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But you cannot have political qabiil without qabyaalad, the two are sometimes inseparable.

Gabre wrote:It's time to switch up the game and invent some new qabiils like Muj Caydiid did by inventing Kamasle Hawiye in 1991. Keep it strictly local; eg Habar Kiska is anyone native to Kismaayo by 3 generations or more. Have a moratorium on qabiil creation except for 1 year out of every 25 during a horn or country-wide conference. Eventually Somalis will get the clue that your qabiil don't mean jack son.

Mengistu's way was by moving/mixing huge populations around and killing everyone equally, especially the rich/landed. Maybe Somalis could take pointers from this, since the main leeches who drum up qabiil fervor are the establishment. The problem with this plan may be distinguishing qabiil-inspired killings and qabiil-destroying killings. Then you're back in a circle.

Somalis are a collective society and the clever ones are just ahead of the curve by exploiting the qabiil system for individual aggrandizement.

GeoSeven wrote:I agree Estarix.

But you cannot have political qabiil without qabyaalad, the two are sometimes inseparable.

So, our distorted sense of reasoning has us trying to work a system which fuels the problem? We've built a car, with only a reverse gear.

GeoSeven wrote:PO, is it fair to label a person a Qabiiliiste for partisanship in a political environment forged and entrenched in qabiil? Anywhere else, an ambitious and pragmatic politician would be labelled as cunning and shrewd, why debase the Somali counterpart as a malevolent tribalist?

Would the fictitious qabyaalad of a Political Qabiilist equate to that of a genuine qabiiliiste?


Shirib, it's already a failure.

Gabre wrote:The problem in Somalia is there was never a clear victor, even after almost 50 years of civil war (counting from the mid 70s). There needs to be a final orgy of bloodletting to allow a dominant power to appear. Otherwise "Somalia" is going to be stuck in this limbo as the African Union Protectorate of the Former Somali Democratic Republic for the next 50 years.

Before the last Ethiopian emperor was overthrown during the revolution in 1974, the Derg calculated that there would be at least 3 million killed for the revolution to be a success. They overshot a little, but were willing to take the risk.

A luta continua, AUP-FSDR

United Somali Congress forces began closing in, having twice overrun the military garrison at Bulo-Burtey, 220 kms north of the capital, killing the commander there. yet even while USC commando groups were actually infiltrating the city and forces led by Brigadier General Aidid were sweeping through the center of the country, the Italians never let up in their efforts to stave off collapse. Meetings were held, manifestos were circulated, new appointments ere canvassed and broadcast but the chaos deepened steadily. It might be news even to Siad Barre himself that on Saturday 29 December 1990, it was actually hos own soldier bandits who provoked the final escalation of fighting in Mogadishu.
Some gangs, including Siad Barre's men, had become highly organized, collecting information and choosing their targets for looting forays. on that particular day, a group of army bandits acting upon correct intelligence of the availability of a large amount of cash in a Hawiye owned store, took two military vehicles with artillery guns ad raided the store. They killed the owner and seized sacks of cash It was about noon and the noise of their firing sent warning signals throughout the nearby surroundings. Anyone with a gun to the scene. Some of the bandits were killed there and then. One of the two vehicles was immobilized. the money was recovered, but the remaining bandits escaped in the other vehicle ad fetched reinforcements including a tank from the hitherto vaunted 77 Army group.
This clash developed into the final phase of civil war in the Somali capital which did not cease until Siad Barre fled on January 26, 1991. All able-bodied men in both the Army and the Police crossed over on the night following the flare and joined the USC forces.
Siad Barre became short of infantry manpower to halt the USC advances. He resorted to the indiscriminate bombardment of large civilian populated sections of the city. Meantime uhis officials, led by his on-in-law, Ahmed Suleiman, struggle to organize a Darod-based armed civilian militia. He met with some success amongst Dolbahante, Mijertein, and related clansmen, although the Ogadeen and other Darod refused to fight on the side of the dying regime against the USC. Regrettably, this nevertheless triggered off another phase in the civil war and led to eventual Darod-Hawiye ethic retribution of serious dimensions and far reaching consequences, long after the aged dictator, Siad Barre, had been bundled into an armored car and hastily evacuated to the temporary safety of his clan homelands."