REPORT ON MISSION TO HAUD AREA, REGION 5- 1994

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UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia


02 - 15 NOVEMBER 1994, Matt Bryden





Clan Relations


"Habar Yonis (Isaaq): the Habar Yonis, a large clan of the Isaaq / Garxajis family (which also includes 'Idagale) straddle the Somaliland border, and branches of the family also live in the area of Berbera and 'Eerigaabo in Somaliland. Gaashamo serves as the clan's Ethiopian "capital", in a territory that spreads north to Hargeysa, Oodweyne, and Bur'o. It is a source of aggravation for the community that Gaashamo is administratively labelled as a dependency of Dhagaxbuur - a town dominated by a clan (the Ogaadeen) with whom they have strained relations and little common interest. Relations with their Garxajis cousins, the 'Idagale, are generally good and they share a common political orientation on most matters. In Somaliland, sections of the Habar Yonis, are presently allied with the dissident 'Iidagale militia in their opposition to Mohamed Ibrahim Egal's administration. Their relations with their eastern neighbours, the Habar Je'elo, traditionally involve some friction, and the two often find themselves on opposite sides of divisive political issues (also the case in Somaliland at the moment). . In the south-east corner of their territory, the Habar Yonis share a border with the Dhulbahante with whom they have cordial relations, despite a more general Isaaq-Dhulbahante hostility. Even during the SNM's struggle against Siyaad Barre, trade and travel between Isaaq and Dhulbahante could continue through this peculiar juncture. "



Dhulbahante (Daarod / Harti): Within Ethiopia the Dhulbahante share borders with the Isaaq (Habar Yonis and Habar Je'elo) to the west, their Harti cousins the Mijerteen to the east, and the Ogaadeen to the south. Relations with the Ogaadeen are generally good, perhaps better than the Mijerteen whose history with the Dhulbahante is complicated by infrequent skirmishes and blood feuds. The Dhulbahante 'capital' is at Las 'Anood, across the border in Somaliland. Following several years of dependence upon Bosaaso as an outlet for trade, the Dhulbahante are turning increasingly to Berbera, both for its proximity and in consequence of a general warming of Dhulbahante-Isaaq relations under the Somaliland administration.




Habar Je'elo (Isaaq): the Habar Je'elo are not strongly represented in Ethiopia, occupying a wedge of territory between the Habar Yonis and the Dhulbahante. Their relations with the Dhulbahante are characterised by feuds and disputes over grazing, and they have little in common politically, having fought on different sides during the SNM's war against the Siyaad Barre regime. Their only major 'urban' centre is Bur'o, a town they share roughly equally with the Habar Yonis. Within Ethiopia, the Habar Je'elo find themselves generally lumped together with the Habar Yonis, and resent the pre-eminence of Gaashamo as a local centre of Isaaq activity (the Habar Je'elo have no comparable Ethiopian base). They therefore seek separate representation from Gaashamo vis-à-vis the regional government and the constituent assembly.








Water

Water, or the absence of it, is perhaps the single most important determinant of life in the Haud. Permanent water sources are scarce, and even temporary sources are unreliable. Pastoralists and their livestock are therefore dependent upon a vast system of ponds or cisterns (balli), used to trap rainfall and groundwater runoff. Probably thousands of these balli exist throughout the area. The balance between exploitation of available water sources and the need to claim fresh pasture in order to sustain livestock is still the main preoccupation of communities of the area.

Permanent water sources typically fall under the jurisdiction of a single clan, and can only be used by others with the proprietor's consent. Clans may therefore show a preference for watering at one of their "own," distant wells, rather than to negotiate access to closer water within the territory of a different clan. Habar Yonis (Isaaq) communities described Bur'o and Oodweyne as the nearest permanent water sources, while Habar Je'elo mentioned Bur'o (shared with Habar Yonis) and 'Aynabo. Dhulbahante communities referred to 'Aynabo (shared with Habar Je'elo) and Las 'Anood (surprisingly, the former was mentioned more than the latter).


Virtually every group of elders expressed a desire for permanent water sources (e.g. boreholes) to be established within their locality. No consideration was made of the effects this might have on grazing, nor of the fact that in some parts of the Haud, exploratory drilling has shown the water table to be lower than 250-300m (e.g. beyond borehole depth).

In the absence of permanent water sources, most communities depend on cisterns or balli for their water supply. Since balli are usually private property, a single village and its environs may have dozens of them, each serving an extended family and their relatives. In times of relative abundance, owners may elect to sell water to other residents of the area; when scarce, water may remain family property, not for sale.

Both humans and livestock share these rain-fed artificial ponds, raising concerns about water quality for human consumption. Contamination is not the only threat to water quality, however. Since balli also tend to become breeding grounds for mosquitoes and thus malaria, it is common practice for owners to add a slick of diesel to the water's surface. The relative advantages and disadvantages of this practice clearly merit some investigation.

Tanker trucks fulfil a kind of intermediate function between boreholes and balli, since they allow seasonal water-sources to function perennially. It is common practice for balli owners to hire water tankers (at no small expense) in order to keep the ponds full even during the dry season (i.e. Jilaal, between November/December and March/April). Pastoralist are therefore no longer obliged to migrate in search of water during the dry months, and often choose to remain static. Nomads and elders consistently described their annual migration as covering only 20-30 km, noting that this is a steep reduction from several decades ago, when families might wander more than 150 km in search of water and grazing.

This evolution of the transhumant migratory pattern towards a more settled, stable model must undoubtedly have a tremendous impact upon social, economic and political arrangements within pastoral communities, possibility inducing new and intolerable pressures upon the local ecosystem and the populations - human and animal - which depend on it.





Livestock

Animal welfare is of at least equal importance to pastoralists, if not more so, than human welfare. Elders in most villages in which we stopped preferred to devote the bulk of our discussions to matters of livestock health (including the availability of water) than to issues like human health and education. Their prime concerns in this domain were the availability of veterinary drugs, and protection of livestock from predators.

There is no effective government veterinary programme in the region visited. The South-East Rangelands Project (SERP), recently galvanized by a change of management, is in the process of completing a "development centre" in Gaashamo which will include veterinary services amongst other activities, but the timetable is uncertain and the effectiveness of the programme remains to be tested. In the meantime, herders are entirely dependent upon the irregular commercial supply of drugs from businessmen returning from abroad. The pertinence of these products and the correct use of drug protocols are therefore questionable, and the effectiveness of this system clearly inadequate: livestock merchants and herders were unanimous in their desire for better access to veterinary medicine, even through commercial channels.

Predators, specifically hyena and fox, were also commonly identified as a scourge. We were repeatedly apprised of the need for poisons to deal with these animals, whose predations were reported to be increasingly troublesome to the pastoralists.



Pastoralism

The population of the Haud, specifically in the sector north and east of Wardheer is almost exclusively pastoralist. An SCF socio-economic survey of the Ogaadeen conducted in 1991 found no communities which could be described as either agro-pastoralists or cultivators in the area (0%). Although the geographic reach of the SCF survey was limited, observations from this mission would tend to support the assumption that only pastoralists live in this zone.

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New Trends

Despite the traditional character of local authority throughout the Haud, some new linkages between these far-flung communities and the administrative hubs of Jigjiga, Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa seem to be emerging. Among these phenomena are the new mechanism of direct representation to the constituent assembly, the formation of new political parties (in particular the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League or ESDL), and the first exploratory efforts of the TGE to extend its influence directly into rural areas (initially through the population and housing census).

The mission encountered two communities with direct representation to the constituent assembly: Gaashamo (Abdikarim 'Ali Guleed: Isaaq / Habar Yonis) and Marqaan Weyne (Jamaa' Diibleh: Dhulbahante). Community elders are aware of these delegates' participation in the assembly and apparently consider them to be representatives of their kinsmen throughout the area, rather than as conventional "platform" politicians or as the spokesmen for one or another village. A direct linkage between the traditional dynamic of inter-clan relations and the modern "democratic" model exemplified by the constituent assembly may therefore be inferred.

Uncertainty, and a certain degree of scepticism, surrounding the role and purpose of the constituent assembly was common, though we were able to observe efforts underway to raise popular awareness about this new mechanism. For part of the journey the mission travelled together with Mr Huseen Ali Guleed, an official from the regional administration. Mr Guleed met with the elders of various villages, informing them of the need for collaboration and consensus at the regional level, and the imperative of subordinating clan interests to Somali "national" interests where regional affairs were concerned, and the need to offer a united Somali front vis-à-vis other nationalities in the Ethiopian political arena.

The "unity" message is also the message, perhaps not coincidentally, of the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) and of the League's architect, Mr Abudlmejid Huseen (current Minister of External Economic Co-operation). Many villages through which we passed had new League offices and nascent party structure. In view of Mr Abdulmejid's virtually single-handed management of Somali affairs on behalf of the TGE, it is not surprising that the "unity" theme is also pervasive within the new Regional Administration. Moreover, it has caught on among some of the League's adversaries among the Ogaadeen clan, who are now trying to effect a rapprochement between radical Ogaadeen tendencies (disillusioned by their perceived fall from grace) and those more predisposed to share power with the (generally) non-Ogaadeeni membership of the League. A meeting intended to encourage this process is scheduled to take place from December 5th in Qabri Dehaar.







Public Services: Education

Gaashamo is also the only community in the area to benefit from a public school building - supposedly constructed during Haile Selassie's reign. Like the health workers, the teachers are supposed to receive a government salary which arrives rarely, if ever at all. Furniture and educational materials are a matter of pure improvisation: children bring tin cans and rocks to sit on in class, while teachers search for textbooks wherever they can find them: most seem to come from UNICEF contributions in Somaliland. The principal (and acting District Education Officer), 'Ali Ibrahim Yusuf, draws up the curriculum himself without any guidance from either central or regional government.

Parents apparently contribute to the expenses of their children's' education, and the disproportionate presence of children from the local religious community or tariiqa, Al Wahda, which we observed during our visit suggests that the group may also underwrite some of the school's costs. Al Wahda, a pacific, traditionalist Islamic movement, has long been active in the Bur'o area and has some support among both the Habar Yonis and Habar Je'elo. There is no other form of support.

Education in smaller communities is limited to private Quranic schools, whose curriculum sometimes includes subjects like Somali language and maths. In all other respects, formal education is non-existent throughout the area.

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Economy

Trade patterns are primarily a function of the geography of each clan and its relationships with its neighbours. The population of the Haud is therefore more closely linked economically to its kinsmen across the border in Somaliland and Somalia that to neighbouring, but unrelated, communities in Ethiopia. Consequently, the Haud and Somaliland (which includes part of the Haud plateau) comprise what Dr. Ahmed Yusuf Farah, anthropologist and UNHCR consultant, rightly describes as "a single economic zone." Livestock flow north for export through various ports along the Red Sea coast, while commodities and manufactured goods follow the same routes inland.

Terms of trade in the eastern Haud seem to reflect natural trading patterns, free of the kind of market distortions encountered further west, where the local economy is largely fuelled by food aid inputs. Apparently, clan-specific demographics favour this north-south continuum, while posing invisible barriers to east-west trade. East of Gaashamo for example, there is no sign in markets of the grain and maize distributed through refugee/returnee programmes that is so abundant in the area of Jigjiga and Aware (questions about the availability of these items met with derision in many villages, where elders told us that even were they available nobody would eat them). By several accounts, fortified by our own observations, nothing of value moves along the east-west road from Jigjiga but qaad.

Prices for livestock throughout the area remained constant, with animals (sheep or goat) of first quality for slaughter or export selling between 100-120,000 shillings (approx. E.Birr 160-190). Second quality sold between 85-100,000/- (approx. E.Birr 130 - 160. Prices were quoted to us without exception in Somali Shillings). Most livestock traders said they would accept full or part payment in kind (barter) since cash of all denominations is in short supply. None of the herders encountered brought their own livestock to port for export. They preferred instead to sell their stock to large-scale exporters who purchased either through major markets (Gaashamo, Bur'o, Las 'Anood) or sometimes directly from the herders.

In return for livestock, merchants purchase commodities and manufactured goods imported from Djibouti and the Gulf states. Again, prices remained constant throughout the area visited, though Dhulbahante merchants consistently added 20,000/- shillings to these prices which they attributed to additional transport costs from Berbera (see map). As with livestock prices, all quotes we received were in Somali shillings.

The merchants were generally satisfied with these terms of trade, describing them as far better than the 1988-91 period of Somalia's civil war. During those years, fighting strangulated cross-border trade and forced sharp price rises for imports. A sustained drought over roughly the same period (but extending into 1992) concurrently encouraged widespread distress-selling of livestock throughout the Ogaden, placing pastoralists at a critical economic disadvantage. In response to questioning, we were told universally that the situation had much improved.

One "unknown quantity" at the time of our visit was the recent introduction of the new Somaliland shilling. In Isaaq areas the value of the new shilling remained pegged at 1:100 (1 S/L Shilling = 100 SoSh). This rate seems to have been fixed by Habar Awal traders (who sponsored the introduction of the new currency), while the value of the Somali Shilling was calculated against the Saudi Riyal, rather than the US Dollar. We encountered Somaliland Shillings throughout the Isaaq territories, and found that the currency met with widespread acceptance. Among the Dhulbahante however, we were shown only some specimen notes whose appearance was greeted with derision. Dhulbahante we interviewed were categorical that they did not recognise this new currency and did not wish to accept it, presumably mirroring sentiment among certain Dhulbahante living across the border in Somaliland

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Summary of 1994 Capital Budget
Region 5


Financial
Source
Cost
Centre Government
Treasury Foreign
Aid Foreign
Loan Total %
Economic Development 25,938,300 1,500,000 - 27,438,300 31.7
Agricultural Development 10,599,900 - - 10,599,900 12.2
Natural Resources 12,075,400 1,500,000 - 13,575,400 15.7
Mining and Energy 80,000 - - 80,000 0.1
Road Construction 2,633,000 - - 2,633,000 3.0
Transport & Communications 550,000 - - 550,000 0.6
Social Development 2,891,900 18,656,300 50,023,800 57.7
Education 8,026,000 1,651,900 14,341,100 24,018,700 27.7
Health 13,402,900 1,240,300 4,315,200 18,958,400 21.9
Urban Development & Housing 7,046,700 - - 7,046,700 8.1
General Development 9,239,400 - - 9,239,400 10.7
Statistics 136,000 - - 136,000 0.6
Admin. and Infrastructure 9,013,400 - - 9,013,400 10.1
Total 63,653,300 4,391,300 18,656,300 86,701,500 100.0

Note: All figures in 1000s of Birr

[Aliyah99]

We encountered Somaliland Shillings throughout the Isaaq territories, and found that the currency met with widespread acceptance.

[NoilPoint]

^ The fake somaaliland shilling is nothing but Habar Awal ( sacad muusa ) dominion .
it's a shame Habar Yoonis and Ciidagale ain't collebarating across borders to make some new Gaashaamo currency.

It would benefit the communities through currency transcations and tax.

instead they feed the enemies by using birr and somaliland shilling

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^ The fake somaaliland shilling is nothing but Habar Awal ( sacad muusa ) dominion .
it's a shame Habar Yoonis and Ciidagale ain't collebarating across borders to make some new Gaashaamo currency.

It would benefit the communities through currency transcations and tax.

instead they feed the enemies by using birr and somaliland shilling

sxb - gaashaamo now uses Ethiopian Bir - the somaliland shilling is not even used in burco let alone gaashaamo

Bir has more Value then Shilling