Col cabdi farax laqanyo has met the president during his first visit to london, its a win win situation for all. The presedent wanted some one who is influential and can change the things, he is ex colonel and from a big family. Baladweyne mayor is elected directly I don't know if they changed him, we were proad of that system wich doesn't exisit in the south.there is a new vice president and other deputies.
Hiraan Region’s polity: is there a light at the end of the tunnel?
By Hassan Ossoble* (Monday, April 22, 2013)
The Somali Federal Government has recently appointed a new administration for the Hiraan Region led by Abdi Farah Laqayo; this arrangement might have been a ‘win-win’ situation for both Hiraanians and the Federal Government, however given the scale of the tasks expected from the new governor and the environment that he is operating under, it is believed that he is unlikely to achieve much – at least in the six months given by his superiors. Nevertheless, if he secures the support of the traditional leaders in the region, the reputable diaspora leaders and capable technocrats, the current Hiraan leader might just be able to build the foundations of viable political process and institutions and, in the end, an able leadership.
The new governor, Abdi Farah Laqayo, a grandson of a well known Hiraanian family, was an intelligence officer before the Somali civil war and he is from the largest and most armed clan in the Hiraan region. Abdi Farah Laqayo is also the uncle of the late Ambassador Abdikarim Laqayo, who was killed by Al-Shabab suicide bomber together with the former national security minister, Omar Hanshi Adan, and dozens of other Hiraanians. Being appointed to this role might have made happy Abdi Farah Laqayo, and his attributes might also have made the already distrustful Hiraanians slighty relieved – at least in the short term. Furthermore, Governor Laqayo’s appointment equally might have pleased the President, since it made Hassan Sheikh looked as though he is ‘winning’ by replacing a militia leader with a civilian administration. Nevertheless, the job that is expected from the Governor by the Hiraanians is almost impossible to attain.
The Hiraanians, both inside the country and abroad, are expecting the current civilian administration to establish inclusive political processes, institute people’s security and increase the people’s access to justice. Once these constitutive dimensions of peace/state buildings are realised, Hiraanians also expect better economic management, service delivery and employment. It is not easy to establish such tasks in a land whose most of its wise men and wemen have either died or have abandoned their responsibilities. We also know that, if the foundations of the Hiraan polity – legitimate political processes and leadership, security of the people and access to justice – are not put in place, no matter how friendly, humble, supportive and experienced the administrators are, they will not be able to sow the seeds of a sustainable polity and services.
In addition to what might be called the ‘irrational demand’ of the Hiraanian public – irrational in the sense that the demands of the public noted above needs resources, if they are to be realised, and so far Hiraanians have been unable to beneficially contribute to the reconstruction of their region – the environment in which the current leader operates is not conducive for a transparent democratic polity at present due to the fact that the Al-Shabab and Ethiopian spoilers are roaming freely and are equally committed to derail whatever little achievements made by the Hiraan administration and indeed by Somalis at large. There are also no resources coming from the Somali Federal Government to run programmes aimed at changing the attitudes of the already suspicious public, and to deal with or buy the spoilers including the Al-Shabab and the Ethiopians. If, for example, the administration launches a reconciliation conference for the elders, the security of the elders and other important members of the community who might be attending such meeting could be compromised given the fact that there are no available resources and the existence of the powerful spoilers. The Djiboutian AMISON peacemakers, however supportive, will not be able to achieve much if there are no organised Hiranians who do what they can to improve the polity of their region and equally able to ask convincingly what they cannot do by themselves.
What is more, the current leadership, however ill equipped for the current local tasks, the rest of the south central polity is in a disorder (mainly ruled by Islamists or local militia groups) hence Hiraan leaders are expected to support and organise their tactless neighbouring regions to give a sense of direction and purpose to their politics, since historically Hiraanian leaders had performed this role. The peace making responsibilities in the region might seem mammoth so too are the rewards. If the current leaders pacify their region and support the neighbouring regions for the benefit of Hiraan and the country as a whole, probably the next president of Somalia will be a Hiraanian – for the fourth time?
To pacify Hiraan and its surroundings and, perhaps, ultimately to lead the country, one needs to meet the expectations of the Hiranians noted above – at least the main ones. In other words, one needs to secure inclusive political processes, build suitable institutions for this inclusive political process, improve the security of the public and provide justice. This would mean – assuming that some of the parliamentarians and the traditional leaders were consulted prior to the appointment of the current administration – organising and supporting the rest of Hiraan traditional leaders, and Nabadoonada, particularly those who are reputable, to perform their traditional peacemaking roles. It would also mean dealing one way or the other with ‘the spoilers’ – local or foreigners – to improve the confidence and the security of the public.
Furthermore, this would also mean to tap the resourceful diaspora by appointing capable Hiraan Diaspora co-ordinators to support honourably and financially some of the expected peacemaking programmes and quick impact projects. Finally, it is believed that this can only be realised if capable policy makers and managers are made operational, meaning without finding committed technocrats – who can assess the fragility of the polity and can come up with policies and programmes that addresses the root causes, as well as the consequences, of the fragility – there can be no light at the end of the tunnel and guess who is to blame for such a looming failure, yet preventable, the leader.
Therefore, to avoid eminent failure, and to realize the long awaited peace and institution building, Hiraan Peace and Development Forum – an organisation made by Hiraanian researchers and experts for the progress of this region – urges the current administration to:
Utilise the knowledge of the indigenous institutions such as Hiraan Peace and Development Forum to prepare the much needed fragility analysis and other planning documents such as Hiraan Stabilization Plan and Strategic Development Plan;
Empower traditional leaders to be able to function and support the administration in pacification activities such as stabilization and outreach;
Create a competent humanitarian co-ordinator to manage the Humanitarian activities going on at the moment and to help to bring more;
Create Diaspora Co-ordinators to raise funds from the Hiraan Diaspora communities to run quick impact projects to alleviate poverty and support displaced people and the youth;
Organize football tournaments, debate forums, peace education and other youth activities to channel youth energy into productive activities which in turn helps the public to appreciate the difference between life under the leadership of militias/warlords and one under civilian administration;
Empower Ahlu-Suna teachers and preachers – both men and women – to deal with Al-Shabab sympathizer in the mosques while the security forces deal with them in the streets;
Take a stance of zero tolerance on corruption and nepotism.
