History of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'ca14. On one level, the conflict in Somalia represents a struggle between groups
with competing political and ideological agendas. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
both profess Salafi versions of Islam, while ASWJ represents a number of Sufi
branches of the Shafi’i school. The Transitional Federal Government accommodates
a range of views from both sides of the spectrum, as do the authorities in Somaliland
and Puntland.
15. On another level, however, the conflict is a product of the clan dynamics that
have shaped the Somali civil war for the past 20 years. Recent fighting in central
Somalia, for example, has pitted an ASWJ alliance of Habar Gidir Ayr, Marehaan
and Dir clan militias against Al-Shabaab militias drawn heavily from the Murosade
and Duduble. In the Hiraan region, the Hawaadle clan east of the Shabelle River
tends to support the government, while the members of the Gaalje’el and
Gugundhaabe on the western bank serve as foot soldiers for Al-Shabaab. In the Juba
Valley, the battle between Al-Shabaab, Raas Kaambooni and Anoole for control of
Kismaayo has been in many respects a continuation of the multidimensional
struggle between Marehaan, Ogaden and Harti (as well as many smaller
communities) that has destabilized the area for two decades.
16. Analysis of these superimposed conflict dynamics is essential to an
understanding of Somalia’s security environment, in particular to the composition of
various armed groups, their leadership, organization, capabilities and alliances.
History of Al Al shabab20. Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a was established in 1991, in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Barre regime, with the support of General Mohamed Farah Aydiid, in
order to counter the growing influence of militant reformist movements like Al-Ittihad
Al-Islami. Until mid-2008, ASWJ was of marginal importance, lacking a political
profile or military wing. In July 2008, however, clashes broke out between ASWJ
and Shabaab militias in a number of locations in central and south-western Somalia
where Al-Shabaab had attempted to ban Sufi religious practices. In December 2008,
with the support of the Transitional Federal Government headed by then Prime
Minister Nur Adde, ASWJ leaders solicited and obtained military support from
Ethiopia, and embarked upon a campaign to expel Al-Shabaab militias from the
central regions. By late 2009, ASWJ had emerged as the largest and most effective
government-aligned fighting force in southern Somalia. The Monitoring Group
estimates the total strength of these disparate forces at approximately 2,000 fighters.
21. Like most other Somali factions, ASWJ is an umbrella for various local militia
groups, including Sufi sects, clan interests, political opportunists and external
agendas. The largest and most effective wing of ASWJ operates in the western
Galguduud region and is anchored mainly in the Habar Gidir Ayr, Dir and Marehaan
clans of that region. Affiliated groups also operate in the eastern Galguduud and
Middle Shabelle regions (Abgaal Wa’eysle), in Gedo region (Marehaan) and since
late 2009 in Hiraan region (Hawaadle). Some other militia leaders, including some
serving as proxies for Ethiopian influence (such as Barre Aden Shire “Hiiraale”5
and Yuusuf Ahmed Hagar “Dabageed”6) have tried to portray themselves as ASWJ
in order to attract greater domestic and international support. Despite attempts to
unify these efforts, ASWJ lacks a unified chain of command and suffers from a lack
of internal cohesion — in part because of bitter disputes over external resources.
22. The relationship of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a with the Transitional Federal
Government has been difficult and at times ambiguous. In July 2008, ASWJ leaders
expressed their support for the preliminary Djibouti agreement and, on 21 June
2009, Abdulqaadir Ma’alin Nuur of ASWJ and the Prime Minister of the
Transitional Federal Government, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke, signed a joined
declaration pledging full cooperation. By late 2009 the agreement had yet to be
implemented in any meaningful way, however, and the relationship between the two
parties was strained. The government’s selective engagement with ASWJ during this
period further complicated the situation. Late in August 2009, for example, having
failed to provide assistance to ASWJ forces in western Galguduud, the Transitional
Federal Government sent military aid to embattled ASWJ fighters from President
Sharif’s own Abgaal clan near Eel Dheer.
23. On 30 November 2009, ASWJ and the Transitional Federal Government signed
a more substantive cooperation agreement, underpinned by a written request from
the Transitional Federal Government to the Government of Ethiopia seeking material
support, including arms and ammunition for ASWJ in Galguduud. Although ASWJ
had been receiving military support from Ethiopia since December 2008 in violation
of the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia (see paras. 200-203 below), these
most recent developments appear to indicate that ASWJ may now be considered a
legitimate local security sector institution, acknowledged and supported by the
Transitional Federal Government, and therefore eligible for external assistance.
27. Al-Shabaab was founded by former members of Al-Iltihad Al-Islami, a militant
group active in Somalia between 1991 and 1997. Elements of Al-Shabaab appear to
have been independently active from approximately 2002, but the group first
acquired a public profile in 2005, when it desecrated a former Italian cemetery in
Mogadishu and established a base there. In 2006, the group emerged as the militant
wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Following the defeat of UIC by
Ethiopian forces in January 2007, Al-Shabaab adopted an increasingly independent
trajectory, rejecting the formation in September 2007 of the Asmara-based Alliance
for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), of which UIC was a member.
28. Despite its former alliance with Sheikh Sharif, Al-Shabaab disapproved of the
Djibouti peace process that reconciled one wing of ARS with the Transitional
Federal Government, and in January 2009 saw Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed elected
president. Al-Shabaab leaders describe President Sharif and the Transitional Federal
Government as “apostates” and have continued to attack them with guerrilla tactics,
improvised explosive devices and targeted killings. Nevertheless, while hardliners
within the organization reject dialogue and compromise, the Monitoring Group
believes that other elements of Al-Shabaab appear to be pragmatic and eligible for
political engagement
29. Organizationally, Al-Shabaab remains a relatively loose and heterogeneous
organization, serving as an umbrella for self-professed “jihadists”, clan militias,
business interests and foreign fighters. Decision-making in Al-Shabaab is
undertaken by a collective leadership structure, including a shura (council) of key
individuals. Some of the most prominent Shabaab figures are:
• Ahmed Abdi aw Mohamud “Godane” (also known as Mukhtar Abdirahman
abu Zubeyr), senior operational commander, designated supreme leader or
emir in December 200711
• Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad “Al-Afghani” (also known as Abubakar
al-Seyli’i), regional governor of Kismaayo administration
• Mukhtar Roobow Ali, spokesman and regional commander (resigned and
replaced by Ali Mohamud Raghe “Dheere” in May 2009)
• Ali Mohamud Raghe also known as Ali Dheere, spokesman (since May 2009)
• Fu’aad Mohamed Khalaf “Shangole”, regional commander
• Hussein Ali Fidow, chief of political and regional affairs, Mogadishu
• Hassan Yaqub Ali, regional spokesman (Kismaayo)
30. Extremists within Al-Shabaab seek, with limited success, to align the
organization more closely with Al-Qaida.12 Several of the group’s leaders have
trained or fought overseas, principally in Afghanistan, and have introduced tactics
employed in those conflicts to Somalia.13 From 2003 to 2006, members of
Al-Shabaab were linked to the murders of several foreign aid workers. Since 2007,
the group has targeted government officials, civil society activists and journalists
with targeted killings, improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings.
31. The tensions between these tendencies of the movement were most clearly in
evidence in December 2009, in the aftermath of the bombing of the Shamo Hotel,
when reports circulated about a fracture within the organization and the formation of
a new wing, named Millat Ibrahim, headed by dissidents opposed to such extreme
and indiscriminate tactics. In the light of subsequent public displays of solidarity by
the group’s leadership, however, the Monitoring Group believes that reports of a
split within Al-Shabaab may be overstated.
32. Equally overstated is the importance of foreign fighters in Al-Shabaab ranks.
Although there is no question that several hundred foreigners now fight within or
alongside Al-Shabaab units and provide advice and technical expertise at various levels within the organization, they do not appear to have made a decisive
contribution to any single engagement in recent months, nor to the overall course of
the conflict.
33. Al-Shabaab military forces include three main categories of fighters:
• A core force comprising fewer than 2,500 Somalis and several hundred foreign
fighters
• A larger number of local clan militias aligned with Al-Shabaab, but not readily
deployable for operations outside their home areas
• Irregular fighters engaged for specific operations on a “pay-as-you-go” basis
34. Al-Shabaab compensates for these relatively small numbers, and the variance
in quality of its forces, with the mobility of its forces and its ability to concentrate
them across considerable distances on short notice and to great effect.
35. The tactical unit of the core Al-Shabaab force is typically platoon-sized
(30-50 fighters), equipped with cold war-era arms, including assault rifles, PK
general purpose machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and when necessary
B-10 recoilless rifles. Like other Somali militias, Al-Shabaab infantry units may be
accompanied by vehicle-mounted machine guns and light anti-aircraft guns adapted
to a ground support role. Al-Shabaab generally reserves its indirect fire weapons —
mortars — for use in Mogadishu. In addition to threatening Transitional Federal
Government and African Union positions, the use of mortars has proved effective in
provoking retaliatory and often indiscriminate responses from AMISOM forces —
precisely the effect Al-Shabaab hopes to achieve.
40. By November 2009, Hizbul Islam had effectively been reduced to two of itsHistory of Xizbul Islam
36. Virtually since its formation in February 2009, Hizbul Islam has been in a
process of slow but inexorable disintegration. At the moment of its inception, Hizbul
Islam was an alliance of four armed opposition groups:
• Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia — Asmara wing (ARS-A)15
• Somali Islamic Front (SIF, also known as JABISO)16
• Raas Kaambooni Forces17
• Anoole Forces (also known as Al-Furqaan Forces)18
37. The first chairman of the alliance was Omar Imaan Abdulqaadir, a close ally of
Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was still based in Asmara at the time. When Aweys
himself returned to Somalia in April 2009, he assumed de facto leadership of Hizbul
Islam, and the front launched its first major military operations (see section II.A.
below).
38. Despite its religious and nationalist rhetoric, Hizbul Islam was essentially
structured along clan lines. ARS-A and JABISO militias were drawn mainly from
smaller Hawiye sub-clans with little reputation for military proficiency. Anoole
sought support from among the residual Harti communities in the Juba Valley. The
Raas Kaambooni forces, which were composed almost exclusively from the
Mohamed Subeer sub-clan of the Ogaden, represented the most significant fighting
component of the alliance.
39. In October 2009, Hizbul Islam was thrown into disarray when the Raas
Kaambooni group sought to dislodge Al-Shabaab from Kismaayo. Anoole ultimately
opted for neutrality between the two, while ARS-A and JABISO — who cooperated
with Al-Shabaab in operations against the Transitional Federal Government and
AMISOM in Mogadishu — refused to lend their support to Raas Kaambooni. The
refusal of much of Hassan Dahir Aweys’s sub-clan, the Habar Gidir Ayr, to endorse
his anti-government platform left him considerably isolated and without significant
military forces at his disposal
40. By November 2009, Hizbul Islam had effectively been reduced to two of its
constituent parts: ARS-A and SIF — both of them comprising militias drawn from
the smaller Hawiye sub-clans — and its area of operations confined to Mogadishu,
Afgooye and parts of the Hiraan region.
41. Perceiving Hizbul Islam as an increasingly feeble and unreliable ally, at
meetings near Afgooye in October 2009, Al-Shabaab offered Aweys the option of
either joining Al-Shabaab or surrendering to the Transitional Federal Government.
Aweys chose to remain independent, and by early 2010 Hizbul Islam had become of
only marginal relevance to the broader struggle for power in southern Somalia.
constituent parts: ARS-A and SIF — both of them comprising militias drawn from
the smaller Hawiye sub-clans — and its area of operations confined to Mogadishu,
Afgooye and parts of the Hiraan region.
Ras Kambooni
Anoole forces/Al-Furqaan forces42. The Raas Kambooni forces are a clan militia constituted mainly of fighters
from the Mohamed Subeer sub-clan of the Ogaden. Leaders of this group include
Ahmed Mohamed Islaan “Madoobe”, Ibrahim Shukri and Abdinaasir Seeraar. In
October 2009, a faction of the Raas Kaambooni militia headed by commanders
Mohamed Muhumed Ali “Dulyadeen” (see S/2008/769), Abdiqani Mohamed Yusuf
“Kaboje’el” and Isse Kaambooni split with the main force and aligned itself with
Al-Shabaab in Kismaayo. Early in February 2010, led by Hizbul Islam Deputy
Chairman Hassan Abdillahi Hirsi “Turki”, this Raas Kaambooni splinter group
declared it had merged with Al-Shabaab.
43. Raas Kaambooni forces under Ahmed Madoobe’s leadership were
overmatched by Al-Shabaab and its local allies in November 2009, but withdrew in
relatively good order and remain a viable fighting force. They seem likely to
re-emerge in the context of broader Ogaden initiatives to recover control of the
Lower Juba region from Al-Shabaab.
Who Is Financially supporting this fringe groups? (Al Shabab, Xizbul Islam)44. Anoole forces are also a clan militia composed of fighters from the Harti
sub-group of the Daarood (Majeerteen/Warsengeli/Dhulbahante), who are often
referred to in the Juba Valley as “Harti Waamo”. The Anoole militia is headed by
Mohamed Mire, a member of the Edegfa’le sub-clan of Majeerteen.
45. Although small in comparison with other militia groups in the region, the
group’s military training camp at Laagta Anoole (Anole estuary) continues to
produce more fighters. Al-Furqaan training camp was founded in October 2007 and
is located between the villages of Buulo Xaaji and Qudhaa, 110 km from Kismaayo.
Anoole forces also control a number of islands and villages in the Lower Juba
region.
meeting of March 2009 at an undisclosed location inside Somalia (probably in the
Lower Juba region, under the auspices of Hassan Turki)
47. In addition to the better-known Somali factions, the Monitoring Group has
learned that a small number of fighters from the United Western Somali Liberation
Front headed by a commander named Mohamed Arab Hiirey may also be fighting
against the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, under the umbrella of
Hizbul Islam.
48. Like other Somali factions, the United Western Somali Liberation Front is
supported by activists in large Somali diaspora communities, including Kenya. The
Monitoring Group has received information indicating that some senior leaders of
the Front may have travelled to and from Nairobi during the course of the mandate.
Somali Militia Propaganda websites?73. Kenya hosts one of the largest Somali communities outside Somalia, although
precise numbers are impossible to determine — in part because of the difficulty in
distinguishing between Kenyan Somalis and long-term refugees or migrants from
Somalia. Kenya’s weak citizenship registration system compounds the problem,
since it is as likely to deny documents to genuine Kenyan Somalis as it is to provide
documents to non-Kenyan Somalis in exchange for bribes or influence.
74. Kenya’s large Somali community, its proximity to Somalia and the notoriously
porous border between the two countries all contribute to Kenya’s emergence as a
major base of support for Somali armed opposition groups. Members of Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam travel with relative freedom to and from Nairobi, where they raise
funds, engage in recruitment and obtain treatment for wounded fighters. A key pillar
of this support network is a community of wealthy clerics-cum-businessmen, linked
to a small number of religious centres notorious for their links to radicalism —
notably the Abubakar as-Saddique mosque on 6th street, the Al-Hidaya mosque,
Beit-ul-Mal Madrassa and the Masjid-ul-Axmar in Nairobi. The networks organized
around these institutions have long provided both ideological leadership and a
resource base for Somali militants.
75. The current imam of Abubakar as-Saddique mosque is Sheikh Mohamed Abdi
Omar “Umal”. Umal, a longstanding associate of Mohamed Sheikh Osman,35 is an
Ethiopian-born cleric and businessman who served as a vigorous advocate of the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006-2007. When UIC split in 2008 over the Djibouti
peace process, Umal stridently opposed the peace talks, and subsequently rejected
Sheikh Sharif’s election as President of the Transitional Federal Government in
January 2009. His opposition to the Transitional Federal Government also involved
community mobilization and fund-raising. The Monitoring Group has received
credible, detailed and specific information concerning Umal’s participation early in
2009 in meetings with representatives of armed groups from Somalia, together with
prominent members of the Eastleigh business community, in order to discuss
logistical issues and raise funds for the armed struggle.
76. Under the spotlight of Kenyan and international media attention, however, in
mid-2009 Umal began to change his tone and has ostensibly become an advocate of
the Transitional Federal Government. In January 2010, he took a step further and
denounced the takfiri practice of designating other Muslims as apostates in order to
justify spilling their blood, posing a direct challenge to Al-Shabaab.36
77. Other radical figures have since succeeded Umal as advocates and ideologues
of jihad — notably Umal’s nephew and protege, Hassan Mahad Omar — better
known to his audience as Sheikh Hassaan Hussein Adam and to his followers in
Al-Shabaab as Abu Salmaan. Hassaan and his associates at the informal religious
centre known as Masjid-ul-Axmar are not simply sympathizers of Al-Shabaab, but
actually key figures in their outreach efforts to recruit new members and solicit
funds. Hassaan’s approach to fund-raising is remarkably aggressive: in a sermon on
4 February 2008, he stated:
Funding the Jihad is an individual duty for every Muslim. If you cannot physically join the Jihad, then it is mandatory that you finance it. The small
amounts of money collected from you for the Jihad are not donations for
charity but an individual duty incumbent upon you. It is mandatory unlike the
funds of alms collected for the Mujahidin. If the funds of alms for the
Mujahidin become insufficient, then it is permitted to forcefully collect more
funds. It is also permitted to shoot any obstructionist with five bullets
78. In April 2009, Hassaan headed a list of clerics invited to participate at an
Internet discussion promoted by the Al-Shabaab-affiliated website alqimmah.net and
the Dacwatutawxiid online forum; the discussion also headlined Shabaab leaders
Mukhtar Roobow and Fu’aad Shangole, as well as Hizbul Islam leaders Omar Imaan
Abubakar and Abdullahi Ali Hashi
Case study 2
Masjid-ul-Axmar (The Red Mosque)
Masjid-ul-Axmar (The Red Mosque) is a small, informal centre
near Al-Hidaya mosque in Eastleigh, Nairobi. The leaders of Masjid-ul-
Axmar actively engage in propaganda, fund-raising and recruitment on
behalf of Al-Shabaab, together with known Shabaab leaders. The
Monitoring Group has also received information that Shabaab leaders
from Mogadishu were hosted by the leaders of this group on several
occasions in 2009.
Who are being recruited to fight for Al shabab (Which clan?)Hizbul Islam jabiso.net
somalimirror.com
cadaalada.com
halgan.net
Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a shaaficiyah.com
www.ahlusunna.org
106. Although Somalis from a wide variety of clans have been recruited in this way,
there is little doubt that recruiters are taking advantage of kinship in order to
identify prospective recruits, win their trust and exploit community solidarity to
escape the attention of the authorities.
107. In Minneapolis, for example, Monitoring Group investigations indicate that
more than half of the 20 young people known to be missing had at least one parent from the Harti sub-clan of the Daarood. Three of the five Somali Minnesotans killed
while fighting for Al-Shabaab belonged to the Omar Mohamud sub-clan of the
Harti/Majeerteen, and the fourth’s mother was also from the Harti. In Sweden,
Shu’ayb Ali Hassan, himself a member of the Rahanweyne clan, was initially
recruited into a Harti fighting force by maternal relatives from the Siwaaqroon
sub-clan of the Harti/Majeerteen.
108. The selective clan trend in the recruiting patterns investigated by the
Monitoring Group appears to have been compounded by circumstances of social or
familial dislocation. In at least four of the cases investigated by the Monitoring
Group, young people had been granted entry into the United States on false
pretences, including being lodged with families not their own.
Who are the Pirates?
Who is Sheik Atam and Warsangeli Mujahids?Probably the most notorious pirate leader in Puntland goes by the name Abshir
Abdillahi “Boyah”, who is approximately 44 years old and originally from the
coastal town of Eyl.68 In previous reports, the Monitoring Group has identified
Boyah as a principal organizer and financier of pirate activity in 2008. Independent
and intelligence reports received by the Monitoring Group have confirmed his
involvement in piracy. Boyah himself has publicly admitted to being the commander
of a maritime militia consisting of approximately 500 pirates. By Boyah’s own
account, his militia is responsible for hijacking between 25 and 60 shipping vessels
since the mid-1990s, including the Japanese-owned chemical tanker Golden Nori. Boyah has numerous aliases and was identified in the Monitoring Group’s report of December
2008 (S/2008/769) as Farah Hirsi Kulan. Like President Faroole, Boyah is a member of the
Majeerteen/Issa Mohamud/Musa Issa sub-clan.
Somaliland and Al shabab connection!146. Several recent incidents have been specifically attributed to Mohamed Sa’iid
“Atom”,78 described in the Monitoring Group’s report of December 2008
(S/2008/769), whose activities pose a growing threat to peace and security in both
Puntland and Somaliland.
147. Although he remains essentially a Warsengeli clan warlord, Atom reportedly
calls his militia the “Eastern Sanaag Mujahidicen”79 and has strengthened ties with
Al-Shabaab during the course of 2009. A significant number of non-Warsengeli
militia are reported to have recently joined his group. His training camp at Galgala
remained active in 2009, and the Monitoring Group has received reports about two
related training centres in the Bari region. Numerous sources indicate that there are
several non-Somali instructors at the Galgala camp, and according to eyewitness
reports delegations from southern Al-Shabaab groups have been regular visitors.
148. The Monitoring Group has received eyewitness reports that Atom continues to
import arms from Yemen and to receive consignments from Eritrea, including
120-mm mortars, which may have been transferred to southern Somalia. He has also
embarked on an expansion of his influence and infrastructure, attempting to build an
access road to his main training camp near Galgala. Local Warsengeli elders have
reportedly tried to discourage him from this effort.80 In January 2010, Monitoring
Group sources and local media reported that Atom had also completed construction
of an airfield near his Galgala base.
149. Meanwhile, Atom appears to be preparing to confront both the Puntland and
the Somaliland authorities more directly. In March 2009, he issued a press statement
in which he demanded that the Puntland authorities release several Warsengeli youth
from prison or his forces would liberate them and take unspecified action against the
administration.81 Late in 2009, Atom personally visited the town of Laascaanood,
where he reportedly established an operational cell. There have since been several
attacks with improvised explosive devices against Somaliland forces in the town,
although it is unclear whether these may be Atom’s responsibility or the work of an
autonomous Dhulbahante clan militia.
150. Talks in Galgala district between Puntland officials and Warsengeli clan elders
about the fate of Atom and his militia were suspended late in January without
agreement.
151. Shabaab operations in Somaliland date from at least 2003, when members of
the group killed four foreign aid workers in three separate operations.83 In 2006, a
Shabaab team with arms and explosives was apprehended while plotting a campaign
of assassinations and bombings to disrupt parliamentary elections. In October 2008,
Al-Shabaab deployed suicide bombers in simultaneous attacks against the
Somaliland presidency, the Ethiopian liaison office and the UNDP office, killing
25 people.
152. In September 2009, Shabaab emir Ahmed Abdi “Godane” (Abu Zubeyr) issued
a recorded statement entitled “A Message to Somaliland”, in which he described the
administration as anti-Islamic, denounced the electoral process, and called on the
public to rise up against the authorities.85 The message was widely interpreted as a
warning that Al-Shabaab would turn greater attention to Somaliland, and the
Somaliland authorities have since thwarted a number of Shabaab operations,
intercepting consignments of arms, ammunition and explosives.
153. Late in September 2009, the Somaliland authorities arrested Mohamed Omar
Abdirahman, a suspected bomb maker.86 In November 2009, the authorities
unsuccessfully attempted to arrest in Bur’o two suspected senior Shabaab leaders
named Sa’iid Ahmed Abdi “Jaar” and Adan Ahmed Arreh (also known as Adaan
“Jihad”). Late in December 2009, the Somaliland Interior Minister briefed the press
that the police had recovered a sack of explosives planted at a bridge on the main
road between Berbera and Bur’o.87 In January 2010, Somaliland authorities
recovered high explosive projectiles apparently intended to bomb a mosque in
Hargeysa, whose imam had been outspoken against Al-Shabaab.
Foreign Fighters in Somalia.
180. One of the most widely cited sources with respect to foreign fighters among
Al-Shabaab is Mohamed Sheikh Abdullahi, also known as Bakistaan,104 an
Al-Shabaab commander of the Maymana Brigade who defected to the Transitional
Federal Government on 9 November 2009. Both in government debriefings, and to
the international media, Bakistaan provided names and nationalities of a number of
foreigners allegedly operating with Al-Shabaab. According to his statements,
Kenyan nationals, including Kenyan Somalis, account for half of all foreign
fighters, and about 450 other foreign nationals have come from Bangladesh,
Chechnya, Pakistan, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania — assertions
that the Monitoring Group has generally found to be corroborated by a variety of
other credible sources, including Monitoring Group contacts on the ground.105
However, Bakistaan’s assertions that the total number of foreign fighters is in the
thousands and that Al-Shabaab operations are directly controlled by Al-Qaida are
less credible.
