History of Somaliland: SNM and KHAT

[union]

Qat (khat), a type of leaf chewed in Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia and East Africa is a mild drug which can stimulate the mind and give a state of euphoria. When chewed moderately once in a while, the harm of qat may be negligible but the damage it can cause to those who frequent its use is incalculable. Qat is evil which destroys people. Not only does it drain resources but it numbs people and makes them forget about their problems and lulls the person in the face of the challenges of life. It robs the user the resolve and the will to take tangible steps in their life. Qat is grown in Ethiopia, Yemen and Kenya. It is not grown in Somalia or Djibouti where it is consumed exponentially.
Qat was banned by the military government in Somalia on March 17th 1983. It was the Saudi government which played a crucial role in its ban in Somalia. The Saudis, through their embassies in Yemen, Somalia and Djibouti observed the economic and social devastation the mass use of qat inflicts and the human dilapidation it causes. The Saudis then decided to help proximity nations such as Somalia rid qat from its society.

In 1982, the Saudi government of King Fahad Bin Abdulaziz approached and presented Yemen with cash inducement to ban qat. This was followed by a similar offer to the government of President Mohamed Siad Barre in Somalia. In 1983 the Saudis gave Somalia US $60 million towards the ban of qat.1

When on March 17th 1983 qat was banned in Somalia, there was little preparation for pandemonium to come. Its sudden ban was going to impact thousands of traders, outlets and hundreds of thousands of consumers. The ban of qat was going to affect those who from its sell make their livelihoods.

Apart from the social sigh of relief its ban was to bring greater security risks and danger for Somalia. Military governments know how to ban things but rarely do they prepare for the aftermath. The ban had a number of serious security related consequences. In the north the ban sent thousands of qat traders, transport vehicles and merchants who used to rush the commodity from Ethiopia to cities, towns and villages across the north.2

Thousands of young people who could not face life without qat too went packing. They crossed over the border in droves to the delight of the SNM in Ethiopia which was waiting them on the other side. The qat immigrants had no place else to go other than swell the movement on the other side in Ethiopia to the glee of SNM who signed them up for its armed struggle against Somalia.

For Somalia, the sudden ban of qat also brought home other dangerous security implications. It helped destroy Somalia’s prided national army built over many decades with the help of the Soviet Union and later the US. Once qat was banned and its price shot up 20 fold like every contraband commodity someone must step in to benefit from the illegal trade.

Elements within the army saw the opportunity to bring qat into the country using the military vehicles which were not subject to inspection at checkpoints. The implications were huge. In the south it caused irreconcilable conflict within army officers of two sub-clans whose members were involved in the illegal trade. The group which did not enjoy equal power accused the other of preferential advantage. They went on to form the SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement).

The illegal qat trade too affected discipline and moral within the army. The ban of qat was a God sent opportunity for the SNM and the Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam which was hell-bent in the destruction of Somalia. One may conclude that the 1983 ban of qat aided the enemies who were engaged in the destruction and collapse of Somalia.

Abdulkadir Mohamoud

[union]

Quick Quiz:

1. What does SNM stand for?
a. Somali Naago Movement
b. Somali Narcotics Movement
c. Somali Nacalat Movement

2. Why was SNM formed?
a. To help Ethiopia destabilize regional superpower, Somalia
b. To help the iddors get their fix of qad
c. Because iddors are f-king retarded

3. Was Siad Barre right in banning khat?
a. Yes, because it was depriving tens of thousands of families
b. Yes, because it was a blight on the face of the somali nation
c. Yes, because it was enriching Ethiopia and Kenya while draining Somalia

[ZubeirAwal]

SNM Insurgency in Somalia 1982-1988

The Isaaq clans of northwestern Somalia also resented what they perceived as their inadequate representation in Siad Barre's government. This disaffection crystallized in 1981 when Isaaq dissidents living in London formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) with the aim of toppling the Siad Barre regime. The following year, the SNM transferred its headquarters to Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, from where it launched guerrilla raids into the Woqooyi Galbeed and Togdheer regions of Somalia. Like the SSDF, the SNM had both military and political wings, proclaimed itself as a nationwide opposition movement, and tried to enlist the support of non-Isaaq clans. Initially, the SNM was more successful than the SSDF in appealing to other clans, and some Hawiye clan leaders worked with the SNM in the early and mid1980s . Prior to establishing itself within Somalia in 1988, the SNM used its Ethiopian sanctuary to carry out a number of sensational activities against the Siad Barre regime, most notably the 1983 attack on Mandera Prison near Berbera, which resulted in the freeing of hundreds of northern dissidents. SNM also freed one of its highest ranking military leader called Abdilahi Askar who was in custody of Gen.Gani in the Hargeisa police-headquarter. Abdilahi Askar would have been executed by the next day of his release.
In April 1981, a group of Isaaq emigrés living in London formed the Somali National Movement (SNM), which subsequently became the strongest of Somalia's various insurgent movements. According to its spokesmen, the rebels wanted to overthrow Siad Barre's dictatorship. Additionally, the SNM advocated a mixed economy and a neutral foreign policy, rejecting alignment with the Soviet Union or the United States and calling for the dismantling of all foreign military bases in the region. In the late 1980s, the SNM adopted a pro-Western foreign policy and favored United States involvement in a post-Siad Barre Somalia. Other SNM objectives included establishment of a representative democracy that would guarantee human rights and freedom of speech. Eventually, the SNM moved its headquarters from London to Addis Ababa to obtain Ethiopian military assistance, which initially was limited to old Soviet small arms.
In October 1981, the SNM rebels elected Ahmad Mohammad Gulaid[3] and Ahmad Ismaaiil Abdi as chairman and secretary general, respectively, of the movement. Gulaid had participated in northern Somali politics until 1975, when he went into exile in Djibouti and then in Saudi Arabia. Abdi had been politically active in the city of Burao in the 1950s, and, from 1965 to 1967, had served as the Somali government's minister of planning. After the authorities jailed him in 1971 for antigovernment activities, Abdi left Somalia and lived in East Africa and Saudi Arabia. The rebels also elected an eight-man executive committee to oversee the SNM's military and political activities. On January 2, 1982, the SNM launched its first military operation against the Somali government. Operating from Ethiopian bases, commando units attacked Mandera Prison near Berbera and freed a group of northern dissidents. According to the SNM, the assault liberated more than 700 political prisoners; subsequent independent estimates indicated that only about a dozen government opponents escaped. At the same time, other commando units raided the Cadaadle armory near Berbera and escaped with an undetermined amount of arms and ammunition.
Mogadishu responded to the SNM attacks by declaring a state of emergency, imposing a curfew, closing gasoline stations to civilian vehicles, banning movement in or out of northern Somalia, and launching a search for the Mandera prisoners (most of whom were never found). On January 8, 1982, the Somali government also closed its border with Djibouti to prevent the rebels from fleeing Somalia. These actions failed to stop SNM military activities.
In October 1982, the SNM increased pressure against the Siad Barre regime by forming a joint military committee with the SSDF. Apart from issuing antigovernment statements, the two insurgent groups started broadcasting from the former Radio Kulmis station, now known as Radio Halgan (struggle). Despite this political cooperation, the SNM and SSDF failed to agree on a common strategy against Mogadishu. As a result, the alliance languished.
In February 1983, Siad Barre visited northern Somalia in a campaign to discredit the SNM. Among other things, he ordered the release of numerous civil servants and businessmen who had been arrested for antigovernment activities, lifted the state of emergency, and announced an amnesty for Somali exiles who wanted to return home. These tactics put the rebels on the political defensive for several months. In November 1983, the SNM Central Committee sought to regain the initiative by holding an emergency meeting to formulate a more aggressive strategy. One outcome was that the military wing—headed by Abdulqaadir Kosar Abdi, formerly of the SNA—assumed control of the Central Committee by ousting the civilian membership from all positions of power. However, in July 1984, at the Fourth SNM Congress, held in Ethiopia, the civilians regained control of the leadership. The delegates also elected Ahmad Mahammad Mahamuud "Silanyo" SNM chairman and reasserted their intention to revive the alliance with the SSDF.
After the Fourth SNM Congress adjourned, military activity in northern Somalia increased. SNM commandos attacked about a dozen government military posts in the vicinity of Hargeysa, Burao, and Berbera. According to the SNM, the SNA responded by shooting 300 people at a demonstration in Burao, sentencing seven youths to death for sedition, and arresting an unknown number of rebel sympathizers. In January 1985, the government executed twenty- eight people in retaliation for antigovernment activity.
Between June 1985 and February 1986, the SNM claimed to have carried out thirty operations against government forces in northern Somalia. In addition, the SNM reported that it had killed 476 government soldiers and wounded 263, and had captured eleven vehicles and had destroyed another twenty-two, while losing only 38 men and two vehicles. Although many independent observers said these figures were exaggerated, SNM operations during the 1985-86 campaign forced Siad Barre to mount an international effort to cut off foreign aid to the rebels. This initiative included reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Libya in exchange for Tripoli's promise to stop supporting the SNM.
Despite efforts to isolate the rebels, the SNM continued military operations in northern Somalia. Between July and September 1987, the SNM initiated approximately thirty attacks, including one on the northern capital, Hargeysa; none of these, however, weakened the government's control of northern Somalia. A more dramatic event occurred when a SNM unit kidnapped a Médecins Sans Frontières medical aid team of ten Frenchmen and one Djiboutian to draw the world's attention to Mogadishu's policy of impressing men from refugee camps into the SNA. After ten days, the SNM released the hostages unconditionally.
Siad Barre responded to these activities by instituting harsh security measures throughout northern Somalia. The government also evicted suspected pro-SNM nomad communities from the Somali- Ethiopian border region. These measures failed to contain the SNM. By February 1988, the rebels had captured three villages around Togochale, a refugee camp near the northwestern Somali- Ethiopian border. Following the rebel successes of 1987-88, Somali-Ethiopian relations began to improve. On March 19, 1988, Siad Barre and Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam met in Djibouti to discuss ways of reducing tension between the two countries. Although little was accomplished, the two agreed to hold further talks. At the end of March 1988, the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs, Berhanu Bayih, arrived in Mogadishu for discussions with a group of Somali officials, headed by General Ahmad Mahamuud Faarah. On April 4, 1988, the two presidents signed a joint communiqué in which they agreed to restore diplomatic relations, exchange prisoners of war, start a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border area, and end subversive activities and hostile propaganda against each other.
Faced with a cutoff of Ethiopian military assistance, the SNM had to prove its ability to operate as an independent organization. Therefore, in late May 1988 SNM units moved out of their Ethiopian base camps and launched a major offensive in northern Somalia. The rebels temporarily occupied the provincial capitals of Burao and Hargeysa. These early successes bolstered the SNM's popular support, as thousands of disaffected Isaaq clan members and SNA deserters joined the rebel ranks.
Over the next few years, the SNM took control of almost all of northwestern Somalia and extended its area of operations about fifty kilometers east of Erigavo. However, the SNM did not gain control of the region's major cities (i.e., Berbera, Hargeysa, Burao, and Boorama and Gabileh), but succeeded only in laying siege to them.
With Ethiopian military assistance no longer a factor, the SNM's success depended on its ability to capture weapons from the SNA. The rebels seized numerous vehicles such as Toyota Land Cruisers from government forces and subsequently equipped them with light and medium weapons such as 12.7mm and 14.5mm machine guns, 106mm recoilless rifles, and BM-21 rocket launchers. The SNM possessed antitank weapons such as Soviet B-10 tubes and RPG- 7s. For air defense the rebels operated Soviet 30mm and 23mm guns, several dozen Soviet ZU23 2s, and Czech-made twin-mounted 30mm ZU30 2s. The SNM also maintained a small fleet of armed speed boats that operated from Maydh, fifty kilometers northwest of Erigavo, and Xiis, a little west of Maydh. Small arms included 120mm mortars and various assault rifles, such as AK-47s, M-16s, and G-3s. Despite these armaments, rebel operations, especially against the region's major cities, suffered because of an inadequate logistics system and a lack of artillery, mine- clearing equipment, ammunition, and communications gear.
To weaken Siad Barre's regime further, the SNM encouraged the formation of other clan-based insurgent movements and provided them with political and military support. In particular, the SNM maintained close relations with the United Somali Congress (USC), which was active in central Somalia, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which operated in southern Somalia. Both these groups sought to overthrow Siad Barre's regime and establish a democratic form of government. The Isaaq as a clan-family occupy the northern portion of the country. Three major cities are predominantly, if not exclusively, Isaaq: Hargeysa, the second largest city in Somalia until it was razed during disturbances in 1988; Burao in the interior, also destroyed by the military; and the port of Berbera.
Formed in London on April 6, 1981, by 400 to 500 Isaaq emigrés, the Somali National Movement (SNM) remained an Isaaq clan-family organization dedicated to ridding the country of Siad Barre. The Isaaq felt deprived both as a clan and as a region, and Isaaq outbursts against the central government had occurred sporadically since independence. The SNM launched a military campaign in 1988, capturing Burao on May 27 and part of Hargeysa on May 31. Government forces bombarded the towns heavily in June, forcing the SNM to withdraw and causing more than 300,000 Isaaq to flee to Ethiopia. The military regime conducted savage reprisals against the Isaaq. The same methods were used as against the Majeerteen—destruction of water wells and grazing grounds and raping of women. An estimated 5,000 Isaaq were killed between May 27 and the end of December 1988. About 80,000 died in the fighting, but 30,000, including women and children, were alleged to have been bayoneted to death. Bitter cross-clan feuding fed by the inept and brutal one-party rule of Muhammad Siad Barre (Siyad Barrah) came to a head in the spring of 1988 when the Somali National Movement (SNM) began taking over towns and military installations in the north. Thousands were killed, and hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to neighboring Ethiopia. Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, remained in the hands of the socialist government. In the meantime the SNM made major gains.

[ZubeirAwal]

On January 2, 1982, the SNM launched its first military operation against the Somali government. Operating from Ethiopian bases, commando units attacked Mandera Prison near Berbera and freed a group of northern dissidents.
According to the SNM, the assault liberated more than 700 political prisoners; subsequent independent estimates indicated that only about a dozen government opponents escaped. At the same time, other commando units raided the Cadaadle armory near Berbera and escaped with an undetermined amount of arms and ammunition. Mogadishu responded to the SNM attacks by declaring a state of emergency, imposing a curfew, closing gasoline stations to civilian vehicles, banning movement in or out of northern Somalia, and launching a search for the Mandera prisoners (most of whom were never found).
On January 8, 1982, the Somali government also closed its border with Djibouti to prevent the rebels from fleeing Somalia. These actions failed to stop SNM military activities. In October 1982, the SNM tried to increase pressure against the Siad Barre regime by forming a jointmilitary committee with the SSDF. Apart from issuing antigovernment statements, the two insurgent groups started broadcasting from the former Radio Kulmis station, now known as Radio Halgan (struggle).
Despite this political cooperation, the SNM and SSDF failed to agree on a common strategy against Mogadishu. As a result, the alliance languished. In February 1983, Siad Barre visited northern Somalia in a campaign to discredit the SNM. Among other things, he ordered the release of numerous civil servants and businessmen who had been arrested for antigovernment activities, lifted the state of emergency, and announced an amnesty for Somali exiles who wanted to return home.
These tactics put the rebels on the political defensive for several months. In November 1983, the SNM Central Committee sought to regain the initiative by holding an emergency meeting to formulate a more aggressive strategy. One outcome was that the military wing—headed by Abdulqaadir Kosar Abdi, formerly of the SNA—assumed control of the Central Committee by ousting the civilian membership from all positions of power.



Loss of Ethiopian support

Following the rebel successes of 1987-88, Somali-Ethiopian relations began to improve. On March 19, 1988, Siad Barre and Ethiopian president Mengistu Haile Mariam met in Djibouti to discuss ways of reducing tension between the two countries. Although little was accomplished, the two agreed to hold further talks. At the end of March 1988, the Ethiopian minister of foreign affairs, Berhanu Bayih, arrived in Mogadishu for discussions with a group of Somali officials, headed by General Ahmad Mahamuud Faarah.
On April 4, 1988, the two presidents signed a joint communique in which they agreed to restore diplomatic relations, exchange prisoners of war, start a mutual withdrawal of troops from the border area, and end subversive activities and hostile propaganda against each other. Faced with a cutoff of Ethiopian military assistance, the SNM had to prove its ability to operate as an independent organization.

[ZubeirAwal]

Therefore, in late May 1988 SNM units moved out of their Ethiopian base camps and launched a major offensive in northern Somalia. The rebels temporarily occupied the provincial capitals of Burao and Hargeysa. These early successes bolstered the SNM's popular support, as thousands of disaffected Isaaq clan members and SNA deserters joined the rebel ranks. Over the next few years, the SNM took control of almost all of northwestern Somalia and extended its area of operations about fifty kilometers east of Erigavo. However, the SNM did not gain control of the region's major cities (i.e., Berbera, Hargeysa, Burao, and Boorama), but succeeded only in laying siege to them. With Ethiopian military assistance no longer a factor, the SNM's success depended on its ability to capture weapons from the SNA. The rebels seized numerous vehicles such as Toyota Land Cruisers from government forces and subsequently equipped them with light and medium weapons such as 12.7mm and 14.5mm machine guns, 106mm recoilless rifles, and BM-21 rocket launchers.
The SNM possessed antitank weapons such as Soviet B-10 tubes and RPG-7s. For air defense the rebels operated Soviet 30mm and 23mm guns, several dozen Soviet ZU23 2s, and Czech-made twin-mounted 30mm ZU30 2s. The SNM also maintained a small fleet of armed speed boats that operated from Maydh, fifty kilometers northwest of Erigavo, and Xiis, a little west of Maydh. Small arms included 120mm mortars and various assault rifles, such as AK-47s, M-16s, and G-3s. Despite these armaments, rebel operations, especially against the region's major cities, suffered because of an inadequate logistics system and a lack of artillery, mine-clearing equipment, ammunition, and communications gear. To weaken Siad Barre's regime further, the SNM encouraged the formation of other clan-based insurgent movements and provided them with political and military support. In particular, the SNM maintained close relations with the United Somali Congress (USC), which was active in central Somalia, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), which operated in southern Somalia. Both these groups sought to overthrow Siad Barre's regime and establish a democratic form of government.


Somali Civil War

The SPM succeeded in overrunning several government outposts in southern Somalia. The SNM-USC-SPM unification agreement failed to last after Siad Barre fled Mogadishu. On January 26, 1991, the USC formed an interim government, which the SNM refused to recognize. On May 18, 1991, the SNM declared the northwestern Somali regions independent, establishing the Republic of Somaliland. The USC interim government opposed this declaration, arguing instead for a unified Somalia. Apart from these political disagreements, fighting broke out between and within the USC and SPM.


Thats the SNM history,

[ZubeirAwal]

The only successful Somali rebel group in history


The last war, when we took back hargeisa '91

[Username1]

Union your an atheist, right. Do you think Afwyene was an atheist and will you be both sharing the same room inhell.

[Blue_609]

SNM somali national mirqaan

[Madelina]

SNM somali national mirqaan

Dude, I've never EVER seen you comment on any other topics other than the anti-somaliland and isaaq topics. Can't help but think you made this "nick" to exclusively bash this >>>>> and a certain tribe Maskiin!

And far as Khad is concerned , it's no longer exclusive to "reer waqayi" but has now crossed over to the wider Somali population and is a menace to our society. There's a somali saying laga baro laga badi (I hope I said it right) basicly means that the student has surpassed the teacher...

[LiquidHYDROGEN]

History of Gedo

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[juzme123]

SNM

[Blue_609]

Dude, I've never EVER seen you comment

barasho wanaagsan

[Barkhadd]

History of Gedo

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GEDO 2011 CE