The perils and pitfalls of Kenya's invasion

[Lamagoodle]

Ok, somalis. I find the below analysis very well articulated and free from the anagaa reer hebel kind of stuff people write on websites. The writer of this piece - unlike many of you- know the historical and institutional contexts.

After so many years of threatening to invade Somalia, Kenya is finally on Somali soil. The stated goal for that incursion into one of the most violent, desolate and hopeless places on earth is to topple Al Shabaab and remove their menacing threat from the Kenya border. The subtle goal is to impose a friendly regime in Azania, the clan enclave created most recently in Southern Somalia close to the Kenyan border. That is the crux of the matter.
The Kenya government is always slow in making decisions and hardly follows up any line of action for far too long. Most of the grand programmes it initiates usually fall apart within a short period. It lacks the tenacity to sustain an action especially if it requires careful calculation and painful sacrifice. Many of the government initiated programmes are scuttled by profiteers. This applies to the Kenya government policy towards Somalia. The government of Kenya and IGAD were involved in training a group of Somali youth for the Somali TFG to invade and dislocate Al Shabaab insurgents from Southern Somalia. Thousands of young recruits were taken to Manyani and Isiolo for training. They were trained for six months and supplied with armour and vehicles and sent to fight in the frontlines. They made initial successes against the rebel group chasing them out of Elwak, Dhobley and Bulla Hawo on initial contact with a tactical backing from the Kenya Military. But this is where the nightmare begins.
According to sources on the ground the plan backfired at initial stages. On recruitment, most of the young men recruited were not Somali nationals. They were unemployed Kenyan youth of Somali and Boran extraction. Those of Somali origin are predominantly from one clan. Their knowledge of the language, terrain and war culture of Somalia is limited. The biggest blunder was not the fact they were Kenyan Somalis, because all Somalis qualify for Somalia citizenship regardless of where they were born and current nationality. The problem was no proper verification of age and ability was done; a percentage of the eventual militia is child soldiers barely 13 year olds. The story gets murkier. On deployment, they were handed over to a “general” from the Somalia National Army. They were promised $ 200 a month as salaries and allowances and other provisions to survive on. Few months into battle, the young soldiers were for all intent and purposes abandoned in the frontline without enough provisions and without pay. The demoralized youth faced a rejuvenated but desperate Al Shabaab fighters whose sole goal these days is to procure supplies of food, arms and vehicles through use of force. The battle was at two fronts; Dhobley and Elwak. On both contacts both sides suffered casualties but the battle hardened Al Shabaab forced the young recruits to abandon the towns. Whispers among Kenyan Somalis estimate that over 500 of those young Kenyan men are unaccounted for. Many abandoned the battlefield sold their uniforms and guns to the pastoralists and fled to Ethiopia. Some came back home in questionable mental state. At least two military vehicles were stolen and sold to A lShabaab. Al Shabaab cleaned out the provisions; arms, vehicles and food from the military camps and fled Dhobley and Elwak when Kenyan planes started bombing them.
The injured soldiers were taken to a clinic at Elwak where there are absolutely no medicine and nothing else. Their suffering was highlighted by NTV in “Operaton X-Somalia”. This is a remarkable and costly programmes that has failed because of lack of proper care and sabotage through profiteering. The funds to supply the youth once they have been trained and put to battle must have been misappropriated by those entrusted to oversee procurement. The initial recruitment was bungled. They should have done a proper recruitment of the many unemployed refugees living in Kenya.
By October 2011, it dawned on Kenya that the Al Shabaab insurgents were not intimidated by the thousands of young soldiers stationed on the border. To add insult to injury, 2 women tourists were kidnapped at the Coast and two Spanish aid workers were also taken by men believed to be Al Shabaab at Hagardera Refugee Camp. Sources say that pirates who operate in the Indian Ocean have contracted elements of Al Shabaab and other militia groups in Somalia to kidnap foreigners, mainly Europeans, and deliver to them at designated places. Al Shabaab has been using fiery rhetoric to tout Kenya into joining the war in Somalia. They have threatened on several occasions to carry out bombings in Nairobi. In the latest bombings in Mogadishu at least one Kenyan student died. Kenya therefore had the Justification to fight them but blind rage is never a good strategy.
Kenya has according to the latest Census, although strongly contested, 2.3 Million Somali citizens. According to the Somali Constitution all Somalis are entitled to citizenship of Somali Republic. The Kenyan constitution allows for dual citizenship. There are almost a million Somali nationals living in Kenya as refugees. The Kenya border with Somalia is over 700 Kilometres. In this period of drought nearly all Kenyan pastoralists have shifted to Somalia with their livestock and are directly under in the line of fire. All this three facts have an impact on the outcome of Kenya’s foray into Somalia.
The best case scenario is a lightening operation that moves fast to capture the whole of Southern Somalia giving the insurgents little time to prepare and counterattack. This may not be possible because of the sheer size of Southern Somalia, the desolateness of the terrain and the fact that the insurgents are entrenched. The operations overall goal may not even include completely dislodging A lShabaab. The goal is quite modest according to insiders; to create Azania as a buffer zone so that the militants cannot cross to Kenya to mess up Kenya’s delicate tourism and aid industry. Azania was created in March 2011 by some elites from the tribes that live in the region with the support of IGAD and AU in the hope of squeezing Al Shabaab out of Kenya’s neighbourhood. Currently Kenya supports the Azania State and its President Mohamed Ahmed Gandi while Ethiopia opposes its creation through Ahmed Madoobe, one of the warlords with the TFG.
The worst case scenario which is likely is to get embroiled in Somalia’s confused conflict for years and disenfranchise both Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees living in Kenya. This is likely because Kenya Government forces are not known for duty of care when in battle. They are likely to injure, kill or plunder the wealth of a Somali civilian not related to Al Shabaab and there lies the danger; danger that Americans found themselves in Somalia and Afghanistan. Tribal societies are easy to recruit into a cause if one of them is harmed. They are out for revenge on the slightest provocation. Currently Al Shabaab is facing a low period; surrounded by hostile armies, funding and arms shortage due to the Arab spring, facing the world economic crisis like everybody else and demoralized and fragmented fighters. A way out of this mess is to instigate a major power into its war. Ethiopia was there and seen how Somali friends of yesterday become vicious opponents the next day. Kenya now seems to have fallen for the ploy. Any major mistake will bring the conflict into Kenya and may open up new fronts within the large region occupied by Kenyan Somalis. It may also stir xenophobia against Somalis living in Kenya both in the security forces and the public. The government has already deployed police in Somali enclave of Eastleigh in Nairobi without a clear mandate. The police usually harass residents without regard to their status as citizens or legal refugees under International Law. The government is also hinting at screening the Somalis for ties to AlShabaab. Somalis are aware of what screening means and are also aware that the man in-charge at the Ministry of Defence, Yusuf Haji, was leading the screening process in 1989. A sense of de javu is already in the air; in 1989 nearly 25% of all Kenyan Somalis were deported to Somalia or Ethiopia. This kind of feeling is a boon for AlShabaab recruitment and support. Kenya has taken an action that is irreversible. It has sparked a war with a shadowy group that has no clear frontline. This means those responsible for military action must think carefully not to create new enemies or inflame the conflict further. It is too early to determine possible success of this military invasion of Somalia. There has been no foreign military invaion that has ever been successful in Somalia. Many are hoping for an outcome like that of Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda which toppled Idi Amin and restored normalcy to the country.


S. Abdi Sheikh

[Hyperactive]

abti dadkan ha ko daalin. qof meel o adahay meel ka modoow.

Ps; you know, being home sick for a week now made me in an lokta la galo wahan waligey ignore it cause i realized in somalinet is all about scoring cheap shot and not being truthful with one's self or others. Allah ko hamdi kuwan mesha ordaya in Allah wahba nogu diibin. and they have no she camel or he camel and it's all about scoring cheap shot online!!

du'ada so badi abti.

[Lamagoodle]

abti dadkan ha ko daalin. qof meel o adahay meel ka modoow.

Ps; you know, being home sick for a week now made me in an lokta la galo wahan waligey ignore it cause i realized in somalinet is all about scoring cheap shot and being truthful with one's self or others. Allah ko hamdi kuwan mesha ordaya in Allah wahba nogu diibin. and they have no she camel or he camel and it's all about scoring cheap shot online!!

du'ada so badi abti.

I agree that somalis have lost the ability to think independently. It seems that our clergy, our herdsmen, our intellegentia etc have outsourced their thinking capability to the devil called tribalism.
Ilaahey ha ku caafiyo.


BTW, Qabri dahare waa inaad mid yar ka raadsataa; hergab iyo cudurba wuu kaa ba'i lahaa hadaad baadiyaha joogtid. You are in need of DHEYLO (ari iyo gashaanto)

[Hyperactive]

how you insert naag in everything. abti doolka wey ko waleen.

[Lamagoodle]

naag
Well, I was just giving you advice on how to tackle sickness. I am talking about you combining two dheeylo macaans; cesaan ari ah iyo gashaanta qoordheer

By the way, did you read this letter by the diaspora somalis?
http://wardheernews.com/Articles_2011/O ... spora.html

[Hyperactive]

lol i scanned now. how effective is it? ya dageysani!!

[Lamagoodle]

I have no idea. But, what this shows is that Somalis despite decades of hardship and despite Al-sheydhaans grip of power will not tolerate invasion by Kenya or Ethiopia. We simply have a horrible history that has characterised our existance.

I am afraid that the momentum and strides made to fight Al-sheydhaan will come to a halt. This invasion will only strengthen Al-sheydhaan because this is what they wanted; to point the finger at Kenya/Ethiopia.

[Hyperactive]

horta abti arabiga sided isku tiheen?

cause i remember arabic saying " kolun yagani leylaah" or i guess somali that meanss same is " nin walba 3eesanti 3eelka keen"

[Lamagoodle]

horta abti arabiga sided isku tiheen?

cause i remember arabic saying " kolun yagani leylaah" or i guess somali that meanss same is " nin walba 3eesanti 3eelka keen"

Carabiga iskuma fiicanin; ilaa mar dhow waxaan u maleeyn jiren in dadka carabiga ku hadlaa quraan aqrinayaa. Beri baan Cimra tagay markaasi ayaan dhahay MAAY (water) waa laigu qoslay. Waxaan u ekeedaay dad soomaali ah oo laiga sheekeyey; waxaay tageen Qaahira maqaayad ku taala; Assalamu calaykum Malaaig korkiina ha ahaate; anaa u xibo, waxaan doonayaa al-shaahu- shah, al lebanu- caano leh; amaa bacdu; dijaajtul abyad.



Waxaan u maleeynayaa in maahmaahda u dhigatan aay LAX WALIBA MEESHII AAY IS DHIGTO AYAA LAGU QALAA.

[Hyperactive]

no abti. what i meant was; if you closely read dadkan invasion ka la jira, each have it's own agenda and dreams how things will be.

meeshan wa la isku ghaadaya. waligey somali iney sidan somali iney munaafiqnimo gaartay and do it with straight face thinking they fooling others!!!

wa riwaayat iska daawo meeshan

[ina aadan]

no abti. what i meant was; if you closely read dadkan invasion ka la jira, each have it's own agenda and dreams how things will be.

meeshan wa la isku ghaadaya. waligey somali iney sidan somali iney munaafiqnimo gaartay and do it with straight face thinking they fooling others!!!

wa riwaayat iska daawo meeshan

[Lamagoodle]

no abti. what i meant was; if you closely read dadkan invasion ka la jira, each have it's own agenda and dreams how things will be.

meeshan wa la isku ghaadaya. waligey somali iney sidan somali iney munaafiqnimo gaartay and do it with straight face thinking they fooling others!!!

wa riwaayat iska daawo meeshan

Hyper, waa maadeeys soomaaliddu umadda kalena waay daawanayaa [ Somalis are like a theatre play (tragedo-comical) and the global community is watching)

[shiniile9]

[Lamagoodle]

The Guardian writes;

Kenya has a right to defend its people and its visitors, but will it be able to deal with the consequences?

The word "war" is one that Kenyans go to great lengths to avoid invoking. Ethnic clashes, post-election violence, cross-border raids, security operations – these are all things that the average Kenyan is broadly familiar with – but war is something that other countries do.

Such an open display of aggression and hostility runs counter to the euphemistic and allegedly peaceful instinct of our national culture. So the news that the Kenyan army was going into Somalia in pursuit of al-Shabaab following the kidnapping and death of Marie Dedieu, our first out-and-out war since independence, has caused surprise and significant concern.

It's not that Kenya and Somalia do not have a shared history of violence. Dedieu's death was, unfortunately, the latest in a long line of hostage-takings that al-Shabaab and other Somali groups have committed in Kenya. Each episode is a harsh indictment of our security forces and their apparent inability to protect our people and our most valuable industry: tourism. The concern is that the belated response from the security forces to these events is more often than not ham-fisted, brutal and generally perpetrated against Kenya's own significant Somali population rather than any member of al-Shabaab or other militia groups. It's hard to rage freely against the crime without some trepidation, as most of us fear the brutal "security operations" that the government implements in north-eastern Kenya, and the news of European and North American involvement in the shadow of Libya only makes it harder to process.

The north-eastern area of Kenya is a tough region, and has been problematic for Nairobi since before independence. It forms part of the "homeland" of "Greater Somalia", which in the colonial era was split between Abyssinian (modern-day Ethiopian), British and Italian spheres of influence. The theoretical agreements between these governments quickly proved practically unenforceable, even though they were enough to disrupt the traditional transhumance of communities in the region.

Absurd borders along fictional geographical lines (of latitude and longitude) were the basis of competing imperial interests in a region that offered very little economic benefit for these powers – the perfect mix for fights about nothing to drag on endlessly. Overall, the three entities spent a great deal of time and money trying to prove that the Somali people living beyond their borders were foreigners, in order to justify excluding them from trans-border grazing areas, while the Somali people tried to sustain their traditional way of life and keep the sense of broader community alive.

These half-hearted attempts at creating some kind of order sowed the seeds for some of the mistrust of governmental action in the region today. The Somali people were never included in the decision-making process and continued to view all three powers with suspicion. Today, considering the rag-tag nature of the al-Shabaab militia, it is unlikely that the Kenyan military will be able to adequately distinguish civilians from combatants, Kenyans from Somalis. No one denies that Kenya has a right to defend its people, but there is some concern for the security of civilians in the region, who continue to bear the brunt of internal brutality and external apathy.

Just before independence, an irredentist movement tried to unite Greater Somalia and the response from Nairobi and Addis was typically violent but ineffective. The governments often supported various clans in their incursions across the new boundaries to try to gain political favour, further blurring the lines between historical, political and economic tensions. At independence, the pattern continued more or less unchecked. The independent government in Kenya promised to support the secession of the north-eastern territory, but quickly reneged on the deal, fuelling the so-called Shifta rebellion, which continued as a low-intensity conflict for the better part of the last five decades.

As it stands, Kenya cannot afford to go to war right now. Aside from internal structural problems and the open question of next year's general election, the struggling dollar has contaminated the economy further as the woes of our biggest trading partners bleed into our own problems. With a bloated government, which was put into power in part to keep the peace and which will continue to grow as constitutional changes create a more federal system, government expenditure has never been higher or, arguably, less productive. All of this comes in the shadow of a slow response to what experts are calling the worst drought in the region in 60 years. (As one Kenyan noted on Twitter, it seems that in Africa they always have money for war but never enough for food.)Even so, the changing circumstances of al-Shabaab's increasing aggression and apparent lack of central command have led to unspeakable violence against Somali and international civilians, and is a question that demands a robust answer. The troubling issue is whether the Kenyan government, even (or especially?) with French support, is in a position to manage the inevitable fallout