The Federalist Myth

[Adan_1]

The Federalist Myth


The story is meant to characterise the supposed inclination of the Garxajis towards politics, the mercantile acumen of the Habar Awal, and the bellicosity of the Habar Je’elo. Historical anecdotes have been invoked to reinforce these clan stereotypes: the Habar Yonis allegedly dominated posts as interpreters for the British during the colonial period, and thus acquired pretensions to intellectual and political superiority; Habar Awal dominance of the import-export trade via Djibouti and Berbera is virtually uncontested; and Habar Je’elo military prowess, though hardly unique to the clan, is cited in accounts of previous conflicts.


Such myths have been freely exploited on both sides: opposition sympathisers have typically cited the complicity of a Habar Awal Presidency with Habar Awal business interests in conspiring to dominate Somaliland. Habar Awal merchants are said to have underwritten ‘Igal’s Presidency, paid for the new Somaliland Shilling, and planned the slow strangulation of Garxajis livestock traders through exclusive control of Berbera port. In its crudest form, this stereotype found expression in the circulation of the "Subeer Awal Manifesto" - a letter, allegedly authored by ‘Igal, calling on his kinsmen to secure their interests within Somaliland through exploitation of their political and economic influence.

Stereotypes typically portray members of the Habar Yonis as unsophisticated nomads who exploited British favouritism to attain positions of early political influence; they are accused of having since acquired a belief in their own intellectual superiority and their inherent right to rule, entirely out of proportion with their importance and capability. Other clans thus characterise the Habar Yonis as inveterate trouble-makers, insatiable in their quest for political power, never content with anything less than the lion’s share. Conventional wisdom among their adversaries in the present conflict argues that they therefore needed to be taught a lesson.

These myths are reinforced by numerical arguments pertaining to one clan’s status relative to others. Garxajis belief in their absolute numerical superiority within the Isaaq is key both to the Garxajis sense of justice in militarily dictating their terms to "the rest" of Somaliland, and also to their sense of being victimised by an unfair "maryalool" coalition. Paradoxically, however, Garxajis support for "regional autonomy" as a principle of local government might actually undermine their numerical strength by dividing them between far-flung constituencies in which they enjoy nowhere a majority. Other Isaaq clans are highly sceptical of the Garxajis (esp. Habar Yonis) calculations of their numerical might.

Such arcane arguments must await a systematic census in order to be fully resolved, but in the meantime they directly influence Isaaq political behaviour. Habar Yonis grievances in the recent conflict relate directly to the approportionment of seats in the national parliament and government, according to a formula inconsistent with Habar Yonis importance. In fact, power-sharing arrangements within the Isaaq differed significantly from that between the Isaaq and other clans. Non-Isaaq were awarded parliamentary seats in proportion with their representation in the 1959 parliament; Gadabursi and Warsengeli seats were then increased by contributions from the Isaaq and Dhulbahante respectively. Within the Isaaq, however, the 1959 figures were superseded by the division of seats between clans at the 1990 SNM Congress held in Balleh Gubadleh. There, places were assigned equally to each of the eight sons of Sheikh Isaaq, leaving the Habar Je’elo with four, while the Garxajis and Habar Awal received one share each. That this formula was the child of political expediency, and unrelated to the relative size of Isaaq clans, is generally uncontested.


The Federalist Myth

Another key myth manipulated by leaders on both sides was the federalist dimension to the conflict. Federalist figures on the Garxajis side claimed full support from their clans for their association with General Mohamed Farah ‘Aydiid’s Moqdishu-based administration. ‘Aydiid himself was attracted to the idea that Garxajis militia could be described as SNM/SNA soldiers waging war on his behalf, regardless of evidence to the contrary. External observers, particularly among the Nairobi-based aid agencies and journalists, tended to accord this version far more credit that it deserved. In fact, the federalist platform enjoyed virtually no support among Garxajis within Somaliland, and most of the militia saw themselves as fighting only to unseat ‘Igal and his government; suggestions of their loyalty to ‘Aydiid (or even Abdirahman Tuur and co.) were explicitly rejected. Indeed, the very idea of a common Garxajis platform, beyond visceral opposition to ‘Igal and his government, was an illusion. Interviews with Habar Yonis and Iidagale refugees in Ethiopia suggested that a large majority rejected federalism as an aim of the war, and resented the involvement of their own clansmen within the federal clique. Nevertheless, logistical and financial support from the federal lobby was accepted by the Garxajis militia, who had no other base of support to which they could turn. Outside Somaliland and Somalia, the Garxajis diaspora tended to be more radical than their war-affected kinsmen. While the latter generally rejected association with the south, financial support from the diaspora was forthcoming despite, and in some cases because of, the linkages with Moqdishu.

The federalist challenge, however illusory, also served the purpose of those on the government side. The existence of the Moqdishu clique conveniently allowed the government to portray the conflict as one between pro-Somaliland forces of the government and anti-Somaliland stooges of General ‘Aydiid, rather than an internal conflict between clans. It would have proven far more difficult to sustain support for a civil war, and the National Charter would have obliged the government to defer to the "guurti" for resolution of the conflict. Instead, reports of SNA flags and Habar Gidir fighters captured by government forces during early fighting in Hargeysa served to fuel public indignation and support for the war. The menace of federalist forces from the south made any opposition to the government seem traitorous. Snared in a fiction of its own design, the opposition failed to win the sympathy of any other clan in Somaliland.

As the conflict wore on, obfuscation would continue to hamper initiation of a dialogue. While Garxajis leadership insisted on negotiations between clans, the government and its supporters consistently called for a dialogue between the government and its political adversaries (excluding those with posts in a foreign government, i.e. Moqdishu). Both sides would exploit this distinction in order to side-step dialogue for months on end. The recent schism between ‘Aydiid and ‘Usman ‘Aato in Moqdishu, followed by ‘Aydiid’s death, dealt a serious blow to the credibility of the Somaliland federal lobby, and thus removed a key obstacle to dialogue.

Among the Somaliland public, attitudes towards federalism have been tempered by the persistent thread of scepticism that any of Somaliland’s leading political figures wholly supports independence for Somaliland. Behind the nationalist rhetoric that pervades both camps lies gnawing suspicion that neither side’s leadership is truly sincere. Garxajis opposition fighters therefore feel free to claim, despite their leadership’s presence in Moqdishu, that they are fighting in support of independence, and that it is ‘Igal who wishes to take Somaliland back to Moqdishu (his inclinations have not changed since engineering Somali unity in 1960, the argument goes). Others, unable to make up their minds, prefer not to take sides, accusing all the present leaders of surreptitiously seeking their fortunes in a united Somalia.

[X.Playa]

Adan why did u left out the name of the author and the soruces?

[DawladSade]

Adan goormaad afhayeen u noqotay qolyahaas?