Plunder, Piracy, Politics, Presumption and Puntland
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Bosaso Harbor
British Professor Anja Shortland recently presented her latest report on piracy in Somalia at Chatham House. Like many recent piracy reports that build on other piracy reports, this academic project is designed to add clearer understanding to the international community that seeks to help solve (and often profit by) problems in Somalia and the maritime region.
Dr. Shortland teaches Finance and Banking at Brunel in the UK and has previously delved into popular and obscure topics that range from “The Effect of US Television News on Demand for Tourism in Israel” and “Political Violence and Excess Liquidity in Egypt”. Her credentials are impeccable and her reputation secure, but her grasp of piracy should be examined. Her latest report is entitled "Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy”.
This recent report from builds on her previous paper entitled, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia” authored with Sara Percy. Essentially the paper claims that piracy has fueled Puntland's growth and that piracy will actually increase as the Puntland politicians spread governance. Let's coin a new word and call what she is describing as a "piratocracy". She also makes the obvious point that pirate money does not stay in the coastal towns from where they operate, but in the main cities where the elites live. She specifically focuses her attention to the government city of Garowe and the port of Bosaso.
The second largest city in Puntland (and pirate capital) of Galkayo is ignored. Perhaps because it remind readers that the largest center of piracy, hostages and kidnapped vessels are actually based in the central state of Galmagud. What is bothersome is her presumption that the success of Puntland and its government are tied to piracy.
To understand where Shortland is going, it is helpful to see where she is coming from. Specifically, the conclusions from her first paper on piracy last updated in August 2010 are as follows:
1) Somali piracy is a land-based problem and naval control mechanisms are not changing the incentives for pirates.
2) Improving Somalia’s anarchic political situation will not necessarily stop piracy but will actually increase it.
3) Piracy is an organized criminal activity, and like other organized crime groups will be difficult to control, especially if it becomes embedded in state structures.
4) Few of the relevant players have any real incentives to alter their behavior.
Her most recent report repeats some of the same general conclusions (with less strident accusations) and adds more research to show urban development and economic indicators of the effect of pirate money. The assumptions and tone of this report follows a well worn path typically taken by those who have never been to Puntland. But it an important report, created by a respected researcher and presented by a world renowned institution. How seriously should readers take the author's new suggestions when a piracy report from August 2010 is reviewed?
A review of recent events appears to indicate that her four conclusions from her first report are no longer correct:
1) Naval forces have no effect: Clearly pirates come from land, but piracy occurs at sea. In the ocean around Somalia naval mechanisms, albeit under resourced, have significantly enhanced and supported the shipping industry’s attempts to increase safety, situational awareness and resulted in numerous interdictions. Yes the few ships and aircraft that patrol the vast oceans could be more plentiful and their actions more meaningful but currently pirate groups are tracked from the time they leave land to logging incidents at sea. These naval resources currently provide mariners a real time warning system and complex system of tracking and information sharing among security groups and governments. The truth is that the naval presence along with industry steps (like hiring security teams) has significantly lowered the success of piracy and the resultant cash flow.
2) Enhanced governance supports enhanced piracy: Increased governance and political cohesion in the north has enhanced the ability to identify, arrest, prosecute and even deter pirates. Puntland currently has arrested and put more pirates in prison than any other nation. Better systems in country and coordination also aid the ability to track finances, associates and deter planning of future attacks. Although Puntland passed the first anti-piracy law in Somalia and has focused on arresting, prosecuting and jailing piracy, the author chooses to cite a 2010 UN Report that accuses the government of Puntland of accepting proceeds from piracy. The report was, in fact, written by the very same UN contractor who has tried to shut down the region's anti-piracy efforts.
3) Piracy will become or is embedded in Puntland's government: The UN report is in direct contrast with actual developments on the ground. Piracy is not embedded in state structures. For example, despite the opposing UN efforts to prevent the creation of an indigenous anti-piracy force, Puntland has just announced the launch of the Puntland Marine Police Force. They have arrested hundreds of pirates with over 250 in Bosaso prison alone and over 400 in jail region wide. All this has transpired in the last two years because of UAE support for anti-piracy efforts.
The central TFG government and Somaliland have little exposure to piracy. Galmadug has little functioning governance or security institutions, but has just begun to take steps to defeat piracy. They await funding or assistance in defeating pirates.
Even quasi administrations like al-Shabaab have publicly attacked pirates and its recent sale of kidnap victims not withstanding, has not supported piracy. Coastal communities in Puntland have violently and openly threatened pirates forcing them into more remote regions. Evidence indicates that Somali's across the board do not want piracy in their midst.
There is no argument that the dollars generated by piracy are an enticement to support the criminals but there is clear evidence that Somalis’ no longer see piracy as a noble pursuit and that state structures are fighting back against piracy
4) There is no incentive for key players to abandon piracy: Proof that there are incentives to change major players attitude towards piracy are everywhere. Major pirates like Boyah and Kulan are in jail. The UAE has provided millions to support an anti piracy force. The US, NATO and EU track, arrest and attack pirates on a weekly basis. Political and security elements do not benefit from piracy and see the influx of funds from international sources to defeat piracy. President Farole was invited to the UK to open an anti-piracy conference and has been an outspoken critic of piracy and the inaction of the international community. Pirates, despite increased attacks, are having dismal success, which will lead investors to question the use of their ransoms to fund pirates. There are plenty of incentives for Somali pirates, governments and investors to move away from piracy.
Pirates, Politics and Puntland
The professor’s latest report released in January 2012 and the resultant media focus ignores the erroneous conclusions from her first attempt to define piracy. In her latest document, she removes personal attacks but still singles out Puntland. The new report is powered with photographic proof of the effects of what she maintains is pirate money. This use of matching "before and after" satellite photos and her economic research make the case that Puntland’s economy is driven by piracy. Her research can’t quite figure out how much, where the money came from or where it goes, but it’s an attempt to prove to the world that Puntland is a 'piratocracy' with little chance of redemption.
Dr. Shortland has the right credentials for making this argument, but her contextual confusion and lack of hard proof creates questions on as to her motivation for ignoring other reasons for Puntland’s growth. Despite clearly pointing out that “each of the data sources has significant weaknesses” her latest January 2012 makes the following conclusions:
1) Coastal communities have not greatly benefited from piracy. Instead the regional centres of Garowe and Bosasso, which provide the material inputs and the fire-power of the pirate operations, appear to benefit from piracy-related investment.
2) Piracy appears to lead to widespread economic development and therefore has a large interest group behind its continuation.
3) Puntland’s coastal communities could easily be made considerably better off through activities other than hosting pirates. The international community should bear these results in mind when developing land-based strategies to resolve Somalia’s pirate problem.
She goes on to muddy her conclusions by stating, “it is unclear where the beneficiaries from piracy are located, whether revenue from pirate activity is mostly channelled abroad or used domestically and how widely the benefits are spread.” The oft quoted but incorrect report that states, “the total cost of piracy off the Horn of Africa (including the counter-piracy measures) was estimated to be in the region of US$7–12 billion" for 2010 is trotted out. Somalia Report has shown that not only is this highly inflated number speculative but that is an income number, not a cost.
Her estimates of ransoms are generally accepted numbers using a roll up of US$250 million. Without any hard evidence, the author then assumes that a third of that money hits the ground. If the current population of Puntland is just under 5 million that is about $50 per person or a pirate pay raise of roughly 8% from the average per capita income estimate of $600 per person in Puntland. So just using simple math pirate money must be going somewhere. However if you take Somalia Report's estimate of roughly $150M in ransoms paid in 2010 and spread that over the same Puntland population base, that's not much of an economic boost.
