Comparative analysis of different periods in Somali history

[Somaliweyn]

This is as response to Warsame's pseudo-academic research and poorly-disguised attempt to rewrite history and give his hero a positive legacy.

First of all, if one really wants a genuine unbiased (as far is possible) comparison between the different periods and their results in Somali history, one needs to show according to what aspects one will compare the different periods. So let us first agree on what aspects we have to compare the different periods and their achievements

Lets compare them by looking at the political, economic and military aspects. This is the most appropriate way instead of he built hospital, he built a well, he established a navy

As far as the different periods are concerned, one needs to know in advance that I have low esteem of them. All periods, whether the 1960-1969, 1969-1991, and post 1991, are characterized by failures and disappointment. Failing to achieve the wishes and aspirations of the Somali people and the realization of the latent greatness of the Somali nation Yet, some periods have achieved more then others, and some periods will have more lasting impact on Somalis and Somalia. I will argue that the post-1991 is by far the most important, and has by far the greatest impact on Somalis and their future. If any event in Somali history can be termed a Revolution, then it is post-1991. Before continueing to this controversial claim, let me first show how a decent comparison is conducted.

For all convenience, lets consider Somali history as two periods: pre-1991 and post-1991. This is a legitimate division since the pre-1991 is characterized by relative stability, peace, law and a functioning government, while the post-1991 is characterized by instability, conflict, no functioning government, and to some extent blossoming economic activities.

Pre-1991 is then subdivided into two periods: The first pseudo-democratic government, The second-pseudo socialist government.

I will first start with the civilian government and its pseudo-democracy, and the achievements and failures of this period. In the other post I will discuss the military government and its pseudo-scientific socialism which turned into oppressive military dictatorship.

[Somaliweyn]

>>The first government (1960-69): It's achievements & failures on three aspects:<<


((#1)) On the political front, every Somali government is supposed to take care of stability, strengthening of the state-apparatus, and not to forget the achievment of National goals as articulated by the government: which was during pre-1991, the re-unification of all Somali lands in Horn of Africa.

Political aspect: achievements

- It was democratic in nature, there were elections, peaceful transfer of power, free press etc.

Like David D. Laitin says in Political economy of Military Rule in Somalia (1976):

''Civilian government survived for nine years in the Somali Republic. It has been noted by many observers that here was one of the few African states which had peaceful elections: indeed, there were non-violent transfers of power based on the results.''

He then continues: ‘It was the comparative success of institutional parliamentary transfer that led some western scholars to consider Somalia an emerging democratic and stable state’

Political aspect: failures

The down side of this pseudo-democracy: Clannism infiltrates the government and Somali politics with as result: dozens of clan-based parties, hundreds of candidates etc. State apparatus becomes a vehicle for corruption, nepotism and employment agent for a large section of the population. Also, during this time, the first signs of comprised state ability to rise above the society and its clanstructure and be independent of this clanstructure become clear. Government and state apparatus is abused by certain sections of Somali groups in the their own benefit.

Like David D. Laitin points out:

''Political appointments were made constantly to enhance
'clan' power, and different ministries became satraps for different
clans. What had started out as a putative nation was being torn apart
at the seams through clan 'tribalism'.''

Robbing the state:

''Finally, although the Republic had received more foreign aid per capita than
any other African state, nine years of development projects led to little
or no visible improvement in the standard of living - apart perhaps
from the creation of the first generation of millionaires! And so, where
some western observers saw democracy, many Somalis saw corruption,
tribalism, indecision, and stagnation.''

Also, in 1964 there was a short border conflict with Ethiopia. Undecided, but Somali government did not achieve it political goal of re-uniting Somali lands. This became clear when in 1964 Kenya became independent with NFD as part of it. So Somali government failed in this respect: National Goal was not achieved.

((#2)) On the economic front, every Somali government is supposed to be working towards economic development, becoming economic independent and increasing living standards.

Economic aspect: achievements

It unleashed its first 5 year development plan in 1963. See Z.A Konczacki (Nov., 1976) and Ozay Mehmet (May, 1971)

In this plan:

- 7% of total planned expenditure to development of the livestock sector (very low figure considering the fact that above 80% of Somali people are dependent on the livestock sector for their livelihoods)
- New research projects, well defined program aiming at improvement of animal husbandry and sedentarisation of nomads.
- In the pastoral sector, the Livestock Development Agency was formed in 1965-66
- Provision of water and veterinary services, and adequate marketing facilities and transportation services to increase tradable fraction of herds.
- Development of large areas of land for agricultural production (large state farms at Tugwajaleh and Jilib)
- Increase of sugar output through expansion of productive capacity of Jowhar sugar factory.
- Development of meat packing, fish processing, milk and dairy products, textiles and a few other industries.
- Construction or improvement of a number of roads
- Building three seaports at Kismanyo, Berbera, and Mogadishu. (You thought Abe Siyad built them?)

This Plan looks ambitious, so it is interesting to know how the government envisaged to finance it.

As Ozay Mehmet says in Effectiveness of Foreign Aid- The Case of Somalia (1971):

‘‘ The method of financing the projects envisaged under the First Five Year Plan was very simple, relying almost entirely on loans and grants from abroad.’’



Another question: Has the plan materialized?

Again Ozay Mehmet:

‘’ Unfortunately, 1964-7 was a period of crises and hardships in the life of the young Somali Republic. Poor rains for two successive years reduced grain production and grazing over a wide area, causing famine among 700.000 nomads and heavy losses of livestock.’’

*Ambitious plan, minor results, what happened with the money supposed to finance the plan?

- For 48.4% it was dependent on ‘friendly countries’(Western countries), for the other half: Soviet countries, Arab countries and other Muslim countries.
- Italy pays not on time, Britain stops Aid when Somali government breaks diplomatic ties with Britain as for not allowing NFD to join Somalia.

So at mid 1966, a report found that the rate of implementation of the plan was only 25%!

To make up for delays in implementation, Government launches in 1968 a two-year Short-Term Development Programme.

Which is: ''the consolidation of the work of the First Five-Year Plan and the creation of basic conditions necessary for the formulation and implementation of future development programmes of a more ambitious nature''


These short-term development programme combined with the 5 year Plan, are the main reason why the period of 1969-1974 showed good economic figures. Siad Barre’s regime had the honour to present the results of hard work of the previous government to the Somali people and claim it as their own work.

It is the same as the period of 1954-1963 with the booming livestock sector. In that period, number of cattle exported rose five-fold!, that of sheep, goats and camels three-fold, two-fold and twenty-seven fold respectively! During this same period the quanityt of meat sold for internal consumption in the Southern Region increased by 65%.

Now is this achievement that of the Somali government of 1960? Or of someone else?

As Z.A Konczacki says in ‘Nomadism and Economic Development of Somalia: The Position of the Nomads in the Economy of Somalia’ (1967):

‘‘ A new approach to economic planning was adopted during the post-war period by the Italian Trusteeship Authority in the form of the Seven Year Development Plan, 1954-60. The plan was preceded by a number of studies of various agencies of the United Nations, United States Mission in Italy and the A.F.I.S’’

So the incredible boom in the livestock sector in 1963 is the result of the previous development plan which was implemented under the Italian Trusteeship Authority. It is impossible that a young Republic and a government which only exist 3 years could achieve such a fast incredible export boom of livestock.

Also, this is the reason why Siad Barre’s military junta could impossibly claim the incredible performance of the Somali economy between the end of 1969 to 1974. This was the work of the previous civilian government and its various Development Plans and Programs.



Economic aspect: Failures

Somalia was severely dependent on Foreign Aid. So Although we were independent de jure we were still dependent on mainly our ex-colonies: Italy and Britain.

Did the government do something about this neo-colonialist form of dependency?

No, as Ozay Mehmet says:

‘‘However, the energetic efforts of the Somali authorities themselves, with the active
involvement of the diplomatic service abroad, must be given high marks
in their drive to raise outside aid’’

‘’The efforts of the Somali Government to secure additional foreign aid are repeatedly
described in a large number of official documents’’

We were a nation of diplomatic beggars, as Siad Barre would use as rhetoric in his Self-Reliance goal. A shamefull history of been the per capita highest beggars in Africa:lol:

And this Aid money did not went to development projects as was planned but instead into the pockets of people who abused the state apparatus: The first generation of millionaires



((#3)) Militarily, the Somali government is supposed to strengthen first of all the security apparatus of the nation for the benefit of the nation, second it must be effective in times of war.

Military aspect: achievements

On this front, the Somali government was doing good job, as the military apparatus of the state was established and further developed till the army itself grabbed power from the civilian government. Without the pre-independence and post-independence development of the military capabilities of the Somali nation, it would be impossible for the army to stage a coups d'état

Also, on this front, the first civilian government achieved to get a grant from the Soviet Union of $32 million, to modernize the Somali army and expand it to 14.000 personnal. This grant was later increased to $55 million. Besides this the Soviet Union also provided Somalia during the 60s with a substantial number of T-34 tanks, armored personnel carriers, MiG-15 and MiG-17 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. Approximately 300 Soviet military advisers deployed to Somalia to train the army, and about 500 Somali pilots, officers, and technicians received training in the Soviet Union. (see Library of Congress, country study: Somalia)

This was incredible achievement considering the fact that the first goverment wasn't even socialist in character.
Also it succesfully repelled an Ethiopian aggression in the war of 1964.

Military aspect: failures.

The army the government created toppled the government itself, thus a failure in defining the institutional framework of the military with clear checks and balances.


Conclusion:

Nicely put by our Turkish friend Ozay Mehmet:

''Thus the first decade in the life of independent Somalia, starting as
it did with great hopes and an ambitious attempt at social and economic
development, closed with little demonstrable progress towards these
objectives. Indeed, evidence suggests that living standards, on average,
were lower at the close of the decade than at its beginning.''

This era of Indepence which was accompanied with optimism eventually dissapointed the vast masses of Somalis and paved the way for the military coup of 1969. Perhaps this new military regime would correct past mistakes and fullfill the wishes and aspirations of the Somali people? And finally realize the latent greatness of the Somali nation by achieving internal unity as well as external unity (with NFD, Djiboutie& Western Somalia)?

Well we already know the answer to these questions, but still I will show how this second period went in the next post.


Stay tuned. And please lets have a constructive debate and leave all childish behaviour at home

[Somaliweyn]

Siad Barre's military rule of 21 years will take more pages than the short 9 years rule of the civilian government. Because of this reason I will first post the political aspect of the military rule.
------------

>>The military regime (1960-69): It's achievements & failures on three aspects:<<

((#1)) On the political front, every Somali government is supposed to take care of stability, strengthening of the state-apparatus, and not to forget the achievement of National goals as articulated by the government: which was during pre-1991, the re-unification of all Somali lands in Horn of Africa.


Maxamed Siad Barre’s explanation for the coup:

''Intervention by the Armed Forces was inevitable. It was no longer possible
to ignore the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft of public
funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country.
The laws were thrust aside and people did whatever they wanted.''

He continues:

'There was no longer a sense of confidence in the national will, not even a minimum basis for national cooperation was established, and there was a high degree of moral decay.' (David D. Laitin, 1976)

Now lets explore how this military junta will combat the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft of public funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country. Also let us see whether the military regime succeeds in creating a sense of confidence in the national will, and a sustained basis for national cooperation.


Political aspect: achievements

- Winning over early popular support by PR-stunts like: transparency policy (xisab xil maalle), burning of clanism, combating nepotism (at least rhetorically)
- Siad Barre declares ‘Scientific Socialism’ ala Soviet style.
- Nationalizes various economic sectors
- Creates a seemingly strong government which rises above clan-structure in the early years of its rule.
- Pursues a policy of self-reliance
- Builds National unity and confidence in the future by organising collective projects (sand dunes etc)


--------------

Political aspect: failures

- Military regime looses support and resorts to brutal oppressive measures.
- The burned clannism resurfaces, even at the top layers of society: The famous MOD is created.

''Faced with shrinking popularity and an armed and organized domestic resistance, Siad Barre unleashed a reign of terror against the Majeerteen, the Hawiye, and the Isaaq, carried out by the Red Berets (Duub Cas), a dreaded elite unit recruited from among the president's Mareehaan clansmen. Thus, by the beginning of 1986 Siad Barre's grip on power seemed secure, despite the host of problems facing the regime.'' (Library of Congress, country study: Somalia)

''No clear evidence exists, of course, that clan politics are being played
by Siyad, but arrests and executions have had a carefully managed
clan balance, and in the lower-paid jobs in the administrative structure
the Marayxan and the Dulbahante are doing comparatively well.'' (David D. Laitin)

- pseudo Scientific socialism is abandoned for IMF-ism.
- The nationalized economic sectors are mismanaged and used for personal gain
- National unity is destroyed as the military dictatorship becomes more brutal
- Corruption and nepotism are back in town

Abdi Samatar says in Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? Bananas, Boom, and Poverty in Somalia (1993):

‘’Members of the regime, who controlled and used the national coffers as their personal accounts, paid little attention to the details of the new contract and related questions of fairness and the national interest.

He continues:

''Moreover, senior members of the regime and their families had a stake in this distribution because they owned plantations. For example, two large estates were owned by one of the president’s wives and one of his daughters.''

Nepotism is not eradicated but became one of the main employment criteria

State is turned into a clan/family enterprise, worse than the 1960-1969 period.

As Steve Askin explains in the article: Food Aid Diversion (1987)

''For at least six years, top officials of the Somali government
diverted US food aid from the most needy to
enrich their friends and to feed the army fighting a
long-running border war with Ethiopia.''

Siad Barre thus not only abandoned self-reliance but even became dependent on US Food Aid to feed what's left of the SNA to combat poor Somali civlians which were tired of oppressive military dictatorship and rose up against it. A classic turn of events

The article continues:

''Some of the worst abuses occurred during Africa's most tragic
famine year, 1984. Only 12 percent of the 16,000 tons of emergency
food the US provided Somalia reached the hungry people it
was intended for, reported the GAO.''

''Instead, 9 percent went to
the Somali armed forces, 21 percent to other government bodies
for their use, and 58 percent was not even distributed.''

DAMN So Aideed learned from the Godfather Siad Barre how to steal food AID and re-direct it to own forces

The shameless corruption continues of Barre's kinsmen, no wonder these kids defend him like he's a prophet, they lived off this shameless corruption

''Somalia also misused $96 million worth of wheat, rice, vegetable
oil and other food items bought from the US between 1978
and 1984 under an economic aid program (PL 480) which gives
Third World countries low-interest loans to buy surplus commodities.''

''At one point, AID pressed Somalia to sell the food at public
auction. Somali officials obligingly staged auctions, but rejected
high bids and sold grain to their friends at low cost.''

''By allowing food aid to enrich this small
elite of politically-connected merchants, the US further impoverished
the Somali people and undercut local farmers, charged the
GAO.''

Warsame, were you perhaps the child of one of these well-connected people?

[Somaliweyn]

*Lets now look at the realization of the National Goals,

As we know the national goal of every government pre-1991 was the unification of all Somali lands in the Horn of Africa.

Not only failed the Siad Barre’s regime in international diplomacy as was epitomized by his expulsion of the Soviet trainers and military advisers which then were directly air-transported to Ethiopia with vital military information about the Somali National Army but also by his miscalculation of launching the war without foreign diplomatic support.

Like explained by Gebru Tareke in The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited :

''Soviet aid was not limited to hardware: they also sent more than a thousand military advisers and technicians (Comrades 01). Some of the senior officers like General Grigory Barisov and Lt. Colonels Andrei Filatov and Semyon Nezhinsky had been principal advisers to the Somali General Staff only a few weeks earlier. They, ofcourse, brought with them intimate and thus invaluable knowledge iof the strengts and weaknesses of the Somali military that the Ethiopians put to good use''

We will discuss this further as it is part of the military aspect.

In short, although Somali army fought bravely despite shortcomings of the Mogadishu-based regime, the national goal of uniting Somali lands in Horn of Africa failed miserably when Djibouti opted for independence and we lost the 77 war.


Now lets look back at the speeches of Siad Barre

''Intervention by the Armed Forces was inevitable. It was no longer possible
to ignore the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft of public
funds, injustice and disrespect to our religion and the laws of the country.
The laws were thrust aside and people did whatever they wanted.''

He continues:

''There was no longer a sense of confidence in the national will, not even a minimum basis for national cooperation
was established, and there was a high degree of moral decay.'' (David D. Laitin, 1976)


At the end of Siad Barre’s rule

-corruption was at its height,
-bribery the norm of the day,
-nepotism official employment criteria,
-theft of public funds was normal as public coffers and personal accounts was the same,
-injustice and disrespect to our religion very normal as every wadaad which had different interpretation of the religion then Siad Barre was executed,
-and the laws of the country was a joke, the ruling people did whatever they wanted. Exemplified by the brutal measures taken against any dissident, the famous land cruiser-symbol etc.

What the coup set in motion, in the words of Richard H. Shultz, Jr. in State Disintegration and Ethnic Conflict: A Framework for Analysis (1995)

''The coup set in motion 21 years of
military rule in Somalia, prevented
the development of civil institutions
and a sense of nationhood, and culminated
in clan warfare and state disintegration.''

The resurrection of the burned clannism by Siad Barre: Again in the words of Richard H. Shcultz, Jr (1995)

''Thus, Siad Barre actually pursued a policy of
undermining the power of certain
clans while promoting that ofhis own
Marehan group and subclans allied
with it (mainly the Ogadeni and, to a
lesser extent, the Dolbuhanta).''

Barre’s insatiable hunger for power:

''To maintain control, Siad
Barre established an extremely repressive
internal security apparatus,
the National Security Service,
headed by his son-in-law.''

The seeds of clan-based hatred and violence:

''To destroy the role and power of
the clan system, while promoting his
own Marehan subclan and its allies,
Siad Barre relied on violence and repression.
These policies had the opposite
effect. Instead of shattering
the clan structure, they facilitated
the creation of clan-based politicallparamilitary
organizations committed
to the overthrow of the government
through the use of force.''

Conclusion:

Siad Barre stole the ruling seat by proclaiming that he would eradicate evil things like clannism, nepotism, corruption and would restore a sense of confidence in national will and a minimum basis for national cooperation. In the first years of his rule he came with PR-stunts which secured him popular support. But as soon as the economic windfalls generated by the previous civilian government ended after 1974, Siad Barre had to secure his wide support and launched a premature invasion of Ethiopia to gain the Ogaden region, this turned disastrous despite the courageous effort of Somali soldiers. After the 77 war things went really bad, economy was bankrubt, self-reliance policy abandoned in favour of IMF-ism, clannism, nepotism and corruption surfaced back. Instead of restoring confidence in national will and a minimum basis for national cooperation, and fighting the evils of the previous civilian government Siad Barre’s oppressive military dictatorship further underminned any credibility the Somali state had, and ultimately destroyed any confidence and hope Somalis had in a neutral Somali state which rises above clan structured society and is free from nepotism, corruption and clannism. The dead of the First Republic of Somalia was a fact when Siad Barre was forcefully removed from the capital of Somalia. His brutal repressive measures undermined any future national unity and the required minimum of trust between the different Somali groups which is the basis for national cooperation. This was only further exacerbated by the civil war and enduring anarchy in many parts of Somalia.

Next episode is the economic aspect of the 21 years rule of Siad Barre.


Stay Tuned

[Somaliweyn]

Economic aspect: achievements


- Nationalization of key economic sectors
- Announcement of the first Three Year Plan

The plan emphasized a higher standard of living for every Somali, jobs for all who sought work, and the eradication of capitalist exploitation. Agricultural "crash programs" and creation of new manufacturing plants were the immediate results.
Siad Barre quickly brought a substantial proportion of the modern economy under state control. The government nationalized banks, insurance companies, petroleum distribution firms, and the sugar-refining plant and created national agencies for construction materials and foodstuffs. (Library of Congress, country study: Somalia)

In 1973 the government decreed the Law on Cooperative Development, with most funds going into the agricultural sector. In the pre coup years, agricultural programs had received less than 10 percent of total spending. By 1974 the figure was 29.1 percent. (Library of Congress)


- Barre’s regime pursued a self-reliance policy, economic as well as political.

As he put it in his speech on 23 February 1971:

''We filled our lives with degradation, thievery, backbiting, envying and plotting. That was our harvest in the past. He also distinguished between the recurrent and capital budget, and
argued that a 'fully-independent country never . . . seek[s] money for
the actual running of its machinery from a foreign country''.

''And so, independence in food and in ability to pay for the regular budget would
enable Somalia, according to Siyad, to restore its lost national dignity.'' (David D Laitin, 1976)


Lets see whether this was the case.


As shows David D. Laitin in Political economy of Military Rule in Somalia (1976):

1. The Revolutionary Goal of Making Somalia Self-Sufficient in Food Has Not Been Achieved

- Import of rice, cereals, fruit & vegetables, and other foodstuff increases after 1969.

2. The Revolution Has Not Succeeded in Reducing Foreign Dependence in Trade

- Imports increase from a level of 286.4 million Sh in 1967 to 646.2 million Sh in 1973.

- Exports also increase but relatively slow.
- Trade deficit increases from a level of 87.9 million Sh. In 1967 to 342.2 million Sh. In 1973

David concludes:

''The general point which emerges from these figures and from Tables
2-4 is that Siyad, despite his rhetoric, has not been able to give Somalia
a new economic independence from the colonialists and the neocolonialists.''


This is also supported by Ahmed I. Samatar in Self-Reliance Betrayed: Somali Foreign Policy, 1969-1980 (1987)

He says:

''The evidence presented in this analysis points to serious failures with regard
to the Somali regime's declared objective -a self-reliant political economy.
By 1980 Somalia's acute degree of external economic dependency was highlighted
by heavy reliance on export-receipts (their dwindling contribution
notwithstanding), high concentration of import / export markets, chronic
balance of payment deficits, and a hobbling debt burden.''

Stay tuned for part two of economic aspect

[Somaliweyn]

Now lets further scrutinize the economy by looking at the two pillars of the Somali economy and main sources of state revenues: The Rural Sector

*Agriculture and Pastoralist economy.

In the beginning till the drought of 1974, the agricultural and pastoral sector showed somehow good figures (when not compared to population increase). Siad Barre as usual claimed it as the result of his socialist experiment, but a closer look at it will reveal that it was the harvest of the investments the previous governments made in its Development Plans.

Like for example the expansion in area under cultivation and banana export till 1974.

Abdi Samatar says in Structural Adjustment as Development Strategy? Bananas, Boom, and Poverty in Somalia (1993)

''The National Banana Board was organized to ‘manage’ the industry. Whatever its supposed function was, this board had little positive impact on the plantation economy. While banana output increased from 145.500 tons in 1970 to 168.300 tons in 1973, with the area under cultivation growing from 6.500 cultivated hectares to 9.500 hectares, such growth was the result of investments and improvements made before the regime came to power (Gaas 1990)’’

So what happened after 1973, which is solely the harvest of what the military government did

Abdi Samatar sheds some light on this issue:


''Banana production began a downward spiral in 1973. The area under cultivation fell by more than 50 percent from its peak in 1973 to 3.600 hectares in 1981, while production hit rock bottom in 1981 at 59.000 tons, less than a third of the 1973 output. Yields per hectare declined from 29.7 tons in 1973 to 20.3 tons in 1981 (World Bank 1987, 17).''

So it was a messed after the windfall of 1973 as consequence of the Development Plans of the previous civilian government ended.

*What about the economy in general:?:

Again Abdi Samatar in his own words:

''The Somali agrarian economy, guided by ‘scientific socialist’ policies, failed to keep pace with population growth (over 3 percent annually) in the 1970s. Even lifestock, the most vibrantly growing sector, fell behind population in rate of increase (Table 1). The crop sector, including bananas, declined in absolute terms during most of the 1970s. The banana economy of the Shabelle and Juba valleys of southern Somalia was one of the sectors that suffered the most during that decade.''


Abdi Samatar is not alone in this pessimist view of the Somali economy at the end of the decade:

It was also diagnosed by World Bank and IMF as suffering from all problems which other African countries also faced: declining productivity, excessive expansion of the public sector (every illiterate cousin gets a public office), overvalued exchange rate, a restrictive investment code, poor incentives for farmers etc. In short the usual bambo jambo of IMF and World Bank.’

Christian Webersik in his paper titled fighting for the plenty – The banana trade in southern Somalia (2003)

''Shortly after Siyad Barre established his regime, banana production and the export trade was nationalised. This included export companies owned by Somalis and foreigners such as Societa Azionaria Concessionari Agricoli in Shalambood.18 Barre created the National Banana Board, when banana production increased steadily from 145,000 MT in 1970 to 168,000 MT in 1973, while the area under cultivation grew from 6,500 ha to 9,500 ha. From 1973 onwards however, the area under banana cultivation fell so that by 1981 it was less than 50 per cent of its peak in 1973 only amounting to 3,600 ha.19 Production dropped sharply, too.''


*So at the beginning of the 1980s ‘scientific socialism’ is been changed for the ‘economic liberalization’ and IMF-ism.

From this moment on Somalia like many other African countries lose their economic independence (what was left of it) and are pressed to implement the Structural Adjustment Programme’s designed by IMF and World Bank. Long live Siad Barre’s self-reliance.

Not only the pseudo scientific socialism ideology are abandoned but also the self-reliance policy and not to forget the nationalisation of key economic sectors.

De Nadai group replaces the defunct National Banana Board. Also the ex-colonialists which were kicked out of the commercial agriculture are back:

''De Nadai (Italian company) took over the 3.000 hectares previously owned by the Italian interests and became the sole exporter of Somali bananas’’ (Christian Webersik)

So the Italian colonialists that left their aziendas after independence were first redistributed among the corrupt civilian government of 1960-1969. After the military coup all land was declared as ‘state land’.

Like Christian Webersik explains in his paper

''Subsequently, the socialist government attempted to expropriate unclassified and communal land in declaring it ‘state land’. This was made This was made possible through provisions of the 1975 land reform. ''

So what happens with the land after the disastrous first decade of military rule

Again Christian Webersik:

''In particular in the 1980s, elites connected to the government of Siyad Barre participated in land-grabbing, largely by the Marehan and Dulbahante of the Darod clan family.''

There goes the fight against corruption and nepotism.

Stay tuned for more..

[Somaliweyn]

TTT

[Somaliweyn]

Here is the other part.

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So after 1980s IMF, World Bank and other groups poured a substantial aid money into stabilizing the Somali economy. What happened with that money? Where did it went?

As already explained senior members of the military government did not know any distinction of national coffers and personal accounts (Abdi Samater, 1987)



This widely known corruption and nepotism is again supported by Christian Webersik:

''The liberalisation of the economy had a positive impact on the agricultural sector, especially the banana economy. But it led to corrupt practices when public assets were transferred to private hands

As Mohamood Abdi Noor, a Senior Agricultural Specialist of the World Bank, explains:

And the West, the IMF, the World Bank, said you should liberalise the economy. We liberalised the economy, this brought lots of positive and negative things. Among the positive things are, liberalised green marketing, or lots of farmers could sell their goods in the market. These are positive things. But then, here you have a government which controls everything from utilities, to banks, to factories, to property, to export, everything. [...] You liberalise these public assets, the private sector can compete with them and they will die on their own. But if you transfer public assets to the private sector, what happens? Insiders take over. And this was a very bad [...] effect. So, people become over night rich because of public assets, this caused nepotism, this caused corruption, it caused that ‘it’s ok to take public assets’ and outsiders want to [benefit and] came and fought.''



*A summary of Barre's period and the economy of Somalia:


As Jamil A. Mubarak explains in his 1997 paper titled The ‘Hidden Hand’ Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia:

''During the 1970s and 1980s the rural economy
suffered from long-standing neglect and unfriendly
government policies. The sector provided the livelihood
of more than 80% of the population, accounted
for more than 70% of the labor force, 65% of GDP at
factor cost, and 95% of total exports. The pastoral
economy, which was the dominant subsectorconsidering
its contribution to the economy and its
vulnerability to recurrent droughts-received only
about 6% of public expenditure, corresponding to
1.2% of GDP annually during 1974-88.”

So to make a long sad story short: In what shape was the economy at the end of the military dictatorship

Again Jamil A. Mubarak in his paper of 1997:

''The official economy was close to a total collapse in the years preceding the fall of Siad Barre from power. The magnitude of the macro-economic imbalances were astounding. During 1989-90, the non-financial public sector deficit exceeded 30% of GDP, and the current account deficit of the balance of payments (excluding official grants) averaged 45% of GDP. Government policies were repressive and had little credibility and influence. The alienated urban private sector was forced to join the informal market. Activities, such as trade smuggling, black marketeering of foreign exchange and other goods and services became entrenched. By the mid-1980s, the crisis intensified to the extent that the government lost control over managing or solving the economic crises. Hence the collapse of economic institutions and the private sector’s efforts to cope with harsh environment and to fend for itself was a process that started long before the Somali state’s ultimate collapse in 1991.''


Conclusion:

So basically the formal national economic system was down to the ground at the end of the 21 year rule of Barre's regime. In 1969, when the regime took over the ruling seat of Somalia the economy was doing well thanks to the development plans the civilian government had implemented. These good figures continued the first half of the first decade (till 1974). After that year, the economy was trapped in a downward spiral which mainly influenced the regime to start an invasion of Ethiopia (1977) since the best time to start a war is when one needs diversion from domestic problems. After this war, which Somalia lost due to diplomatic failures of the Mogadishu regime, the Somali economy was nearly close to collapsing wasn't it for the IMF and World Bank's Structural Adjustment Plan. Since this year the control of the Somali economy was handed over to foreign forces (IMF, World Bank, USAID etc), which completely destroyed the policy of self-reliance which the regime used to win over popular support. Much money was poured into revitalizing the Somali economy, but most of this money ended into private pockets of senior members of the military regime. This shameless corruption and nepotism was the last straw for the economy of Somalia, which collapsed around 1988-89, much earlier then the collapse of the regime. The formal economy of Somalia was nonexistant at the end of the regime, since most business groups went underground and created the informal economy which would launch Mogadishu and Somalia into 21st century. A paradoxical situation occured in which a nation without state, government has succeeded in economic transformation, which drew the attention of many International organizations like World Bank, IMF etc. Anarchist groups began also to refer to Somalia as a practical case of how an economy could prosper without a state.