali run government no marehan thing at all, gedo was neglected like a mothafugga

[DawladSade]

[quote="cabdallah252"]the barre nigerian toilet boy government was a somali run government no marehan thing at all, gedo was neglected like a mothafugga[/quote]


Tumaal, go pay attention in special ed courses, this is for intelligent people to have intellectual discussion. Go play your kindergarten level "Habar Warsanten" shit somewhere else.

[Luq_Ganane]

Unrefutable evidence. Lets see if they can respond with facts, or just find a convenient way to dismiss them.

[cabdallah252]

[quote="DawladSade"][quote="cabdallah252"]the barre nigerian toilet boy government was a somali run government no marehan thing at all, gedo was neglected like a mothafugga[/quote]


Tumaal, go pay attention in special ed courses, this is for intelligent people to have intellectual discussion. Go play your kindergarten level "Habar Warsanten" shit somewhere else. [/quote]

what is tumaal? is that some kind of fish sound yummy

[AbdiWahab252]

Warsame,

Did u spend all night doing research on that ?


U also forgot the major shortcomings of the Siyaadist Regime:


1. Disasterous Defeat in the Ogaden War
2. Overseeing the first Somali Civil War
3. Using the Somali National Army as a tool of repression
4. Mismanaging Foreign Aid to Somalia as shown below:


Overall, outside aid generated $2.8 billion for Somalia between 1972 and 1989, making Somali people Africa’s greatest beneficiaries of aid on a per capita basis at that time. The geographic, sectoral and political distribution of aid, however, shows that most Somalis benefited very little as aid, not just from his Italian patrons, became a major source of corruption and kickbacks to regime favourites. The extreme dependence of the country on foreign aid for 90 percent of recorded development spending underlines the centrality of Barre in all avenues of economic life-as manager of formal state allocations and as patron to political allies-at the expense of broader community or commercial efforts. Barre’s domination of these economic channels also entrenched his power in the institutional frameworks of communities targeted for development spending. He used these initiatives to overlay his own political network over old informal local networks. The consequence later would be that informal mediating institutions such as xeer and the authority of ‘traditional’ leaders would be weakest in these areas once sustained conflict broke out in the late 1980s. Thus economic globalization in this manner laid the groundwork for state collapse. When examined in its patrimonial context, it also provides a guide for predicting which communities would organize their own responses to state collapse and which ones would not, and how each category would respond to economic opportunities in the 1990s and 2000s.

Meanwhile, agricultural projects and programs absorbed 22 percent of development spending in the 1980s, with 90 percent of that allocated to large-scale commercial crop farming. Favoured groups benefited from the construction of dams, irrigation and plantation farming in the south. This southern area was the dominant beneficiary of this category of spending. Foreign experts complained that this priority excluded more numerous pastoralists, especially those in northern areas affected by conflict that continued long after the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, even though agriculture spending rose as a proportion of development spending during this period. Further accentuating the social differentiation that development spending promoted, social service expenditures fell from 6.3 percent of development spending in 1975 to less than one percent in 1989. By the 1980s, even this small amount was reserved in large part to provide housing for faculty and staff at the National University in Mogadishu.

Even though state support declined politically favoured groups continued to benefit. Industrial firms, for example, received 35 percent of development spending in 1975, dropping to 10 percent in the mid 1980s. This decline reflected the regime’s acceptance of creditor advice to privatize industrial enterprises. This was carried out on the basis of political favouritism, and was immediately followed with massive manipulation of credit markets to benefit regime cronies. Administrative regulations depressed formal market interest rates for credit to -80 percent in real terms in 1984, compared to marginal positive rates in the late 1970s. Not efficient in economists’ terms, negative rates ensured that credit would be distributed to politically powerful groups and businessmen. Lucky recipients later paid their creditors in severely depreciated local currency, which effectively meant that the state provided its favourites with a bonus for holding these loans. The fiscal demands of this policy meant that the politically marginalized had to seek credit on their own in much more expensive informal markets that did not enjoy patronage from the state. Alternatively they could leave the country in search of economic opportunities abroad. This further marginalizing politically disfavoured groups from Barre’s informal patronage networks, though it would have positive significance in later years when their community leaders would find that they had influence over these overseas sources of income independent of strongmen associated with Barre’s regime.

Likewise, policy failure coupled with a steady flow of foreign aid helped civil servants migrate into regime-sanctioned clandestine channels. By 1989, civil servants were paid only three to four percent of the real value of their 1975 salaries, and had to support themselves through corruption, bribes and kickbacks. Despite declining salaries, Barre increased civil service employment from approximately 20,000 in 1969 to over 56,000 in 1983. This made association with foreign financed development projects a vital part of the survival strategies of civil servants. Uncertainty and scarcity helped turn these projects into an even more valuable political resource for Barre. A foreign consultant observed, however, that the civil service lost a disproportionate portion of more educated employees, particularly those who came from the north who Barre regarded as less desirable as political clients. As shown below, politically marginalized communities in the north were forced to became more adept at exploiting the economic opportunities of clandestine markets and overseas employment on their own, often in defiance of the regime and in conflict with clandestine rackets that regime favourites ran.

Even when Barre’s irredentist adventure and destructive economic policies brought growing popular insecurity, foreign relief aid offered him additional political resources that he could plow back into his ‘official’ clandestine economy. UN officials, for example, complained that $100 million in relief aid to refugees of the 1977-78 war was distributed on the basis of clan leadership loyalties to Barre, and was used to reinforce the control of regime strongmen who were responsible for controlling distribution of relief aid in the camps. Aid workers testified that food was pilfered from convoys and sold in local markets with the connivance of local officials. UN officials used this same complaint over pilferage to justify intervention in the early 1990s. Nor is it coincidence that the same individuals and armed groups were responsible for this use of violence in both periods, though prior to 1990 this was an informal ‘official’ state policy, while freelance in the latter. One aid worker estimated that three quarters of all supplies were stolen, with some going directly to pro-Barre militias that attacked clans that Barre believed opposed his rule. Massive over counting of refugees, 1.5 million by Somali government estimate versus 650,000 in the view of aid agencies also were geared toward generating resources for patronage.

[Luq_Ganane]

Abdiwahab, this guy brings you sources, with authors and documentation, and you come back with sentiments. I told you before you've been ruled out as a positive contributer to this debate, as you only have silly bedtime stories and anecdotes from without any facts. Come back when you can contribute something other than cuqdad laced replies. Until then kindly excuse yourself from this debate saaxib.

[DawladSade]

Abdiwahab, stop copy and pasting without bringing sources that DIRECTLY concern the points brought by Warsame.

You cannot talk about mismanage of money in Somalia without bringing into the discussion such men as Cabdullahi Cadow and Galayr who were entrusted with State treasury and usurped it.


Now again, directly talk about the topic at hand and HOW President Siad freed Habar Gidir from mental and physical bonadage.

Before 1969, the dream job of Habar Gidir was to be the chief hair cutter of Majeerteen.

Post-1969, Habar Gidir were allowed to eat near Majeerteen.

Deny it or shall we bring Cilmiile to come in and start cursing Mareexaan again for freeing the enslaved?

[kambuli]

Cabdalle, quote " the barre nigerian toilet boy government was a somali run government no marehan thing at all, gedo was neglected like a mothafugga"

Exactly walaal, Gedo and All Marehan areas were negelected, because Abbe Siyad Alla Yaa Raxmu was for Qaran not for qabiil...

[Warsame101]

AbdiWahhab, it takes less than ten seconds to pull an academic article using the online university database. But a high-school dropout like yourself would know nothing about that.

Anyways, I am not going to waste time with you since I have already proven you are a member of the Caydiid-worshipping cult. Anything that does not pertain Caydiid and his "glorious" history, you neglect it. You are nothing but a case ofthe brainwashed lead by another brainwashed.

Learn the meaning of the term academic research. I dare you to cite the author of that piece of garbage that you quoted. The same garbage written by some unknown author who clearly has never heard the term 'referencing'.

[DawladSade]

Kambuli, looks like I was so used to Abdalle that I did not even read his quote before responding. I love how these fools shoot them in the foot, isn't that exactly why Aabe Siyaad was NOT unfair?

[AbdiWahab252]

Warsame101,

A booli qaran child like you suckled on the tit of Siyaad Barre's corruption can be excused for defending him.

I just pray that you do something in the future to help the taxpayers from which funds were stolen to feed, clothe and raise your family.

[DawladSade]

[quote="Warsame101"]AbdiWahhab, it takes less than ten seconds to pull an academic article using the online university database. But a high-school dropout like yourself would know nothing about that.

Anyways, I am not going to waste time with you since I have already proven you are a member of the Caydiid-worshipping cult. Anything that does not pertain Caydiid and his "glorious" history, you neglect it. You are nothing but a case ofthe brainwashed lead by another brainwashed.

Learn the meaning of the term academic research. I dare you to cite the author of that piece of garbage that you quoted. The same garbage written by some unknown author who clearly has never heard the term 'referencing'.[/quote]

I used to hear if looks can kill, but if writing can kill .......